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To: epicure who wrote (4187)10/28/2003 9:08:58 AM
From: epicure  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 20773
 
Iraq Paradox: Cracking Down While Promoting Freedom
By DAVID E. SANGER

Published: October 28, 2003

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 — At one of the first meetings of the White House's new Iraq Stabilization Group, days before the series of attacks on Monday that left at least 34 dead, President Bush's aides debated the trade-off between locking down Baghdad and demonstrating to Iraqis that they now live in an open society, where they are free to shop, go to work or even protest the American-led occupation.

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"It wasn't much of a discussion," one of Mr. Bush's senior aides reported. "We couldn't turn the place into a police state for long, even if we wanted to. And if we did, it would be a Pyrrhic victory."

Now that question is more urgent than ever.

Even with the number and sophistication of the daily attacks accelerating, Mr. Bush's response to questions about how the United States should respond has become almost automatic: The United States is slowly winning hearts and minds, and making Saddam Hussein's loyalists "more desperate" each day.

The situation will improve, he argues, as Iraqis themselves take more and more authority over the security scene.

Meanwhile, Mr. Bush's aides and Pentagon officials describe what is going on as a war of attrition, against enemies whose resources are being depleted, suggesting they will eventually run out of steam.

But when speaking on background, some senior administration officials acknowledge that some of those answers are beginning to ring hollow. Retraining the Iraqi Army, as Mr. Bush was reminded again on Monday in an Oval Office meeting with L. Paul Bremer III, the chief of the American authority in Iraq, is a slow business — far too slow for the urgency of the problems facing the occupation forces.

While the mixture of loyalists to Saddam Hussein, foreign infiltrators and released criminals may not be able to build momentum over the long term, they have certainly built some in the past few weeks — as demonstrated by the attack on the Rashid Hotel on Sunday and the apparently coordinated attacks on the Red Cross and police stations on Monday.

Targets like those could be cordoned off with new bomb barriers, new walls, new restrictions on movement.

But then, said one senior official, "you would have Beirut, without the ocean view."

So the decision for now is to avoid a crackdown, especially one so disruptive of everyday life that Arabs could seize upon it as evidence that Iraqis have simply traded one kind of repression for another.

The first test has already descended on the administration: Ramadan. Only a few hours after the bombing on Monday, Maj. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of the Fourth Infantry Division, was telling reporters how his troops had been told to keep their distance during the most sacred month on the Muslim calendar. He said they should "not really be patrolling or be around those areas when they are in their time of — when they're conducting their prayers."

In other words, in the name of a light touch and religious freedom, General Odierno's troops are creating another buffer zone — one where Iraqis can observe the holy month, and where holdovers of the old government and their foreign allies can plan and try to carry out terror attacks.

It is not clear that there are any other choices. The attack on the Rashid Hotel on Sunday, during the visit of the deputy secretary of defense, Paul D. Wolfowitz, underscores the nature of the problem. The hotel is well within a security buffer, and it is surrounded by a wall.

Its attackers had to fire their rockets from hundreds of yards away, with a makeshift launcher hidden in a portable electric generator. A wider security perimeter would probably have halted the attack, and saved the life of the one American, an Army colonel, who was killed in his hotel room.

But it also would have required closing down an entire Baghdad neighborhood, one filled with Iraqis who, for the most part, have welcomed Mr. Hussein's ouster from power.

"Locking down Baghdad would take enormous manpower and resources, more than the administration has been willing to provide," said Michele A. Flournoy, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here, and a former Pentagon official in the Clinton administration.

Even were such a lockdown possible, she said, "It would be at a great cost — perhaps at the cost of turning the Baghdad population against us, decisively."

That would be risky at any moment, she said, but particularly now, "at a tipping point where we must keep the Baghdad population with us, or at least not against us.

"If we make their life difficult," Ms. Flournoy said, "we may lose their support."

That is the kind of problem that Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser, had in mind when she created the Iraq Stabilization Group, the coordinating committee inside the White House that is supposed to hone Mr. Bush's message, keep the Iraqi economy growing, and balance good military practice and good politics.

It is a balancing act, one senior administration official said during Mr. Bush's trip to Asia, that is being made all the more difficult by the absence of vocal support from the rest of the Arab world.

