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To: LindyBill who wrote (15214)	11/5/2003 1:47:13 AM
From: KLP	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793717

Races, Ballot Items Around U.S. Tuesday Tuesday, November 04, 2003 foxnews.com GOVERNORS -- Mississippi: Democratic Gov. Ronnie Musgrove (search) was locked in a tight race with Haley Barbour (search), a top Washington lobbyist and former head of the Republican National Committee. State Sen. Barbara Blackmon lost a bid to become Mississippi's first black female lieutenant governor after losing to incumbent GOP Lt. Gov. Amy Tuck. -- Kentucky: GOP Rep. Ernie Fletcher (search) easily defeated Democratic Attorney General Ben Chandler to succeed term-limited Democratic Gov. Paul Patton, becoming the first Republican to lead the state in 32 years. Former University of Kentucky basketball player Richie Farmer, a Republican, defeated Democrat Alice Baesler for agriculture commissioner in a matchup that touched on the state's deep passion for basketball. -- Louisiana: A Nov. 15 runoff for governor will pit Democratic Lt. Gov. Kathleen Blanco against Bobby Jindal, a former health policy adviser in the Bush administration. GOP Gov. Mike Foster is term-limited. LEGISLATIVE -- New Jersey: Democrats gained control of both houses. The New Jersey Senate had been tied 20-20; Democrats narrowly controlled state House. -- Virginia: Republicans held their majorities in the state Senate and House of Delegates. Mississippi also electing legislatures; Louisiana's legislative elections take place Nov. 15. MAYORS -- Philadelphia: Democratic Mayor John Street easily won re-election against Republican businessman Sam Katz in a rematch of their 1999 contest. Street's poll numbers rose after revelations the FBI bugged his office; investigators won't discuss the case but have interviewed people who received city contracts. -- Houston: Bill White, an Energy Department deputy secretary in the Clinton administration, was ahead in a field of nine. He spent $2.2 million of his own money in the most expensive mayoral contest in the nation's fourth-largest city. -- San Francisco: Entrepreneur Gavin Newsom had a wide lead in the polls in a crowded race to succeed longtime politician Willie Brown, who was term-limited. Newsom's successful 2002 ballot initiative to get panhandlers off city streets won him attention. A runoff is likely. -- Hayden Lake, Idaho: Neo-Nazi Richard Butler ran for mayor of town of 9,000, three years after he lost his compound outside of town in a civil rights lawsuit. -- Buffalo, N.Y.: City's longest-serving mayor, James Griffin, sought election to Common Council. -- Charleston, S.C.: Mayor Joseph P. Riley Jr. won an unprecedented eighth term, defeating four challengers. -- Akron, Ohio: The city's longest-serving mayor, Democrat Don Plusquellic, won a fifth term and voters rejected a separate proposal to add mayoral term limits. -- Birmingham, Ala.: Democratic Mayor Bernard Kincaid was re-elected with the support from a former mayor whose administration he once called corrupt. BALLOT QUESTIONS GAMBLING -- Maine: Rejected a $650 million gambling resort. Supporters said state's first casino would produce jobs; foes said it would tarnish Maine's outdoorsy image. -- Indiana: Approved riverboat casino in French Lick, hometown of basketball great Larry Bird, a potential investor. -- Colorado: Turned down proposal to allow slot machines at racetracks. LIGHT RAIL: -- Tucson, Ariz.: Emphatically rejected a proposal for a 13-mile light rail system. Houston and Kansas City, Mo., considering similar measures. MISCELLANEOUS: -- Denver: Rejected a measure requiring City Council to implement stress-reduction measures, a proposal championed by former Transcendental Meditation teacher but scoffed at by several council members. -- Colorado: Considering $2 billion in bonds for water projects, a proposal that pitted arid, populous east against western ranchers. -- Washington state: Vote on repeal of rules aimed at reducing repetitive-strain injuries in workplace. -- San Francisco: Considering setting $8.50 minimum wage for virtually all workers. -- Cleveland Heights: Measure to allow same-sex and unmarried heterosexual couples to register as domestic partners. -- Richmond, Va.: Overwhelmingly approved a measure for direct elections of the mayor, rather than appointment by City Council. -- New York City: Defeated measure to abolish primaries and have nonpartisan elections for mayor and certain other city posts. -- Pennsylvania: Approved pair of amendments to the state Constitution designed to allow children to testify by closed-circuit television or videotape, already allowed in 35 other states.

