Page 2/2 -- IRAN’S MISSILE AND NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: A CONUNDRUM FOR RUSSIA
Iran’s Missile Capability
Along with the development of nuclear technologies, Iran has paid particular attention to
the acquisition of a missile capability. Iran’s missile industry is one of its most
dynamically developing branches, to which it has dedicated large funds and numbers of
technical personnel. The current presence of thousands of American troops in the region,
beyond doubt, is a serious stimulus for Tehran’s acceleration of its missile development
program. Iran is surrounded by land borders on all sides: American bases are located in
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and the American presence in two
others Iranian neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, has been strengthened. Under the
circumstances, Iran has been forced to search for a counterweight to the American
presence in the region. A missile capability is the only way for Iran to restrain the United
States, which possesses an incomparably large conventional military capability.
At present the armed forces of Iran have about 40 launchers for theater missiles,
including Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles.
The Scud-B ballistic missile, which was developed and produced in the USSR, is a
mobile system with a guided theater missile that entered service in 1987. The launcher is
mounted on a Chinese tractor, and can be moved at a rate of 60 km/h.
The Scud-C ballistic missile was developed in North Korea with Chinese technical
support and entered service in 1992. It too is a guided missile used with a mobile
launcher mounted on a Chinese tractor. In peacetime these mobile launchers are on
standby alert at operational bases, while in times of war they are at launch readiness, and
are periodically exchanged.
The capabilities of the Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles found in Iran’s arsenal are
presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2. The Tactical and Technical Characteristics of Iranian Missiles
Characteristics Scud-B Scud-C
Maximum range, km 300 550
Payload, kg 1,000 700
Accuracy, m 450 1,000
Missile payload can be something other than conventional explosives.
Together with its medium-range missiles, Iran has tactical ballistic missile complexes,
including the Luna-M, Nazeat-10 and Okhab.
The Luna-M ballistic missile was developed and produced in the USSR in the beginning
of the 1970s, and is a ground-based mobile unit, with a maximum range of 65 km. It is
capable of delivering a conventional 420 kg high explosive warhead this distance.
The Nazeat-10 ballistic missile was developed in Iran with the technical assistance of
China, but is produced in Iran. Plans call for it to be mounted on a mobile ground-based
complex. It has a range of 150 km and a conventional 250 kg high explosive warhead.
The Okhab ballistic missile was also developed in Iran with the technical assistance of
China and is mounted on a similar mobile ground-based tactical complex. It has a range
of 34 km and a warhead weighing up to 170 kg equipped with conventional high
explosives.
On July 15, 2000 a successful test of an Iranian Shehab-3 missile was carried out,
testifying to the country’s ability to manufacture ballistic missiles. This was the missile’s
second flight test. The first test, which took place in July 1998, ended with the explosion
of the missile during the test. The Shehab-3 is a single-stage ballistic missile, capable of
carrying a 1 t warhead a maximum range of 1,300 km. The missile has an impact
accuracy of about 2 km. In the opinion of a number of experts, this missile was developed
on the basis of Scud-C technologies and the North Korean Nodong missile. With this
range the missile is able to strike almost all regions of the Middle East, including Israel,
and also some regions of Russia, depending on the launch site. The launchers of Iran’s
forward-based missiles are located in Isfahan and near Hamadan.
The appearance of the Shehab-3 missile in Iran’s arsenal indicates a qualitative change in
the threat not only for Israel, but also for Russia. The missile’s range already allows it to
strike Russia’s southern regions, in which more than 20 million people live, including the
provinces of Volgograd and Astrakhan. Iran’s missile capabilities are presented in Figure
2.
At present Iran is working on increasing the range of the Shehab-3 ballistic missile. This
may involve the use of more powerful accelerators or a reduction in payload mass. It may
be technically ready for deployment by 2005, and will be a multiple-stage missile.
In addition, Iran is working on the development of the Shehab-4 missile, with a range of
2000 km and a heavier warhead, capable of carrying a biological or even nuclear payload.
There are reports that Iran is attempting to acquire China’s M-9 missile technology.
Iran is also conducting work on the development of the Shehab-5 missile, which will act
as a medium-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with a range on the order of
4000 km.
