For Iraq’s Sunnis, the tables may have turned
Ahmad Mukhtar - 22/12/2003
iraq-today.com
Saddam Hussein’s capture has unleashed all manner of questions and reactions, beginning with the spider hole from which he was found to his unlikely willingness to surrender. He appeared puzzled, shabby and astray, maybe even cooperative. All that may have longstanding implications for the balance of power between Sunnis and Shia in the country. For Sunnis, especially, it’s a chance to look out for their interests without Saddam.
To be sure, the footage enraged certain Arab groups not satisfied with the explanations and dismissive of everything as an American conspiracy. Those who pondered Saddam’s capture and surrender in that filthy hiding place no doubt see it as yet another humiliation, an insult to the Arab and Islamic world. The humiliation may have been due more top the fact that it was at America’s hands than because of Saddam’s cowardice itself. For many, it was simply too much to bear.
But the Arab and Islamic groups don’t seem to consider the humiliation and persecution of the Iraqi people at the hands of the former dictator. That could be because the two major groups subject to the subjugation were Arab Shia and Sunni Kurds. Or perhaps it is that the Arab & Islamic world has its own norms that everybody must review. Arab and Islamic countries are only a minor influence on the Iraqi scene.
But something caught my attention when the American civil administrator, L.Paul Bremer, called a press conference to announce Saddam’s capture, he brought Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni GC member, introducing him as the acting president of the GC because Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the official president, was in Madrid at the time. Perhaps Bremer deliberately chose a Sunni Arab and not a Shia or Kurd. A speech delivered by the British PM Tony Blair underscored the thought: he dedicated a passage to Iraqi Sunnis, beseeching them that Saddam’s myth had been shattered at his own hands, and they must play a vital role in rebuilding their country and maintaining its unity.
Nobody can predict what will happen to Iraqi politics in the coming months, yet Sunnis seem to have more options than they may have before December 13. Those options will determine their political future. Before Saddam’s capture, there was no option except sticking with Saddam, but now, they can join the other side cooperating with Americans. Now they can take a part in leadership without the terrorism of Saddam.
The success of the American intelligence in capturing Saddam was a message both to Shia and Sunnis of the American power. It was a message to the resistance that he knows everything and is likely to talk. However, Saddam’s capture indicated that the Americans penetrated resistance groups, and every local chief of these groups has to think of his situation. The Iraqi resistance is at stake, as it has to reorganize itself. Politically, they have to show themselves as capable of making resistance operations. US, in its turn, will make use of Saddam’s capture to depose the resistance. Once the American have good information, the resistance will be defeated.
The Americans were compelled to establish alliances with the Shia, the majority, almost marginalizing the Sunnis. Saddam’s capture changes the whole scene. Until now, the American authority may have been afraid of holding direct elections for the fear that Iraqis would likely elect a Shia government and possibly launch an Islamic state similar to that of Iran. The Kurds may keep up their demand for a federal state in order to guarantee and protect their future. But the Sunnis, admitting that they are no longer holding the reigns of power, may want to go along with the American plan, select their representative and guarantee some power. Although the Sunnis are the minority, their presence is spread throughout more than 40% of the country.
A Shia tie-up with Iran is remote because the Iraqi Shia were considered Arab even in exile in Iran, where they faced notable racism. And if Sunnis suffer from a crisis of leadership, the Shias are also strikingly divided into more than five camps.
The question that remains now is will the resistance from the tribes of in Sunni triangle continue or will it be disbanded? The answer will determine the role of the Sunnis later.
There is no justifiable reason for the Sunnis to trust the American authority or Shia leaders. The Coalition studied the possibility of winning over the Sunni tribes and figures to kill support for the resistance. The American are unable to distance the Shia considering they are no longer the sole hope for an American victory. The Sunnis will show may show more readiness for cooperation when they are permitted to choose their delegates of whom they have great expectations.
That last point may be critical as Bremer’s plan for indirect elections continues. The plan for selecting delegates requires the approval of 5 members from the GC, 5 members from the provincial council members and 5 from the larger municipal councils, almost all of which have been handpicked by the Americans. Iraqi Sunnis and the majority Sunni Arab countries are afraid of a Shia lead, which they fear could become an extension to Iranian policy.
The Shia may in fact see Saddam’s capture as an undermining factor to their role and importance to the Americans. Therefore, they may concentrate their efforts on reaching an agreement stipulating their supremacy. The Shia have been lumped in the American camp, yet they have to expect the worst. The American may muster up their press on ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to lessen his rejection to the agreement of authority handover. Many Arab states lobbied out to open new scopes for the Sunni participation, Marwan al-Muasher, the Jordanian Ministry of foreign affairs,’s statement of the Arab concerns about the future Sunni role, was a part of this campaign. The American have a greater penchant for the active Sunni participation as long as it keeps Iraq united and distances it from Iran. The US must handover Iraq as a unified state, and not as a giant construction project. They must help Iraqis rebuild their country both politically and economically, and be included as more than just cheap manpower. |
