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Pastimes : The United States Marine Corps -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: haqihana who wrote (87)	12/26/2003 2:46:52 AM
From: goldworldnet	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 6227

All of our faithful servicemen and women are heroes. * * *

To: haqihana who wrote (87)	12/27/2003 1:33:50 AM
From: JEB	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 6227

" On December 12, 1941, I was called to the War Department and given a task that had much to do with the concentration of our troops -- ground and air -- to utilize them for various projects throughout the world. Within a surprisingly short time after the beginning of the war, well-meaning people were springing up all over the country to urge "action." It was un-American to be passive under attack; it was shameful that we had apparently deserted the Bataan garrison to its fate; it was unthinkable that the Germans could come over to our Florida coast line and sink our tankers within sight of our shores; it was criminal that the War Department was allowing our cities to be exposed to attack by clandestine bombing which could come from Iceland or Hudson Bay or a submarine. In short, it was implied that while the people occupying the responsible directive positions in our armed forces were probably not traitors or really criminal, it was obvious that they were too deliberate, too cautious, too fearful to be mentioned in the same breath with the red-blooded writers of these various exhortations and diatribes. Actually the time had to be used, and was used effectively, to build the teams of leadership and of combat units necessary to win the war. At the same time there was fought a series of delaying and reconnoitering secondary and probing actions by land, sea and air. This story was repeated in slightly different terms and tones after I landed in London in June of '42. Our first attack could not be made until November of that year, and even then it was not one that was intended to involve and employ all of the magnificent forces that America was then building and which Great Britain had already built. After our first landing in Africa, the old chatter of "inaction" soon built up again. My staff urged that I personalize the operation by calling it "Eisenhower's Headquarters." They wanted me out in the open with statements and all kinds of gestures and postures, in all of which I refused to participate. I was too busy working at the job of creating an effective staff, finding and training subordinate commanders, and developing the skill and morale and material strength of units. When we finally captured the last Italian and German forces in North Africa in the following May, great joy swept over the allied world and the allied commanders were heroes, far-seeing soldiers, virtual supermen. It was all of two or three weeks before the old anvil chorus got again into full play; in fact we were lucky to have the chance to take the little island of Pantelleria, which stilled the chorus long enough for us to get off our attack against Sicily in July. But that campaign was only days old when the "red blooded" Americans were again showing their disdain for commanders in the field. The story was repeated in Italy and reached new heights during the spring months following my January return to Britain. That was in 1944, when I went back to prepare the Overlord Operation. The development of new staffs and teams, the job of planning, of accumulation of forces and supplies -- all the thousand things that must be done in managing an intricate human operation -- was not finished until early June. By that moment I had long since learned to avoid reading the newspapers. They stormed that success had gone to my head and I was not ready to risk my phony reputation on the outcome of the great battle that now alone could defeat the Germans and save democracy -- the battle on the shores of northwest Europe. I learned one lesson through all these many months and many experiences. It is that in war there is scarcely any difficulty that a good resounding victory will not cure -- temporarily. And I learned that there is a priority of procedure in the preparing for carrying forward great tasks that the leader ignores at his peril. People close to a respected or liked commander fear he is losing his stature and urge the "squelching" of a Montgomery or a Bradley or a Patton; the seizing of the limelight in order to personalize the whole campaign for the troops and the public. But obviously in the hurly burly of a military campaign -- or a political effort -- loyal, effective subordinates are mandatory. To tie them to the leader with unbreakable bonds one rule must always be observed -- Take full responsibility, promptly, for everything that remotely resembles failure -- give extravagant and public praise to all subordinates for every success. The method is slow -- but its results endure!! Not for one moment am I classing your constructive comments with the kind of never-ending columnist criticism that bears a startling familiarity to the kind of military castigation that I learned to ignore on wartime. What I am drawing attention to is that much of our so-called "public opinion" is merely a reflection of some commentator's reports which, as you so well know, bear little relation to the truth. By the same token, I believe that public opinion based on such flimsy foundations can be changed rapidly; and I agree with you most heartily that it must be changed by deeds. This brings us to the discussion of methods necessary to assure accomplishment. One man can do a lot -- he can especially do a lot at any particular given moment, if at that moment he happens to be ranking high in the public estimation. By this I mean if at that moment he is dwelling in the ivory tower and not in the dog house. But in our complicated political system, even with such an individual standing, success is going to be measured over the long term by the skill with which the leader builds a strong team around him. ..." (December 10, 1953, Letter to Emmet (?), President Dwight D. Eisenhower)