By 2005 Iran also plans to develop:
• Theater missiles based on M-11 technology, with Chinese assistance, that
have a range of 300 km and a conventional 800 kg warhead;
• Zelzal-2 theater missiles, with the technical assistance of North Korea, that
have a range of 200 km and a conventional 600 kg warhead.
In 2005, when its nuclear fuel cycle facilities become operational, Iran’s armed forces
will include: 16-20 launchers with 80-100 Nazeat missiles; 40-60 launchers with 200-300
tactical Okhab missiles; as well as 24 launchers with 150-180 Scud-B theater missiles;
and 4-6 launchers with 10-20 Shehab-3 missiles.
In the more distant future, in 2010, Iran may have up to 16-20 Shehab-3 launchers. In
addition, Iran plans to develop a promising IRBM that uses technology from the North
Korean Taepodong-2 IRBM by 2010. It will be launched from a stationary ground-based
missile complex, and will have a range of 4000 km and a 2000 kg warhead. Plans call for
a separable warhead that can carry either a conventional or, possibly, a chemical payload.
Iran’s missile program is characterized not only by a rapid increase in the number of
delivery vehicles, but also by their qualitative development. While the first tactical
missiles, the Luna-M, Nazeat, and Okhab, were unguided and inaccurate, the Scud,
Shehab, and Zelzal class missiles, and the promising IRBM, will have substantially
higher performance characteristics.
Thus, Scud-B and Scud-C missiles have a considerably larger launch weight and payload
mass, as well as increased accuracy, hitting a target through the use of an inertial
guidance system. These missile complexes have the option of remote control, monitoring
and launching, including remote retargeting of launchers through the use of launching
and mobile command post equipment. Retargeting takes 15 minutes. Preparation and prelaunch
operation time has been substantially reduced. The time needed for a repeat
launch has been reduced to 1-2 hours.
As far as the promising IRBM is concerned, along with a separable warhead, this missile
possesses greater accuracy due to an inertial guidance system. Its increased range (up to
4000 km) and warhead mass (up to 2000 kg) makes it possible to deliver strikes on
facilities at a significant distance from missile bases.
Recommendations for Russia
The above estimates indicate that by 2006, one year after the enrichment complex at
Natanz has become operational, Iran will have acquired the technical capability to join
the club of states that possess nuclear missile capabilities. Under these circumstances,
questions regarding Russia’s position on further cooperation with Iran in the nuclear and
other spheres, and what actions Russia should undertake to decrease the possible negative
consequences of Iran’s development of its nuclear industry, are unavoidable.
Russia should tie the continuation of cooperation with Iran in the nuclear sphere to the
country’s signing and ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Russian
representatives, conducting negotiations with Iran on various ways to improve
cooperation, including in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, invariably raise the question
of the nation’s accession to the Additional Protocol. Russia is experienced in conducting
“critical” dialogues with Iran. In 1995, when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was
extended, Russia was able to convince Iran not to block an indefinite extension in
exchange for the continuation of cooperation at Bushehr. Under the current circumstances,
Russia must stiffen its position on Iran’s accession to the Additional Protocol and directly
link further cooperation in the field of nuclear power engineering to the resolution of this
question. If Tehran signs and ratifies the Additional Protocol, Russia will most likely face
serious competition on the Iranian NPP market; however, economic and political
expenses could prove far higher, if Iran continues to remain outside the protocol.
During negotiations with AEOI representatives, Russia should strictly adhere to the
position defined by Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev and later
confirmed by President Vladimir Putin regarding the return of SNF from the Bushehr
NPP to Russia. Negotiations over the details of the protocol on the return of SNF have
been going on a long time; however, to date no agreement has been signed. In August
2002, there were statements to the effect that the protocol on SNF return would be signed
in September or October. After Rumyantsev’s visit to Iran in December of the same year, they said they would be ready to sign the protocol within a month. However, it remains
unsigned.
The most likely reason for the protracted negotiations is the search for mutually
acceptable provisions governing the procedure for SNF storage in Iran and the time frame
for its removal. It is well known that Russia, under pressure from the United States and
Israel, wants to reduce this period to the minimum required from a technological point of
view. Normally this means a three-year period of SNF storage in cooling ponds near the
NPP.
In case the Iran SNF return procedure is agreed upon within a shorter time, it is evident
that the US must bear expenses for manufacturing of special “thicker” containers for safe
transport of SNF to Russia and, possibly, provide Russia with technological support in
solving this issue. According to certain information, Minatom of Russia and the US
Department of Energy have been already conducting consultations on this problem.