There has been no outcry, he noted, from "neighboring states — our allies — as the attacks on Americans have mounted. No outcry at all. Which has got to embolden the terror groups."

Mr. Bush is also increasingly concerned about the infiltration of foreign fighters from the Iranian and Syrian borders. Measuring their numbers is nearly impossible, American officials say. But the concern is that they are a source of continuing funds, technology and strength for the pro-Hussein forces.

The White House strategy, one senior official noted, depends heavily on choking off those funds, guns and explosives so that the Hussein loyalists are gradually starved of resources. "To look at the plan," the senior official said, "the starvation effect should have started a few months ago. It didn't — and that's something to worry about."



To: epicure who wrote (4187)10/29/2003 6:22:51 AM
From: Ron  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 20773
 
Up to 15,000 people killed in Iraq invasion, claims thinktank
Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington
Wednesday October 29, 2003
The Guardian

As many as 15,000 Iraqis were killed in the first days of America's invasion and occupation of Iraq, a study produced by an independent US thinktank said yesterday. Up to 4,300 of the dead were civilian noncombatants.

The report, by Project on Defence Alternatives, a research institute from Cambridge, Massachussets, offers the most comprehensive account so far of how many Iraqis died.

The toll of Iraq's war dead covered by the report is limited to the early stages of the war, from March 19 when American tanks crossed the Kuwaiti border, to April 20, when US troops had consolidated their hold on Baghdad.

Researchers drew on hospital records, official US military statistics, news reports, and survey methodology to arrive at their figures.

They were also able to make use of two earlier studies on Iraq's war dead from Iraq Body Count, a website which has kept a running total of those killed, and the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, which has sought to count the dead and injured of the war in order to pursue compensation claims for their families.

The new report, which estimates Iraq's war dead at between 10,800 and 15,100, uses a far more rigorous definition of civilian than the other studies to arrive at a figure of between 3,200 and 4,300 civilian noncombatants.

It breaks down the combat deaths of up to 10,800 Iraqis who fought the American invasion. The figures include regular Iraqi troops, as well as members of the Ba'ath party and other militias.

The killing was concentrated - with heavy casualties at the southern entrances of Baghdad - but as many as 80% of the Iraqi army units survived the war relatively unscathed, in part because troops deserted.

As many as 5,726 Iraqis were killed in the US assault on Baghdad, when the streets of the Iraqi capital were strewn with the bodies of people trying to flee the fighting.

As many as 3,531 - more than half - of the dead in the assault on the capital were noncombatant civilians, according to the report.

Overall in Iraq, the ratio of civilian to military deaths is almost twice as high as it was in the last Gulf war in 1991. The overall toll of the first war was far higher - with estimates of 20,000 Iraqi soldiers and 3,500 civilians killed.

However, Operation Iraqi Freedom, as the US military calls this year's war, has proved far deadlier to Iraqi civilians both in absolute numbers, and in the proportion of noncombatant to military deaths.

The findings defy the reasoning that precision-guided weapons spare civilian lives. According to the author of the study, Carol Conetta, 68% of the munitions used in this war were precision-guided, compared with 6.5 % in 1991.

However, he argued yesterday that his report demonstrated that sophisticated weaponry did not necessarily offer protection to civilians in war zones.

"Many of the recent wars have been fought with the notion of a new type of warfare that produce very low civilian casualties. What we see here is that in fact we don't have that magic bullet," he said.

"In this war in particular we see that improved capabilities in precision attacks have been used to pursue more ambitious objectives rather than achieve lower numbers of civilian dead."

Counting the human cost

Total war dead (Iraq)

Between 10,800 and 15,100, with a midpoint of 12,950

Combatants killed (Iraq)

Between 7,600 and 10,800, with a midpoint of 9,200

Noncombatants killed (Iraq)

Between 3,200 and 4,300, with a midpoint of 3,750

War dead (Baghdad)

Between 4,376 and 5,726, with a midpoint of 5,051

Combatants killed (Baghdad)

Between 2,224 and 3,531, with a midpoint of 2,878

Noncombatants killed (Baghdad)

Between 1,990 and 2,357, with a midpoint of 2,174

· Source: Project on Defence Alternatives research
guardian.co.uk