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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (6717)9/3/2003 11:57:14 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 793656
 
Here is the opening salvo in Miniter's excerpt published in the Washington Times. I picked up the reprint from Front Page. There is no doubt that this is exactly what went on in this meeting. Miniter cross checked it several ways.

Clinton AWOL in the War on Terror
By Richard Miniter
Washington Times | September 3, 2003

Clinton administration counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke attended a meeting with Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Attorney General Janet Reno, and others. Several others were in the room, including Leon Fuerth, Gore's national security advisor; Jim Steinberg, the deputy National Security Advisor; and Michael Sheehan, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism. An American warship had been attacked without warning in a "friendly" harbor ? and, at the time, no one knew if the ship's pumps could keep it afloat for the night. Now they had to decide what to do about it.

Mr. Clarke had no doubts about whom to punish. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had compiled thick binders of bin Laden and Taliban targets in Afghanistan, complete with satellite photographs and GPS bomb coordinates ? the Pentagon's "target decks." The detailed plan was "to level" every bin Laden training camp and compound in Afghanistan as well as key Taliban buildings in Kabul and Kandahar. "Let's blow them up," Clarke said. . . . Around the table, Clarke heard only objections ? not a mandate for action.

This is how Clarke remembers the meeting, which has never before been described in the press. . . . Attorney General Janet Reno insisted that they had no clear idea who had actually carried out the attack. The "Justice [Department] also noted, as always, that any use of force had to be consistent with international law, i.e. not retaliation but self protection from future attack," Clarke told the author. Reno could not be reached for comment.

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet joined Reno in insisting on an investigation before launching a retaliatory strike. Tenet "did not want a months-long investigation," CIA spokesman Bill Harlow said. "He simply believed that before the United St ates attacked, it ought to know for sure who was behind the Cole bombing." While Tenet noted that the CIA had not reached a conclusion about what terror group was behind the surprise attack on the USS Cole, "he said personally he thought that it would turn out to be al Qaeda," Clarke recalls.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was also against a counterstrike ? but for diplomatic reasons. "We're desperately trying to halt the fighting that has broken out between Israel and the Palestinians," Albright said. Clarke recalls her saying, "Bombing Muslims wouldn't be helpful at this time." Some two weeks earlier, Ariel Sharon had visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which touched off a wave of violence known as the "second Intifada" and threatened to completely destroy the Clinton Administration's hopes for Middle East peace settlement.

Mr. Clarke remembers other objections from the State Department. "State noted that we had been bombing Iraq and Serbia and were getting the reputation internationally as a mad bomber nation that could only address its problems that way." "It would be irresponsible," a spokeswoman for Albright told the author, for the Secretary of State, as America's chief diplomat, not to consider the diplomatic impact of a missile strike that might try but would quite likely fail to kill bin Laden.

Albright urged continued diplomatic efforts to persuade the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. Those efforts had been going on for more than two years and had gone nowhere. It was unlikely that the Taliban would ever voluntarily turn over its strongest internal ally. . . .

Secretary of Defense Cohen also did not favor a retaliatory strike, according to Mr. Clarke. The attack "was not sufficient provocation," Clarke remembers Cohen saying, or words to that effect. Cohen thought that any military strike needed a "clear and compelling justification," Clarke recalls. (Cohen, despite repeated phone calls over more than one week, failed to respond to interview requests.) Cohen also noted that General Anthony Zinni, then head of CENTCOM, was concerned that a major bombing campaign would cause domestic unrest in Pakistan (where bin Laden enjoyed strong support among extremists) and hurt the U.S. military's relationship with that nation.

Mr. Cohen's views were perfectly in accord with those of the top uniformed officers and Clinton's political appointees at the Pentagon, Sheehan told the author. "It was the entire Pentagon," he added. The chief lesson that the Defense Department seemed to draw from the assault on the USS Cole was the need for better security for its ships, what was invariably called "force protection." Listening to Cohen and later talking to top military officers, Sheehan, a former member of Special Forces before joining the State Department, told the author that he was "stunned" and "taken aback" by their views. "This phenomenon I cannot explain," he said. Why didn't they want to go hit back at those who had just murdered American servicemen without warning or provocation?

