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To: frankw1900 who wrote (22248)12/31/2003 3:29:04 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793698
 
French Kiss-off

Punishing dissent in Snail Country

By Michael Young
Michael Young, a Reason contributing editor, is the opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut, from which this story is taken. His weblog can be read at www.beirutcalling.blogspot.com.

The French journalist Alain Hertoghe paid a heavy price for accusing leading French newspapers of being unreasonably critical of the United States when covering the war in Iraq. In a recent book, La Guerre à Outrances, he wrote that the papers saw "the war they would have liked to have seen," infusing news stories with their ideological preferences. This prompted Hertoghe's own employer, the Catholic daily La Croix, to fire him because he had maligned its war coverage.

Many might observe that Hertoghe was merely stating the obvious: the notoriously subjective press in France has always been ambiguous toward the United States, and in the case of the Iraq war its criticisms merely mirrored an unsympathetic mood pervading French society. However, the fate that befell the journalist revealed something more perverse, namely that France's foreign policy self-esteem continues to be propped up by dubious perceptions that simply should not be challenged.

As it happens, a leading perception is that of a "French alternative" in the Middle East, which holds that France is virtually one among equal world powers in the region, whose interests must be taken into consideration whenever important decisions are pending. Ever since Charles de Gaulle realigned French policy away from Israel after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, France has regarded itself as an independent troubleshooter in the region, often advancing its interests against those of the United States, while also filling the gaps Washington has left open.

This self-image has been largely made possible by France's being a permanent member of the Security Council. However, it has stood against the reality that no Middle East state friendly (or unfriendly) to Paris and Washington considers its relationship with France as even moderately equivalent to that with the US. At best, ties with France are used as leverage against the Americans, never as a substitute.

The contours of this purported French alternative were not necessarily sharpened with the emergence of the European Union. In April 1996, for example, France's foreign minister, Herve de Charette, took on a diplomatic mission during Israel's Grapes of Wrath operation in Lebanon that undermined EU interests as much as it did American ones. It was Paris, not Washington or Brussels, which initiated the so-called "April understanding," although the Clinton administration hijacked the proposal once it proved to be a useful means to end the border conflict.

France's achievement brought confidence to its Middle Eastern diplomacy, which had shown little real success after the Madrid conference in 1991. Yet this led nowhere. Paris soon resorted to playing the role of spoiler in Iraq, as it headed an effort to lift UN sanctions there, which would have conveniently allowed French companies to rake in billions of dollars from contracts with the Ba'ath regime. This hardheadedness may have been financially explicable, but it also meant France was hitching its Iraqi fortunes to the resilience of Saddam Hussein.

As Hertoghe wrote in his book: "As a result of being permanently confronted with dictatorial, or at least authoritarian, states and abusive or even terrorist means, a kind of tolerance develops, which sometimes drifts into open complaisance."

That the French were complaisant with the Ba'ath regime was plain in the run-up to the Iraq war, after Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin indicated France would prevent military action at all costs: "We will not allow a [UN] resolution to pass that authorizes resorting to force," said de Villepin at a press conference with his Russian and German counterparts. This contradicted the spirit of UN Security Council resolution 1441, but also raised questions about French acumen, since the statement could be justified neither on idealistic nor pragmatic grounds.

With respect to idealism, it made little sense for France to engage in a quixotic effort to derail a war that was by then certain to happen. Far more usefully, France could have abstained at the Security Council, preserved a friendly rapport with the US and used this to help ensure that the humanitarian interests of Iraqis would be protected. When it came to pragmatism, French combativeness merely guaranteed that once the war ended, Paris would be viewed with hostility, marginalizing it in post-war bargaining over reconstruction contracts and the debt owed to it by Iraq.

French President Jacques Chirac managed to hide behind the fact that the public supported him. That's why France has yet to engage in a public debate over whether it gained anything politically from its fervent opposition to the US. Yet Chirac and de Villepin had nothing to show for their efforts. If anything, the French president's slapping down of Eastern European states for supporting the US on Iraq (where he imperiously remarked that they "missed a good opportunity to keep quiet") only confirmed he would tolerate no dissent on his policy choices.

Apparently La Croix was of a similar disposition, even though Hertoghe was far less critical of its coverage than he was of reporting in such papers as Le Monde, Le Figaro and Libération. Yet Iraq was significant enough an episode in recent French Middle East diplomacy to require different behavior. Did the French media fail to ask the right questions about the wisdom of their government's performance prior to the Iraq conflict? Did they intentionally avoid providing more objective news of the war?

These are perfectly legitimate questions in a Western democracy, and they merit more than this rejoinder to Hertoghe—that he missed a good opportunity to keep quiet.



