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To: unclewest who wrote (18398)12/3/2003 9:04:17 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793903
 
I think this problem started in 1775 with George.

From the Editor:

A Rare Victory over the Army Bureaucrats

By Ed Offley - Defense Watch

Brad Giordani’s long struggle with the Army bureaucrats may be nearly over, and countless thousands of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan will have reason to celebrate.



Giordani’s firm, Militec Inc. of Waldorf, Md., manufactures a synthetic-base weapon lubricant called MILITEC-1 Synthetic Metal Conditioner. The lubricant is used by dozens of state and federal agencies including the United States Secret Service, Coast Guard, Immigration & Naturalization Service and U.S. Marshall Service.



MILITEC-1 first became a news topic last spring after widespread allegations emerged from Operation Iraqi Freedom that the Pentagon’s longstanding weapon lubricant, CLP (for Cleaner, Lubricant and Protectorant), had caused numerous weapons to jam during combat in the Iraqi desert. The most famous incident involved the ambush of the 507th Ordnance Maintenance Co. in Nasiriyah, Iraq. Iraqi fighters killed 11 soldiers (including two from another unit), wounded nine and took six prisoner, including Pfc. Jessica Lynch, after all of the soldiers’ weapons jammed during a 45-minute running firefight.



As I noted in an earlier column (“Wrong Lubricant, Jammed Weapons, Dead Soldiers,” DefenseWatch, June 18, 2003), experts in the field had complained for years that CLP was ineffective in a desert environment such as Iraq, where the sand has the consistency of talcum powder. Retired Lt. Col. Robert Kovacic, who works for a defense contractor in Kuwait that trains U.S. military units, told DefenseWatch, “I can say with complete assuredness, from many, many observations [of training exercises], that CLP does not work. I did not use it … at Fort Polk (because it did not prevent rust, I don’t care what the government says), and it sure as hell does not work here.”



What made the MILITEC-1 lubricant a matter of controversy was the fact on the eve of combat operations in Iraq, Army bureaucrats responsible for monitoring and approving acquisition of weapons lubricants had arbitrarily blocked Militec Inc. from being able to sell its product to a host of Army and Marine Corps units who had already ordered it.



The reason? Giordani and his company had been engaged in a protracted struggle of their own for over 10 years to win formal DoD acceptance of MILITEC-1 as a product for military purchases, and the bureaucrats – primarily at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. – repeatedly ignored directives from higher authority to permit soldiers to purchase the lubricant.



“We’ve spent the past 15 years marketing our product to the military,” Giordani told DefenseWatch this week. “But these civilian bureaucrats who have never fired a gun or been in combat are calling the shots.”



Militec’s 10-year struggle with the Army acquisition staff is a sad and depressing account of a bureaucracy’s refusal to admit it was wrong, and a relentless determination to impose its will on the Army despite overwhelming evidence that the product it developed 23 years ago – CLP – was ineffective and a danger to the troops forced to use it.



It began in July 1993, when Militec was first granted “National Stock Numbers” that would enable military units to purchase the lubricant. Less than a year later, the bureaucrats issued an order blocking the stock numbers, which prevented further sales. Giordani and his company appealed the decision and 19 members of Congress wrote then-Secretary of Defense William J. Perry demanding that the Army restore access to the military market. Three months later, the under secretary of defense replied that the Defense Logistics Agency would re-issue the stock numbers so that Militec’s lubricant could be purchased by the military.



For the next eight years, Giordani said, Militec sold its product to military units without incident. But just days before the outbreak of combat in Iraq, the Army bureaucrats struck again, tersely canceling the company’s stock numbers and blocking over $117,500 in existing orders to units in the invasion force. Giordani said his company lost over $500,000 in income due to the cancellation.



The Army in mid-April seemed to relent, offering Militec a limited opportunity to receive orders for MILITEC-1 from units in Southwest Asia through the Defense Supply Center Richmond. But four months later, the bureaucrats again blocked the company’s access to military sales. Giordani and his company officers lobbied members of Congress and went public with additional interviews, and the Army seemed to relent again, temporarily reinstating its sales access on Oct. 14.



What led to Militec’s belated victory?



What the Army bureaucracy could not overcome was the “ground truth” in Iraq, where soldiers who had struggled with CLP-related jamming found that the MILITEC-1 lubricant worked effectively. The Army’s own official “lessons learned” report from Iraq on May 15 confirmed that most soldiers preferred to use MILITEC-1 rather than CLP.



