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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Hawkmoon who wrote (120697)	11/30/2003 11:50:36 AM
From: h0db	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Hawkmoon, you raise another point, albeit inadvertently, perhaps: the impact of intelligence on the outcome of conflict. I understand that John Keegan has challenged the idea in a recent book, but some historians believe that the overwhelming intelligence advantage enjoyed by the US & the UK played crucial roles in WWII, in both the European and Pacific theaters. The role of Enigma codebreaking was not even known by historians until the early 1980s. The US enjoyed similar codebreaking success against the Japanese diplomatic and military cyphers. One thing we don't know, and may never know, is which side holds the relative intelligence advantage on the Taiwan Strait. I would guess that Taiwan holds a technological advantage, because of its closeness to the United States. But I would have to give the human agent advantage to China.

To: Hawkmoon who wrote (120697)	11/30/2003 12:56:33 PM
From: Bilow	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Hawkmoon; Re: "... it ignores the fact that Hitler's Luftwaffe nearly achieved air superiority over Britain in 1940. Had he not decided to switch from bombing British airfields to bombing cities (in retalitation for a British bombing of Berlin) the RAF would likely have been overwhelmed and wiped out in that aerial war of attrition." It is a simple fact of history that Britain was at no time nearly overwhelmed by German air power. The historians write their history books in order to make history interesting, not militarily factual. It's the garbage written by people who deal in concepts, rather than simple numbers. To understand the true situation between Britain and Germany during the Battle of Britain, you have to look at the numbers, not the rhetoric. Here's the facts: Attrition and the Luftwaffe ... From the onset of major operations against Scandanavia and Western Europe in the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe had faced an appalling attrition rate. In May 1940, a month during which the Germans lost 20.2 percent of their total force structure and 27.4 percent of their bomber force, the Luftwaffe lost more aircraft in three weeks of heavy fighting than it would lose in any other month of that year. (3) ... airpower.maxwell.af.mil ... In Poland, the Luftwaffe destroyed the Polish Air Force in a series of attacks on airfields. This job completed, the Luftwaffe turned to giving direct support to the advancing Wehrmacht. The campaign did not result in new viewpoints on the use of air power, which it should have, because the Luftwaffe lost not less than 285 airplanes, with another 279 planes damaged, for a total loss of 333 Polish machines. ... airpower.maxwell.af.mil German and British total fighter strength for the Battle of Britain were roughly equal. By simple attrition, Germany could not defeat Britain. The concept of bombing airfields didn't even keep the Iraqis from shooting down US aircraft with a Mig-25 during the first Iraqi war, there was no way in HELL that the Germans could have bottled up the British. All that concentration on airfields would have done would have been to force the British to use somewhat more dispersed bases. The concept you're pushing here is that it is always better to be on the offense (over the enemy's territory) in air superiority operations. The converse has been often proved in warfare. Sure, if you can obtain air superiority it's a great thing. But operating aircraft over enemy air space tends to reduce your aircraft's chance of sucess against the enemy. This is known from even the first world war. For the situation of obtaining air superiority over an equal enemy, the following applies: When you operate over enemy air space, your damaged aircraft are lost completely. At home, you can salvage them for parts. Your surviving downed pilots are captured, rather than returned to duty. And your aircraft are forced to operate under fuel constraints unfelt by the enemy. These disadvantages outweigh the advantages of being able to damage the enemy's airfields, as you can do very little of this in the ABSENCE of air superiority. The Germans were unable to achieve air superiority, consequently they were unable to invade Germany. Hey, your solution would have been better, but THEY TRIED DOING IT AND IT DIDN'T WORK FOR THEM. What you're claiming is that if they'd only tried their losing behavior longer, they'd have won, which is more than just vaguely reminiscent of your stands on Vietnam and Iraq. -- Carl