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To: Mephisto who wrote (4971)9/21/2003 3:45:15 AM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 5185
 

Fixing a Tarnished Market

The New York Times

September 21, 2003

There is no more evocative monument to the vibrancy of American
capitalism, and to New York City's claim to be the world's financial
capital, than the graceful, colonnaded building that houses the New
York Stock Exchange on Wall Street. The imposing structure
exudes a sense of reassuring permanence, befitting a marketplace
that has served, through boom and bust, for 211 years.

So much for the aspirational architecture. Inside, utter disarray reigns.
The controversy that led to Richard Grasso's resigning last week,
when it became clear that he would never outlast the furor created
by the disclosure of his absurd $187.5 million deferred compensation
plans, has given the investing public a peek into the Big Board's
clubby boardroom. It's been a frightening sight.

The recent corporate scandals have taught us, if nothing else,
that when reckless chief executives are able to raid their institutions'
treasuries at will and enrich themselves beyond reason, it's a sure
sign that corporate governance has been corrupted to an alarming degree.
And the ensuing absence of any meaningful protection for the institution's
stakeholders and its longer-term interests encourages other
types of mischief.


If the New York Stock Exchange were an ordinary company,
its practices would be appalling enough. That the exchange is a quasi-public
organization charged with policing the stock market makes its
conflict-riddled organization a threat to the entire financial system. It must be
overhauled, and soon.

Even before the controversy surrounding Mr. Grasso's pay,
the Securities and Exchange Commission had rightly been
pressing for such an overhaul, and a plan is due in a few weeks.
After Mr. Grasso's fall, Congress and William Donaldson,
the S.E.C. chairman and a former head
of the exchange, cannot afford to be timid in their ambitions.

No longer can Wall Street's trading community - the member
firms that own the exchange - be allowed to regulate
themselves. Mr. Grasso was paid tens of millions by the
people he was charged with policing. Many of these directors,
some of whom he picked for his compensation
committee, now claim they had no idea just how much
he was due. Believe this, and you are still left with a case
of negligent oversight. Any director involved in approving
Mr. Grasso's compensation should resign.

The exchange needs a new chairman who is a proven
reformer, with stature in both New York and Washington,
to guide its transition. Arthur
Levitt, the former S.E.C. chairman who forced needed
change on the Nasdaq market in the 1990's, would be
a solid choice. The 27-member board also needs to be
reconfigured. It should no longer be dominated by Wall
Street traders, but by institutional investors and the broader
public.

Ultimately, the exchange's commercial enterprise - the
business of executing trades and soliciting companies
to list their shares - must be separated from its regulatory
duties. Regulators must be answerable to the public, in
requiring fair pricing from traders and transparency
from listed companies, and not to the exchange's owners.
The conflict between the two missions, as the restructuring
of the Nasdaq recognized, cannot be reconciled.

As part of their effort to restore investor confidence,
the S.E.C. and Congress will have to make fixing the
Big Board a top priority. It will do
no good to reform companies' behavior if people
remain leery about the integrity of the marketplace.

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company

nytimes.com



To: Mephisto who wrote (4971)9/21/2003 9:34:24 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 5185
 
One Resignation Is Not Enough

The New York Times
September 21, 2003

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

By MURIEL SIEBERT

The resignation of Richard A. Grasso as chairman of the New York
Stock Exchange has created a once-in-a-generation opportunity to improve
the exchange's commitment and ability to serve the public interest.
But if the board and management of the exchange close ranks and resist
further change, investors will know that they can expect business
as usual in the post-Grasso era.

How will we know whether the exchange is serious about reform?
Look for action in three crucial areas: the exchange's board, its management and
its transparency.

The first step for the exchange is to diversify its board of directors.
The days when the Big Board could be governed for and by a small group of
specialists, members, regional brokerages and listed companies should be
long gone. Yet their interests, along with those of the huge financial
conglomerates, still predominate.


A majority of the directors, as well as the board's chairman, should be
from outside the industry. At the very least, the compensation committee
ought to consist solely of outside directors. Institutional investors, shareholder
activists, academics - the same constituencies who have had such
an impact on reforming the boards of public corporations in recent
years - should be given a greater voice.

The structure of the exchange must also be made more efficient,
with management duties separate from regulatory functions. The regulatory
function should be pristine, set apart from the business concerns
of the exchange and the influence of its members, its managers or other industry
insiders. The exchange should name a chief regulator who would
report directly to a committee of independent, non-industry directors. Meanwhile,
a chief executive could oversee the exchange's business affairs and
serve as head cheerleader and administrator.

Finally, the exchange needs to open up its books. Last week's
fiasco has only underscored the degree to which the investing
public is ignorant of how the exchange is run. Much greater
transparency is essential if the public is to have faith in the
stewardship of management and the board.

At a minimum, the exchange should disclose its revenues
and earnings, go public with its management and governance
structure and reveal how it goes about nominating candidates
for its board. These requirements are no more than what the
exchange itself demands from the companies it
lists.

Remember, this is an institution that has considered becoming
a public company itself. Clearly, that idea should be forgotten until the exchange
demonstrates its willingness to conduct its affairs in the light of day.

As necessary and obvious as these changes may be, they will not
be easy for the exchange to swallow. Those who have been running the exchange
for generations would have to cede control to outsiders who serve
the investing public's interests before those of the financial industry.

This opportunity to reconsider the institution, its function and
its responsibility to society cannot be squandered. The New
York Stock Exchange is an integral part of a capital system
that has made America the envy of the world. It is no accident
that most technological breakthroughs come
from the United States. In part because of the
exchange, American companies have the funds they need
to innovate, grow and start whole new
industries.

Now we must restructure the exchange so that we can
maintain and enhance its vitality and credibility. We can only
hope that the current board, having acted wisely and ethically
in seeking Mr. Grasso's removal, will follow its impulse for
reform to its logical conclusion.

Muriel Siebert, the first woman to own a seat on the
New York Stock Exchange, is chairwoman and chief
executive of Siebert Financial Corp.

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company
nytimes.com



To: Mephisto who wrote (4971)9/23/2003 2:09:33 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 5185
 
Big Board Is Far From Forefront When It Comes to
Policing

Mon Sep 22, 8:54 AM ET

story.news.yahoo.com

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON The New York Times

Investors think first of the New York Stock Exchange
as a marketplace for buying and selling shares. But the Big Board is
also one of the market's most important regulators. And as John S.
Reed, the former Citigroup banker, steps in as the exchange's acting
chairman, he will have to wrestle with growing questions about the
effectiveness of its regulatory performance.

Securities lawyers and former executives of
brokerage firms say that under its ousted
chairman, Richard A. Grasso, the Big Board
was a weak corporate policeman a sense that
has grown stronger since the bull market
ended and revelations of unsavory Wall Street
practices have piled up. Regulators from the
exchange, they note, have not played leading
roles in the major investigations of the
brokerage business.


And it was not the Big Board but another
regulator, NASD, that brought a case against
Invemed Associates, the brokerage firm run
by Kenneth G. Langone, who is a friend of Mr.
Grasso's and sat on the exchange's board
and on the compensation committee that
approved Mr. Grasso's $139.5 million payout.

"The idea that they would have this little
handpicked group of regulated firms setting
the salary for the regulator is so obviously
inappropriate it boggles the mind," said
Barbara Roper, director of investor protection
at the Consumer Federation of America. "To
be so oblivious to how these issues are likely
to be perceived by investors should disqualify
you from the regulatory function."

Officials at the exchange contend that its
operations are closely scrutinized and point to
its relatively scandal-free floor trading
operations as proof. "We're happy that most of our firms are not taking
advantage of customers," said Edward A. Kwalwasser, who heads the
exchange's regulatory unit. "But when we find that they are, we think we
bring aggressive proceedings."

The New York Stock Exchange polices its 400 member firms not just big
brokerage firms, but also the specialists that conduct trading on the
exchange's floor to make sure they are abiding by both federal securities
laws and the institution's own rules on trading.

The exchange watches for securities law violations like insider trading by
those trading in its listed companies. Investors also rely on the Big
Board to make sure that the companies whose shares it trades maintain
the asset, revenue or share-price standards required for listing on the
exchange.

And the exchange also oversees arbitrations filed by aggrieved investors,
making sure they are fairly adjudicated.

Calls for separating the Big Board's regulatory operations from its stock
trading business have increased in recent years, in part because the
exchange's major competitor in regulation, NASD, formerly the National
Association of Securities Dealers, is seen as more aggressive. Either
entity can regulate firms that do business on both the Big Board and
Nasdaq markets.

Only after an investigation in the mid-1990's by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (news - web sites) were trading and regulation
separated at NASD. The S.E.C. found that traders at Nasdaq, the stock
market owned by NASD, were colluding to make investors pay artificially
high prices to buy and sell shares and that NASD regulators looked the
other way while the collusion occurred. When NASD settled with the
S.E.C., it agreed to spin off its regulatory function.

"It does seem to me that the NASD has been a good deal more
aggressive and more effective in its enforcement activities since the split-
up and the reorganization," said Alan Bromberg, professor of securities
law at Southern Methodist University. "That suggests to me that that
may be where the stock exchange is heading."

The exchange has not headed to the front of the line lately in
investigating Wall Street wrongdoing.

For example, the inquiry into tainted research at brokerage firms was
initiated by Eliot Spitzer, the New York State attorney general. Later,
when the Big Board, the S.E.C. and NASD became involved in the case,
it was the NASD's regulatory unit that acted most aggressively. It not
only filed cases against institutions, it also took action against
individuals.

In April, NASD filed suit against Invemed, run by Mr. Langone, who was
also a founder of Home Depot. Mr. Grasso sat on the Home Depot board
until recently.

Invemed is fighting the suit, which contends that the firm illegally shared
in customers' profits by overcharging them to trade in hot new stock
offerings during 1999 and 2000.

Because the Big Board is Invemed's primary regulator, some market
professionals wondered at the time why the exchange had not taken the
lead in filing the suit. Skeptics' eyebrows arched higher when Mr.
Langone's role in Mr. Grasso's pay package was made public.

The Big Board said that because the case against Invemed involved
shares of initial public offerings that traded on Nasdaq, it was appropriate
that NASD take action. But according to NASD's complaint, the
improper profit-sharing involved some New York Stock Exchange-listed
stocks, as well. So the case against Invemed could have been filed by
either the Big Board or NASD.

When the Big Board does act, it can encounter stiff
resistance. Earlier this year, the exchange began
investigating a number of its specialist firms to
determine if they had broken Big Board rules by
inserting themselves between customers who were
buying and selling stocks and profiting as a result. The
investigation fueled the anger that some specialists
have harbored against Mr. Grasso and highlighted the
Big Board's awkward position as both regulator and
marketplace.

Mr. Kwalwasser says that his regulatory unit is run
with little input from the stock exchange's board. The
directors see all the cases once they are decided, but
do not become involved during the investigations.

While the directors approve the regulatory budget, Mr.
Kwalwasser dismisses the notion that their handling of
Mr. Grasso's pay has anything to do with the
exchange's performance as a regulator.

"Whether the compensation committee did the right
thing or wrong thing, it has no impact on regulatory
function," he said. "We examine every one of our
member firms every year. No director has come in and
said `do not examine my firm.' "

Others are less confident of the Big Board's
independence. Ken Morris, a former Wall Street
executive who began his career in the brokerage
industry in 1979, said that he considered the exchange
a toothless watchdog that protects its member firms.

"Actions against specialists are very rare," he said. "We
have specialists making millions of dollars who are
fined peanuts. The huge majority of cases are against
people who have lied on their employment application
or against retail brokers who have exercised improper
discretion over a client's account."

He cited an action taken against a specialist firm last
February that resulted in a $25,000 fine and a
censure. Among other infractions, the specialist had
failed to match orders to buy and sell at the same
price, as is required by Big Board rules, had in one
instance bought more than half the stock offered at a
lower price than was proper and executed trades for
investors at prices that were inferior to those offered by
traders in other regional markets.

When it comes to small players, however, the penalties
appear more severe, Mr. Morris said. For example, an
employee of a member firm who improperly withdrew
$320 from a cash machine in 2001 using another
employee's card was censured and permanently barred
from working in the securities industry.

Another area of concern is how fair a shake investors
get when they file arbitration cases at the exchange.
The quality of the Big Board's arbitration system is
crucial, because investors are generally required by
their brokerage firms to seek redress in arbitration
rather than in the courts.

Arbitration panels consist of three people two so-called
public representatives and one from the securities
industry. To qualify as a public arbitrator, individuals
are supposed to have no close ties with the securities
industry.

But Stuart D. Meissner, a lawyer who represents
investors in arbitration cases before both NASD and the
New York Stock Exchange, said the Big Board arbitrator
fell short of that standard in a case filed by an investor
against Banc of America Securities last November.

Mr. Meissner said that one of the panelists selected at
random for his case was a director at a bank that has a
brokerage subsidiary. The arbitrator was also on the
investment committee of the bank's board.

These facts were not disclosed by the arbitrator and
came out only when Mr. Meissner sought more
information. Mr. Meissner challenged the panelist's
inclusion as a public arbitrator but the exchange
rejected his challenge with no explanation. Only when
the arbitrator agreed to step aside was a new panelist
assigned to the case.

"The exchange's arbitration department has become a
star chamber where defrauded investors never know
what to expect from what is supposed to be a neutral
forum," Mr. Meissner said. "The exchange does not
fairly apply their own rules and guidelines, and they
have enormous power over cases with little oversight by
outside authorities."

Ray Pellechia, a spokesman for the exchange, said:
"Our arbitration officials describe this as an
exceptional situation, because we have few bank
directors. But since it has come up, we will review it
with an eye for strengthening the process."

But piecemeal reforms may not be enough of a cure,
Big Board critics say. The root of the problem, they
argue, is that the exchange is trying to serve too many
constituents: brokerage firm members, specialists,
companies that pay considerable fees to list their
shares on the exchange and investors.

Exchange officials say that all are treated equally. But
an increasing number of people involved with the
market have their doubts.