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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/24/2003 8:49:16 AM
From: T L Comiskey  Respond to of 89467
 
LOL...'Dont make me hurt you'...Jim Willie CB
T@jewishcarpenter.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/24/2003 6:13:38 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
The Spy Who Was Thrown Into the Cold

truthout.org



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/24/2003 6:53:23 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Too Low a Bar

__________________________

By PAUL KRUGMAN
Columnist
The New York Times
Published: October 24, 2003
nytimes.com

John Snow, the Treasury secretary, told The Times of London on Monday that he expected the U.S. economy to add two million jobs before the next election — that is, almost 200,000 per month. His forecast was higher than those of most independent analysts; nothing in the data suggests that jobs are being created at that rate. (New claims for unemployment insurance are running at slightly less than 400,000 a week, the number that corresponds to zero job growth. If jobs were being created as rapidly as Mr. Snow forecasts, the new claims number would be closer to 300,000.)

Still, Mr. Snow may get lucky, and the job market may pick up. But his prediction was a huge climb-down from administration predictions earlier this year, when the White House insisted that it expected the economy to add more than five million jobs by next November.

And even if Mr. Snow's forecast comes true, that won't vindicate the administration's economic policy. In fact, while private analysts are criticizing Mr. Snow for being overly optimistic, I think the stronger criticism is that he's trying to lower the bar: to define as success a performance that, even if it materializes, should really be considered a dismal failure.

Bear in mind that the payroll employment figure right now is down 2.6 million compared with what it was when George W. Bush took office. So Mr. Snow is predicting that his boss will be the first occupant of the White House since Herbert Hoover to end a term with fewer jobs available than when he started. This is what he calls success?

Bear in mind also that just increasing the number of jobs isn't good enough. If we want to improve the dismal prospects of job seekers — currently, 75 percent of those who lose jobs still haven't found new jobs when their unemployment benefits run out — the number of jobs must grow faster than the number of people who want to work. Indeed, because the working-age population of the United States is steadily growing, the economy must add about 130,000 jobs each month just to prevent the labor market from deteriorating.

Mr. Snow thinks the economy will, finally, start to do better than that — but it's not happening yet. In September, employment rose for the first time since January, but the increase was only 57,000 jobs. And to have kept up with the population growth since Mr. Bush took office, the economy would have to add not two million, but seven million jobs by next November.

Mr. Bush's employment policies would truly have been a success if he had left the job market no worse than he found it. In fact, even his own Treasury secretary thinks he'll fall five million or so jobs short of that mark.

I know, I know, the usual suspects will roll out the usual explanations. It is, of course, Bill Clinton's fault. (Just for the record, the average rate of job creation during the whole of the Clinton administration was about 225,000 jobs a month. Mr. Clinton presided over the creation of 11 million jobs during each of his two terms.) Or maybe Osama bin Laden did it.

But surely there must be a statute of limitations on these excuses. By the time of the election, Mr. Bush will have had almost four years to deal with the legacy of the technology bubble, and more than three years to deal with the economic fallout from 9/11.

And Congress has given him everything he has wanted in terms of economic policy, even though that has led to a frightening explosion in federal debt: in the current fiscal year the Bush tax cuts will account for almost $300 billion of a deficit expected to top $500 billion. (If that $300 billion had been used to employ workers directly — a new W.P.A., anyone? — it would have created six million jobs.)

Yet Mr. Bush's own Treasury secretary has, in effect, admitted that despite the administration's unimpeded efforts, and all that debt, the job market will still be in poor shape a year from now.

Mr. Bush's handlers have often managed to have small achievements hailed as triumphs by persuading people to set the bar very low. Now his officials are trying to convince the public that if, after several years of dismal performance, they can achieve one year of job creation at a rate below the average rate Bill Clinton achieved over eight years, this will constitute a great economic victory.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 12:17:20 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 89467
 
Russia to join anti-dollar game

_________________________________________

October 22, 2003 Posted: 10:57 Moscow time (06:57 GMT)

MOSCOW - Russia plans to cut the share of US dollars in its reserves and increase the share of euros, Senior Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Ulyukayev said on Tuesday. According to him, the necessity of this measure is connected with the important role of the European market for the Russian economy and with the weakening of the American currency on the international market. The percentage of dollars in the currency reserves will be reduced by 3-5 percent, and the share of euro reserves will be increased by the same amount, Mr. Ulyukayev told the Bloomberg agency.

Four years ago, dollar reserves made up 90-95 percent of Russia’s foreign currency reserves. At that time, the Central Bank’s leadership did not plan to increase it significantly. Two years ago, the former Chairman of the Central Bank Viktor Gerashchenko said that only 5 percent of the country’s reserves were in euros. According to him, there was no need to increase this share, as the bulk of foreign trade payments was made in dollars.