To: LindyBill who wrote (15214)	11/5/2003 9:48:40 PM
From: JF Quinnelly	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793717

As recently as last year, Rumsfeld and his top confidante for transformation issues, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Steven Cambone, were reported to be continuing to plan to reduce the number of Army divisions from ten to as few as six, for a reduction of up to 40 percent. Under that earlier scenario, the few remaining Army divisions would then be transformed into an all-wheeled force of motorized light infantry brigades without the tanks or tracked vehicles necessary to fight and win major conflicts. sftt.org DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt" 11-04-2003 Guest Column: New Army Brigade Plan Is Dangerous By David Pyne Following his unprecedented and premature retirement of 47 U.S. Army generals and with his installation of hand-picked replacements to lead the U.S. Army nearly completed, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is on the verge of moving full bore to begin implementing long-planned reforms, including the complete elimination of the Army’s division-based force structure. Rumsfeld and his hand-picked replacement as Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Shoemaker, plan to replace it with a force structure based on dismounted infantry-centric mini-brigade units consisting of about 1,800 men – each of which will be more optimized to fight small wars, but less suited to fighting major conflicts. These new mini-brigades will reportedly consist of only two battalions each down from the four battalions of today’s combat brigades. Shoemaker recently announced his plan to immediately begin implementing this reformed structure with the 101st Air Assault Division and the 3rd Infantry Division, both of which have just returned to the United States following a long-term deployments in Iraq. Five mini-brigade size units will be derived from each of the two divisions, which will then be ready for action about a year from now, presumably for redeployment to Iraq. These mini-brigades will have a smaller complement of men and fighting vehicles than current brigade combat teams, but will also have limited integrated artillery and aviation assets as divisions do today on a much larger scale. The divisions themselves will become similar to Army corps headquarters, which are little more than command-and-control units for attached subordinate elements. Once the reorganization of these two divisions is complete, Shoemaker will then report back to Rumsfeld with a recommendation on the future size of the Army. The presumption is that he will recommend a substantial reduction to the Army’s end-strength. At the annual Association of the United States Army conference last month, top Army officials including Shoemaker confirmed plans to disband all of the Army’s heavy divisions and discard its tanks and tracked vehicles by 2025, without which the United States cannot fight or win a major wars. Shoemaker is also reportedly considering “transforming” in the near term one of the Army’s existing six heavy divisions into a light infantry division by removing all of its tanks and tracked vehicle assets. This particular change will provide more optimized units for ongoing occupation and peacemaking duties in Iraq. Given that the 3rd Infantry division, a heavy division, is already slated to undergo a major reorganization, it may well be the division selected for transformation from a heavy mechanized force to a light unarmored infantry force. These plans seem to indicate that the Army leadership does not anticipate that major conflicts such as the recent U.S. invasion of Iraq will be waged in the foreseeable future and that Operations Other Than War (OOTW) such as U.N. peacemaking missions and occupation duties will remain the primary focus of the U.S. Army. Perhaps the new Army leaders agree with Secretary Rumsfeld that all future wars the U.S. military fights will be small wars like Afghanistan, requiring no more than 50,000 special forces and light infantry troops supported by airpower. However, if history teaches us anything, it is that the United States will fight a major war that it did not plan on fighting sometime in the next decade or two. That being the case, any transformation effort that does not recognize that fact and disarms the Army of the weapons that it needs to fight and win major conflicts will inevitably result in the unnecessary deaths of countless thousands of American soldiers in the future. Army generals successfully defended the Army’s force structure from a two-division cut contemplated by Rumsfeld during the 2001 Quadrennial Review process, but it is doubtful that they will continue to resist such cuts for long in opposition to the autocratic Defense Secretary. Rumsfeld is accustomed to getting his own way and sometimes even resorts to firing those who disagree with him on matters of principle as in the case of former Secretary of the Army Thomas White. The elimination of the Army’s divisions would provide Rumsfeld with cover for his longtime plan to slash tens of thousands of troops from the service’s payrolls, despite the fact that the Army remains severely overextended in Iraq. It has been unable to sustain the current level of deployments, forcing the call-up of tens of thousands of Army reservists and National Guard troops to fill the gap. As recently as last year, Rumsfeld and his top confidante for transformation issues, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Steven Cambone, were reported to be continuing to plan to reduce the number of Army divisions from ten to as few as six, for a reduction of up to 40 percent. Under that earlier scenario, the few remaining Army divisions would then be transformed into an all-wheeled force of motorized light infantry brigades without the tanks or tracked vehicles necessary to fight and win major conflicts. Dispensing with the division structure altogether and replacing the Army’s current thirty-three brigades with forty-eight much smaller regiment-sized units, each with fifty-five percent less personnel than modern-day brigades, would allow Rumsfeld to conceal many of his planned Army personnel reductions as part of the transformation to a brigade-focused structure. Rumsfeld may even find a way to bypass the congressional authorization necessary to approve his planned force reductions. There is another reason behind Rumsfeld’s plan to eliminate the Army’s divisions. Since the Vietnam War, the Army’s mobilization plan has ensured that the Army would have to rely upon reserve and National Guard units in any major or protracted conflict. This policy, devised by former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Creighton Abrams, was intended to prevent the U.S. Army from being used in no-win wars in the future without a highly-publicized mobilization of reservists and Guardsmen. That decades-old policy is causing the Bush administration headaches as reservists and their families complain about being sent to Iraq for twelve to eighteen months at a time, creating potential political problems for the president’s re-election campaign. While restructuring the Army will take several years to fully implement, it will make it easier for future presidents to bog down the U.S. Army in future no-win wars – like the one now being waged in Iraq – without the necessity of widespread public support. David T. Pyne, president of the Center for the National Security Interest, a national security think-tank in Arlington, Va., has joined DefenseWatch as a Contributing Editor. He can be reached at pyne@national-security.org. © 2003 David T. Pyne.

To: LindyBill who wrote (15214)	11/5/2003 9:55:23 PM
From: JF Quinnelly	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793717

Now, fortunately, Gen. John Abizaid, who's just taken over Central Command from Tommy Franks, has had the guts to call the conflict in Iraq a "guerrilla war," over his boss Rumsfeld's deep denial that it was any such thing. Then Abizaid leveled with his troops in Iraq and told them the ground truth – that their tour would be extended, to stop bitching to the press and to suck it up. Eric Shinseki, the last four-star who dared to stand up to the SecDef, had his head handed to him after he predicted 200,000 peacekeepers would be needed in Iraq once the sand settled. But I'm betting Abizaid won't be cowed by Rummy's bully-boy routine. And it's about time someone who knows the score stood tall for the troops and took Rummy to task. sftt.org DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt" 07-22-2003 Hack's Target Try a Little Decent Leadership By David H. Hackworth Suddenly, the big breaking headline shocker is that our line soldiers in Iraq have a major morale problem. Except that anyone who's plugged in knows that military morale is lower than today's interest rates – and not just in the Iraqi desert, but pretty much right across the black-boot board. "Why? Aren't they all volunteers?" you ask. "Why don't they just shut up and do what they signed up for?!!" The answer's a no-brainer. We've tasked half the force we had in 1991 with twice the number of missions. More than 500,000 GI Joes and Janes are deployed in 120 countries. And a chunk of rubber or a military force can only be stretched so far before it snaps. That's what the troops are trying to tell us – that they're getting to the breaking point. While there's no easy solution, a good beginning would be more leaders who know and love their troops enough to put their welfare ahead of their own stars and bars. Truth-tellers who are unafraid to lay their careers on the line and stand up to dumb, uninformed decisions such as SecDef Les Aspin's refusing to send tanks requested by a field commander in Somalia or SecDef Donald Rumsfeld's cutting the number of troops recommended by his generals for the invasion of Iraq. Truth-tellers who stand tall and stick to their guns with any and all civilians, from the president on down, over what our forces are capable of doing, the probable consequences of jumping into places like Afghanistan and Iraq, and how running-sore commitments like these degrade their outfit's ability to defend America from international terrorism. Now, fortunately, Gen. John Abizaid, who's just taken over Central Command from Tommy Franks, has had the guts to call the conflict in Iraq a "guerrilla war," over his boss Rumsfeld's deep denial that it was any such thing. Then Abizaid leveled with his troops in Iraq and told them the ground truth – that their tour would be extended, to stop bitching to the press and to suck it up. Eric Shinseki, the last four-star who dared to stand up to the SecDef, had his head handed to him after he predicted 200,000 peacekeepers would be needed in Iraq once the sand settled. But I'm betting Abizaid won't be cowed by Rummy's bully-boy routine. And it's about time someone who knows the score stood tall for the troops and took Rummy to task. Good military leaders like Abizaid are connected with their people. They know what's going on in the trenches because they've been there, leading from the front. Early in the Korean War, I frequently saw Gen. Matt Ridgway, my Army commander at the time, on the forward edge; and later in the war my division commander, Maj. Gen. Joe Cleland, was always up front, dodging incoming and talking to his soldiers. But during five years in Vietnam, I witnessed only two generals who spent real time with the troops – San Antonio's Jim Hollingsworth and now-deceased Willard Pierson. The rest buzzed around in their choppers, providing guidance from a safe distance and perhaps landing occasionally for five careful minutes to "set the example" and collect another medal for "heroism." And it's gotten drastically worse since. In fact, the quality of the senior leadership in our military has been in a steady downward spiral since hands-on leaders like "Chesty" Puller, "Bull" Halsey and Matt Ridgway began to be replaced by bright, well-educated, me-first managers long on PowerPoint presentations but short at walking point. Self-serving, super-smooth MBA types looking to make their move from the Pentagon to plummy destinies with America's major companies. A manager who's out of touch is no big deal on Civvy Street unless the company goes belly up. But on battlefields, soldiers die. If I were in John Abizaid's combat boots, my next order would be for every division commander to spend two solid 24-hour blocks every week with a company doing exactly what the troops do, and for every brigade commander to do the same with a platoon. You better believe the top would be in touch with the bottom in a George Patton minute. And the present huge disconnect between the brass and the grunts would disappear as quickly as a foul smell in a strong wind. Hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831. His newest book is “Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts.” © 2003 David H. Hackworth.