Giordani said Militec has been swamped with requests for MILITEC-1 samples by relatives of troops deployed to Iraq. The company decided early on to provide samples free of charge in such cases.



Moreover, now that the ban on sales has again been lifted, the company is receiving a steady stream of sales orders from units currently in Iraq and those preparing to deploy there as part of the Army troop rotation plan.



Col. William R. Bishop, assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters in Baghdad, recently wrote Giordani an email that the Militec president says is typical of hundreds he has received from troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bishop noted:



“I use your product back in the US and it is truly superb. However, all I can get over here in Baghdad is CLP and it is just not hacking it. Seems to attract grit like a magnet and that is if you can get a fresh can …. It separates out very easily and usually you get stuck with the thin cleaning agent – but not the lubricating properties which sink to the bottom like a milky white sludge. So, it does not lubricate due to the separation and what you do get still attracts the sand! Please send me some MILITEC-1 lube and grease as we will use it on all our weapons – M9 pistol, M4 carbine, M249 SAW and M240B medium MG. I know for sure your product works as I use it on all my transferable MG’s back home!”



Giordani said he is both cautiously optimistic yet still suspicious over the latest Army decision to allow Militec into the military market. “These civilians, when they have a position – right or wrong – are going to fall on their swords until they are forced to make a change,” he said.



He noted that the Picatinny Arsenal staff recently posted a formal “Request for Information” (RFI) on the Federal Business Opportunities website for small-arms weapons lubricants, that could be the precursor for a formal Request for Proposal (RFP) that would constitute a formal decision to shift from purchases of CLP to another lubricant such as MILITEC-1. However, the announcement states, “The lubricant evaluation team is formulating requirements for the development of a Statement of Objectives to acquire, test and validate alternate weapon lubricants designed to work in sandy/dusty/desert environments.”



What that means, Giordani said, is that the acquisition staff wants to set up its own, separate and lengthy test and evaluation process for the proposed new lubricant that “ignores the real-world combat lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq.”



But for now, Giordani said the clamor for MILITEC-1 from troops in the field seems to have stifled any more bureaucratic games.



“It appears that we are on the threshold of the system fully embracing our product based on overwhelmingly enthusiastic support from troops either in the desert or getting ready to go into the desert,” Giordani said. “It’s getting a lot better. We’re getting orders in from all over the place.”



At least for now.


sftt.org



To: unclewest who wrote (18398)12/3/2003 9:08:25 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793903
 
Hack finally got the "Visiting Firemen" story.

Hack's Target

Iraq Isn’t for Tourists

By David H. Hackworth

George Bush hit the mark when he visited our troops in Iraq on Turkey Day. He’s the Main Man, and his daring and dangerous trip told our warriors he cared and was with them all the way.



Commanders – and especially the commander in chief – inspire soldiers, and it’s their duty to beat feet to the front whenever they can. But not senior staff weenie wannabe-warriors back in the rear with all the gear – straphangers who are into cluttering up battlefields such as Iraq mainly for the braggin’ rights.



Such visits usually balloon into a bloody waste of commander and staff time, as the folks running the combat show are ripped away from their primary purpose of leading their units to lay on fancy briefings that inevitably involve rehearsals, pre-inspections and visits to subordinate units. We’re talking literally hundreds if not thousands of soldiers setting war-fighting aside to jump through irrelevant, costly, got-to-get-things-shaped-up hoops.



Not to mention the misuse of critical assets needed to hunt down guerrillas – helicopters and airplanes assigned to move the VIPs around, as well as the soldiers and combat gear seconded to secure the stops along the scenic route.



Staffers in every fighting division in Iraq have complained to me that there are just too many visiting firemen sashaying around Iraq these days on ego-driven trips that accomplish nothing except to put our troops at additional risk and interfere with their ability to perform critical combat jobs.



Take, for example, the November visit to Iraq of the Army’s top Pentagon lawyer, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Romig, accompanied by three personal staffers. According to the Pentagon, the purpose of his trip was “to assess the provision of legal services, look at integration of RC (Reserve Component) soldiers in our operations, talk with commanders, look at both traditional and nontraditional legal issues, gather lessons learned ... and check on the status of our soldiers and our equipment.”