But the Central Bank’s new team has broken this mold. The bank’s Chairman Sergey Ignatyev has recently reported that 70 percent of the reserves were in dollars and 25 percent in euros. The Russian gold and foreign currency reserves were $63.5bn as of October 10, including $58.3bn in foreign currency reserves.

Generally speaking, the main purpose of foreign reserves kept in the central bank of any country is to serve the needs of foreign trade and ensure the stability of the national currency. According to the State Customs Committee, EU countries accounted for 35.9 percent of Russia’s foreign trade in January-August 2003, about 1.5 percent less than last year, mainly due to the reduction of exports.

However, it should be noted that most of Russia’s exports to the European Union are raw materials, with prices fixed in dollars. Given this, the share of euros should be at least twice as low. The situation on the Russian foreign exchange market confirms the stability of this indicator, even if indirectly. The number of ruble/euro deals is many times lower than the number of ruble/dollar deals. And the ratio does not change. Thus, a conclusion can be made that 90 percent of export proceeds subject to obligatory sales are in dollars, and the demand for euros from importers does not exceed EUR 150m to EUR 200m a month.

Another reason for increasing the share of euros in the Russian gold and foreign currency reserves might be the desire to harmonize the structure of the reserves with the structure of Russia’s external debt. But the required balance has almost been achieved. According to the Finance Ministry, the euro-denominated part of the Russian foreign debt makes up about 28 percent. About 70 percent of the debt is denominated in dollars. Due to Russia’s significant debt payments to the Paris Club of creditors, the share of euro-denominated obligations is likely to decrease slightly by year-end.

We can only assume that the Finance Ministry fears that the dollar will continue falling on the international exchange market. Since the start of the year, the American currency has weakened against the euro by about 10 percent, and, according to some forecasts, this tendency will continue. However, it is not ruled out that the Finance Ministry’s statements are part of its anti-dollar game. The positions of the dollar and the euro are determined by the demand for this or that currency in international payments and, accordingly, the demand from national central banks.

Meanwhile, the Central Bank of Russia may have its own opinion on the ratio of foreign currencies in the reserves. In September, Senior Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Oleg Vyugin said that the Central Bank was not going to introduce serious changes to the structure of the country’s gold and foreign currency reserves. “Our currency policy is not based on the exchange rate of the main currencies, and we don’t speculate on the exchange rate. That is why any change in the euro/dollar exchange rate does not prompt us to change the currency structure of the reserves,” he stressed.

russiajournal.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 12:18:08 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Global: The Cyclical-Structural Tradeoff
_______________________________

By Stephen Roach (New York)
Morgan Stanley
Oct 24, 2003

This summer’s reawakening in the global economy hasn’t exactly fit the script of those of us who have been growth skeptics for the past several years. Nor does the seven-month surge in world equity markets suggest that the economic uplift will be short-lived. Rarely do I give a presentation in these days of froth when I don’t get asked the obvious question: Where could you be wrong? My answer addresses what I have long believed is the toughest challenge we macro practitioners face -- the time-honored trade-off between cyclical and structural considerations. If I’m wrong, it will probably be because I have missed a shift in the balance between these two sets of forces.

I’ll be the first to admit that over the past several years my work has focused largely on the structural pressures that I believe are bearing down on an unbalanced global economy. The extraordinary divergence between America’s massive current-account deficits and Asia’s external surpluses is without precedent in the modern-day history of the world economy; it is symptomatic of a US-centric global growth dynamic that I believe is inherently destabilizing. It’s not just that the non-US portion of the global economy is lacking in self-sustaining domestic growth. I have also argued that the US economy itself -- the unquestioned growth engine of this lopsided world -- rests on a precarious foundation of its own set of imbalances.

Insofar as America’s structural problems are concerned, I worry most about record lows in domestic saving -- namely, a US net national saving rate that fell to 0.5% of GNP in 2Q03. Related to that are my concerns over America’s reckless fiscal policy adventures. They account for the major swing factor in the US saving conundrum, one that will probably take the net national saving rate into negative territory within the next year. By attempting to finance the war on terrorism, Iraqi reconstruction, and tax reform, Washington has repeated the “guns and butter” mistakes of the late 1960s. The major difference between now and then is that today’s US economy is lacking a private sector saving cushion; America’s net private saving rate averaged around 8.5% in the late 1960s, more than double the current 4% rate. This makes today’s US economy far more dependent on foreign saving to finance economic growth than was the case 35 years ago. And that virtually guarantees far more serious problems with the US current-account and trade deficits -- to say nothing of the dollar-related vulnerabilities associated with such imbalances.