To: LindyBill who wrote (15214)	11/5/2003 10:03:31 PM
From: JF Quinnelly	Respond to of 793717

For sure, the Army Top Guns are reluctant to let go of the Powell Doctrine, which calls for overwhelming force, and accept Rummy’ idea that this proven policy should be scrapped based on the success of the Afghanistan and Iraq models – even though those were actions primarily against insurgents employing mainly Vietnam-era light-infantry weapons against all that “shock and awe.” The generals do have a point: The template for the future should be carefully tested before drastic change becomes locked and cocked. sftt.org DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt" 05-06-2003 Hack's Target Try a Little Lincoln-Style Leadership By David H. Hackworth The U.S. Army has fought many battles since Bunker Hill. But now, during the mop-up of one of its most brilliant campaigns – a war that took down Saddam’s best in a mere few weeks – it's engaged in still another critical fight. And not in Iraq, or with North Korea, Syria or Iran – but with Donald Rumsfeld, the tough guy who runs the Pentagon. Insiders there say that the secretary of defense views the Army top brass as rigid obstructionists unreceptive to his vision for the armed forces. And that Rummy, known as an impatient, ruthless, crafty and very unconventional bureaucratic fighter, will do whatever it takes to kick the Army into the 21st century. Rummy fired the first barrage in his campaign to bring the Army to heel more than a year ago when he announced that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki was toast 14 months before his term expired. Shinseki, a soldier who has served this nation with distinction for almost 40 years, suddenly found himself a lame-duck general in a military society unused to such rude, underhanded – and unprecedented – treatment of its senior leaders. Then two weeks ago on a Friday night – after the Washington media had conveniently disappeared for the weekend – Rummy released shot No. 2 by calling in Secretary of the Army Thomas White, a West Point-trained war hero like Shinseki, and abruptly firing him. White, who'd become a boy general before checking out to make his mark in the corporate world, was treated like some inconsequential dishwasher sacked for breaking too much china. The word is that both White and Shinseki went down because they stood up to Rummy. Another great warrior, Gen. John Keane – Shinseki’s vice chief of staff and heir apparent – has suddenly given that job a pass, citing family problems. That’s an act comparable to a bishop saying no to being pope. My guess is that Keane figured the gain wasn’t worth the pain. Rummy is unquestionably right about reform. Once North Korea is defanged, Special Operations, air and naval power, missiles, gadgets zipping about in space and unmanned aircraft will be the main players in future fights. Large formations of mud soldiers will only be needed much as they’re now being used in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo - to keep the peace after the blitz. That means the Army drastically needs to shape-shift – starting with disappearing a few of its redundant huge headquarters and tank divisions and using the personnel assets and cost savings to expand Special Forces, light infantry and Ranger units. But in his savage attacks on Shinseki, White and the U.S. Army, Rummy, a former reserve naval officer, has given new meaning to the Navy chant, ”Beat Army!” For sure, the Army Top Guns are reluctant to let go of the Powell Doctrine, which calls for overwhelming force, and accept Rummy’ idea that this proven policy should be scrapped based on the success of the Afghanistan and Iraq models – even though those were actions primarily against insurgents employing mainly Vietnam-era light-infantry weapons against all that “shock and awe.” The generals do have a point: The template for the future should be carefully tested before drastic change becomes locked and cocked. While Rummy, too, has a point – the Army brass are cautious – they weren't exactly planning a coup. They well understand that the SecDef is the boss and that what he says is what's going down. It’s fundamental to our Constitution and the American military system: Civilian leadership rules the roost. No way did Rummy need to employ the chain-saw approach and repeated salvos of rudeness and humiliation to have his way. The SecDef seems to take great delight in antagonizing Secretary of State Colin Powell, senators and House members, the press corps and anyone else downrange. But his bloody assault on distinguished warriors who've repeatedly risked their lives for this country has been way over the top. Rummy could take a lesson from Abe Lincoln, who had more than his share of problems with stiff-necked generals. In spite of their differences, however, he treated them with respect and dignity and eventually won them over – and along the way also won one of the most important wars in this country’s history. © 2003 David H. Hackworth.

