High-Tech Isn't Enough
In Saddam's hometown, the Army copes with the challenge of intelligence.
BY MATTHEW KAMINSKI WSJ.com
Wednesday, November 19, 2003 12:01 a.m.
TIKRIT, Iraq--"Sure, we take off our helmets and knock down vodka with the sheiks," Lt. Col. Steve Russell of the Fourth Infantry Division told me here, in Saddam Hussein's hometown. A day later, after a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down nearby, Col. Russell had "to remind the town that we have teeth and claws" as well. His battalion raided homes looking for suspects and razed three buildings, while overhead U.S. warplanes dropped 500-pound bombs.
Frustrated by casualties, the U.S. in the past week has stepped up combat operations against Saddam loyalists and foreign terrorists blamed for the attacks on coalition forces. A tougher military posture and faster transition are all well and good. But the real challenge for the military is how to tailor tactics and assets designed for big wars to a complex postconflict peacekeeping and counterinsurgency mission. In this conflict, coffee (or vodka) with an Iraqi chieftain is as strategically important as a pinprick military strike. "We're not going to win this fight by conducting raids and seizing people," said Brig. Gen. Marc Barbero, the assistant commander of the Fourth ID, which controls the Sunni triangle north of Baghdad.
In the subtle art of peacekeeping (or colonial policing or whatever you call it), relationships with Iraqis that produce good intelligence and allies are the key to success. That's not an American strength. A recent report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., noted a glaring shortfall in use of intelligence by soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. Often the soldiers nurturing contacts were young and inexperienced, producing predictably disappointing results. And with translators in short supply, the troops must take their Arabic phrasebooks more seriously. "The days of going to 'language lab' one day a week to read foreign comic books are over," the report said. Cultural sensitivity isn't a strong suit either, but it can be taught. Commanders ordered the troops to look people in the eyes, rather than talk at their translator, which many Iraqis found insulting. During Ramadan, U.S. troops have been told to avoid eating or drinking in public in daytime.
Compared with other European forces that have deeper colonial traditions, many American officers say, the U.S. is "too procedure driven," a handicap in postwar Iraq. "We crush things real well," said a major in Baghdad. "We're not so good at human intelligence. Part of the problem is we're so big." The other problem: The U.S. has a Cold War-era bias for high-tech gadgetry over the human touch. "For the past 25 years, the Army built its intelligence system on technology, believing that would be the most likely war we were bound to fight," said Brig. Gen. Martin Dempsey, commander of the First Armored Division, which controls Baghdad.
Inside the "green zone" in Baghdad, the seat of the civilian administration, intelligence dominates any discussion of the insurgency. "I'm disappointed we don't have better intelligence on who these people are," L. Paul Bremer, the coalition's administrator, said last week, adding that the attacks might even get worse. Military commanders admit they were slow to get a handle on the insurgency. But a clearer picture is emerging. Gen. Dempsey said insurgents in Baghdad are grouped in eight to 10 cells of 25 people or so, mostly senior Baath Party leaders. Hundreds of suspects are in detention or dead. It's still a work in progress, but the military is responding creatively.
To see how, take a look at the Fourth ID. Nicknamed the "Iron Horse," the Fourth is old-school Army, heavy on armor and slow on the move. It was soon apparent that the Sunni triangle was no conventional battlefield. When Col. Russell arrived, he knew little about Tikrit. But his tour in Afghanistan taught him to get to know the tribal chiefs. Everyone "claimed to be in charge," so he organized a meeting. "We figured the guys sitting in the front row were most important," he said. "We were about 95% right."
The division hired the tribal chieftains to secure the northern pipeline, with some success in safeguarding against sabotage, and consults with them daily. The eight tribes around Tikrit each contributed volunteers for the new Iraqi civil defense force. As elsewhere in Iraq, the locals have begun to turn in terrorists and Baath Party loyalists as well as point out roadside bombs to U.S. soldiers. Why? Some are after cash, others want peace. "We've seen a significant increase in the number of Iraqis reporting actionable intelligence," said Gen. Barbero. Gen. Dempsey noted that "it's been only in the last month to six weeks that we've gotten decent intelligence," adding that "it takes a long time get these people's trust." Co-optation isn't an exact science. Some locals friendly to the U.S. have other hidden loyalties.
In this Byzantine world, the military must be as innovative as its enemies. The Fourth ID fakes raids to throw off adversaries. "We don't get sidetracked by tribal feuds any more," said Lt. Col. Ted Martin. The division's analysts headquartered at Saddam's Tikrit palace use "link analysis" to figure who's tied to whom in the Sunni triangle, borrowing a technique honed by the FBI to fight organized crime in the U.S. The "insurgents" resemble Mafia organizations, in structure and methods, more than they do a military or even guerrilla force.
All that technology and firepower can still come in handy, if used properly. When mortars landed near troops in the town of Balad on a recent night, a counterfire radar gave the location of their origin. A remote-controlled spy plane was rerouted to the site and using its night vision camera spotted six men fleeing the scene. Troops on the ground picked them up. It all took place in a matter of minutes. The Fourth ID, Gen. Barbero said, now demands a response time of under 120 minutes to any "actionable" intelligence.
Postwar Iraq resembles the battlefields of the 21st century more, one suspects, than the 17-day war that toppled Saddam's regime this spring. "This is nothing new for our Army," said Col. Russell. Many of his men served in the Balkans (a waste of time, Pentagon brass then complained) or Afghanistan and understand this situation requires a different approach. "We can adapt to any situation," he said. In this race against the insurgency, the question for U.S. troops in Iraq is, how fast?
Mr. Kaminski is an editorial page writer at The Wall Street Journal Europe.
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