But there’s far more to my concerns about America’s structural problems. Record private-sector debt loads and elevated debt-service burdens -- especially in the household sector -- remain an unmistakable feature of this post-bubble climate. Such reliance on a debt-funded growth paradigm is symptomatic of a US consumer that continues to cling to the wealth-driven growth paradigm that became so popular during the late 1990s. As the equity bubble morphed into other asset bubbles -- property, credit, and bonds -- newfound wealth effects gained the upper hand over classic income effects in driving consumer demand. In that vein, I have also sounded the alarm over the extraordinary leakage of earned labor income that has been an unmistakable by-product of America’s jobless recovery. By our calculations, over the first 21 months of this recovery, real wage and salary disbursements -- the dominant component of personal income -- are running about $320 billion below the path that would have been generated in a normal recovery. In a job-constrained and income-short recovery, wealth-driven demand -- and the increased dependence on debt it entails -- emerges as a key source of structural tension in my assessment of America’s structural vulnerabilities.

The global labor arbitrage is the final piece of this structural puzzle. Courtesy of profound new twists in IT-enabled globalization, there has been a meaningful breakdown of the time-honored relationship between aggregate demand and employment growth in high-wage developed nations like the US. The maturation of outsourcing platforms in goods (i.e., China) and services (i.e., India) present multinational corporations with alternative input and cost structures that have never before been available with the scope and scale that is the case today. At the same, the advent of the Internet offers a new connectivity to offshore outsourcing options that never existed in business cycles of the past. The same can be said of the lack of pricing leverage and the intense cost-cutting such conditions imply -- pressures that provide an unmistakable urgency to the global labor arbitrage as a means of competitive survival in high-cost economies such as the US. Little wonder that fully 22 months after the economy supposedly hit bottom in November 2001, the private sector US hiring curve is running fully 4.3 million workers below the norm of the past six recoveries. Little wonder also that in such a climate, American consumers have turned to wealth and debt as the sustenance of aggregate demand growth. The shortfall of domestic income generation is also key to America’s saving deficiency and the lethal current-account and fiscal-policy dynamics that have subsequently been unleashed.

So much for the tough structural story. The problem with emphasizing this set of factors, goes the critique, is that these are long-tailed constraints that can easily be overwhelmed by the more immediate and often more powerful forces of the business cycle. America’s 6%-7% growth outcome in 3Q03, together with a likely spillover that could support growth in the 4% zone in the current period, certainly appears to lend credence to just such a possibility. It was my first boss, the legendary Fed chairman Arthur Burns, who always cautioned me never to underestimate the power of the US inventory cycle. Once it gets going and triggers the time-honored dynamic of a lifting of depressed production levels to meet the improved state of aggregate demand, hiring and income generation invariably follow. This gives rise to classic “multiplier effects,” which have long been at the heart of most cumulative cyclical revivals. The recent growth spurt in the US seems to support that possibility -- leading most to conclude that the balance of risks has shifted from structural constraints to cyclical revival.

While I certainly can’t deny the possibility of such an outcome, I continue to have serious doubts that we can use the cycles of yesteryear as a model for what to expect today. In my view, many of the structural headwinds enumerated above are attacking the very cyclicality of forces that traditionally shape the vigor and tone of economic recovery. That’s especially true of global labor arbitrage; unless it is arrested, America will continue to suffer from a profound shortfall of job creation and domestic wage income generation. Fiscal stimulus, under such circumstances, will provide a temporary injection of purchasing power but -- because of the ongoing income leakage -- will not achieve traction in fueling the cumulative increases in aggregate demand that a classic cyclical revival requires. In other words, the new structural backdrop that frames the basis of my thinking bears critically on the time-honored cyclical dynamics that are now dominating the consensus mind-set shaping financial markets.

There’s one more piece to the cyclical critique -- the distinct possibility that a significant portion of the recent revival reflects a borrowing of gains from the not-so-distant future that will be followed by the inevitable payback (see my October 13 dispatch, “Payback Time”). That conclusion rests on the basis of my assessment of two key pieces of the recent global growth revival -- an extraordinary burst of durable goods spending by the American consumer in the two middle quarters of this year and a credit bubble in the Chinese economy in the first half of 2003. Inasmuch as consumer durables never really fell in the recession of 2001, the recent 25% annualized surge of such buying in the second and third quarters of 2003 cannot be justified on the basis of a classic cyclical unleashing of pent-up demand. Instead, it appears to reflect the temporary impacts of this summer’s tax cut, aggressive vehicles sales incentives, and the last-gasp impacts of the home mortgage refi bonanza. Standard stock-adjustment models, as well as historical experience, suggest that a payback in the form of a pullback in durable spending is coming shortly. At the same time, Chinese monetary authorities have begun what I believe will be a concerted effort to unwind the excesses of a bank lending cycle that pose the very real risk of a new wave of nonperforming loans in China. As Andy Xie has argued, a reduction in bank lending will have the unmistakable effect of slowing Chinese capital formation and Chinese commodity demand -- factors that have been central in shaping perceptions of a sustained revival in the global economy (see Andy’s October 20 dispatch, “China: Sharp Slowdown Ahead” and his October 23 note, China: Slowdown Impact -- Minerals vs. Metals). A payback on both counts is likely in early 2004, in my view.