Sounds cricket. But lawyers can always figure out the right words to fit almost any agenda. Romig’s case for his trip to a guerrilla battlefield was that he had “nearly 400 JAG (legal beagles) personnel – officer, enlisted, warrant officer, both active and reserve component – in Iraq.”



With senior generals in both the Pentagon and Iraq blessing the mission, the Army’s top judge slipped on his combat gear and flew off to play at war games to the sounds of real guns.



But on Nov. 7, Romig’s combat mission turned into a nightmare when one of the two Blackhawk helicopters transporting him and his posse was blown out of the sky. Romig’s assistants, Chief Warrant Officer Sharon T. Swartworth and Sgt. Maj. Cornell W. Gilmore, were killed along with the entire Blackhawk crew – Capt. Benedict J. Smith, Chief Warrant Officer Kyran E. Kennnedy and Sgts. Paul M. Neff and Scott C. Rose.



The deaths of these fine soldiers demand answers to the following questions:



* Was this trip necessary, and who exactly approved it at the Pentagon and in Iraq?



* Why was the helicopter that got shot down flying in a straight line at an altitude of about 250 feet over an area known to harbor rocket-toting guerrillas?



* Why did Romig require two Blackhawks for his party of four when one can carry 10 combat-loaded grunts?



When a Pentagon staffer tried to equivocate and told me it was “to spread the risk,” I couldn’t help laughing out loud.



“Spread the risk, my butt,” I told him. “And stop trying to BS me. The second chopper had a warrant officer and a sergeant on board, not two more generals.”



Then I told him what I’d already heard from my sources – that “the general required two choppers because he and his staff had so much baggage.”



Well, my bet is Maj. Gen. Romig will be toting the baggage from this disaster for the rest of his life. After all, he and the generals who approved his boondoggle – and who should know better – are responsible for six soldiers dying.



Iraq isn’t a Disneyland Middle East fun destination for high-ranking tourists looking to play paint ball.



As George Bush reminded us on Thanksgiving by the extremely cautious way in which he went about his rightful duty, Iraq is presently one of the most perilous places in the world.
sftt.org



To: unclewest who wrote (18398)12/3/2003 9:14:21 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793903
 
Another view on Col West. Makes sense to me.


DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt"
12-02-2003

Witch Hunt or Valid Court-Martial Case?

Contributing Editor Lt. Col. (U.S. Army, ret.) Ralf W. Zimmermann is a decorated Desert Storm veteran and former tank battalion commander. Since his retirement, his columns have regularly appeared in Army Times and other publications. His recent novel, “Brotherhood of Iron,” deals with the German soldier in World War II. It is directly available from www.iUniverse.com and through most major book dealers.



There is no question that the Iraq war is stuck in a painful guerilla phase. Notably, guerilla war is more dangerous for America than industrial warfare.



Why? It doesn’t allow you to celebrate immediate victories and reinforce positive changes. As progress and setbacks take ever more rapid turns, the American public’s mood suffers. As casualty numbers gradually mount, warriors and politicians often turn on each other and then on themselves.



A typical such case is the hotly debated case of Army Lt. Col. Alan B. West, former commander of a U.S. artillery battalion, saddled with the mission to police the streets of Saba al Boor, Iraq. The Army has recently charged West with communicating a threat and aggravated assault for firing a pistol to scare a detainee into divulging information. The prosecutor offered West the following deal: Resign short of twenty years of retirement to avoid a painful court-martial and the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence.



West rightfully refused. Who would want to lose all retirement benefits so close to twenty years in uniform? In his opinion, he did what was right when he fired his 9-mm. pistol twice to scare a detainee into talking. West claims that as a result of the coercion, the detainee provided two names of possible attackers. His actions could have prevented a deadly ambush.



Since the Army began courts-martial proceedings, many military advocates (some without a day in uniform) and conservative papers have rallied around West. They believe West did exactly what should have been done – make the enemy talk at any price, as often happened in Vietnam.



Most emotions aside, a more objective look seems in order. I’d have to say that the case of West is once again an indicator of systemic problems in our Army. It wants to fight a war by the book but isn’t able to produce the specialized manpower, tools and training for that by-the-book warfare.



First, an artillery unit isn’t fully qualified for military police work or grunt missions until it undergoes very specific retraining. Yes, it should happen as a home-station routine but when you look at unit training schedules, grunt training usually takes second seat to considerations for others drills and family support group indoctrination.



