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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (118066)10/30/2003 12:34:00 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Are they still Bush's dream team?

miami.com

BY JONATHAN S. LANDAY, WARREN P. STROBEL AND WILLIAM DOUGLAS
Knight Ridder News Service
10/26/03




WASHINGTON -- In the days before he assumed the presidency in 2001, George W. Bush liked to boast about the foreign policy ''Dream Team'' he had assembled.

Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were all ''smart people'' who would compensate for the former Texas governor's lack of international experience.

''General Powell's a strong figure, and Dick Cheney's no shrinking violet, nor Condi Rice,'' Bush said in December 2000. ``I view the four as being able to complement each other.''

But after nearly three years in office, Bush's dream team is beset by infighting, backstabbing and maneuvering on major foreign policy issues involving North Korea, Syria, Iran and postwar Iraq. The result has been paralysis, inconsistency and a zigzagging U.S. policy that confuses lawmakers on Capitol Hill and disturbs America's friends, allies and would-be partners.

It has hampered U.S. policies in the Middle East, where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to rage, caused anxiety in Asia, where the administration's refusal to deal directly with North Korea has dismayed allies, and has seriously soured relations with some North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, say U.S. and foreign officials.

One U.S. diplomat, who asked not to be named, recalled what he said was Chinese exasperation over what they perceived as conflicting messages from the administration on North Korea. ''We actually don't care what your point of view is. Just have one,'' he quoted his Chinese counterparts as saying.

White House officials declined to comment for this story.

The battles between Bush's foreign policy principals spilled into public view recently after Bush announced he had tapped Rice to oversee a new group designed to reduce violence and speed the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld, whose Pentagon has led the charge of postwar Iraq, publicly bristled at the news and hinted that he had not been consulted. Rumsfeld suggested that in forming the Iraq Stabilization Group and putting Rice in charge, the president was finally having the National Security Council do its job of coordinating the various government agencies involved in rebuilding Iraq.

The Bush foreign affairs team can't seem to agree even when it embarks on a mission in unison. Tired of what it felt were negative media reports from Iraq, the White House launched a public relations blitz three weeks ago. The president, Cheney and Rice delivered speeches stating the administration's case.

The outcome was a series of addresses that varied so much in tone and message that some leading lawmakers, such as Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., were left dismayed.

'I'm not certain who assigns these or whether people just say `I've got to say something' and just blurt it out,'' said Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Bush ``really has to indicate a unified voice, his voice, to the American people and people abroad.''

Bureaucratic infighting in foreign policy is nothing new. During George Washington's administration, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams battled, often viciously, over whether the United States should tilt toward England or France. Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger squabbled in the Reagan administration. National security adviser Henry Kissinger overpowered Secretary of State William Rogers in the Nixon administration, and Jimmy Carter's secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, quit after the failed 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran, which he had opposed.

But the Weinberger-Shultz fights and those between Vance and Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, ''look like Sunday-school picnics'' compared with the present fights ''in terms of freezing the administration's ability to act,'' said a former U.S. official, who requested anonymity.

DIFFERENT OUTLOOKS

The conflict pits so-called neo-conservatives led by Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld against so-called pragmatists led by Secretary of State Powell, and is fueled by a major difference in world outlook, say knowledgeable officials.

''This time it's not about tactics; it's about ideology,'' said one senior official who served in several Republican administrations.

The Cheney-Rumsfeld camp looks at the terrorist threat much as communism was viewed during the Cold War: a global network of evildoers whose links to one another are real even if they aren't visible. They oppose negotiating with regimes in Syria, Iran, Iraq and North Korea that support terrorism.

The pragmatists, who include CIA Director George Tenet and some members of the armed services, are ideological descendants of Kissinger. They continue to seek some form of détente with Syria, Iran and North Korea, believing that a combination of international sanctions, carrots and sticks can moderate their behavior.

The divisions between the two camps were muted at the outset of the administration, but they hardened after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, several top officials said.

''What happened was that Cheney and Rumsfeld essentially went on a crusade against terrorism, starting with Iraq, and Powell kept trying, mostly without success, to rein them in,'' said one official, who like the others spoke only on the condition of anonymity. 'Cheney is always in Bush's ear, whispering `terrorism, terrorism, terrorism.' He's obsessed.''

Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he's hearing more complaints about Cheney's influence on foreign policy matters.

''If you look at Afghanistan, if you look at the [Israeli-Palestinian peace] roadmap, if you look at Iraq, if you look at bilateral and multilateral dealings with the Europeans, just as Powell looks like he will stitch the garment back together again, Cheney goes to the Heritage Foundation [a conservative think tank] and re-enunciates the policy of pre-emption,'' Biden said. ``It's just what they did in Iraq. They outsmarted the centrist or the internationalists in this administration, and the neo-cons carried the day.''

One of the major internal battles centers on who will lead Iraq. Civilian leaders in the Pentagon have pushed for Ahmad Chalabi, a controversial Iraqi leader who for years lived in exile in London, to replace former President Saddam Hussein.