All this is another way of saying that much of the world’s newfound cyclical vigor may be far more tenuous than it appears on the surface. If that’s correct, don’t count on a lasting cyclical offset to ongoing structural headwinds. The vigor of the recent data flow may be exaggerating the possibility of a meaningful shift in the balance between these two sets of forces. If the cyclical revival turns out to have been as temporary as I suspect, the world may well have to come to grips with another growth scare in early 2004. Frothy financial markets are leaning precisely the other way.

morganstanley.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 12:20:37 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
A True Paradigm Shift

_______________________________

Credit Bubble Bulletin
by Doug Noland
October 24, 2003

<<...The captivating issue of “money supply” has recently been garnering more than its usual amount of attention and commentary. I’ll throw in my two cents worth. First of all, we must constantly remind ourselves that the contemporary financial system is a much different animal than conventional thinking gives it credit for. Traditionally, the financial system was essentially the banking system. This is simply no longer the case, as the banks share center stage with the Wall Street financial conglomerates, the GSEs, and securities markets generally. Importantly, contemporary “money” is anything but limited to government issued currency and bank created deposits. Moreover, the banking system no longer dominates the issuance of monetary liabilities (depositor assets) or commands the payment system. We have today the powerful money market fund complex, as well as instruments such as repurchase agreements and Eurodollars. Traditional money – currency and bank deposits – no longer exclusively represents “liquidity,” and a strong argument can be made that non-bank Credit creation (liability expansion by the GSEs, Wall Street, and foreign monetary authorities) is the driving force behind contemporary financial market-based “liquidity.”

Today, it is the nature of financial sector liability expansion that we must carefully monitor to garner clues for important systemic liquidity developments. There has been a recent notable stagnation of money supply after several months of heady growth. During the past 12 weeks, M3 has declined $37 billion, or 1.9% annualized. This is a dramatic reversal from the preceding 12-week period (weeks of April 28 to July 21) when M3 surged $220 billion, or 11% annualized. Digging into monetary component detail, we see that over the past 12 weeks Money Fund Deposits have declined almost $78 billion (Retail Money Fund deposits down $35.5 billion and Institutional Money Fund deposits down $37.3 billion), or 15.4% annualized. Meantime, Savings Deposits expanded $70.6 billion, or almost 10% annualized, with y-o-y year expansion of $466 billion (17%). Recent money supply stagnation is essentially explained by the decline in Money Market Fund deposits.

Clearly, there has been a tremendous flight to risk assets this year (out of the money market funds), but that doesn’t help much in explaining the dramatic monetary boom turned recent stagnation. There is also the issue of the collapse of the Refi boom that has played a role in the composition and holders of financial sector liabilities over the past several months. But talk of a collapse in net mortgage lending is poor analysis. Yet I do believe we can look directly to the recently mushrooming Fannie and Freddie balance sheets. They provide the best explanation for the abrupt stagnation of “money,” especially Money Fund deposits.

The GSEs have aggressively ballooned their holdings (mainly buying mortgages and mortgage-backs), providing liquidity to the banks, hedge funds, and Wall Street community. And, importantly, to finance this extraordinary balance sheet expansion, the GSEs have been issuing non-monetary IOUs/liabilities – long-term agency bonds (that are not a component of the “money supply”). Thus, we must appreciate that agency debt (as opposed to bank or money fund liabilities) has been over the past few months a predominant financial sector liability created in the unrelenting financial sector expansion (liquidity creation). The system has experienced tremendous liquidity creation resulting in little expansion of money supply components. This is a very atypical development in quite unusual times.

So I would tend to have my own view of the current liquidity situation: I believe the recent money supply stagnation is NOT indicative of generally faltering systemic liquidity. Indeed, it could be just the opposite. There is today a strange paradox of GSE induced over-liquefication financed by the issuance of agency bonds. Large quantities of these agency securities are being purchased by foreign central banks and international players recycling the raging surplus of global dollar balances. The Overriding Issue Remains Unrelenting Dollar Liquidity Excesses – an out of control Bubble of dollar financial claims creation. (At the same time, the grossly speculative and inflated U.S. stock market is a liquidity-Bubble accident in the making.)

This acute dollar over-liquidity view may be counterintuitive and even controversial, but there is certainly ample supporting evidence. I can point to continued over-liquefied Credit markets. Credit spreads domestically and internationally remain extraordinarily narrow (they’ve collapsed!), and demand for dollar denominated global risk assets (debt instruments in particular) remains unprecedented. Credit Availability could seemingly not be easier at home or abroad. The case for abundant dollar liquidity is also supported by surging gold and commodity prices, as well as a dollar that just cannot find its footing. Moreover, that “commodity” currencies -- the Australian dollar (up 25%), South African rand (up 24%), Brazil real (up 23%), Canadian dollar (up 20%), and Argentine peso (up 18%) -- are the leading global currencies this year lends especially strong support to my dollar over-liquidity/global reflation thesis.