Russia need not phase out the construction of light-water power reactors in Iran.
WWER-1000 reactors cannot be used for the creation of nuclear weapons. The only case
in world history of the creation and testing of a warhead with a payload of nuclear powerderived
plutonium was in 1962. It took 15 years of experiments and 62 full-scale tests for
the United States to create and successfully test a nuclear warhead from plutonium that
was isolated from SNF from the British Magnox reactor. However, this reactor is loaded
with natural uranium, which makes the isotopic composition of the resulting plutonium
considerably more similar to weapons-grade plutonium than plutonium from a light-water
reactor. In Iran, even taking into account the considerable progress this country has made
in the field of nuclear power engineering in recent years, similar technical capabilities are
absent.
For Russia, the economic desirability of building an NPP in Iran is obvious. The total
cost of building one power unit is more than $1 billion. About 300 Russian enterprises
participated in the construction of the Bushehr NPP. According to some estimates, the
contract to complete the nuclear reactor in Iran created about 20,000 jobs. The contract to
produce components for the Bushehr NPP is providing 70% of the work for the firm
Izhorskiye Zavody, and resulted in a four-fold increase in average wages at the plant in
2002 alone, while the state budget received 3.5 times more in taxes.
Russia must also pay special attention to the control of exports from domestic enterprises
that manufacture products and services of proliferation concern, and also to scientific
research centers that have scientific and technical secrets in the nuclear and missile
sphere.
In the past, Iran has repeatedly attempted to acquire illegally high-tech equipment that
can, in part, be used for creating weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery.
In 1997-98, Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) curbed a whole series of attempts to
bypass the export control system and acquire missile technologies, including missile
engine and guidance system components. There is information about Russian (and Ukrainian) experts – former employees of government-owned missile and aircraft
building enterprises and left today without work and money for a decent living who go to
Iran as tourists where they participate in research and development related to missiles. In
January 1999, the leadership of the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy
Technologies (NIKIET) curbed the unsanctioned contact of several institute employees
with Iranian specialists. In addition to this, in December 2001, FSB Director Nikolai
Patrushev stated that there had been increasingly frequent discoveries of people
employed in Russian government bodies and the “power” ministries (those ministries
with troops at their command, such as the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as
the FSB) “taking the initiative” and attempting to establish criminal contacts with the
special services of other countries, including Iran.
Russia should be more active in the official level discussions of Iran’s missile and
nuclear dossier in the bilateral working group format Russia-USA and Russia-EU.
It is obvious that Russia, the United States, and EU cannot independently check the
development of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. The problem of the absence of hard
information on the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle was noted by Russian Minister of Atomic
Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev. The isolation of Iran and, as a result, the shortage of
information about domestic developments there, has a negative effect on the entire
international security system.
The international organizations that are trying to monitor the situation, including the
IAEA, face the same difficulties. It is therefore no surprise that high-ranking IAEA
representatives are interested in any information about the Iranian nuclear program that is
received from Iran itself. Thus, a high-ranking IAEA representative, who accompanied
ElBaradei on the trip to Iran in February 2003, asked the PIR Center for a transcript of a
press conference dedicated to the Iranian nuclear program that was held immediately
after PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov visited Iran.
Bilateral Russian-American working groups on nonproliferation and export control issues
had already existed, but were abolished at the initiative of the United States upon the
arrival of the Bush administration.
In order to effectively carry out this task, we must first increase mutual confidence. To
date, the United States has considered the transmission of confidential Russian
information to it as its due, and used information thus obtained exclusively in its own
national interests, often to the detriment of Russia’s. Thus, in 1997, soon after the
Russian Federation Security Council gave the United States a list of Russian
organizations suspected of missile technology cooperation, the Americans imposed
unilateral sanctions on them. After the confidential transfer of the names of two Russian
missile specialists suspected of making an unsanctioned trip to Iran, one of the largest
American newspapers published an expanded interview with one of these “heroes.”
One of the issues the bilateral commissions should address is the sources providing
sensitive technologies to Iran. Where is the technology coming from? There is a whole
series of suspect countries that can be listed as the most active “proliferators.” These
include Pakistan, North Korea, and China. In order to develop certain nuclear
technologies, Iran may have followed its own “missile” example, whereby the country
financed the development of a new, modified model of the Scud-B missile in North Korea
on the condition that a significant quantity be delivered to Iran.
