'Winning Modern Wars': Wesley K. Clark's Warpath
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By MAX FRANKEL
The New York Times Sunday Book Review
Published: October 26, 2003
nytimes.com
In the front of his austere black-and-white book jacket, Gen. Wesley K. Clark is presented as the former supreme allied commander in Europe and the author of what purports to be an expert analysis of the war in Iraq. But on the book's back side, you will find a colorful full-page poster of a handsome civilian with a winning smile and the unmistakable ambition to commit more than military history.
''Winning Modern Wars'' turns out to be aptly wrapped. For its 200 pages, many of them updated just a month ago, are obviously designed to abet the swift transformation of a once embittered warrior and armchair television analyst into a hard-driving, platitudinous candidate for president.
That jacket speaks louder than the coy words with which Clark denies any partisan purpose. He allows that while writing he heard ''continuing speculation about whether I might engage in some manner'' -- sic! -- ''in the 2004 election.'' But that ''looming decision had no bearing on my analysis.'' His only aim, he insists, is to give voice to the soldiers ''far from home, in an uncertain mission,'' because they ''cannot and should not speak for themselves.''
Well, those soldiers and their fellow citizens can vote. And the general cannot camouflage the partisan thrust of his polemic. His deft review of the battlefield tactics that won Baghdad in less than a month is merely the preface to a bitter, global indictment of George W. Bush. The president and his administration are condemned for recklessly squandering a brilliant military performance on the wrong war at the worst possible time, diverting resources and talent from the pursuit of Al Qaeda, neglecting urgent domestic needs and dissipating the post-9/11 sympathy and support of most of the world.
No credit even for the one thing that Clark admires about the American performance in Iraq. He recounts with relish the ''synchronization of high-tech airpower with agile ground maneuvers'' -- how the rapid advance of armor forced Iraqi units to move and expose themselves to air and rocket attacks, which in turn facilitated more ground advances. But ''the irony is that the vision of . . . a high-tech battlefield, viewed through an array of sensors, with battles fought and won by precision strikes and a slimmer ground component -- which the Bush administration, and especially Donald Rumsfeld, have trumpeted, is largely a reality that they inherited when they took office in 2001.''
In any case, the war in Iraq, though generally well fought, was a costly diversion. ''Taking down Saddam became a hobbyhorse'' for the group around Rumsfeld even before they achieved authority over the Pentagon. And they exploited 9/11 as ''a gift-wrapped opportunity'' to try to ''clean up the Middle East.'' So instead of concentrating on a ''knockout blow'' against Al Qaeda, they turned the focus to Iraq and let the terrorists scatter from Afghanistan.
As portrayed by Clark, the attack on Saddam Hussein -- without evidence to link him to Al Qaeda -- was not only wrong but deeply cynical. It bespoke a cold war mind-set of assigning terrorists a state sponsor, a ''face'' that could be more easily attacked. ''It was almost certain to be successful. It emphasized U.S. military strengths and built on a decade of preparation for a refight of the gulf war.''
The benefit of toppling Hussein is only faintly acknowledged: ''All else being equal the region and the Iraqi people were all better off with Saddam gone. But the U.S. actions against old adversaries like Saddam have costs and consequences that may still leave us far short of our objectives of winning the war on terror -- or, in themselves, may actually detract from our larger efforts.'' (Don't be fooled by those conditional ''mays''; the general knows how to protect a rhetorical flank.)
The general's predictions were soon enough overtaken by the sour news from Iraq. No one had planned properly for the occupation of Iraq and how to keep its army. And the United States Army proved ill suited for the tasks of empire. Hedging against better news in the future, the general observes, ''The occupation had thus far failed to meet popular Iraqi expectations in restoring security and minimal economic standards; Saddam Hussein had evaded capture for months; Baathist elements were hostile; Al Qaeda and other Islamic fighters were entering the country; and a steady diet of daily sniping attacks, bombings and ambushes were producing more casualties each week among the Americans.''
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How would a President Clark deal with these failures? ''Unfortunately, we are now engaged and fully committed'' and can't leave Iraq in chaos or to a Baathist or radical Islamic regime. ''Now, if possible, we must transform a successful military attack into victory by helping the Iraqi people to use this opportunity to establish representative government and the political and economic freedoms that can at least serve as an example to others throughout the region, as well as by demonstrating the awesome constructive power of U.S. values, ideas and resources.''
That may sound not unlike the policy of President Bush, and indeed the president may ''at last'' want to welcome a United Nations presence in Iraq, ''internationalize the problem'' and get the soldiers of other nations to replace some of our overtaxed forces. But Clark has no confidence in the Bush team's view of the world or management of home affairs. He thinks it has failed to find allies and friends around the world and made a mess of the domestic economy.
''Not since Vietnam had a U.S. administration made the mistake of going for 'guns and butter' simultaneously, or asked so little of an American people at a time of crisis.'' Might that be a gutsy call for higher taxes? Well, not really: ''Tax cuts are a good idea, but we must be certain that we have sufficient funds for defense and other critical needs.'' It seems safer to dwell, at great length, on the need for ''a new strategy for the 21st century -- a broader, more comprehensive and less unilateralist approach abroad coupled with greater attention to a sound U.S. economy at home, and long-range policies to take our nation forward successfully into the future.''
It is a breathtaking vision. Besides sidling out of Iraq, a President Clark would strengthen ''and use'' international institutions, ''repair'' trans-Atlantic relations, ''resolve'' the nuclear challenges of North Korea and Iran, help settle ''disputes'' between India and Pakistan and Israel and the Palestinians, and help to ''ease the ongoing conflicts'' in Africa. He would increasingly employ ''the weapons of law enforcement rather than warfare in attacking terrorism,'' focus more on the ''root causes'' of Islamic terrorism and provide ''substantial economic and political development assistance'' to stimulate ''far-reaching reforms in critical societies in the Middle East.''
In America, too, he favors ''a fresh effort'' to balance private initiatives and public responsibilities to enlarge opportunity and strengthen the nation's competitiveness. That means protecting our air, water and resources, retaining a pluralistic democracy ''with institutional checks and balances,'' meeting ''30-year challenges'' in education and health care and ''smoothing out the business cycle'' with both monetary and fiscal tools.
Clark glibly lists these objectives, and many more, without suggesting any priorities of effort. And he makes no attempt to explain how any American leader could effectively reconcile so many conflicting ambitions and sovereignties. His self-confidence seems rooted in his experience as commander of the NATO forces that bombed and pacified Kosovo in 1999, a headstrong performance that enlarged his faith in international collaborations while it poisoned his relations with peers and superiors at the Pentagon.
As Clark recounted in a previous book, ''Waging Modern War,'' his enemies in Washington managed to trick the Clinton White House into firing him from the post of supreme allied commander in Europe. And so he was left to watch from a CNN studio as a new administration employed the battle doctrines he had long championed in what he bitterly concluded was a misguided cause in Iraq. It was enough to drive a man to print, and to think he could do better, as commander in chief.
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Max Frankel, a former executive editor of The Times, is completing a history of the Cuban missile crisis. |