It has been fascinating to witness truly historic financial evolution over the past decade. I have often attempted to explain how the Fed, GSEs and Wall Street have evolved to the point of having mastered the art of liquefying the market-based U.S. Credit system – Liquidity on Demand in Grand Excess. The nexus of this unparalleled power lies in the capacity for virtually unlimited GSE liability creation – insatiable demand for (implicitly guaranteed) GSE debt that can be issued in gross excess with no impact on perceived creditworthiness or investor demand (the “moneyness” of GSE liabilities); the Fed’s capacity/audacity to peg short-term interest rates significantly below market rates; the explosion of aggressive leveraged speculation; and, of course, the dollar’s role as international reserve currency. These provided a confluence of powerful forces unlike anything experienced in monetary or financial history.

This monetary/liquidity mechanism gained deserved credibility from rectifying the tumultuous market episodes of 1994, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002 experiences. Over the past several months, this “mastery” has been absolutely flaunted. Credit, liquidity and speculative excesses were taken to a whole new level. Interest rates began to shoot higher in July. Quickly, the highly leveraged and speculation-rife bond and interest-rate derivative markets faltered in near dislocation. But from July through September, Fannie and Freddie expanded their mortgage portfolios by the unprecedented $160 billion (compared to the 2nd quarter’s $13.3 billion increase). Problem “resolved.”

It is worth briefly rehashing the dynamics of GSE “liquefication.” Today, the system is acutely vulnerable to rising interest rates. For one, we face unprecedented leveraged speculation that would be forced into problematic liquidation in the event of a significant and sustained rise in interest rates. Second, there is great systemic risk associated with asset Bubble dynamics (especially throughout mortgage finance) and exceptionally weak debt structures after years of poor and excessive lending (Minsky’s “Ponzi Finance”). Third, there is this incredible interest-rate derivatives monster that expands with each new day of Credit and speculative excess. The GSEs, speculators, and other financial operators have purchased derivative protection against rising rates. Sellers of unfathomable quantities of “insurance” must “dynamically hedge” their exposure in the event of rising rates -- they are forced to sell/short Treasuries, agencies and other debt instruments into a declining market to establish positions that would generate the required cash-flow to pay Fannie, Freddie and all the rest in the event of a sustained jump in rates.

It is simply difficult to comprehend how our Credit system could avoid dislocation (a liquidity crisis) in the event of sharply higher rates. Everyone knows as much. Yet there is apparently no cause for concern. The Fed, GSEs and Wall Street have mastered the art of manipulating market rates and liquidity. With the first serious episode of spiking rates/speculator liquidation/derivative-related selling, the GSEs immediately commence the ballooning of their balance sheets (buying mortgages and other debt instruments). This accomplishes several crucial things; I’ll touch quite briefly on a few. First, it provides the leveraged players a “Buyer of First and Last Resort,” thus emboldening the community and keeping them in the game (no liquidation allowed!). Second, by aggressively acquiring mortgage-backed securities, GSE operations mitigate the amount of (duration) hedging that would otherwise be required by holders of these securities in a rising rate environment. And, most importantly, by capping the interest-rate rise, GSE liquidity operations greatly allay the amount of systemic derivative selling that would be necessary if rates were to jump sharply. Or, stated differently, the JPMorgans and Citigroups of the world, with their huge and growing interest-rate derivative positions, can sleep soundly at night with the confidence that the Fed and GSEs enjoy the capacity to manipulate rates lower at their discretion. With this – a guarantee of continuous and liquid markets, along with “pegged” low rates – a flourishing interest rate derivative market becomes viable. The key Credit Bubble perpetrators - the expansive Fannie, Freddie and speculator community - are advanced the cheap insurance necessary to ensure continued rapid growth. It's like buying flood insurance in an environment where the insurance community can carefully control the amount of rainfall.

A truly amazing system has evolved over time. And, let there be no doubt, “The Community” has ably and repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to regulate the amount of “rainfall”/interest rates/liquidity. The Fed can peg short-term rates at 1% and orchestrate a steep yield curve; the GSEs can sit back with the capacity to create enormous liquidity on demand; the leverage speculators can bet with reckless abandon; the financial sector can expand without limitation; inexhaustible liquidity can fuel real estate and securities inflation and resulting economic expansion; and the interest-rate derivative players can write unbounded policies with confidence that rates will simply not be allowed to shoot higher. All the while, the Credit system can expand aggressively with little concern for the endless supply of new dollar financial claims created. A Trillion here and a Trillion there, and there’s no downside. Speculative demand for securities will meet the ballooning supply, with little if any impact on the “controlled” interest rate markets. Cheap and plentiful Liquidity on Demand Forever!! A truly historic “achievement.”