The issue was hotly debated. Some of the principals were concerned that bin Laden might somehow survive the cruise-missile attack and appear in another triumphant press conference. Clarke countered by saying that they could say that they were only targeting terrorist infrastructure. If they got bin Laden, they could take that as a bonus. Others worried about target information. At the time, Clarke said that he had very reliable and specific information about bin Laden's location. And so on. Each objection was countered and answered with a yet another objection.

In the end, for a variety of reasons, the principals were against Mr. Clarke's retaliation plan by a margin of seven to one against. Mr. Clarke was the sole one in favor. Bin Laden would get away ? again.

frontpagemag.com



To: JohnM who wrote (6717)9/4/2003 1:59:22 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793656
 
The legal distinction was Clintonesque: Bin Laden could be killed accidentally, but not on purpose. So, a covert team could accidentally shoot bin Laden in the crossfire, but not aim at him

Here is part three of Miniter's book on Clinton's Foreign Policy. The above says it all. God.

Unprepared for battle
By Richard Miniter
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published September 4, 2003

Part three of an exclusive four-part series of excerpts.
Clinton Administration counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke helped develop a daring covert-operation plan. Helicopters launched from an aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean would deposit Special Forces near a bin Laden camp. Hours before dawn, using night-vision scopes, the commandos would surprise bin Laden's guards and kill or capture the arch-terrorist. But the plan had to run a bureaucratic obstacle course.
The first hurdle was cleared in the spring of 1998. In the middle of "Monica-gate," Clinton signed a secret memorandum of notification ? informally called a "finding" ? that explicitly allowed the CIA and other U.S. armed forces to take actions that might lead to bin Laden's death. Before the finding was signed, the military and the CIA were supposed to avoid any action that might, conceivably, result in the death of bin Laden or other targeted persons. Unfortunately, the finding was not a death warrant. Clinton's order did not overturn a long-standing ban on political assassinations. The legal distinction was Clintonesque: Bin Laden could be killed accidentally, but not on purpose. So, a covert team could accidentally shoot bin Laden in the crossfire, but not aim at him. At least inside America's increasingly rule-laden intelligence services, this was seen as a major bureaucratic step forward. Operatives no longer had to avoid actions that might set off a chain of events that might possibly result in bin Laden's death. If bin Laden was killed, the covert team would have little to fear from military or Justice Department lawyers. Ordinarily, if a covert operation turned lethal, a federal criminal investigation could be launched.
The next bureaucratic hurdle was bigger: What if bin Laden was taken alive? CIA analysts considered that possibility remote ? they believed that bin Laden would "martyr" himself rather than be taken a prisoner. But if bin Laden was captured, the policy was that he would be put on trial. Moving along a parallel track, the FBI and a New York U.S. Attorney had been preparing charges against bin Laden since January 1998. Bin Laden was accused of murdering Americans in Somalia in 1993 and in Riyadh in 1995, among other offenses. The secret charges were formally handed up by a grand jury sometime in the spring of 1998. The indictment was sealed and remained secret for months. But it was in force. Now, by summer 1998, the second hurdle was cleared. The Justice Department had a plan for putting bin Laden on trial.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Special Forces Command and CIA planners continued to draft a detailed operations plan. All of the elements were in place for a bold covert operation to take bin Laden, dead or alive. But it was the plan, not bin Laden, that was soon killed.
The problem was the CIA, Clarke told the author. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet asked that the plan be extensively revised, touching off another months-long cycle of meetings, drafts, and consultations. Tenet's stated reasons sounded as if he was either repeating or anticipating White House objections. Bin Laden and his band often traveled with their wives and children, raising the risk of unintended civilian deaths. That would be unacceptable to the president. (Of course, bin Laden had no qualms about civilian deaths.) Tenet wanted better safeguards for non-combatants.
Yet another concern came from the Pentagon: U.S. military casualties. Once a firefight began, it would be very difficult to extract wounded or trapped soldiers. If the mission went sour, dozens of Americans would be dead and bin Laden might escape. The military wanted a war without casualties or risks. The planners went back to the drawing board.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, opposed a small Special Forces operation. Rather than oppose the operation directly, the general fell back on a favorite Pentagon tactic: counteroffer with a proposed operation so large that the president and his senior staff would back down. This is a time-honored technique for killing ideas that the Pentagon opposes. Without giving away his motivation, Shelton explained his reasoning to Barton Gellman of the Washington Post. "The greatest risk is that you would have a helicopter or a [special-operations] aircraft that would encounter mechanical problems over those great distances, or you have an accident. You want to have the capability if that happens to go in and get them, which means a combat search-and-rescue capability, and if you want to send those people in, you have to have an air-refueling operation." At that point, thousands of soldiers, sailors, and airmen would be involved, as well as several ships and dozens of aircraft. That was far from the small, surgical operation Clarke and others had in mind.
So, in the spring and summer of 1998, the Clinton Administration was deadlocked. Tenet had essentially vetoed covert operations to seize bin Laden. Clinton might have wanted to get bin Laden, but he didn't want to overrule the Pentagon to do it. Neither could the president stomach sending thousands of troops into harm's way, as General Shelton proposed.
America was at war with bin Laden. But on America's side it was a phony war, while America's adversaries were waging a real one.

