US: Leaner is not always meaner
By Ehsan Ahrari
The transformation of the US military is not just a new buzz, nor is it a current fad. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has a very broad vision of what the military should look like as a result of transformation.
To the extent that the profession of warfare is highly dynamic, military transformation is a never-ending process. It comprises, inter alia, creating new concepts to fight wars, development of new war plans, exploitation of the incessant changes in all realms of technology, especially in information technology, elimination of archaic thinking that has been focused on war-fighting and parochial service orientation, reduction of the size of the armed forces, incorporation of lighter but highly lethal technological platforms that would enable the military to remain the most agile and most deadly force in the world. Despite this rather long list of characteristics that are the core of the concept of transformation, I have not done justice in terms of capturing its comprehensiveness.
The transformation of the US military is taking place at a time when two massive paradigms of US foreign policy are also competing for national attention and precious resources. They are: President George W Bush's global "war on terrorism", and his equally ambitious goal of transforming the Muslim Middle East. Needless to say, a substantial focus of the war on terror is also on the world of Islam. That focus stretches beyond the Middle East to South Asia and Southeast Asia.
One of Rumsfeld's pet concerns is that the transformed US military must (and can) do more with less. Viewing this proposition from the perspective of the military's continuously mounting reliance on high technology, one may think that doing more with less is conceivable, as long as the adversarial or potentially adversarial forces are significantly behind in the realm of their reliance on technological tools of warfighting. However, considering the immensity of the missions at hand - ie, the "war on terror" and transforming the Middle East - doing more with less becomes a highly controversial proposition. In order to comprehend its contentious nature, one has to disaggregate the specifics of these missions in light of the current US global force positioning.
The current total strength of the US military is 1.4 million on active duty and 1.2 million in the reserves. Currently, US forces are committed to 136 countries. The United States has 140,000 troops deployed in Iraq, 34,000 in Kuwait, 10,000 in Afghanistan and 5,000 in the Balkans. Then 37,000 troops are stationed in South Korea, serving as a small "tripwire" force.
Since the security situation in Iraq has taken a turn for the worse, there are open and persistent calls from a number of retired flag officers and legislators for an increased force presence in Iraq. For instance, retired General Barry McCaffrey - who led a US division in the Gulf War of 1991 - said, "We are in a global war on terror with inadequate forces." Senator John McCain, an important Republican voice, advocated an additional deployment of 100,000-150,000 more soldiers in Iraq. Senator Joseph Biden, a major Democratic voice on the prestigious Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for an additional 40,000 troops in Iraq. He is also one of the major advocates for the United States sharing its governing authority with the United Nations.
In Afghanistan, US troops have picked up the pace of anti-terrorism operations to respond to resurgent Taliban-al-Qaeda forces. There are not as yet any public calls for additional deployment of US forces in that country, especially since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-commanded International Security Assistance Force has taken the command. However, if the mission of these forces were to change, from patrolling Kabul and some other populated areas to widening the scope of the authority of Hamid Karzai's government to rural regions as well as to all provinces of Afghanistan, the US government would come under immediate pressure to commit its own additional troops for that mission.
Then there is added concern about what happens if the Korean conflict flares up. Even though the chances of such an eruption are minimal at this time, the contingency planners of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon and the Pacific Command (PACOM) are required by the very nature of their job to be ready for it. The question, then, becomes: What kind of pressure would a Korean contingency put on the already highly stretched US forces all over the globe?.
Returning to Middle East, no one can state for sure what kind of plans the neo-conservative-heavy Bush administration is contemplating. Are there any additional plans for regime change? Iran or Syria, maybe? Given the deteriorating security situation in Iraq, no overt plans for regime change may be implemented any time soon. But, considering the fact that the Bush administration went after Saddam Hussein's regime long before the war-on-terror-related job was done in Afghanistan, no one can be sure that an additional front toward the east of Iraq (ie, Iran) or toward its west (ie, Syria) might not be open. How would such a scenario affect the deployment of US troops, since such an operation (or operations) have to be carried out solely by applying US forces? Considering the heat British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been taking from those who opposed the United Kingdom's participation in the Iraq campaign, he is not likely to support the aspirations of the US to carry out any additional regime change.
