Thanks. That's an interesting table.
I hadn't realized the military manpower had declined so substantially, since the end of the Cold War.
From 1974 through 1991 (the end of Vietnam to the end of the Cold War), total manpower was stable, at 2.0-2.2M. Since then, it has steadily declined, to 1.5M now. That's the lowest it's been, since 1947-1950 (the brief lull, between WW2 and Korea). Then, we were doing garrison duty in a lot of places, but they were all pacified. Nobody was shooting at us anywhere.
The limiting factor, in achieving our military objectives today, in Iraq and Afghanistan (and likely to be true just about anywhere else) is the post-Regime Change occupation. Clearly (in retrospect), we had enough forces to do Regime Change, that part did not strain our forces, even with the Turkish fiasco placing a lot of them out of position and effectively out of the dash to Baghdad. But the occupation is straining us, and threatening the whole mission.
For occupation, Navy and Air Force aren't much use. Army + Marines = 480K +175K = 655K today. If each of them spends one year in three in Iraq, that's 655K/3 = 218K, which is approximately what we have now, in Iraq (plus support for Iraq in nearby areas).
That's not counting National Guard. I would guess, they will be very unhappy, at spending a year in Afghanistan or Iraq (total 15 months, including preparation for deployment). And many of them are Navy or Air Force. So I'm guessing (haven't done my homework on this) the National Guard manpower doesn't change the equations much.
I am reluctantly brought to the conclusion, that, since we are now in a non-short and non-small shooting war (and should be prepared for another one, even when we get out of this one), we need more troops than we had in 1948. Probably at least the 2-2.2M we had in the 1980s. Current doctrine says we should be prepared to fight two medium-size wars at the same time, and it doesn't look to me like the current military is sized to do that. If we don't get engaged in unpopular wars, we ought to be able to achieve that, without bringing back the draft.
The other things that could be done, are:
1. not have any permanent large garrisons overseas. With modern transportation and pre-positioning of equipment in likely theatres, troops can quickly be brought anywhere needed. This has obvious political benefits, too, in places where our troops generate local hostility. And should help in recruitment and retention.
2. end Cold War commitments, unless they fit today's needs. I read an article about U.S. Air Force planes being kept in Iceland, for absurd reasons.
3. S. Korea has twice the population, and 20 times the money, as N. Korea. For conventional warfare, there is no good reason they cannot 100% defend themselves. For nuclear deterrence, mobile and distant U.S. bases (submarines, Guam, Alaska, even Missouri) are better than S. Korea itself.
4. Germany: out of position for any likely combat. Local politics restrict the troop's mobility. Redeploy to Poland or Bulgaria, or better yet Florida. Or Iraq, if that's where we need them today.
5. Again, I'm displaying my ignorance, but I thought all soldiers were trained to fight, basic infantry skills, how to march and shoot a rifle. Doesn't everybody do basic training? If not, maybe the Army needs to copy the Marines ("infantry first", technician second).
6. since occupation rather than conquest is the limiting factor, the increase in manpower should probably go to Special Forces, infantry, Civil Affairs. Not Air Force, Navy, Armor, Artillery.
7. We have 6 million Muslims in the U.S. today, and about half of them are immigrants (most first or second generation). Many of them speak Arabic. They should be vigorously recruited. If more of our checkpoints were manned by Arabic-speaking soldiers, if Iraqis saw our soldiers at their mosques, they would be better received.
8. Last, a controversial proposal: our units should copy Communist armies, and have political officers at every level. Not to teach the soldiers to vote Republican (ng). Rather, there should be a dedicated cadre, to monitor the interaction between our troops and the locals. From what I've read, there seems to be a lot of variability in this, from unit to unit. These political officers can help our military do the things we don't now do very well: the skills that are not strictly military, but are crucial to military victory, in Iraq and the conflicts we are likely to be fighting in the future, in the War on Islamism. |