To mitigate mistakes and accidental shooting, the Army then applies excessive rules of engagement, often endangering the lives of the troops. And don’t even forget the below-average quality of our human intelligence people and translators. Unless these guys are properly trained and speak the right dialect, no information you pull is reliable.



Common sense is the other overlooked issue. West’s actions fall far short of common sense and were overly theatrical. As a commander of almost 600 artillery personnel, there should have been plenty of other qualified officers and seasoned noncoms to conduct a “quality interrogation,” giving the commander a bit of a standoff range. Instead of being the guy tried for detainee abuse, he should have been the one directing the overall operation and the “proper” (exploiting all limits of the box) interpretation of the rules of engagement. I actually suspect that one of his pissed-off subordinates initiated the investigation after observing a much less than professional approach.



Combat is messy, especially in an urban setting against pesky guerilla forces. The Army must acknowledge this fact and give West the benefit of the doubt. What truly strikes me as odd is that while his division commander wants to see West hang, there has been no mention of his brigade commander, the immediate superior.



Why not? Shouldn’t he have a position, especially since he most likely passed on the charges?



To expeditiously end the bloody media campaigns and internal witch-hunts, West should be let off the court-martial hook. No one was actually killed. Probably not totally free of guilt, the officer should be allowed to retire or serve on a staff.



Although he showed lack of common sense, he acted under pressure and in the constant fear of suffering combat deaths among his unit. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, I witnessed quite a few senior officers – who had been wonderful administrators in peacetime – turn into nervous maniacs when faced with the possibility of enemy contact.



Nonetheless, the chain of command can’t ignore that somehow, before hitting Iraqi dirt, West served his country well for over 19 years.

sftt.org



To: unclewest who wrote (18398)12/3/2003 9:19:04 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793903
 
Good article on Choppers.


DefenseWatch "The Voice of the Grunt"
12-02-2003

The Helicopter’s Grim Future in Modern Combat

By Ralph Omholt

Despite our rapid defeat of the Iraqi army last spring, one clear lesson that has emerged from both the combat and occupation phases of the war is that the entire concept of helicopter operations in battle is undermined by their extreme vulnerability to ground fire.



Unlike our experience in the jungles and wooded mountains of Vietnam, the helicopter is a prime and easy target in desert and urban warfare environments such as we have seen in Somalia, and are still seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan.



The combat record of the helicopter in Vietnam was different from subsequent battlefields. That was true by virtue of the limitations of the Viet Cong-NVA firing accuracy, the limitations of their weaponry – including quantity - and the visual limitations of the jungle or forests which served to protect the helicopters flying overhead.



It was also true that the UH-1 Huey was a simple and tough helicopter, easily repaired. The application of the helicopter was uniquely successful in a unique environment. And, their relatively low cost ensured that quantity was rarely a factor.



The harsh reality is that today the helicopter is a terrible choice of troop transport or firepower against any competent or well-equipped force – of any size.



Whether in Mogadishu 10 years ago or Iraq today, the helicopter equation has changed for the worse. Typically, the adversary’s ground arms are more available. And whether by luck or skill, the effectiveness of enemy ordnance is far greater than that experienced in Vietnam.



While the details remain unclear eight months after the fact, the only major battle in the Iraq war centered on U.S. attack helicopters ended in mission failure. The raid involved 40 AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters that attacked Iraqi Republican Guard units south of Baghdad on March 24. One was shot down (the two crewmen taken prisoner) and 30 returned to base having sustained severe damage. The Washington Post subsequently reported:

“In attacking a formation of about 40 Apache Longbows on Monday, the Iraqis staged a classic helicopter ambush first perfected by the North Vietnamese in the 1960s. As the lethal, tank-killing aircraft approached on a mission to destroy the Medina Division’s dispersed armor, troops dispersed throughout a palm-lined residential area and opened fire with antiaircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades and a wall of fire from rifles and other small arms. …

“The Iraqi fire was so intense that the Apaches had to break off their mission and return to base.”



The results of that failed mission strongly suggest that the modern helicopter is a battlefield liability, versus such close air support aircraft as the A-10.



The Iraqis in 2003 seemed to have adapted a lesson from the Afghani resistance that fought the Soviets more than 20 years ago and was repeated over Mogadishu in 1993: The art of downing a helicopter is a well-known methodology – lure and destroy.



