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Politics : Support the French! Viva Democracy! -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: epicure who wrote (4168)	12/19/2003 9:51:29 AM
From: epicure	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 7834

Howard's deft political decision on Iraq By Jeffrey Robertson The pressure on US-allied states in Asia has arguably never been greater. Despite the media frenzy over the capture of Saddam Hussein, the United States still desperately needs assistance in the occupation of Iraq. Accordingly, each ally faces a difficult decision - commit to a dangerous and unpopular occupation and suffer the domestic political consequences or lose favor with the superpower that ensures its long-term security. This conundrum has hit the governments of South Korea and Japan, both of which are sending troops to Iraq in the face of a mounting death toll that now includes their own nationals. However, one country in the Asia-Pacific region has escaped this difficult choice. Long before the pressure built up, conservative Prime Minister John Howard committed Australian forces to the US-led effort to remove Saddam. It was a decision that has proved to be politically deft - not the decision to support the US, but the decision how to support the US. Few Australians were surprised when Howard announced on March 18 that the country's forces would participate in the invasion of Iraq. Critics noted the impossibility of not participating in a US-led invasion. Australia, under the current conservative coalition, has continually sought to reaffirm ties with the United States in both the economic and security fields. Indeed, with the majority of Australian forces already acclimatizing in the gulf region since January, it seemed the decision to participate had been made a considerable time beforehand. Australia contributed about 2,000 service personnel, including an F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft squadron and a Special Forces task group. Australia was the only US ally, besides the United Kingdom, to undertake significant combat operations during the invasion of Iraq. Domestic criticism was scathing. Howard was popularly portrayed as an eager lapdog to an overzealous Texan sheriff with a score to settle. Howard was, critics argued, endangering Australia's ability to engage with its Asian, and immediately Islamic, region. Like Prime Minister Tony Blair in the UK, John Howard even faced growing opposition from long-time party supporters. But John Howard is no political fool - at least his political/strategic affairs advisers are not. The make-up of Australian forces deployed to the Persian Gulf served a particular niche role in the coalition - one that would not be required after the end of major combat operations. It has since been revealed that Howard resisted US requests for the deployment of a larger land force that would have been more appropriate for a longer commitment. The majority of Australian troops returned in May, both victorious and safe, leaving behind Australian representatives to coalition support and reconstruction operations, as well as a small troop detachment to protect Australian interests. Requests from the United States and the United Kingdom for a further peacekeeping commitment were denied. As stated by Howard: "It's one thing to have a short, sharp, highly professional, highly effective contribution when it's really hot. It's another thing to have a very long commitment of a large number of regulars." Howard had apparently drawn his line in the sand. As November passed with the greatest number of coalition troops lost in the war since the commencement of hostilities, Howard's commitment of Australian forces to the invasion of Iraq - but not the occupation - emerged as a decision of considerable political foresight. Howard minimized damage both to his domestic political standing and to the long-term security relationship. His handling of the Iraq crisis warrants further study as an adept play of alliance politics. Every alliance involves a cost-benefit relationship. In security alliances, states forgo a certain level of sovereignty, entailing a political cost in return for the benefit of a security assurance. Committing armed forces to alliance operations is one example of cost. Successful alliance management necessitates minimizing the perceived cost to alliance partners. This can be partially achieved through ensuring that the national interests of all alliance partners are perceived to be served in coalition operations. The administration of US President George W Bush failed to do this. The failure to organize a convincing raison de guerre prior to the invasion of Iraq resulted in allied support coming at a much greater political cost - a cost far too great for most leaders in Asia. The complexity of the occupation has further necessitated the administration putting increased pressure on allies to contribute to a cause they could not support in the first instance, once again increasing the cost of participation in the alliance. The increased political cost of participation in an alliance relationship inevitably results in the usefulness of the alliance being questioned, particularly at a time when the perception of threat, and hence the need for a security assurance, is declining. This is the case now across the Asia-Pacific, where supporting the US has arguably never been more unpopular. In Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, a staunch supporter of his country's alliance with the United States, greatly weakened his political position by making the unpopular decision to send the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to support the US in Iraq - future leaders may well make note of the damage this has inflicted upon Koizumi's once unassailable political lead. In South Korea, the credentials of reform-minded President Roh Moo-hyun were severely discredited by his decision to send 3,000 troops to Iraq - future reformers may well consider any commitment to US operations abroad as a political taboo. John Howard's decision on how to support the US avoided damaging what he clearly believes to be Australia's most important relationship. It is his belief that there exists an unshakable common ideal between Australian national interests and US foreign and security policies. In his words it is "a relationship that, although expressed in security terms, really expresses shared values and shared ideals between two societies". Yet in the end, he made a decision that was based as much upon domestic political considerations. In the coming months as the death toll from the occupation of Iraq inevitably spreads to Asia and the political leaders in South Korea and Japan are further assailed by the damaging political fallout, they will undoubtedly study how John Howard managed to both minimize the damage to his domestic political standing while ensuring the stability of the long-term security relationship with the United States. Undeniably, Howard made a deft political decision in supporting the invasion, and not the occupation. (Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)