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To: patron_anejo_por_favor who wrote (271841)12/24/2003 8:15:49 AM
From: orkrious  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 436258
 
Eyeballing Low-Ball Inflation Numbers
By Peter Eavis
Senior Columnist
12/24/2003 07:31 AM EST

thestreet.com

Of all the economic numbers that drive the market, the inflation rate is among the most avidly watched. But recent data strongly suggest that the government's consumer price index is understating how quickly prices are rising, according to two economists.

Having a faulty CPI for the economy is like having a faulty speedometer on a car -- it makes it hard to know how firmly to press on the accelerator. In the case of the economy, that accelerator is the level of interest rates -- which the nation's central bank, the Federal Reserve, heavily influences through its federal funds rate.

Investors place many of their bets in financial markets on the basis of what they think the Fed is doing with interest rates, and that means they closely watch the sort of economic statistics -- such as inflation -- that might cause the central bank to change its rate policy. Since President Nixon yanked the dollar off a gold-based currency system in the early '70s, inflation, which tends to go up when central banks allow money supply to grow strongly for too long, has been rampant in the world economy. When inflation rises too fast, central banks have to hoist interest rates to prevent severe disruption to the economy, but hiking rates can also cause recessions.

To be sure, inflation has been low in recent years in the U.S. But growth in credit and, till recently, money supply has been very strong, leading a small minority of economists to fear that inflation could pick up more quickly than the Fed expects. If the Fed were to be caught off guard, it may have to raise rates aggressively, which would roil stock and bond markets. The chances of the Fed doing that are higher if the CPI is understating inflation. While the central bank does not set policy on the basis of one or two data points, it has frequently communicated that it believes inflation not to be a threat to the economy. Until recently, the Fed was far more worried about the threat of deflation.

So what is the evidence for a broken CPI? Some economists have long believed that inflation in the real economy is not being captured in government numbers. Suspicions intensified after the release of the November CPI, which rose by 1.8% from the year-ago period -- far less than most economists expected. The index showed that prices were decelerating in sectors of the economy that are clearly showing inflation -- such as medical costs and education. Apparel prices also fell, despite steep recent increases in the prices of cotton and oil, notes John Vail, a strategist with Mizuho Securities.

What's causing Vail as well as Paul Kasriel, an economist at Northern Trust, to scratch their heads is the disconnect between the producer price index and the CPI. The PPI, which measures wholesale prices, has been moving up very strongly in recent months, and such a rise usually translates very quickly into an increase in the CPI.

"I don't have a lot of faith in government statistics in general," says Kasriel. "But I find this divergence between the PPI and the CPI very strange."

Soaring commodity prices have pushed up the PPI. Kasriel also thinks that the plunging dollar should have led to upward pressure on inflation in the U.S. (imported goods rise in price in dollar terms when the currency is falling). Kasriel points out that the European countries that use the euro have a higher inflation rate, even though their currency is stronger.

Indeed, Vail estimates that the CPI would have risen in November at a year-on-year rate of 3.4% if the CPI had maintained a close relationship with the PPI. That is way higher than the 1.8% reported by the BLS -- and it should cause investors to think hard about what's happening.

One possibility is that the retailers are "eating" the rise in wholesale prices themselves, and not passing it on to consumers. That doesn't seem to be the case, says Vail, since there hasn't been any economic evidence of a big squeeze in retailers' profit margins.

Alternatively, the CPI may just be showing price increases at more of a lag than in the past. But that is hardly comforting, because it means it will start rising sharply in the future.

Would higher prices lead to higher rates even if the inflation isn't showing up properly? You bet. Here's what would happen. Consumers would borrow more to pay for the higher-priced goods, which would push up demand for credit and put upward pressure on the market price of credit, which is simply the interest rate on loans. The Fed would then have to decide whether to hold rates down by supplying more reserves to the banking system.

It pays in confusing times like these to look at what the markets are thinking about inflation. The bond market doesn't seem overly concerned. And it may be taking its cue from the fact that money-supply growth figures have slowed markedly. But strength in bonds may just be due to money flows related to the weak dollar. One would think that a weak dollar would lead to weakness in U.S. government bonds. However, foreigners may think U.S. bonds look more attractive in terms of their own currencies the more the dollar falls.