To: LindyBill who wrote (15214)	11/5/2003 10:09:35 PM
From: JF Quinnelly	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793717

Save the Apache, Lose the Gold Plating sftt.org DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt" 04-29-2003 By David H. Hackworth As our magnificent warriors return from Iraq, they will tell the folks who sweated them out at home what really went down during their bold march to Baghdad and will catch them up on all the inside skinny concerning the war's winners and losers. At first glance, one of the big equipment losers is the U.S. Army's crown jewel, the Longbow Apache helicopter gunship (AH-64D model). Especially since a Longbow squadron got ventilated March 24 over the city of Karbala when 34 of these $24 million birds – developed to knock out Soviet tanks during the Cold War – were shredded by a sky full of mainly small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire. One Longbow was shot down – its two-man crew captured – but most of the rugged birds managed to limp home on a shot-up rotor blade and a prayer. Yet almost a month later, 27 of the choppers were still rated "not fit to fly." After this disaster – which got little press because of the Pentagon's daily cover-up drills – the brass no longer considered the much-hyped Longbow the aircraft of choice to lead the aerial battle charge. Instead, caution prevailed, and the U.S. Air Force's thick-skinned A-10 Warthog became the undisputed Close Air Support (CAS) champ of the war. Now a chorus of self-appointed experts who wouldn't know a helicopter gunship from a flying saucer is telling the Pentagon to "deep-six" the Apache and give the prime CAS mission to the A-10. They argue that the Apache not only didn't cut it in Iraq but screwed up big-time in fights last year in Afghanistan and during the 1999 Kosovo War, when it couldn't even get into the game because of training accidents and the concern that Serb missiles would channel "Black Hawk Down." Even though a less fancy, earlier model proved itself in spades during Desert Storm and, contrary to so-called expert claims, remains the favorite of our grunts – past and present – in Afghanistan. But a closer look at the March 24 Little Bighorn reveals that the overconfident – some say even rash – commanders of the 11th Aviation Regiment fell for a classic Iraqi helicopter ambush of the sort perfected by Vietnamese guerrillas in the 1960s and refined by Somalian rebels in the 1990s. Eyewitnesses and Apache pilots say we're talking leadership fault here rather than the failure of a formidable fighting machine. And if so, the 11th Aviation skippers and their flawed planning should wear the blame, not this great CAS aircraft. As it proved in Iraq by not crashing and burning when it became Swiss cheese over Karbala, the Apache is unbeatably rugged. A blistering machine capable of pounding the enemy right on the deck – in their face or standing off at five miles. Not to mention how, unlike a fast-moving fighter jet, it can also stay on station – low and slow – long enough to zap the bad guys and deliver close-in, enormous firepower directly in front of our grunts' foxholes when and where they need it. But the ultra-expensive Longbow system – a sure winner on the open plains of Europe against Soviet armor that became obsolete the day the Berlin Wall tumbled down – makes the Longbow-equipped Apache too heavy to fly in 21st-century high-altitude trouble spots such as Afghanistan. And since its clever congressional cheerleaders have made sure that its parts are made in almost every state, killing this platinum-plated porker won't be quick and easy. Too bad. The money saved could be used to improve the proven AH-64A model, increase Apache pilot training, update attack helicopter doctrine to include the lessons learned in both Afghanistan and Gulf War II – and for training senior commanders on how to use these vital war-fighting assets correctly. As for the A-10: Great airplane that belongs to the wrong service – the U.S. Air Force – where the top brass treat it like Cinderella with wings. These trusty flying machines should be transferred to the Army and the Marine Corps for use alongside their AH-64A Apaches and AH-1 Super Cobras as part of an awesome, well-rounded CAS fleet that would support our ground troops with the best combination of the right stuff. hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831. His newest book is "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts." © 2003 David H. Hackworth.