Calls for the deployment of additional US forces in Iraq notwithstanding, Rumsfeld has been steadfastly insisting that no additional forces are needed. More than ever before, the Bush administration is forced to ask for the deployment of multinational peacekeeping forces. Especially if the operational tempo (Optempo) of the US forces in Afghanistan picks up, Rumsfeld is likely to face additional pressure and heat for more troops.
At least for now, Rumsfeld and the top Pentagon brass are not actively considering the notion of expansion of the military, since that would contradict two of the much-heralded propositions of military transformation, doing more with less, and lethal but agile force. In fact, the secretary of defense has been adamant in denying the necessity for it. He recently stated, "At the current time, every bit of analysis supports just the opposite - that we do have adequate forces. Now that could change, and if it changes, we'll change."
One suggestion is that in order to alleviate the awesome deployment-related pressure from the military, the Bush administration is in dire need of a new foreign policy. The mere suggestion of a new foreign policy is likely to open up an additional wave of acrimonious debates at a time when the presidential campaign is about to pick up its pace. Bush's popularity is already coming under mounting downward pressure.
A less controversial aspect of a new US foreign policy might be a different emphasis, without necessarily changing the overall major objectives. But this option may not be valid for too long in the wake of a study issued by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office. That study states, "If the Pentagon stuck to its plan of rotating active-duty army troops out of Iraq after a year, it would be able to sustain a force of only 67,000 to 106,000 active duty and reserve army and Marine forces." It went on to add, "A large force would put at risk the military's operations elsewhere around the globe."
Now the pressure is on the Bush administration to come up with a different emphasis, but it is also obvious that in the near future major changes in the US objectives in Iraq will have to be introduced. Sooner than later, the presence of a large number of multinational forces would lead to demands that the US share the ruling authority with the UN. Secretary of State Colin Powell, more than Bush, knows that. That is one of the reasons Powell, along with the joint chiefs, has reportedly "nudged" the president toward the UN.
Bush is aware that any sharing of authority with the UN or with other nations is likely to jeopardize his own vision of what the post-Saddam Iraq should look like. The element of realism among the Europeans - and I also include the United Kingdom on this point - is such that they will have no objection in seeing the establishment of a moderate Islamic democracy in Iraq. However, there is little doubt that the Bush administration will have a difficult time accepting that proposition, since such an acceptance would come into serious conflict with its other major foreign objective - transformation of Muslim Middle East.
Another option worth considering is pushing for the transformation of Muslim Middle East through diplomacy, as opposed to waving the red flag of potential regime change in the face of current Middle Eastern governments. I have no doubt that the US government will think about such an option only if the security situation in Iraq deteriorates beyond control.
But that might not be the extent of impending major changes in the US objectives regarding force deployment. A potential worsening of the security situation in Afghanistan will also significantly affect the issue of force commitment. NATO might not want to absorb the brunt of fighting without a similar commitment of US forces.
In the meantime, in terms of its war-fighting capabilities, the pace and scope of the transformation of the US military are going extremely well. However, to the extent that training for the post-conflict aspects of its capabilities (Phase IV in the technical jargon, which includes peacekeeping) is still not popular in the Bush administration, and the US military is suffering from "mission fatigue", or, I would even argue, a new version of "mission creep". In this sense, regardless of whether a major revision of US foreign policy takes place or not, the issue of military transformation will have to expand its scope and consider developing an intense focus on peacekeeping and nationbuilding. That would require a whole slew of additional training programs. However, considering the sustained commitment of the United States' armed forces to the notion of excellence and professionalism, it is capable of taking on even that mission without much difficulty.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst. |