On the other hand, gold, the classic inflation hedge, has rallied strongly in 2003, signaling that investors in the metal could be afraid of resurgent inflation. Or they may be buying the asset because they think the global financial system, bloated with dollars after years of Fed largesse, is so sick that it could break down soon, leaving only gold as a dependable store of value.



To: patron_anejo_por_favor who wrote (271841)12/24/2003 11:21:49 AM
From: Perspective  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 436258
 
Roach year-end, sorry if it was posted before. It's a great read. Excellent thesis, even if it has a (wisely) hedged forecast.

Closing paragraph is great; I especially like the following:
Equally worrisome is the magnitude of the current state of disequilibrium ? and the distinct likelihood that these unprecedented imbalances can only be vented by big movements in asset prices. My deepest fear is that the longer the venting of these tensions is deferred, the larger the ultimate adjustments and the greater the chances of a hard landing.

Happy holidays!

BC

morganstanley.com


Global: Global Venting

Stephen Roach (New York)

The world economy, as I see it, remains very much in a state of fundamental disequilibrium. A US-centric global growth dynamic has given rise to extraordinary external imbalances around the world. America, the world?s unquestioned growth engine, is facing unprecedented imbalances of its own; the national saving rate, current account, Federal budget deficit, and private sector debt ratios are all at historical extremes. And an increasingly powerful global labor arbitrage continues to keep high-wage developed economies mired in jobless recoveries. The result is a unique confluence of tensions that have left the global economy in a state of heightened instability. The venting of those tensions could well be the main event in world financial markets in 2004.

The case for global rebalancing has been an overarching theme of our macro call over the past year. The urgency of such a realignment in the mix of world economic growth has never been more compelling. Over the 1995?2002 period, the United States accounted for 96% of the cumulative increase in world GDP ? basically three times its 32% share in the global economy. This was, by far, the most lopsided strain of global economic growth that has ever occurred in the modern-day post-World War II era. Two sets of forces have been at work in creating this unsustainable condition ? a US economy that has been living beyond its means as those means are delineated by domestic income generation, and a non-US world that is either unwilling or unable to stimulate domestic demand. As a result, an unprecedented disparity has opened up between those nations with current-account deficits (the United States) and those with surpluses (Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe). Such an unbalanced global growth paradigm is not sustainable, in my view. The debate is over the terms under which the coming rebalancing occurs.

The macro fix for a lopsided economy is very simple ? it mainly entails a shift in relative prices. For a US-centric global economy, that implies a realignment in the dollar ? the world?s most important relative price. In that vein, a weaker dollar needs to be seen as the principal means by which the tensions of an unbalanced global economy are vented. The broadest trade-weighted index of the US dollar is currently down about 11% in real terms over the past 23 months. History tells us that global rebalancing will undoubtedly require a good deal more dollar depreciation ? perhaps twice as much as that which has already occurred. That poses the important question as to who bears the brunt of the dollar?s adjustment. The Europeans and Japanese believe they have suffered enough and are pointing the finger at others ? mainly China ? to pick up the slack. US politicians are also sympathetic to this line of reasoning. Consequently, the role that China plays in venting global imbalances is also likely to be a key issue in the year ahead. For what it?s worth, I think this debate overlooks a critical consideration: Europe and Japan are wealthy countries that have dragged their feet endlessly on reforms, whereas China is still a very poor country that has been aggressive in embracing reforms. Why should China be called on to compensate for adjustments that Europe and Japan are unwilling to undertake?

America must also bear its fair share in the coming global rebalancing. And the problem is that the US economy is not in the best shape to cope with the requisite adjustments. That?s because it has a record low saving rate, sharply elevated debt burdens, and massive trade and current-account deficits. Nor is growth alone likely to be a panacea for America?s shaky fundamentals. In fact, there are good reasons to worry that another surge of US economic growth could well exacerbate many of these imbalances The pivotal tension point in this regard is America?s anemic net national saving rate ? the combined saving of households, businesses, and the government sector adjusted for depreciation. This key gauge measures the saving that is left over to fund the net expansion of productive capacity ? the sustenance of any economy?s long-term growth potential. Unfortunately, in the case of the United States, there isn?t any ? America?s net national saving rate fell to a record low of 0.6% of GNP in the first three quarters of 2003. To the extent that domestic income generation continues to lag ? precisely the outcome in America?s lingering jobless recovery ? another burst of private consumption, such as that now under way in the second half of 2004, can only push saving lower. That, in turn, puts greater pressure on foreign saving to fill the void ? giving rise to increased trade deficits and private sector indebtedness.

