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Pastimes : Investment Chat Board Lawsuits -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: dantecristo who wrote (5328)	11/16/2003 10:04:41 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 12465

The judges really go to great lengths to keep the libel vs. slander distinction as written vs. spoken. The key line is: Accordingly, we reject defendants’ contention that the language “communications by radio or any mechanical or other means” was intended to include anything like a computer or other device used to produce written communications. I agree with the conclusion, but only based on what I think is a faulty premise (apparently introduced or at least perpetuated by your lawyers). In contrast to the judges, my interpretation of the language in question was that it was intended to eliminate any distinction between live and recorded spoken material, not differentiate between the rendering device. In other words, to the judges, the key distinction is how the third party actually received the message: via their eyes or ears, no matter whether the content originated live or was played back by any number of recording devices. Thus, it doesn't matter if something originated from a script so long as the person offended by the content used their ears. By the judges' logic, someone libeled in a book could also sue for slander if said book was available on tape, and a transcription of a speech published in a newspaper could be the grounds for libel. I understand that determining the context of something might be equally tricky (i.e. does something defamatory written in the format of a play but also published constitute libel or slander, or both?), but context is what should matter since even the judges acknowledge other courts have ruled that technology has forever blurred the lines between libel and slander: It has been noted that many forms of publication available to us today “cannot realistically be analyzed by reference to the traditional libel-slander dichotomy, which modern technology has rendered increasingly obsolete. [Citations.]” (Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 543, 552, fn. 9.) In this case, however, the publications are readily analyzed by reference to the existing statutes. We hold that written defamatory communications published by means of the Internet are properly characterized as libel. First, the judges acknowledge that others courts have held that the Internet represents a unique form of communication. Then they go on to singularly classify all written defamatory communications as libel, be they, presumably, something published by the NY Times or by someone sitting in their underwear at 3am, drunk out of their mind and posting on Yahoo. To me, this makes no sense. Places like Yahoo and SI have been alternately referred to as chat boards and message boards. That's because many a time what we write is no different in content than something we'd write via an instant message to a friend. While the fact those words may potentially be seen by millions and preserved for millenniums, I can say from personal experience that you often feel thankful anyone reads what you write at all. Therefore, I don't find merit in the argument that a line can always be drawn between written and spoken material. At any rate, because of the Internet, I really do think we need to rethink our legal definitions of libel and slander. To clarify, this doesn't mean we have to redefine what constitutes defamation. The distinction here is that once we determine something is defamatory, we need to have a much more fair and equitable way to mete out justice upon the defendant. I do think, given the increasing ubiquity of the Internet, this is a topic that might even interest the US Supreme Court. - Jeff

To: dantecristo who wrote (5328)	2/4/2004 10:55:38 AM
From: dantecristo	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 12465

[VAR & VSEA]The Price of Freedom ORDER FOR DELIVERY OF PROPERTY AFTER EXAMINATION [CCP §708.205] The examinations of defendants and judgment debtors MICHELANGELO DELFINO and MARY DAY were conducted on December 12, 2003. It appears from said examination that the judgment detors have an interest in property in their possession or under their control and that said property is not exempt from enforcement of a money judgment. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants and judgment debtors Michelangelo Delfino and Mary Day shall within five (5) days of the date of entry of this order deliver to the levying officer at 854 Carmel Avenue, Los Altos, California, the following property identified at the debtor's examinations: a color Sony television, a stereo, a Harmon DVD player, a Sony amplifier and a VCR, the proceeds of the sale which shall be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment entered herein on February 13, 2002. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 699.030(b), the levying officer may seize the property that is to be levied upon and if the property is not voluntarily delivered by the judgment debtors, the levying officer may cause the building where the property is believed to be located to be broken up in such a manner as the levying officer reasonably believes will cause the least damage. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that failure to comply with this order may subject the judgment Debtors to arrest and punishment for Contempt of Court. Dated: February 3, 2004 Request denied Property exempt pursuant to CCP 704.20 geocities.com