Look carefully and you'd see the shape of things to come: Block within the block as the case of France and Germany is showing.
To survive in the coming Beg Thy Neighbor (BTN) tour the force, the two big economies are bracing together to fight off. They know that Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland can be blown by the US, can be made put up and shut up, or can be coopted by a little quota given to them to sweet the deal and turn them into a friend.
France and German must work for all EU members
Anne-Marie Le Gloannec
Published: November 18 2003 21:19 | Last Updated: November 18 2003 21:19
There certainly will not be a Franco-German Bund, as Pascal Lamy, the European Union's trade commissioner has suggested; but France and Germany are nonetheless enjoying a remarkable rapprochement. The idea of a union between France and Germany, first raised by intellectuals and later taken up by politicians and civil servants, has been around for a long time, but now it is the turn of heads of state and governments to consider the idea.
At the celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in January, for example, Jacques Chirac, the French president, and Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, toyed with the idea of a Franco-German citizenship. Since then they have worked closely together at the European convention; they have defied the US over Iraq; they have consulted Tony Blair, Britain's prime minister, on European defence; they have launched a growth initiative; and they have sought to strengthen ties between their regions. When one looks back on the seven-year lull - punctuated by the occasional bitter quarrel - that preceded it, that is quite a revival.
There has always been something miraculous about the co-operation between France and Germany, former enemies with vastly different political cultures. While die-hard advocates of French grandeur favoured inter-governmentalism, the Germans, who wanted to turn their back on the past and merge into Europe, defended a federal Europe. Yet these differences did not hamper European integration; if anything, they catalysed it.
Certainly, both countries remain quite apart from each other in many respects. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Berlin would like to steer closer to Washington, while the Elysée and the Quai d'Orsay are sticking to a more defiant approach. Yet on the whole, German public opinion is becoming estranged from America: it is becoming more European and sees France as its best ally. And even if the idea of an autonomous European military planning capability is staunchly resisted by some officials in Berlin's defence and foreign affairs ministries, Mr Chirac and Mr Schröder are close to one another. Neither wants to see Nato weakened; equally, neither wants Europe to be doomed to passivity.
Yet the potential for discord should not be underestimated. First, the current revival is born out of constraints. The French embrace came in time to draw Germany out of the isolation imposed by its unilateral policy on the war against Iraq. But help is not always welcome when you are in a diminished position. The current renewal is seen by some in Berlin as unbalanced, while in Paris some suspect the Germans do not care enough about the Franco-German relationship.
Second, discord with European countries is another potential problem. The revival has, to put it bluntly, happened at the expense of Europe. True, France and Germany worked together to give impetus to the Convention. But not all of their proposals were framed with the interests of the EU as a whole in mind; and to the extent that Paris and Berlin seek exemption from some obligations - notably in the stability and growth pact - Franco-German co-operation becomes an association for the defence of national interests.
The effect is to undermine further the two countries' claim to speak for Europe. In the grand old days, that claim had a moral and a practical legitimacy: moral because both countries had overcome the traumas of war to launch the process of European integration; and practical because both countries, and their partners, reaped economic benefits from ever-closer integration. But the moral legitimacy is being weakened by the fact that the accession states have a different history from their western counterparts, while the eurozone's economic performance has been feeble.
However, the need for a core Europe should not be overlooked. It is what has driven progress - in areas as diverse as monetary union and defence - in Europe as a whole. In a larger Union, where flexible, issue-oriented coalitions could become the norm, and where the defence of national interests is, alas, more of the Zeitgeist, it is indispensable that somebody should give direction. There is no reason why this core should not consist of France and Germany, allied in an ever closer union - provided they can at same time work for the benefit of all, while including other EU partners.
The writer is senior research fellow at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, and a research Associate at the Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin |
