Hi Jay, German feedback to Thomas Friedman in NYT
Comment
Between greatness and its illusion
Europe has rarely shown as confused and contradictory a foreign policy as these days. The European Union needs a mediator. That could be Germany, assuming Schroeder's balancing act between French and British friendship will not not alienate the small European Union partners.
By Stefan Kornelius
(SZ from 20 September 2003) on Thursday the New York Times considered it appropriate to declare war on France. "It's time Americans came to terms with something: France is not just an annoying ally. It is not just a jealous rival. France is becoming America's enemy." The front-page writer Thomas Friedman then explains, why this is so. Paris wants USA to fail in Iraq. This way the president Chirac's desire to achieve a strong foreign policy role for his country can come true fastest.
An interesting thesis, which - were it not provided by an author who has some knowledge about European foreign policy questions - one could assume to come from the conspiracy garbage dump. However, it does not belong there, because indeed the French president must allow the questions to be asked, what his foreign policy goals actually are and what role he intends to play in view of confusing geometry in the international relations.
Actually the foreign policy in Europe has rarely been as confused and contradictory as it is the last few months. When this Saturday the large three - Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schroeder and Tony Blair - meet in Berlin, they can for starters chalk up an impressing number of debit entries on their political post-it: first a number of smaller European Union partners will be irritated by the fact that - outside of the well established consultation venues - a power cartel is being established, even though it's Schroeder and Chirac themselves, who are so ready to praise the value of common foreign policy.
Also, all this is happening a few days after Sweden rejected the euro - not in the least because it feels it's hard-pressed by the big members in the European club and it can not come to terms with giving up its sovereignty.
In central and Eastern Europe - these countries have yet to be formally taken up into the European Union - the displeasure ferments over the European constitution, as preferred (once more again) particularly by Germany and France. In Great Britain you don't even need to think to mention an European political initiative - after a catastrophic Iraq year Tony Blair could only accelerate his political exodus, if he would push now for the euro or the European Union constitution.
Everybody against everybody
In defense policy the chocolate nations Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg tinker without any long-term strategy on their own headquarters and then watch in fascination, how their construction work - strengthened by American hardheadedness in the NATO - lets the old transatlantic alliance slide into coma. Big against small, east against west, rich against arm, core against periphery, Atlantic lovers against multi-polars - foreign policy in Europe is exposed to enormous interest fights.
This, anyhow, is not a new phenomenon. What's new is that, other than so far, the number of the players has drastically increased. Worse still: the central figures, who are meeting right now in Berlin, are constantly changing the rules of the game, because they are so uncertain, what role they will play in this new European structure. Thus there's more amiss than just the uniting topic, the cement, which bonds the national interests.
Perhaps the biggest self-delusion of Europe is the hope, that it will be able to cure these heartburns without diagnosing the central disease of its foreign policy: the relations with the USA. America was a European power and America will remain a European power - whoever views the worldwide interrelationships without any ideological bias, will have to come to one and only conclusion, namely that Germany, France and Great Britain have to place their relationship to the USA on a common basis.
It is true as well, that the current government in Washington does not make reaching this conclusion easy. Quite the opposite: parts of this heterogeneous Bush crew are actually working on splitting up Europe. But governments change, and therefore first of them all Chirac must ask himself the question, how much America he is ready to accept in Europe (exactly the same as some day hopefully a less ideological post-Bush government will need to ask itself, how much it values its allies).
With or without the USA
The three in the chancellor office will not be able to dodge the following question on Saturday: Before Europeans write a catalog of demands for Washington, before they debate UN resolutions on Iraq, on powers of civil managers, on command structures and troops, they must clarify among themselves whether they accept the USA as a component of the European safety structure or not. This decision does not concern the personal arguments with George Bush, it is a matter of the long-term direction of the foreign policy.
The distrust regarding the French variant of the common foreign policy is so deeply rooted, because the presidents of the republic gave cause for doubts again and again: From de Gaulle's decision to disengage his military from NATO up to Chirac's arrogant flaming of European war proponents ("they are to shut up") the French self over-estimation reflex flared up again and again - the reflex of a nation, which was not ready to replace its old, state- and nation-based greatness by a modern alliance-based point of view. .
Because France grows in the antagonism to the USA, because it looks for importance particularly via controversy, unsolvable problems develop. For example in regard to defense: Europe can try miracles, but it will never be able to match the military capabilities of the USA. And, why should it? It would be meaningful to expand on that: If Europe already invests into its defense, then why not within the old NATO alliance under new conditions.
Why not think the unthinkable, to think of France returning to the alliance fold under the condition that the club is led from Europe. When facing a united Europe, Washington will need to arrange itself when it comes to the leadership question, of face the threat of the alternative- European own military alliance.
Wherever two argue so much, a mediator is needed. In the past Germany has always played this role, juggling skillfully between American and French interests, with great success when it came to its own foreign policy goals. In the past. Today, the Federal Chancellor has lost his dampening influence on Paris. He tries halfheartedly to break the French grip ("of course we'll help in Iraq").
This role however can not succeed, if Schroeder keeps hacking around, if he makes first friends with Tony, then bounces over to Jacques, while stepping all the time on the small partners' toes. Germany has a big chance in Europe - when mediating to a moderate tune, not when tuning to immoderate media.
SZ 217 pg 4, Sat/Sun 20/21 sept 2003
transl DJ
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