Of particular concern to the helicopter pilot today is the time-tested Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). They are cheap and effective weapons. “Close” counts with RPGs, given their 4.2-second time-fuse and associated 900-meter burst-range (lacking physical contact), ensures that a volley of RPG firings will be effective against the frailty of a helicopter’s main or tail rotor.



Second, the electronic frailty of the modern helicopter leaves an exposed Achilles heel. Packed with “black box” components, wire bundles and sensors, the modern helicopter is at a terrible disadvantage against a machine gun or even an ordinary rifleman’s bullet. Beyond the combat scene, the maintenance factor for modern UH-60 or AH-64 helicopters is also a major challenge, compared with the Huey or CH-47 Chinook from the Vietnam era. Given the limited numbers of helicopters, ground time is the greatest expense and also a liability.



A third element of weakness involves the matter of budgetary limits on basic airmanship and training flights. Time and again, the events surrounding the helicopter accidents and combat losses show a distinct pattern of inadequate training in basic flying skills, judgment and tactics. Whether a high-altitude accident or a midair collision, certain truths stand out. There should be no doubt that part of this problem stems from unrealistic expectations by mission planners.



The modern helicopter pilot finds more demand on his/her data management skills than airmanship. The dollar expense of “blade time” additionally detracts from the skill of the pilots, through non-currency and total experience in actual flight.



Unfortunately, in a combat zone, the smart pilot must deviate from the “standardization” of the infamous “classroom solution,” even as it pertains to safety. Landing into the wind is suicide if an enemy gunner is awaiting just that arrival. Since there are multiple forms of combat scenarios, a simple set of tactics is impossible to devise.

Still, there are a number of tactics that can help protect helicopters from enemy ground forces:

1. Alter any takeoff and landing directions from known or predictable helipads.

2. Never fly a predictable or constant schedule, route, course, altitude, “race-track” or other any other identifiable or easily predictable flight path. That includes constant hovering positions, including “nap-of-the-earth” flight.

3. Never follow a predictable altitude or route, including rivers, canyons, streets or roads, for any length of time.

4. Evade any population centers, such as a town or village.

5. If these rules must be compromised, arrange for effective fighter cover and rescue capability.

6. In multi-ship missions, allow at least 500 meters between aircraft, so as to allow all aircraft room to maneuver without risking collision or restriction of defensive gunnery. That includes the basic airmanship of always turning, so as to view a clear spot, whether climbing, descending or staying level.

7. Vary any insertion or extraction tactics as well as those of support aircraft and their stand-off defensive coverage.

8. Be aware that helicopters have no significant surprise element, given their speed and noise. Thus, pilots must be aware that going into an unprepared LZ is extremely dangerous. This is especially true if the LZ presents itself as a predictable insertion point, particularly if a “pathfinder” is not used. One landmine can destroy a helicopter and its mission.

9. Be certain during night operations that a minimum of light from the ground – as simple as a trash-fire barrel - will illuminate the rotor blades, marking the helicopter as an easy target.

10. Never fly a mission without overwhelming firepower in immediate reserve, whether artillery or air cover. That includes rescue capability.

In light of the above helicopter limitations, the U.S. military is proceeding to repeat the current crisis by fielding the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Many news reports over the past five years have cited the aircraft as unsafe in any environment. The FAA won’t certify its use for civilians, yet the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command are preparing to entrust the fate of America’s finest combat troops to an aircraft that begs of disaster.

A schedule of design changes and flight tests have supposedly ironed out some of the MV-22’s problems. However, critics who study the flight history of the Osprey cannot shake a deep suspicion that its basic flight parameters will prove fatal on the modern battlefield. Just one identified limit, the Osprey’s maximum descent rate, is so slow as to leave it a sitting duck for any amount of rifle fire alone.

Beyond the risk of life, the MV-22 also comes with an increasingly exorbitant starting price tag – $68 million apiece – independent of such factors as combat maintenance and repair. Worse, its marginal suitability compromises any mission effectiveness.

The final issue regarding helicopters on the battlefield comes down to an unpleasant premise. The United States may not always be conducting war with a third-world country. It is clear that any competent army armed with sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry or aviation assets, will quickly drive our fleet of attack and reconnaissance helicopters from the sky, rendering them to a marginal role as a vehicle used for air evacuation and mop-up operations.

It remains to be seen whether senior U.S. military leaders have the awareness and moral courage to recognize how endangered military helicopters have become.

Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@comcast.net.
sftt.org