This manipulation has an enviable track record, working so splendidly so many times. But there is a flaw and this failing is and will remain the focal point of my analysis. And this serious flaw goes right to the heart of A True Paradigm Shift. Yes, U.S. interest rates are today controllable and this reality does wonders for the entire fragile financial system and hopelessly distorted U.S. economy. And domestic demand for the endless supply of new Credit – inflated dollar financial claims - can be orchestrated by an expanding U.S. financial sector. But the flaw? Its Wildness Lies in Wait out there in the increasingly distrustful and less compliant global financial arena. The Almighty Fed, the Commanding GSEs and A Powerful Wall Street are today simply not well endowed when it comes to the capacity to manipulate global demand for Bubble Dollar Balances.

The bottom line is that, despite its repeated “successes,” this New Age Financial Control Mechanism (“The Great Experiment”) has not really been tested. Contemporary U.S. interest-rate/liquidity manipulation basically evolved over the King Dollar period 1995 through early 2002. The confluence of inflating U.S. asset prices, an outperforming economy, international high regard for the U.S. generally, and the impaired global financial system, worked to effortlessly recycle the rising flood of U.S. dollar balances right back to U.S. markets. There was absolutely no limit – no domestic or global constraints – on the amount of Credit creation (dollar claims inflation) generated during these U.S. liquefications. The liquidity jubilantly found its way right back to U.S. assets: the late nineties direct investment boom; the technology and U.S. stock market mania; and the Treasury/agency/”structured finance” securities Bubble. The ease of “recycling” dollar balances – of which everyone has grown so accustomed - was a most seductive aberration.

There are a few dynamics worth pondering. First, with the demise of King Dollar comes significantly reduced private demand for U.S. real and financial assets. Nowadays, relative performance of Non-dollar assets gains by the week, exacerbating Non-dollar financial flows. Second, Credit Bubble dynamics dictate (and recent GSE balance sheet ballooning provides evidence) that Credit excess (dollar financial claims inflation) must expand at an accelerating pace to support both levitated U.S. asset prices (real and financial) and an increasingly distorted Bubble economy. Thus, the dynamic of ebbing global demand and the accelerating flow of dollar claims pose a not inconspicuous dilemma. Importantly, however, global central banks have for the past year filled the void. This is not sustainable, and it is worth noting that dollar demand has been supported during this period by strong financial markets and a strengthening economy. Things can easily get much worse, and I would warn that there is a major problem with the markets complacency regarding the risk associated with dollar weakness.

I will return to the fascinating issue of mushrooming derivative positions and systemic risk. In the above discussion regarding interest rate risk, I made the point that derivative players - writers of interest rate protection - operate with the comfort that the Fed, GSEs and Wall Street command control over interest rates. And while it would be absolutely impossible for the $100 Trillion-plus interest-rate market to function as advertised, Financial Armageddon is apparently forever held at by the New Age U.S. financial system’s capacity to manipulate interest rates/liquidity.

The Big Flaw in Market Perceptions, however, is that similar manipulative dynamics operate with regard to dollar risk -- that a currency derivative crisis can be similarly averted. It is my view that such a currency crisis is today unavoidable. The New Age American financial system does today retain the incredible power to manipulate domestic interest rates through the inflation of additional Credit. Global currency markets are a different story. No matter what egregious quantity of U.S. Credit excess or financial sector leveraging, potential disaster can seemingly be resolved by low rates and only greater excess. The unfathomable mountain of interest rate derivatives have, through the wonders of financial manipulation, become a financial disaster scenario Moot Point. But these very same dynamics are nurturing runaway dollar claims/Credit inflation, and virtually assure incessant dollar devaluation going forward. I believe global markets – currency, gold, general commodities – are beginning to sense as much.

Over the past decade the dysfunctional global financial system has experienced repeated currency collapses. And from Mexico, to the SE Asian dominoes, to Russia, Turkey, Brazil and the spectacular Argentine meltdown, derivatives have played an instrumental role in all currency dislocations. Over and over we witnessed how a confluence of developments -- domestic financial excess, resulting booming economies, and exaggerated speculative flows -- all worked to nurture ballooning markets for insurance protection against faltering local currencies. Moreover, market dynamics generally dictate that in the manic late stages of the boom -- when Credit excess and foreign speculative flows go to extremes -- currency derivative positions mushroom. Demand for protection surges, while the escalating price of this insurance coupled with a speculative mindset entices (thinly capitalized) financial operators to write currency derivative contracts. In many instances, as was certainly the case in Russia and Argentina, the readily available currency insurance plays an instrumental role in prolonging Credit and speculative excess. Disaster is assured.

