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To: lurqer who wrote (33212)12/21/2003 12:39:58 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Ounce of Preventive War, Pound of Destruction

By Errol Morris
The Los Angeles Times
Friday 19 December 2003

Notion of 'strike first' helped fill the 20th century with violence

In the spring of 2001, I started interviewing Robert McNamara, the secretary of Defense under presidents Kennedy and Johnson, for the film "The Fog of War." I have often been asked: "Why McNamara? Why make a movie about this man, a man reviled by many as the architect of the Vietnam War?" Because I had read McNamara's "In Retrospect" in 1995 and was surprised that the book I read was different from the mea culpa that was described in countless reviews and editorials.

The book wasn't an apology but an anguished attempt to look back on history and to imagine whether history could have been different. At its heart, it also raised these questions: "Can we learn from experience? Can we learn from history?"

McNamara's earliest memory is of Armistice Day, 1918. "I was 2 years old," McNamara says in the film. "You may not believe I have the memory, but I do. I remember the tops of the streetcars being crowded with human beings cheering and kissing and screaming - end of World War I, we won - but also celebrating the belief of many Americans, particularly Woodrow Wilson, [that] we'd fought a war to end all wars."

What I find so interesting about this is that it is a memory of "preventive war." This becomes one of the central ironies of the film. The war that was fought to end war ushered in the 20th century, the century of the worst carnage in human history. Far from ending future war, World War I engendered war.

Now that the concept of "preventive war" has entered the vocabulary again in the context of the latest war in Iraq, it is interesting to note that it has been a recurring theme through the last century.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, preventive war was seriously discussed because of the advent of nuclear weapons. It was argued that because the United States had nuclear superiority, we would be well advised to fight the Soviets sooner rather than later, before they could match our nuclear arsenal.

One of the advocates of this policy was Curtis LeMay, the Air Force general under whom McNamara served during World War II. In 1957, LeMay was head of the Strategic Air Command. He was warned that few SAC bombers could survive a surprise Soviet attack, and the men who told him the news remember his response: "I'll knock [them out] before they get off the ground.... It's not national policy, but it's my policy."

And it was LeMay who essentially advocated preventive war during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Everyone is familiar with the tape recordings Nixon made in the White House, but it's less well known that both Kennedy and Johnson selectively recorded phone conversations and Cabinet meetings. In one recording made during the missile crisis, LeMay (by then Air Force chief of staff) comes across as angry and bellicose. He tells Kennedy that what Kennedy is doing - forgoing immediate military action in hopes of negotiating a settlement - is worse than Munich; that is, worse than the way British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave in to Hitler and set up World War II. Essentially, LeMay calls Kennedy an appeaser, a weakling. And LeMay never backed down. In a story that McNamara tells, after the Cuban Missile Crisis is resolved, Kennedy compliments his generals on having "won" by keeping the nation out of war. LeMay blurts out, "Won, hell, we lost. We should go in and wipe them out today!"

Such stories are particularly instructive because of new information that has come to light in recent years. In 1962, the CIA told Kennedy and his advisors that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba. It was wrong. In fact, there were 162 nuclear warheads on the island that could have been used against an American invasion force and the U.S. homeland.

LeMay's belief that it was important to strike then - to fight a preventive war when the odds were supposedly with us - would have in all likelihood led to disaster. It could have led to a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Someone recently said to me, "Well, the Cuban Missile Crisis was not that important." I replied, "It depends on how important you think Florida is."

So here we are, at the beginning of a new century, and preventive war has made a comeback. I look at it with a jaundiced eye. Haven't we been there before? Isn't "preventive war" an oxymoron? Shouldn't we have learned by now that war doesn't reduce hostility, anger and instability but instead creates more of the same? And we might ask ourselves: Do we want more of the same for this next century?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Errol Morris' documentaries include "The Gates of Heaven" and "The Thin Blue Line." "The Fog of War" opens in Los Angeles and New York City today.

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truthout.org



To: lurqer who wrote (33212)12/21/2003 2:10:13 AM
From: lurqer  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
After reports of Americans installing Baathists in their haste to Iraqify the occupation, now we're seeking "good" Taliban in Afghanistan.

New Strategy Calls for Wooing Some in Taliban

U.S. military officials, after two years of narrowly focusing on anti-terrorist combat operations, say they are shifting to a broader strategy that includes trying to woo noncriminal members of the Islamic Taliban movement back into mainstream society and establishing long-term civilian assistance programs in conflict zones.

At the same time, the U.S. military does not appear to be having serious second thoughts about combat tactics after two controversial incidents this month in which a total of 15 children were inadvertently killed during U.S. air assaults on two villages in Paktia and Ghazni provinces.

Lt. Gen. David Barno, the new senior U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, said in a wide-ranging interview last week that U.S. military officials saw three distinct adversaries in different parts of the country, each requiring a different approach.

