To: Lane3 who wrote (77549 ) 10/14/2003 6:22:29 PM From: Neocon Respond to of 82486 The first decision broadens the idea of religious belief to allow for non- adherence to a particular sect, or non- traditional belief: We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Being" rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that under this construction, the test of belief [380 U.S. 163, 166] "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not. We have concluded that the beliefs of the objectors in these cases meet these criteria, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgments in Nos. 50 and 51 and reverse the judgment in No. 29. caselaw.lp.findlaw.com . The second one is the crucial one, though, insofar as it uses the First Amendment to include atheists and agnostics: Section 6 (j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with that clause an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361.... ...Welsh elaborated his beliefs in later communications with Selective Service officials. On the basis of these beliefs and the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that he held them "with the strength of more traditional religious convictions," 404 F.2d, at 1081, we think Welsh was clearly entitled to a conscientious objector exemption. Section [398 U.S. 333, 344] 6 (j) requires no more. That section exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war. Message 19392126 Being Or, as it was explained by FindLaw: In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), a unanimous Court construed the language of the exemption limiting the status to those who by ''religious training and belief'' (that is, those who believed in a ''Supreme Being''), to mean that a person must have some belief which occupies in his life the place or role which the traditional concept of God occupies in the orthodox believer. After the ''Supreme Being'' clause was deleted, a plurality in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), construed the religion requirement as inclusive of moral, ethical, or religious grounds. Justice Harlan concurred on constitutional grounds, believing that the statute was clear that Congress had intended to restrict conscientious objection status to those persons who could demonstrate a traditional religious foundation for their beliefs and that this was impermissible under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 344. The dissent by Justices White and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger rejected both the constitutional and the statutory basis. Id. at 367.supreme.lp.findlaw.com