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To: John Sladek who wrote (1059)10/26/2003 3:52:05 PM
From: John Sladek  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 2171
 
23Oct03-David Hirst-'Israelization' of U.S. Middle East policy proceeds apace

By DAVID HIRST
Special to The Japan Times

BEIRUT -- Few disputed at the time that Israel was a factor that pushed U.S. President George W. Bush to go to war on Iraq. Just how much weight it had among all the other factors was the only controversial question. But what is clear, six months on, is that Israel is now a very important one indeed in the stumbling neoimperial venture that Iraq has become.

This "Israelization" of U.S. policy crossed a new threshold with the two blows dealt Syria in the past fortnight -- Bush's endorsement of Israel's Oct. 5 air raid on its territory and the Syrian Accountability Act passed by the House of Representatives last week. A community of U.S.-Israeli purpose pushed to unprecedented lengths is now operational as well as ideological.

For the U.S., the main battlefield is Iraq, and any state that sponsors or encourages resistance to its occupation; for Israel it is occupied Palestine, its "terrorists" and their external backers. These common objectives converge on Syria.

Of course, with his raid, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had his own specifically Israeli agenda, growing out of frustration at his failure to crush the intifada. Breaking the "rules" that have "contained" Israeli-Syrian conflict these past 30 years, he signaled his readiness to visit on Israel's Arab neighbors the same punitive techniques he uses on the Palestinians.

But whereas such an escalation might have had some deterrent logic when these neighbors truly did sponsor or harbor Palestinian resistance, it doesn't now. An essential feature of the intifada is that, spontaneous and popular, it derives almost all its impetus from within; nothing illustrated that like Hanadi Jaradat, the young woman from Jenin whose very personal grief and vengeance prompted, on Oct. 4, the atrocious, self-sacrificial deed that in turn prompted the raid. So, other than brief emotional gratification to the Israeli public, Sharon's action achieved nothing.

But that will not deter Sharon. Having embarked on this course, he has little choice but to continue it; more importantly, violence has always been the indispensable means by which, in the guise of fighting terror, he pursues his long-term aims, the building of "Greater Israel" and the crushing of any opposition to it.

But Sharon is also, he believes, serving an American agenda. At least no one in Washington says he is not. There was a time, even under the current U.S. administration, the most pro-Israeli administration ever, when America would have strenuously distanced itself from such an act by its protege; a time when, mindful of the linkage between the two great Middle East zones of crisis, it would have recognized that too close an identification with the aims and actions of Israel in Palestine and its environs would complicate its task in Iraq. No more, apparently. Now these aims and actions either matter little to America, or even, in Syria's case, complement its own.

True, constraints persist even now. Bush still balks at Israel's projected "removal" of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat. On the other hand, he has effectively "disengaged" once more from the peacemaking, endorsed the Israeli view that Arafat alone is responsible for its breakdown and left Sharon a freer hand than ever to conduct the Israeli share of their common "war on terror."

It was partly because he couldn't go after Arafat that Sharon turned on Syria instead. Again, Bush urged caution -- but then called it legitimate "self defense" of a kind America itself would have resorted to. It was Palestinian "terrorists" Israel struck, but in American eyes, these are a piece of those other "terrorists" -- Arabs or Muslims -- whose passage into Iraq Syria supposedly permits or does little to impede.

Bush's endorsement of the raid -- together with his signaled readiness to sign into law the Syrian Accountability against which he has long held out -- means that, where Syria is concerned, he has now veered strongly in favor of the neoconservative wing of his administration. Its members are so closely linked, personally, ideologically and even institutionally, to the Israeli rightwing that it is impossible to disentangle what is American in their thinking from what is Sharon and the Likud's -- and nowhere, Western diplomats in Damascus say, is this more obvious than it is with regard to Syria.

The Accountability Act -- which calls for sanctions against Syria till it stops supporting terrorism, withdraws its forces from Lebanon, ceases development of weapons of mass destruction and enters "serious, unconditional" peace negotiations with Israel -- is something the U.S. neocons have been working for since the mid-1990s. That was when they first proposed their joint Israeli-American strategy for "regime change" in Syria as well as Iraq, to be accomplished by such means as attacks on Syria by "Israeli proxy forces" based in Lebanon, Israeli attacks on Syrian targets in Lebanon and "select" targets in Syria itself.

