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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Kevin Rose who wrote (470981)10/4/2003 3:07:58 PM
From: Skywatcher  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 769667
 
The Elusive Iraqi Weapons

October 4, 2003




The most striking findings in David Kay's interim report on
the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq are his
revelations about the backward state of Iraq's chemical and
nuclear programs. Based on the evidence gathered so far in
three months of searching, it seems clear that these
programs barely existed and posed no immediate threat to
the global community. To the contrary, it looks as if
international inspectors succeeded in reducing or
eliminating Iraq's arsenals and dedicated production
capacity, forcing Saddam Hussein to lie low and wait for a
new opportunity.

Although there is no doubt that Mr. Hussein used chemical
weapons in the past, no retained stocks have yet been
found. Multiple sources told Mr. Kay's team that Iraq did
not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled chemical
weapons program after 1991. The report concludes that
Iraq's large-scale capacity to produce new chemical
munitions "was reduced - if not entirely destroyed" during
the gulf war, the bombing in 1998 and 13 years of United
Nations sanctions and inspections. This is an astonishing
admission that the presumed chemical weapons threat may not
have existed and that the oft-derided inspections were
actually working.

On the nuclear front, although Iraq came much closer to
making a bomb in 1991 than anyone had suspected,
international inspectors later declared that the program
had been dismantled before they left Iraq in 1998, with no
evidence that it was subsequently revived. The Kay report
finds that while Mr. Hussein remained firmly committed to
acquiring nuclear weapons, "to date we have not uncovered
evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to
actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile
material." Mr. Kay cited evidence the Iraqis might have
tried to restart their nuclear efforts "at the very most
rudimentary level" but nothing to suggest "a massive
resurgent program."

That conclusion contradicts the administration's prewar
claims that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear programs and
deflates the administration's dire warnings that we dared
not wait for a smoking gun lest it come in the form of a
mushroom cloud.

The burden of Mr. Kay's report is that while searchers have
not found any weapons of mass destruction so far, they have
found evidence that Iraq still intended to build them and
had retained equipment and personnel that could be used to
do it. Mr. Kay said his team would need another six to nine
months to explore Iraq, a big country with lots of hiding
room. At least $300 million has been spent on the search,
and the administration is reported to be seeking $600
million more to finish it.

Before approving that substantial sum, Congress may want to
consider bringing back the U.N. inspectors, whose costs
would be paid by the international community. The
inspectors clearly did an effective job and have an immense
store of data and experience. Their findings would look
more credible in the eyes of the world. Still, the
important thing is to finish this search, no matter who
does it. There is always a chance that there really are
some unconventional weapons tucked away somewhere.
President Bush's job approval ratings, now plummeting in
the polls, may depend in part on whether any weapons are
ultimately found. More important, the nation needs to know
whether its intelligence was way off the mark, making any
further attempts at pre-emptive war problematic.

nytimes.com

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