Chalabi, head of the U.S.-backed Iraqi National Congress and now a member of Iraq's Governing Council, had spent years winning over Washington figures such as Cheney and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz by pledging support for democracy.

But Chalabi, who was convicted of bank fraud in absentia in Jordan in 1992 and sentenced to 22 years in prison, is distrusted by the State Department, the CIA and many senior U.S. military commanders. They view him as a self-serving and unreliable source of ``intelligence.''

State Department officials last year withheld about $8 million in funding for the INC in a dispute over accounting irregularities. Shortly after that, the Defense Department agreed to pick up the funding.

The internal turf battles have not been limited to Iraq.

In one early skirmish, the Pentagon defied a White House decision in early 2002 to conclude a legally binding treaty with Moscow that placed new limits on the number of nuclear warheads that could be fielded by the United States and Russia. As U.S. and Russian diplomats hammered out a document, Pentagon officials, in separate talks with their Russian counterparts, continued to push for a non-binding agreement. And Pentagon officials unsuccessfully tried to change portions of the draft agreed to by diplomats.

Eventually, Bush had to intercede with Rumsfeld, reminding him that he wanted a legally binding treaty, which Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on May 24, 2002.

NORTH KOREA

The longest-running battle among the administration's foreign policy titans has been over North Korea. Fissures surfaced early when Bush surprised Powell by temporarily abandoning a Clinton administration policy of seeking an end to North Korea's missile program through negotiation.

The State Department insisted on talks to solve the problem, while the Pentagon opposed any negotiations. That argument was still going on as multi-nation talks involving North Korea got underway, first in April and then in August, in Beijing.

The talks have been stymied by North Korea's demand for a non-aggression pact from the United States. Powell has called the demand a non-starter, but added that there could be another way to give North Korea a written assurance that the United States won't attack. But that idea has met stiff resistance among the administration's hardliners, despite Bush's offer last week to discuss a security guarantee.

Biden believes the neo-conservatives' rejection of any kind of nonaggression pledge has hurt the prospects of resolving the North Korea nuclear crisis.

The administration has ''screwed it up so badly so far that it may not be redeemable,'' Biden said.

Bush himself has apparently grown tired of the internal bickering spilling into public view. He has implored his senior administration officials to cooperate with each other and two weeks ago ordered them to stop leaks to the media.

''Sometimes, you realize that too much time is being spent on the wrong things,'' one senior administration official said.



To: tekboy who wrote (118066)10/30/2003 2:10:59 AM
From: KLP  Respond to of 281500
 
Thanks tekboy, will look forward to reading this tomorrow.



To: tekboy who wrote (118066)10/30/2003 4:30:52 AM
From: Elsewhere  Respond to of 281500
 
transcript of a CFR meeting

Interesting reading.

We, ourselves, have excellent men on the job. I have the highest regard for Clay

... who became the airlift hero. The Berliners loved him.
cnn.com

jj@clayallee.de
berliner-stadtplan.com



To: tekboy who wrote (118066)10/30/2003 10:22:58 AM
From: Alastair McIntosh  Respond to of 281500
 
Or you could read it here:

Message 19415899



To: tekboy who wrote (118066)11/1/2003 5:45:22 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
The intelligence war
_____________________________

How can Bush feign shock at the carnage in Baghdad when he signed off on reports that predicted it ?

- - - - - - - - - - - -

By Sidney Blumenthal
Salon.com
Nov. 1, 2003

In Baghdad, the Bush administration acts as though it is astonished by the postwar carnage. Its feigned shock is a consequence of Washington's intelligence wars. In fact, not only was it warned of the coming struggle and its nature -- ignoring a $5 million State Department report on "The Future of Iraq" -- but Bush himself signed another document in which that predictive information is contained.

According to the congressional resolution authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, the administration is required to submit to Congress reports of postwar planning every 60 days. One such report -- previously undisclosed but revealed here -- bears Bush's signature and is dated April 14. It declares: "We are especially concerned that the remnants of the Saddam Hussein regime will continue to use Iraqi civilian populations as a shield for its regular and irregular combat forces or may attack the Iraqi population in an effort to undermine Coalition goals." Moreover, the report goes on: "Coalition planners have prepared for these contingencies, and have designed the military campaign to minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure."

Yet on Aug. 25, as the violence in postwar Iraq flared, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that this possibility was not foreseen: "Now was -- did we -- was it possible to anticipate that the battles would take place south of Baghdad and that then there would be a collapse up north, and there would be very little killing and capturing of those folks, because they blended into the countryside and they're still fighting their war?"

"We read their reports," a Senate source told me. "Too bad they don't read their own reports."

In advance of the war, Bush (to be precise, Cheney, the de facto prime minister to the distant monarch) viewed the CIA, the State Department and other intelligence agencies not simply as uncooperative, but even disloyal, as their analysts continued to sift through information to determine what exactly might be true. For the intelligence analysts, this process is at the essence of their professionalism and mission. Yet the strict insistence on the empirical was a threat to the ideological, facts an imminent danger to the doctrine. So those facts had to be suppressed, and those creating contrary evidence had to be marginalized, intimidated or have their reputations tarnished.