The deepening U.S.-Israeli alliance is all too liable to backfire. What the U.S. is permitting Israel to do in Palestine and Syria will further inflame Arab and Muslim hostility to what it is doing in Iraq. The effects of that will be felt at the popular level; as despised Arab regimes look ever more incapable of fulfilling the fundamental duty of any government: defense against foreign attack and domination. The militants among their people -- like Hanadi Jaradat in Palestine -- assume that duty themselves; they become terrorists and suicide bombers wherever motive and opportunity for it most potently coincide. Iraq and Palestine are one and the same. "Those," said Beirut's Daily Star, "who cannot take revenge on Israeli occupation will happily visit it on U.S. troops in Tikrit."

As for the regimes, Syria has so far opted for restraint. Aware that its only hope of securing its future in a general Middle East settlement is via the United States, it may become even more conciliatory than it already is. But if Sharon keeps up his attacks, there will surely be a limit to such restraint, set by tactical necessity, domestic public opinion and its own perception of itself as a last bastion of Arab steadfastness.

Damascus has intimated that, at some point, it will hit back -- perhaps by really adopting the spoiler's role in Iraq that the U.S. unconvincingly attributes to it already, or, more likely, by activating Hezbollah against Israel. Of course that would be very risky, given Israel's vast superiority over it in conventional military terms. But -- as Damascus will no doubt calculate -- can the U.S., floundering in Iraq, really afford another Middle East conflagration of its ally's making?

The "Israelization" of America, as a key ingredient in the ever more noxious Middle East brew, is not an extravagant term for a relationship in which, typically, Sharon leads and Bush lamely follows. The pattern constantly repeats itself. Bush may have misgivings about what Sharon does -- at his military excesses, his relentless settlement drive, his "wall" and now his attack on Syria -- and he may stammer out mild admonitions, but he always accommodates him in the end.

With Iraq itself eating away at his prospects of election for a second term, Bush will be more accommodating than ever, more deferential to all the "friends of Israel" in America from whom Sharon draws most of his power to lead -- or mislead -- him.

With the next suicide bomber will Sharon reply against the offices of "terrorist" organizations in Damascus itself -- as he has clearly intimated he might? One thing is sure: If, somewhere down such a road, lies an American disaster in Iraq and a monumental scuttle, the Israeli partner in this most extraordinary and counterproductive of alliances will pay higher price than America itself.

David Hirst is the Mideast correspondent for The Guardian in London. Based in Beirut, he has been covering the region for 30 years.

The Japan Times: Oct. 23, 2003

japantimes.co.jp



To: John Sladek who wrote (1059)12/14/2003 11:37:18 PM
From: Raymond Duray  Respond to of 2171
 
More Tariq Ali: "The Same Old Racket in Iraq"

commondreams.org

To the Victors, the Spoils: Bush's Colonialism Will Only Deepen Resistance

by Tariq Ali

Iraq remains a country of unbearable suffering, the sort that only soldiers and administrators acting on behalf of states and governments are capable of inflicting on their fellow humans. It is the first country where we can begin to study the impact of a 21st-century colonization. This takes place in an international context of globalization and neo-liberal hegemony. If the economy at home is determined by the primacy of consumption, speculation as the main hub of economic activity and no inviolate domains of public provision, only a crazed utopian could imagine that a colonized Iraq would be any different.

The state facilities that were so carefully targeted with bombs and shells have now to be reconstructed, but this time under the aegis of private firms, preferably American, though Blair and Berlusconi, and perhaps plucky Poland too, will not be forgotten at handouts time. Meanwhile, Dick Cheney's old firm, Halliburton, awarded a contract (without any competition) to rebuild Iraq's oil industry, is happily boosting profits by charging the US government $2.64 a gallon for the fuel it trucks into Iraq from Kuwait. The normal price per gallon in the region is 71 cents, but since the US taxpayer is footing the bill, nobody cares.