Such an outcome only heightens the tension already bearing down on the US economy. A lasting recovery cannot be built on a foundation of ever-falling saving rates, ever-widening current-account and trade deficits, and ever-rising debt burdens. These tensions must also be vented if America?s nascent upturn is to make the transition to sustainable expansion. The bond market, in my opinion, offers the principal means by which this venting can occur. And the outlook for bonds is not good. A confluence of three bearish forces are at work ? the Fed?s eventual exit strategy from a 1% federal funds rate, a weaker dollar, and America?s fiscal train wreck. Ironically, under these circumstances, you don?t have to be worried about inflation to be negative on bonds. At the same time, if financial markets ever did get a whiff of inflation, a real rout in bonds might ensue. Higher long-term real interest rates do not temper all the imbalances that are on America?s plate. But they could help ? possibly a lot. The key impact would be a reduction in the growth of the credit-sensitive segments of aggregate demand. That would enable a long overdue rebuilding of domestic saving, which would then act to reduce America?s current-account and trade deficits. A lower pace of consumption growth would also go hand in hand with a reduced expansion of indebtedness. A tough bond market may be just the medicine an unbalanced US economy needs.

The global labor arbitrage is a third major source of tension bearing down on today?s global economy. The accelerated pace of replacing high-wage jobs in the developed world with low-wage workers in the developing world reflects the interplay of three mega-forces ? the first being the maturation of outsourcing platforms in goods (i.e., China) and services (i.e., India) on a scale and with scope never before seen. The second factor at work is the Internet ? providing ubiquitous real-time connectivity between offshore outsourcing platforms and corporate headquarters. In goods production, the Internet forever changes the efficiency of supply-chain management. But for services, the Internet is a transforming event ? effectively converting the once non-tradable sector into a tradable global marketplace. With the click of a mouse, the knowledge content of white-collar workers can now be delivered anywhere in the world on a near-real time basis. The unrelenting push for cost control in a no-pricing-leverage world is the third leg to the stool of the global labor arbitrage. Such environmental imperatives only heighten the incentives for IT-enabled ?offshoring.?

While the global labor arbitrage continues to push costs and pricing lower, it does have its dark side. Significantly, it continues to put pressure on job creation and income generation in the high-wage developed world. Largely as a result, consumers in the high-wage developed world end up defending their lifestyles by drawing increasingly on alternative sources of purchasing power, such as asset-driven wealth effects, increased indebtedness, and tax cuts. In my view, vigorous consumption cannot be sustained in the context of the profound income leakage that stems from the global labor arbitrage. That underscores yet another source of disequilibrium that must be vented. In this instance, the venting appears to be exacerbating the pressures bearing down on an unbalanced world. That?s because it has taken the form of heightened trade frictions and growing protectionist risks ? developments that only intensify pressures on the dollar and the US bond market.

The means by which this confluence of tensions gets vented will likely be key for global economy and world financial markets in 2004. There are two conceivable paths to resolution, in my view ? the benign soft landing and the ever-treacherous hard landing. Macro is not good at making the distinction between these two modes of adjustment. Instead, it basically identifies the forces that have given rise to disequilibrium and then depicts the possible adjustments that must take place to reestablish a new equilibrium. As always, the outcome is more dependent on exogenous shocks. In the current instance, the shocks that worry me the most would be those that might shake foreign confidence in dollar-denominated assets; intensified protectionist actions from Washington would be especially disconcerting in that regard. Equally worrisome is the magnitude of the current state of disequilibrium ? and the distinct likelihood that these unprecedented imbalances can only be vented by big movements in asset prices. My deepest fear is that the longer the venting of these tensions is deferred, the larger the ultimate adjustments and the greater the chances of a hard landing.