There is also evidence that Iran’s missile and nuclear programs use the technologies and
support of Western firms. “We have this information, and we are ready to provide it to
our partners,” President Putin stated in one of his addresses. According to Minatom of
Russia and the US Department of Energy top officials’ statements, the centrifuge
technologies could get to Iran from Europe. In particular, they might have been owned by
the German-British-Dutch Consortium URENCO. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John
Wolf, too, has recognized the existence of a problem with the leakage of technologies
from the United States to Iran.
Multilateral consultations on Iran’s missile and nuclear programs have already been
under way at the non-governmental level.
However, at the present time there are no good reasons making it worthwhile for Russia
to harm its trade and economic relations with Iran, in spite of tempting proposals from
the United States. The promises of the United States to compensate for Russia’s losses in
the Iranian market thus far are only promises. Will money really flow into Russia, if it
forgoes collaboration with Iran? This is far from certain. Many remember the story in the
Ukraine, when in March 1998 Kiev officially rejected participation in the Bushehr project
in exchange for American promises to compensate for these losses in the form of an
increase in assistance to Ukraine’s energy sector and the placement of American orders at
Kharkov’s Turboatom enterprise. This was the enterprise that was supposed to build the
turbines for the Iranian NPP. After Ukraine’s refusal to participate in the Bushehr project,
the Americans soon forgot their promises, and as a result the enterprise lost $5.1 million
dollars (the sum spent on the development of the turbine.) In total, as a result of
nonparticipation in the Bushehr project, Turboatom failed to earn about $40 million.
Ukraine waited for compensation from the United States for four years, and then, during
Iranian President Khatami’s visit to Kiev, agreed to renew cooperation in the nuclear
sphere. In the beginning of 2003, 40% of the construction occurring at Bushehr NPP was
being done by Ukrainian specialists.
On the eve of the May 2002 presidential summit in Moscow, Richard Pearl, the head of
the Council for Defense Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, proposed erasing the
debts Russia inherited from the USSR in exchange for its refusal to cooperate with Iran in
the nuclear sphere. Since Russia’s obligations to the United States for Soviet debt total
about $3 billion, this proposal alone can hardly interest Moscow: the cost of one reactor
is about $1 billion, and Iran plans to build seven.
Moreover, it would be wise to devote attention to broadening economic cooperation with
Iran, in order to overcome the negative consequences of a decrease in the level of
confidence between the two countries caused by the release of information about the
construction of sensitive nuclear facilities in Iran as well as the intensification of Russian-
American cooperation.
It is no accident that the Russian foreign policy concept views Iran as one of its main
partners in the Moslem world. The partnership with Iran is in many respects the solution
to the problems of radical Islamic movements in the Caucasus. For Russia, in which more
than 20 million Muslims live, the support of its antiterrorist actions in Chechnya by a
power as authoritative in the Islamic world as Iran is quite valuable. Tehran’s position
played a positive role in the solution of the Tajik problem and the regulation of the
Karabakh conflict. Nor should one forget the positive role Iran played in opposing the
spread of Wahhabism from Afghanistan to neighboring countries. Thus the retention of a
partnership with Iran for the long term and the development of trade and economic ties
are both extremely important for Russia.
From 1995 through 2002, commodity turnover between the two countries grew by five
times and reached the $1 billion mark. However, the trade increase was essentially
caused by revenue from large-scale projects, including the expansion of thermoelectric
power stations built with the technical assistance of the USSR in Isfahan and Akhvaz,
and the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. Russian military equipment
deliveries, defrosted after the December 1995 signing of an intergovernmental protocol
on the regulation of mutual financial obligations, increased the trade volume as well.
Today these sources are practically exhausted, but contracts for new large-scale projects,
including a construction contract for a second power unit at Bushehr, have not been
signed.
Nor is it worth rejecting cooperation in the sphere of conventional defensive armaments.