When the unavoidable run on the currency finally arrives (and, especially in the case of Argentina, it does often take longer than one would expect) there is absolutely no marketplace liquidity available for the writers of currency protection. Derivative players are simply unable to hedge their exposure. As dynamic hedgers, their computer models dictated heavy selling into declining markets. Such a scenario quickly elicits crowds of sellers and a buyers' strike. Markets dislocate and collapse.

Granted, the U.S. does not today have a vulnerable currency peg. I would argue, however, that unprecedented foreign central bank dollar purchases have to this point played the pivotal role in stemming currency dislocation. But these extreme measures have only bought some time. Importantly, U.S. domestic interest-rate/liquidity manipulation ensures an unrelenting flood of new dollar balances to be accumulated by our foreign Creditors. This is growing exposure that they would surely prefer to hedge against. Meanwhile, the Great U.S. Credit Bubble dictates that gross excess goes to only more unimaginable extremes. And all of this guarantees that the ballooning mountain of dollar derivative positions becomes only more intractable. All the Fed, GSEs and Wall Street can do at this point is make things worse. And are they ever doing it.

Any other Credit system would impose higher interest rates to help support their faltering currency. Higher market rates would work to quell financial excess and Credit inflation, the forces of currency devaluation. The Big Flaw in our New Age system of manipulated interest rates/liquidity creation is that we have mindlessly sacrificed the capacity to rein in Credit and liquidity excess. We simply can’t turn down dollar devaluation and have no intention of doing so. “It’s our currency, your problem.” The Fed and market players apparently believe that the dollar will calmly find some level commensurate with "fair value." But low rates and Credit Bubble dynamics dictate dollar devaluation as far as the eye can see. Such dynamics simply beckon for an eventual run on the dollar. And such a scenario would quickly overwhelm global central bankers already with massive dollar holdings they don’t know what to do with. I believe acute dollar vulnerability is here for the duration: A True Paradigm Shift in Global Finance, and certainly not one for the faint of heart...>>

prudentbear.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 12:22:59 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
What Is A "Dollar"? A Historical Analysis Of The Fundamental Question In Monetary Policy

fame.org



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 3:23:47 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
"The growth locomotive of the world economy is a communist state with a banking system that resembles the Texas S&L industry at the peak of the Dallas real estate delusion. The biggest and most dynamic stock market in the world trades near the high end of its historic valuation range, and the unchallenged global currency is the emission of a country that is running a current account deficit equivalent to 5% of GDP."

-James Grant



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 10:57:32 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
The Florida Marlins had quite a ride...IMHO, they deserved to win...

A five hit shutout...A stunned look all over Yankee Stadium right now.

The 23 year old Josh Beckett was red hot..;-)



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 11:41:08 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
'A Bubble Flow Chart'

cornerstoneri.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (30458)10/25/2003 11:44:29 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
MARLINS WIN SERIES, 4-2
______________________________

Marlins Win Title, and Yanks Face Cold Winter

By TYLER KEPNER
The New York Times
October 26, 2003


They had seemed so close to overcoming everything, to stamping a most uncomfortable season with a happy ending. When the Yankees beat the Florida Marlins' Josh Beckett last Tuesday in Miami, they were two victories from the championship demanded by their principal owner, George Steinbrenner. They were that close to a winter of relief.

But the World Series, and the season, has come crumbling down. The Yankees had trusted in their pitching to pull them through, as it has so many times before in October. But Beckett beat the Yankees at their own game last night at Yankee Stadium, lifting the Marlins to the championship with a 2-0, five-hit shutout in Game 6. Andy Pettitte was stellar; Beckett was better.

Beckett, the 23-year-old Marlins ace who was pitching on three days' rest, baffled the Yankees with curveballs and overpowered them with fastballs. Pettitte allowed two runs, one earned, in seven innings, and Mariano Rivera blanked the Marlins for two. But the Yankees' offense did nothing to support them.

The Yankees went 0 for 12 with runners on base last night and hit just .169 in that situation in the World Series. In the tense off-season that is sure to follow, the Yankees will ponder how to add more thunder to their lineup. Steinbrenner thirsts for elite hitters and does not tolerate losing.

Vladimir Guerrero? Gary Sheffield? Kaz Matsui? The reincarnation of Babe Ruth? The Yankees will search everywhere for the punch that disappeared in this Series, and especially in this game.

As usual, they had their chances in Game 6.

Jorge Posada led off the seventh inning with a double into the left-field corner, but Beckett took over from there. Jason Giambi grounded out to third, and Beckett snapped a 3-2 curveball that Karim Garcia took for strike three. Ruben Sierra, batting for the dormant Aaron Boone, could not touch a 96-mile-an-hour fastball to end the inning.

