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The Capture of Saddam Hussein
December 14, 2003 1303 GMT
Summary
Saddam Hussein has been captured in Iraq. This is the single most
important event in Iraq since the end of major hostilities. It is
not clear whether Hussein had operational control of the
guerrillas, but it is clear that he was the symbol not only of
resistance, but of American impotence. Moreover, whether in
active control or not, he knows a great deal about the guerrilla
movement, and the guerrillas cannot know whether he will talk.
That means the guerrillas are in crisis, and their future is in
doubt. It also means that in order to demonstrate their ongoing
determination, they will have to retaliate soon -- and hard.
Analysis
Saddam Hussein has been captured in Iraq. Most wars do not turn
on the fate of any one man -- and in the end, Hussein's capture
might not be decisive in ending the war, but it is certainly
going to be significant. It will undermine, probably to a great
extent, the fighting capacity of the guerrillas, certainly in the
medium term.
Hussein had become a symbol of the resistance and of the failure
of U.S. intelligence. So long as he was free, the guerrillas
could take comfort in the idea that American forces were blind.
However, as we have argued over the past weeks, that blindness
had been subsiding. Hussein's capture proves that to a great
extent, U.S intelligence in Iraq has penetrated the opacity of
the guerrillas. If the United States could find Hussein, its
forces could operate more effectively against the guerrillas.
That has to have a major effect on guerrilla morale. The best
fighting force in the world -- and the Iraqi guerrillas are far
from that -- needs hope of victory. The Iraqi guerrillas' hope of
victory turned on the impotence of U.S. intelligence. The United
States was able to destroy whatever it could see. If its vision
had improved to the point of seeing and capturing Hussein, then
it has improved enough to engage the guerrillas directly. The
guerrillas must, as individuals, now be recalculating the
probability of victory.
In addition, Hussein knows a great deal about the guerrillas'
structure and plans. Even if he was not in direct operational
command of the guerrillas, he certainly knows a great deal. The
fact that he was taken alive rather than killed says a great deal
about U.S. intentions to interrogate him. If he talks -- and
while that is uncertain, we suspect the interrogation will be
effective even if it does not resort to physical torture -- the
United States will become even more effective in terms of
intelligence.
Moreover, the guerrillas cannot possibly know whether he is going
to talk. They must assume the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the
guerrilla command must be calculating at this moment precisely
what Hussein knows. Once they determine that -- and they will not
be able to be certain what he does know -- they will have to make
speedy adjustments in deployment and methods to counter what is
likely to be a very rapid series of U.S. strikes based on that
fact.
Others in Iraq, particularly the Shia, will see the capture of
Hussein as potentially leading to a diminution in guerrilla
operations among the Sunnis and, therefore, a potential decline
in their own importance to Washington. They have been holding out
in several areas before finalizing a deal with the United States.
The value of that deal might decline in the coming days or weeks.
At this point, the United States does not know what the
consequences of Hussein's capture will be. Neither do the Shia,
but they will have to calculate the worst from their point of
view: the decline of the guerrilla threat. The pressure on the
Shia to close the deal is now more intense than it was before.
In the short run, the threat from the guerrillas actually
increases. They cannot go quiet: Regardless of his importance in
their campaign, the capture of Hussein forces them to increase
operations if possible. If they go quiet, it will result in
serious doubts among the ranks about the survival of the movement
and the possibilities of defections or simple desertions. In
order to prevent this, the guerrillas will need to strike quickly
and effectively. Over the next 72 hours, the threat of
counterattacks in Iraq will be substantial.
In the long run, the outcome is not at all clear. The guerrilla
command certainly did not depend solely on Hussein. The
movement's leaders might well be able to hold things together if
they can get through the next few weeks. However, if the
resistance continues, it is likely to strengthen the hand of
foreign Islamist fighters over the indigenous, secular, Baathist
guerrillas. As -- if -- these latter decline in strength and the
war continues, their influence over the movement is likely to
rise.
Under any circumstances, this is a massive psychological blow to
the guerrillas -- and guerrilla war depends heavily upon
psychological factors. The capture increases the credibility of
the United States dramatically and raises doubts about the
viability of the guerrillas. There is no downside to the United
States on this one -- save for inevitable criticisms as to
whether he was treated humanely, which will start coming out of
Europe in a matter of days.
What to do with him is an interesting question. Following
interrogation, he will be tried. He could be tried in Iraq,
although the outcome there is uncertain, and the internal
pressures could be substantial. An interesting choice would be to
try him at The Hague. What makes that important is that, in spite
of being an organ of the United Nations, the international war
crimes tribunal is a heavily European institution in many
respects. Sending him to The Hague would force the Europeans to
take primary responsibility for judging Hussein. In so doing, it
could shift European public opinion and the view of national
governments.
U.S. President George W. Bush certainly needed this capture from
a political standpoint. The vision of helplessness that had
plagued U.S. policy in Iraq can be reversed by this action,
assuming that any guerrilla counterattack is managed effectively
and explained publicly. In any event, Bush will now be able to
claim that in spite of his critics, he has quietly been pursuing
the war and that the effectiveness of this strategy is now
showing itself.
This might not have been a decisive day for the United States in
the war, but it was not a trivial day. Indeed, it is reasonable
to argue that this is the most important event since the end of
major combat activities was announced. We will now find out what
the guerrillas are made of -- and whatever the answer, that will
be the most important piece of intelligence available. Good, bad
or indifferent, U.S. leaders have got to know how resilient the
guerrillas are. And they are about to find out. |