Twice Vice President Dick Cheney veered his motorcade to the George H.W. Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, Va., where he personally tried to coerce CIA desk-level analysts to fit their work to specification in the run-up to the war.

If the CIA would not serve, it would be trampled. At the Pentagon, Rumsfeld formed the Office of Special Plans, a parallel counter-CIA under the direction of the neoconservative Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, to "stovepipe" its own version of intelligence directly to the White House. Its reports were not to be mingled or shared with the CIA or State Department intelligence for fear of corruption by skepticism. Instead, the Pentagon's handpicked future leader of Iraq, Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, replaced the CIA as the reliable source of information, little of which turned out to be true -- though his deceit was consistent with his record. Chalabi was regarded at the CIA as a mountebank after he had lured the agency to support his "invasion" of Iraq in 1995, a tragicomic episode, but one that hardly discouraged his neoconservative sponsors.

Early last year, before Hans Blix, chief of the United Nations' team to monitor Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, embarked on his mission, Wolfowitz ordered a report from the CIA to show that Blix had been soft on Iraq in the past and thus to undermine him before he even began his work. When the CIA reached an opposite conclusion, Wolfowitz was described by a former State Department official in the Washington Post as having "hit the ceiling." Then, according to former Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin, when Blix met with Cheney at the White House, the vice president told him what would happen if his efforts on WMD did not support Bush policy: "We will not hesitate to discredit you." Blix's brush with Cheney was no different than the administration's treatment of the CIA.

Having already decided upon its course in Iraq, the Bush administration demanded the fabrication of evidence to fit into an imminent threat. Then, fulfilling the driven logic of the Bush Doctrine, preemptive action could be taken. Policy a priori dictated intelligence à la carte.

In Bush's Washington, politics is the extension of war by other means. Rather than seeking to reform any abuse of intelligence, the Bush administration, through the Republican-dominated Senate Intelligence Committee, is producing a report that will accuse the CIA of giving faulty information. While the CIA is being cast as a scapegoat, FBI agents are meanwhile interviewing senior officials about a potential criminal conspiracy behind the public identification of a covert CIA operative -- who, not coincidentally, happens to be the wife of the former U.S. ambassador Joseph Wilson IV, author of the report on the false Niger yellowcake uranium claims (originating in the office of Vice President Dick Cheney). Wilson's irrefutable documentation was carefully shelved at the time in order to put 16 false words about Saddam Hussein's nuclear threat in the mouth of George W. Bush in his State of the Union address.

When it comes to responsibility for the degradation of intelligence in developing rationales for the war, Bush is energetically trying not to get to the bottom of anything. While he has asserted the White House is cooperating with the investigation into the felony of outing Mrs. Wilson, his spokesman has assiduously drawn a fine line between the legal and the political. After all, though Karl Rove -- the president's political strategist and senior advisor, indispensable to his reelection campaign -- unquestionably called a journalist to prod him that Mrs. Wilson was "fair game," his summoning of the furies upon her apparently occurred after her name was already put into the public arena by two other unnamed "senior administration officials."

Rove is not considered to have committed a firing offense so long as he has merely behaved unethically. What Bush is not doing -- not demanding that his staff sign affidavits swearing their innocence, or asking his vice president point-blank what he knows -- is glaringly obvious. Damaging national security must be secondary to political necessity.

"It's important to recognize," Joseph Wilson remarked to me, "that the person who decided to make a political point or that his political agenda was more important than a national security asset is still there in place. I'm appalled at the apparent nonchalance shown by the president."

Now, postwar, the intelligence wars, if anything, have gotten more intense. Blame-shifting by the administration is the order of the day. The Republican Senate Intelligence Committee report will point the finger at the CIA, but circumspectly not review how Bush used intelligence. The Democrats, in the Senate minority, forced to act like a fringe group, held unofficial hearings this week with prominent former CIA agents: rock-ribbed Republicans who all voted for and even contributed money to Bush, but expressed their amazed anger at the assault being waged on the permanent national security apparatus by the Republican president whose father's name adorns the building where they worked. One of them compressed his disillusionment into the single most resonant word an intelligence agent can muster: "betrayal."

- - - - - - - - - - - -

About the writer:
Sidney Blumenthal, former assistant and senior adviser to President Clinton, and author of "The Clinton Wars," is writing a column for The Guardian of London and Salon.

salon.com



To: tekboy who wrote (118066)11/2/2003 5:48:32 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
How the war in Iraq undermined the war on terror.
________________________

By Daniel Benjamin*
Slate
Posted Thursday, October 30, 2003, at 2:25 PM PT

slate.msn.com

<<...The Bush administration chose its moment of opportunity for confronting Iraq, not radical Islam and terror. So now we are stuck with an Iraq policy, not a foreign policy for dealing with a global challenge—and for a hundred well-known reasons, we cannot afford to let Iraq fail. Rumsfeld asks in his memo whether we are now in a situation in the war on terror in which "the harder we work, the behinder we get?"

The answer is yes...>>
________________________________

*Daniel Benjamin, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was director for counterterrorism on the National Security Council staff. He is the co-author of The Age of Sacred Terror.