The Yankees led off the eighth inning with another hit, a single by Alfonso Soriano. Beckett fell behind Derek Jeter — who went 0 for 4 and made an error — with two balls, but Jeter flied to center field for the first out. With a left-hander, Dontrelle Willis, warming up in the bullpen, Marlins Manager Jack McKeon let Beckett face the left-handed Nick Johnson. It was a wise move: Johnson grounded to second for an inning-ending double play.

The game, and season, ended quietly for the Yankees. Bernie Williams and Hideki Matsui flied out to left, and it was up to Posada to save the season. The 55,773 fans rose, but seemed stunned. With a 1-1 count, Posada grounded weakly to the first-base side of the mound. Beckett grabbed the ball, crashed into Posada along the first-base side and tagged him for the final out.

Ivan Rodriguez, the free-agent catcher whose signing heralded a new direction for the listless Marlins, flung his mask into the air, and Beckett exulted in foul territory. The Marlins, a wild-card team that had shocked the San Francisco Giants and the Chicago Cubs in the National League playoffs, were the world champions for the second time in their 11-year history, trumping the Yankees in the final three games.

The Yankees came into Game 6 with a better batting average than the Marlins — .275 to .237 — but an anemic showing with runners on base. The Yankees' .195 average with runners on base was the primary reason they lost three of the first five games.

Manager Joe Torre had shuffled the lineup in Game 5, benching Soriano because of a slump and scratching Giambi because he could not play in the field with his damaged left knee. With the designated hitter back in effect at Yankee Stadium, Giambi returned, batting sixth. Soriano was back in the lineup, too, batting ninth.

"I just thought I'd get him out of the spotlight," Torre said of Soriano, who came in with a .158 average in the Series. "Once we get through that first time, he's batting first, Jeter's batting second, and nobody knows the difference."

After Beckett struck out Boone with a shoulder-high 95-m.p.h. fastball to end the second inning, Soriano came up as the leadoff man in the third. He checked his swing on a first-pitch foul, then stayed back on a curveball and ripped it to center field for a single.

Torre's premonition seemed to be coming true. Soriano had led off with a single, and Jeter was up next. Wary of Soriano's speed at first base, Beckett threw over twice and pitched out once. Soriano ran on his fourth pitch and was safe at second base when Jeter grounded to second.

Johnson walked, putting two runners on for Williams. After doubling off the glove of center fielder Juan Pierre in the first, Williams had a .455 average, the highest of any player in the Series. Beckett approached him cautiously, with three curveballs, before running the count to 2-2 with a fastball.

Then Williams topped a ball to second, starting an inning-ending double play. The crowd recognized that the Yankees had wasted a precious chance against a top pitcher, and Yankee Stadium went silent.

The Yankees still had their stalwart, Pettitte, on the mound, and they were playing fine defense behind him. Garcia made a running catch against the right-field wall to end the third inning, and Jeter made a leaping throw from the outfield grass to end a 1-2-3 fourth.

But with two outs in the fifth, Alex Gonzalez and Pierre singled to center, bringing up Luis Castillo, with a .130 average in the Series. On a 2-2 pitch, after a pair of two-strike fouls, Castillo lined a ball to right, and the Marlins' third-base coach, Ozzie Guillen, sent Gonzalez, challenging Garcia's arm.

Garcia made a strong throw to the plate, and Posada shifted to his right to catch it on one bounce. Posada stretched to his left to try to tag Gonzalez, who slid wide and tapped the plate with his fingertips. Pettitte cocked his fist, ready to celebrate, but he was not out of the inning. Posada had missed the tag and did not argue when Gonzalez was called safe.

Pettitte escaped that inning when he struck out Miguel Cabrera on a cutter with the bases loaded. It was only 1-0, and the Yankees had a chance to tie in the fifth inning, after Boone bunted Garcia to second. Soriano and Jeter were up next, effectively the top of the order.

But Soriano popped out on the first pitch, and Beckett whizzed a 97-m.p.h. fastball past Jeter for strike three.

Jeter's rough night took an inexplicable turn in the sixth. Jeff Conine led off with a routine grounder to Jeter's left, and Jeter fielded it but could not get it free from his glove. He dropped the ball, then hurried his throw to first, firing wildly past Johnson. It was scored a fielding error, and Pettitte walked the next hitter, Mike Lowell, on four pitches.

Derrek Lee hit a comebacker to Pettitte, who threw to second but could not get a double play. With Conine on third, Juan Encarnacion lifted a sacrifice fly to right field, and Conine scored without a play at the plate.

It was 2-0, and Pettitte's pitch count was nearing 100. Jeff Nelson began to warm up in the bullpen, but Pettitte struck out Pierre after Gonzalez's bunt single, ending the inning.

Pettitte was pitching well; after a 1-2-3 seventh inning, he had given up six hits and one earned run. But the Yankees were down to their final nine outs, facing a confident pitcher in command, and there was nothing Pettitte could do about that.

nytimes.com