Today Iran is the third most important buyer of Russian weapons after India and China,
despite the fact that Russia manifests serious restraint in its sale of military equipment,
supplying only a small portion of the arms in which Tehran has indicated its interest. First
of all, these are armaments that do not present a potential threat to Russia and cannot be
used by international terrorists. These contracts, as in the past, are extremely important
for Russian defense enterprises. Thus, the recent agreement to supply Iran with 300
BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles at a cost of about $60 million is a virtual “life buoy” for
the Kurganmashzavod factory, which finished 2001 with losses of approximately $7
million and continued to suffer losses in 2002.
After the military operation by the United States and Great Britain in Iraq, Iranian leaders
will presumably think about the need for large-scale purchases of more high-tech Russian
armaments, and for increased funding for these purchases. In this case Russia should
exercise restraint, in part in order not to aggravate relations with the United States, which
sees the strengthening of Iran’s military power as a threat to its national interests.
According to Russian President Putin, relations with Iran are unique, in that we “need to
calculate the security concerns of the world community. We, as a country that is a
member of the UN Security Council and the G8, must consider these concerns, but [...]
not forget our national interests.”
It would be best for Russia to adhere to a very pragmatic approach vis-à-vis Iran,
developing mutually beneficial commercial and military ties. At the same time, Russia
should strive to understand the fears of Western countries regarding domestic political
developments in Iran, particularly given the fragile political balance in the country and
the results of the February 2003 elections of people’s representatives to city and local
Islamic councils, in which for the first time in six years the supporters of President
Khatami were defeated. The future relations of the two countries should be characterized
by “alert cooperation.”
Footnotes
1 According to AEOI President Reza Amrollahi, smaller uranium deposits have also been discovered in the
provinces of Isfahan, Azerbaijan, Khorasan, and Sistan-Baluchestan.
2 Official Atomic Energy Organization of Iran website, aeoi.org.ir.
These calculations are given on the official Atomic Energy Organization of Iran website,
aeoi.org.ir.
4 “Achieving Nuclear Fuel Production Technology in Iran, a Great Scientific Achievement: Official,”
IRNA, February 11, 2003.
5 Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Gathering Dust Or Gaining Steam?” Policywatch, February
3, 2003.
6 Vladimir Dvorkin and Aleksandr Shcherbakov, “North Korean Missile Dreams,” Voprosy Bezopasnosti,
No. 2 (March 2003).
7 Ian Traynor, “UN alarm at Iran’s nuclear programme,” Guardian, March 18, 2003.
8 Joby Warrick and Glenn Kessler, “Iran’s Nuclear Program Speeds Ahead,” Washington Post, March 10,
2003.
9 Iran’s nuclear power engineering development plans call for the construction of seven 1,000 MW power
units by 2021.
10 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The Iranian Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Plant at
Natanz:
Drawing from Commercial Satellite Images,” paper published by the Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS), March 14, 2003.
11 “A New Post-Cold War Challenge: the Propagation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” unclassified
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Report, 1993.
12 Official Atomic Energy Organization of Iran website, aeoi.org.ir.
13 “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 1999,”
nti.org.
14 Paul Hughes, “Iran Says Its Enriched Uranium Plant Under Way,” Reuters, February 10, 2003.
15 German Solomatin, “Russia’s Minatom: Iran Does Not Have the Capability to Produce Its Own
Uranium-fuel Cycle,” ITAR-TASS, 11 February 2003.
16 Vladimir Dvorkin, “Status and Prospects for Missile Development in Third World Countries in the
Period Up to 2015,” Yadernyy Kontrol, No. 1 (January-February) 2002, p. 44.
17 “Iran Seeks Nuclear Know-how, not Atomic Weapons,” IRNA, February 10, 2003.
18 As of March 25, 2003, the Additional Protocol had been signed by 69 states, the Board of Governors had
approved Additional Protocols with 78 states, and the Additional Protocol had already entered into force in
30 states, including just one Middle Eastern country – Jordan.
19 Azadeh Moaveni, “Iran Pledges Transparency in Its Nuclear Development,” Los Angeles Times,
February 23, 2003.
20 Sergey Kozhukhar and Nikita Krasnikov, “Georgy Mamedov Indicated the Importance of Iran’s Signing
the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement as Soon as Possible,” ITAR-TASS, March 14,
2003.
21 Joint Russian-Iranian Statement, Information and Press Department, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
www.mid.ru, March 12, 2003.
22 “Iran Ready for IAEA Safeguards,” Kommersant, March 17, 2003. |