The secret plan to privatize the country by selling off its assets to western corporations was drafted in February this year and surfaced in the Wall Street Journal, which helpfully explained that "for many conservatives, Iraq is now the test case for whether the United States can engender American-style free-market capitalism within the Arab world". Worried by the leaks, Bush and Blair issued a user-friendly joint statement on April 8, stressing that Iraq's oil and other natural resources are "the patrimony of the people of Iraq, which should be used only for their benefit". But who decides on behalf of the Iraqi people - Bremer/Chalabi or Chalabi/Bremer?

Iraq's state-run health service, which, prior to the killer sanctions, was the most advanced in the region, is now being privatized, courtesy of Abt Associates, a US firm specializing in privatizations that has clearly been forgiven its record of "invoice irregularities" by its Washington patron. Its first priority is instructive. It has demanded armored cars for its staff. Khudair Abbas, the orthopedic surgeon from Ilford and "minister for health" in the puppet government, was recently in London boasting of the state-of-the-art hospitals they would soon build to create a "two-tier health system". Sound familiar?

This week Bush amplified US policy by insisting on the time-honored norm: to the victor, the spoils. Why should those countries (Germany, France, China, Russia, etc) that had refused to make the necessary blood sacrifice expect a share of the loot? The EU is screaming "foul", and its bureaucrats are suggesting that by denying the non-belligerent states equal opportunities to exploit an occupied Iraq, the US is withdrawing itself from the groove of capitalist legality. These arguments won't carry much weight in Washington, but if China, Russia and France insist that, as the occupying powers, the US and Britain should immediately meet the debts incurred by the former Iraqi regime, there might be some basis for negotiation. A few bones in the shape of juicy subcontracts could be thrown in the direction of China and the EU, but only if they stop whining and behave themselves in public.

On its own, the privatization plan, if implemented successfully, would be a disaster for the bulk of Iraqi citizens (as is the case in most of Latin America and central Asia), but the situation here is unique. These "reforms" are being imposed at tank point. Many Iraqis perceive them as a recolonization of the country, and they have provoked an effective and methodical resistance. On the military level, the situation continues to deteriorate, thus remaining the source of numerous internal difficulties and sustaining friction and strife within the west.

In a recent dispatch from Baghdad in the New York Review of Books, Mark Danner reported that in the two months (October and November) he spent in the occupied city, the number of daily attacks on US troops had more than doubled, from 15 to 35, and behind the bombings of other targets "one can see a rather methodical intention to sever, one by one, with patience, care and precision, the fragile lines that still tie the occupation authority to the rest of the world". How will the occupying armies respond? In the only way they can, with the traditional methods of colonial rule. The Israelis are trying their best to help, but they haven't been too successful themselves.

On December 7, the front page of the New York Times carried a report from Dexter Filkins in Baghdad. Its opening paragraph could have applied to virtually any major colonial conflict of the past century: "As the guerrilla war against Iraqi insurgents intensifies, American soldiers have begun wrapping entire villages in barbed wire. In selective cases, American soldiers are demolishing buildings thought to be used by Iraqi attackers. They have begun imprisoning relatives of suspected guerrillas in hope of pressing insurgents to turn themselves in."

During the first phase of European colonization., it was the companies that were provided with a charter to raise their own armies to defend their commercial interests. The British and Dutch East India companies took India and Java. Later, their countries' empires moved in to take control and consolidate the gains. It was different in the Americas. Here it was always a case of "send in the marines". General Smedley Butler, a much-decorated and celebrated US war hero of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with 34 years' military service, later reflected on his campaigns and produced a telling volume entitled War as a Racket. He explained his central thesis thus: "I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism... I helped make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies in 1903. I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefits of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long."

The 21st-century colonial model appears to be a combination of the two approaches. Specialist companies are now encouraged to provide "security". They employ the mercenaries, and their profits are ensured by the state that hires them. They are backed up by the real army and, more importantly, by air power, to help defeat the enemy. But none of this will work if the population remains hostile. And large-scale repression only helps to unite the population against the occupiers. The fear in Washington is that the Iraqi resistance might attempt a sensational hit just before the next presidential election. The fear in the Arab east is that Bush and Cheney might escalate the conflict to retain the White House in 2004. Both fears may well be justified.