Richard Miniter is the author of "Losing bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror." The excerpts are from that book.
dynamic.washtimes.com



To: JohnM who wrote (6717)9/4/2003 2:09:42 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793656
 
Here is one hell of a good idea!

September 4, 2003
For Schooling, a Reverse Emigration to Africa
By LYNETTE CLEMETSON - [The New York Times]

WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 - Najima and Nayaba Bawa were despondent when their parents first raised the subject of sending them home to Ghana. It was three years ago, one evening as their mother was braiding Nayaba's hair. Najima, then in junior high, had lost focus in school. Hanging out with friends had become more important than studying. She had even brought home a few C's on her report card.

They had reached a decision, the girls' parents calmly informed them. They were sending them to the Akosombo International School, a boarding school in the eastern Ghananian town of Akosombo, northeast of the capital, Accra.

"We tried everything to get out of it," said Najima, 16, now preparing, along with her sister, to begin her third year there.

Nayaba, 14, who like her sister grew up in Washington, said, "We wondered what we had done to be sent away."

When they arrived at the Ghananian school and met the children of other Africans from the United States, they realized that their parents' decision was not uncommon. The Bawas, and other African families like them, have opted for a temporary reverse emigration for their children. In part it is an effort to help them maintain links to their African heritage. But it is also, many say, a conscious, protective response to adolescence in the United States.

American teenagers have more opportunity to get into trouble than those in Africa, where high levels of independence and materialism are less common, these families say. And the negative consequences of slipping through the cracks in the United States, they say they have observed, often disproportionately affect black children.

For their children to realize the American dream, many immigrant parents have decided, it may be best for them to leave the United States for a few years.

"During those tender years when so many African-American children are lost, it is seen as a beneficial absence," said Sulayman S. Nyang, a professor of African studies at Howard University. "Parents worry that the negative values of self-denigration that some children fall into here will hamper the quest for social mobility that is part of the immigrant experience."

According to the latest census, the African-born population in the United States totals nearly one million. There are no figures on the numbers of African families who choose to school their children in their home countries, but Professor Nyang and other academics and families interviewed said the cultural timeouts had been practiced since the African population in the United States began to swell in the late 1970's and 1980's.

Though schooling back in Africa is impossible for refugees from the most unstable parts of the continent, it is a popular option for immigrants from African countries with relatively stable political and economic systems like Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya and South Africa.

Though some schools in Africa do not take girls, others, like Akosombo International, are co-ed, and require the girls to take rigorous academic programs with more language and science courses than are required in many schools in the United States. Some schools, which cater to families who want their children to attend college in the United States or England, offer international baccalaureate programs. About 20 percent of students enrolled in Akosombo International are from Ghanaian families living outside Ghana.