In southern provinces bordering Pakistan, such as Khost and Paktika, where Arab Islamic extremists and al Qaeda fighters have repeatedly attacked U.S. bases, Barno said U.S. combat troops would continue to aggressively track down, capture and kill as many as they could.

In northern border provinces such as Kunar and Nuristan, which armed followers of fugitive Afghan militia leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar have used as a base for urban sabotage and links with other Islamic groups, Barno said U.S.-led combat sweeps would also continue in an effort to isolate and destroy these forces.

But in southeastern provinces such as Ghazni, Zabol and Kandahar, where revived Taliban forces have staged numerous attacks against civilians while also trying to win political influence, Barno said U.S. officials were shifting to an "integrated" approach that woos back former Islamic fighters into civilian life.

"Those who are criminals must be held accountable, but for the rank and file, the noncriminals, there will be opportunities for reconciliation and reintegration," Barno said. His remarks suggested that U.S. officials now agree with Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the revived Taliban movement needs to be courted politically.

In numerous speeches and interviews, Karzai has made a distinction between what he describes as good and bad members of the Taliban. He said recently that as few as 150 Taliban officials might be guilty of terrorism and abuse and that the rest needed to be brought back into civilian life, as is the case with thousands of other former Afghan militia forces, who previously fought the Taliban but are being formally disarmed and offered job training.

Until recently, U.S. military officials, headquartered at Bagram air base north of Kabul since the defeat of Taliban rule in late 2001, routinely mentioned Taliban and al Qaeda forces together, and always described the principal mission of some 11,000 U.S. forces stationed here as killing and capturing as many of both enemy groups as possible.

But Afghan and U.N. officials have conducted intensive consultations over the past two months, coinciding with Barno's arrival and with the shift of the U.S. military command from Bagram to Kabul, the Afghan capital. U.S. military officials said they had concluded that while al Qaeda forces represent a die-hard, armed threat, the Taliban revival was more complex and rooted in Afghan society, and thus required a more comprehensive solution.

There have been unconfirmed reports that U.S. military or civilian officials were meeting privately with some commanders of both the Taliban and Hekmatyar's forces. A senior former Taliban official, Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, was recently released from U.S. custody and has been rumored to be acting as a mediator between Afghan and Taliban officials.

"Our move of the senior headquarters to Kabul, instead of a semi-isolated area, recognizes the change of an era in Afghanistan," Barno said. From being "absolutely focused" on combat, he said, U.S. military policy will now stress integrating a variety of efforts to stabilize and secure the country. "Our role will be to help set conditions for successful elections next summer," he said.

Afghanistan is moving gradually toward a democratic political system under U.S. auspices, with a national constitutional assembly being held here this month and presidential elections scheduled for June. Parliamentary elections would be held later.

Asked about the deaths of the 15 Afghan children in two U.S. military raids in early December, and the potential adverse effect of such mistakes on civilian attitudes toward the U.S. military role, Barno said officials would continue to "refine" their efforts to pinpoint targets and minimize civilian casualties, but would not become so cautious as to run the "risk of paralysis."

"The system is imperfect, and we learn from each incident," he said, adding that U.S. military forces here might need to adjust the current balance of human vs. technical intelligence gathering. But if civilians are "co-located" with terrorists or weapons caches, that is a "callous decision by the enemy" rather than a flaw in American planning, Barno said.

International human rights groups have been highly critical of the two attacks. The New York-based group Human Rights Watch said the U.S. military should "increase precautions and explain intelligence failures" as a result. It said a "pattern of mistakes" had led to "too many civilian deaths and no clear changes" in U.S. military operations planning.

In the new U.S. military effort to win Afghan hearts and minds, a key component is to be the rapid expansion of regional military aid centers known as "provincial reconstruction teams" -- some American, some staffed by other NATO members -- into the heartland of the Taliban revival.

Four such centers are already in operation, and eight more are expected to open by spring, including four in the troubled southeast. Last week, a new center opened in Kandahar, a major southeastern city that was once the Taliban religious headquarters. Barno said U.S. military teams there would work with Afghan and U.N. officials, hoping to create a role model for other provinces.

"It's a pretty big change," he said. "We will be out in patrols on the roads, we will be training 20,000 new Afghan police. We want to use the military to enable an integrated effort. . . . We will be planting the U.S. flag and telling the Taliban we are here to stay."

Like the idea of "reintegrating" some Taliban members into mainstream Afghan society, the U.S. decision to expand the military aid teams coincides with long-standing proposals from the Karzai government on the need to greatly improve government services and visibility in areas where the Taliban are active.

In recent interviews, both the interior minister, Ali Ahmad Jalali, and the governor of Kandahar, Yusuf Pashtoon, said such efforts were urgently needed but that the Karzai government had few resources to bring them about.

washingtonpost.com

lurqer