Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: lurqer who wrote (28234)	9/19/2003 6:42:28 PM
From: Karen Lawrence	Respond to of 89467

From another report: GIs in Iraq Kill Aide to Italian Envoy Friday September 19, 2003 1:49 PM By ALESSANDRA RIZZO Associated Press Writer ROME (AP) - American soldiers in northern Iraq fired on a car carrying the Italian official heading up U.S. efforts to recover Iraq's looted antiquities, killing the man's Iraqi interpreter, an official said Friday in Rome. The Italian, Pietro Cordone, was unhurt. Cordone, who is the senior adviser for cultural affairs of the U.S. provisional authority and the top Italian diplomat in the country, was traveling on the road between Mosul and Tikrit on Thursday when his car was fired on at a U.S. roadblock, said a Foreign Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

To: lurqer who wrote (28234)	9/19/2003 6:56:54 PM
From: lurqer	Respond to of 89467

I'm no fan of Arafat, but it seemed incredibly "out-of-touch" to have a publicly known vote to "get rid of him". That was a little too much for even a Likudnik dominated US Admin to concur with. Then the US had to veto an Arab sponsored UN Security Council resolution on the matter suntimes.com So the Arabs took the matter to the UN General Assembly. I don't have a link, but as I understand it, the US lost the vote 130+ to 4. That's right - 4. The 4 are Israel, the US and a couple of US satellite pacific island "nations". Not so mute testimony, that the US's Likudnik policies have "put it out of step" with the rest of the world. JMO lurqer Edit; Watching BBC. The vote was 133 to 4. Israel says it will not reconsider. When the Israeli UN ambassador was pressed about the obvious fact, that Israel's stance had strengthened Arafat, he denied the obvious.

To: lurqer who wrote (28234)	9/20/2003 6:12:58 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 89467

Listening to the Wrong Iraqi _______________________ By DAVID L. PHILLIPS Editorial The New York Times September 20, 2003 nytimes.com Critics say the Bush administration had no plan for postwar Iraq. In fact, before the war, hundreds of Iraqis were involved in discussions with Washington about securing and stabilizing their country after military action. Today's difficulties are not the result of a lack of foresight, but rather of poor judgment by civilians at the Pentagon who counted too much on the advice of one exile — Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress — and ignored the views of other, more reliable Iraqi leaders. Last year the State Department, joined by 17 other federal agencies, put together the Future of Iraq Project, which was supposed to involve Iraqis from the country's many ethnic and religious factions, including representatives from the exile community. The project had working groups on topics ranging from agriculture to the economy to new government structure. I was adviser to the democratic principles working group, which the Iraqis called the "mother of all working groups." Anticipating many of the problems playing out in Iraq today, participants worked on plans for maintaining security, restoring services and making the transition to democracy. On security, the participants envisioned a key role for reformed elements of the Iraqi Army. They insisted on the dissolution of agencies involved in atrocities — like military intelligence and the secret police (the Mukhabarat) — and proposed setting up a body to investigate war crimes, prepare a "most wanted" list, and prosecute war criminals. They envisioned a military council vetting and then taking steps to professionalize the armed forces. Representatives of the Iraqi National Congress, however, claimed to control a vast underground network that would rise in support of coalition forces to assist security and law enforcement. They insisted that the entire Iraqi Army be immediately disbanded. The Pentagon agreed, in the end leading many Iraqi soldiers who might otherwise have been willing to work with the coalition to take up arms against it. Mr. Chalabi's promised network didn't materialize, and the resulting power vacuum contributed to looting, sabotage and attacks against American forces. The working group also emphasized winning hearts and minds of average Iraqis, largely through improving living conditions. It urged cooperation with Iraq's existing technocracy to ensure the uninterrupted flow of water and electricity. Though civil servants and professionals for the most part were required to be Baath party members, the working group maintained that not all Baathists were war criminals. The group proposed so-called lustration laws to identify and remove officials who had committed atrocities. On the other hand, the Iraqi National Congress was adamant that all former Baath party members were inherently complicit in war crimes. Siding with Mr. Chalabi, the coalition provisional authority decided that the Baath party would be banned, and dismissed many party members from their jobs. As a result millions of Iraqis are still without electricity and fresh water, necessities they could at least count on under the criminal regime of Saddam Hussein. Most important, the working group insisted that all Iraqis needed a voice in the transition to a stable, democratic Iraq. Participants agreed that exiles alone could not speak for all Iraqis, and endorsed discussions with leaders inside and outside the country as the basis for constituting a legitimate and broadly representative transitional structure. Before the London opposition conference in December, Mr. Chalabi lobbied the United States to appoint a government in exile, dominated by his partisans, to be installed in Baghdad at the moment of liberation. Concerned about legitimacy, the Bush administration ultimately rejected this proposal. Still, Mr. Chalabi's supporters in Washington — particularly civilians in the Pentagon — relentlessly promoted him as Iraq's future leader. Exceptional treatment included airlifting Mr. Chalabi and his American-trained 700-man paramilitary force to Nasariya in the middle of the war. He is now a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, serving as its president this month. Why such devotion to a man whose prewar advice proved so misguided? For one thing, Mr. Chalabi has shown himself amenable to those in Washington who want to reshape the entire Middle East. They envision Iraq as a springboard for eliminating the Baath party in Syria, undermining the mullahs in Iran and enhancing American power across the region. There are benefits to spreading democracy in the Middle East, but hegemonic ambitions are sabotaging the shorter-term project of turning Iraq into a viable state. The other day, a Sunni participant in the democratic principles working group told me he is reluctant to speak up about how its recommendations have been ignored lest criticism discourage the coalition. In frustration, he asked: "So this is liberation?" The Iraqi people have suffered a generation of tyranny and deserve better. To succeed in Iraq, and be constructive elsewhere in the world, the Bush administration must listen to all voices, not just those that are ideologically compatible. Liberation cannot be imposed. _____________________________________ David L. Phillips is deputy director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.