Some families bring their children back to the United States in 12th grade, so they can take their SAT examinations and make sure they have all the necessary credits to apply to American colleges.

"We want to teach them that they can pick and choose from different parts of the American experience, like a buffet," said Mahama Bawa, the girls' father, who came to Washington from Ghana in 1983, and who owns an African clothing store in Adams Morgan, a neighborhood infused with African and Hispanic culture. "But to do that they need to be able to step back from it, to develop a broader perspective."

The Bawa sisters, who say they cannot wait to return to school in mid-September, say boarding school in Ghana is not devoid of normal teenage pressures. Though students wear uniforms, they still assess one another's coolness ? or lack thereof ? based on things like sneakers and backpacks.

But the girls said that the strict discipline imposed at their school ? dormitory and classroom inspections, mandatory 4 a.m. jogs on Saturdays, rigidly enforced study and play times ? relieved them of some of the pressure of having too many choices.

"Here a lot of people are just focused on what party to go to," said Nayaba, who will soon have to cut off the fashionable braided hair extensions she got this summer and return to the close-cropped natural look, required of all the girls in her school. "In boarding school the goal is just learning, not to be average but to be at the top of the class. You feel out of place if you're not trying; that's sometimes not the case here."

For many families, the relative affordability of boarding schools abroad is also a plus. One of the better private schools in Ghana, Akosombo International is far too expensive for the average Ghanaian. But tuition and board for a three-term school year totals about $750 for each child.

The Bawas, who are Muslim, said they would probably have enrolled their daughters in a Roman Catholic school had they stayed here, but even the least expensive private schools in the Washington area would have cost around $5,000 for each child.

The sisters say the experience is giving them a new view of their identity. Their mother, Tanya, a training and development manager for a federal credit union, is African- American. Ask the girls how they see themselves, and their response is decisive. "We are African-American ? literally," said Najima.

Albouri Ndiaye, a senior at Michigan State University, says the benefits of his time abroad have become clearer to him now that he has been back in the United States four years. Mr. Ndiaye left an elementary school in Brooklyn for a Catholic school in Senegal at age 8.

"The things you pick up don't seem so important to you at the time," said Mr. Ndiaye, 24, who is majoring in environmental economics and policy, "but it's little things like respect for elders, hospitality and a sense of community. I feel so happy now to have received those values. It has given me a bigger sense of myself."

Silas Anamelechi, 29, says his parents' decision to send him back to Nigeria at age 15 might even have saved his life. Just 10 years old when his parents first moved to the United States, Mr. Anamelechi said he was teased mercilessly by the children in his predominantly black Washington school for having the wrong clothes, wrong haircut, wrong shoes and wrong accent.

The things he did to gain acceptance ? cutting up in class, sneaking out of the house ? got him into trouble with his parents. The summer after ninth grade, his father took him back to Nigeria (for what the then-teenager thought was a summer vacation) and left him there at a boarding school.

"I saw it as a punishment then," said Mr. Anamelechi, a Ph.D. student in atmospheric climatology at Howard. "Now I see it as a blessing. A couple of those friends I had started to run around with have been shot and killed."

The pressure to be cool and to fit in during junior high and high school, said Mohammed Mahmoud, who just started 10th grade at a public school in Fort Washington, Md., is especially tough for kids from immigrant families.

"When you're a freshman you get picked on anyway," said the shy 15- year-old, whose parents emigrated from Ghana. "But with me, people picked on my background, the way I talked and dressed. They said I should go back where I came from. I would say to them, `Don't we all come from the same place?' But the things they said really hurt me inside." Then he looked up from his feet and added: "But they started leaving me alone after I switched my ways and started acting more like everyone else."

The boy's parents, Mohammed Sr., a painter at an auto body shop, and Habiba, a bank teller, twitched uncomfortably on their living room sofa as their son spoke.

Over the summer, the couple decided that Mohammed and his younger brother Abdullah, 13, the two oldest of their four children, would start school in Ghana as soon as they could get them in. They were too late for enrollment this fall.

"It is time, we think," said Mr. Mahmoud, anxiously rubbing at the deep furrow in his brow. "It is time."

nytimes.com