To: frankw1900 who wrote (22248)12/31/2003 3:33:55 AM
From: frankw1900  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793698
 
Taheri on Gaddafi:

"To describe Gaddafi as a "statesman" is as accurate as calling Mae West a nun."

benadorassociates.com

CAN GADDAFI BE TRUSTED?
by Amir Taheri
National Post
December 22, 2003

'He is almost in from the cold." This is how British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw described the latest position of the Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Straw described Gaddafi as "a statesman" and "a man we could do business with."

An hour earlier, British Prime Minister Tony Blair had telephoned the Colonel in Tripoli to relay similar sentiments. Unusual words of praise also came from President George W. Bush.

But why this sudden warmth for a man who was described as a terrorist mastermind only a week ago? What is it that caused this strangest of political epiphanies?

The answer coming from British and American officials is that, thanks to months of patient diplomacy, Gaddafi has been persuaded to abandon his quest for weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms, and will also terminate support for terrorist organizations. In exchange, Britain and the United States will persuade the United Nations to lift sanctions against Libya after the Lockerbie tragedy almost exactly 15 years ago. The United States will also end the separate set of sanctions imposed under the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, passed under the Clinton administration. Within months, if not weeks, Libya would be open for massive Western investment in its ailing oil industry, its decrepit infrastructure and its moribund agriculture.

Nevertheless, many questions remain, not the least being: Can anyone trust Gaddafi?

This is not the first time Gaddafi has promised to change course and "come in from the cold."

The first time came in 1982 when he met French president Francois Mitterrand in Cyprus and promised that Libya would stop funding the Irish Republican Army and cut links with terror organizations attacking U.S. military targets in West Germany. By 1984, however, the British had established that Libya had, in fact, doubled its support for the IRA. As for U.S. targets, Libyan-backed groups stepped up their attacks, killing and wounding a number of U.S. troops in West Germany.

The next time Gaddafi promised to mend his ways was in 1986 after U.S. president Ronald Reagan had ordered the bombing of Tripoli. At that time the go-between was Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak, who informed the Americans that Gaddafi had pledged his "Arab honour" that he would stop all anti-American terrorist activities. Well, two years later came the destruction of the Pan-Am jetliner, the single biggest anti-American terror attack before the Sept. 11 tragedies.

Will this will be third time lucky with Gaddafi?

It is too early to tell. Some British and Arab sources claim this time will be different for at least two reasons.

The first is that the Libyan leader has seen Saddam Hussein's dental examination on television. The liberation of Iraq has put the fear of God in many Middle Eastern despots.

Earlier this month, the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad closed the offices of various terror organizations in Damascus and announced the end of the Baath Party's monopoly on power. That was followed by the Sudanese jackboots who agreed to sign an American-brokered program to end the civil war and move towards elections. Then we had the mullahs of Tehran putting their signature to a protocol that could hamper their quest for nuclear weapons. Thus it is perfectly possible that Gaddafi, too, got scared and decided to do what he needs to do to avoid a Saddam-like dental check.

The second reason why this time may be different is that Gaddafi's return from the cold has been negotiated over more than three years and with great care. The first phase was handled by Nelson Mandela, the former South African president and a personal friend of the Libyan dictator. In that, Mandela was assisted by Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington who has close political ties to the Bush family. The second phase of the negotiations was handled by the British, under Blair's personal supervision.

The argument, therefore, is that we should take Gaddafi's latest policy reversal as a strategic change and not a tactical move by a frightened man.

Nevertheless, a strong dose of skepticism is in order. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of Gaddafi's career would be familiar with his capricious and sudden policy changes. Soon after he seized power in a military coup d'etat in 1969, Gaddafi flew to Cairo and almost forced the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul-Nasser to absorb Libya into Egypt as the first step towards Arab unification. Three years later, however, Gaddafi branded Egypt as "an enemy of the Arab nation" and called for the murder of its new leader, Anwar Sadat.

Between 1973 and 1993, Gaddafi tried to make a union with a variety of other Arab states, including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and ended up supporting terrorist groups against all three.

In 1991 he flirted with Saddam Hussein, whose invasion of Kuwait looked like another recipe for achieving Gaddafi's dream of Arab unity.

By the year 2000, however, Gaddafi had quarrelled with almost all Arab leaders and was looking to black Africa for partners. In 2002 he announced Libya was no longer an Arab nation and should emphasize its "African identity." He played a key role, mostly by signing cheques, in the creation of something called the African Union, and, having bribed enough African leaders, managed to promote himself as the leader of the black continent. He also announced that any Libyan who marries a black African would get a cash gift of US$5,000.

The least that one can say is that Gaddafi is an unstable maverick who could change policy anytime and as his pleases. With an ego the size of Everest, Gaddafi believes himself to be the world's greatest philosopher. In recent years he has also taken to writing short stories, and has so far published two collections. He has also directed television documentaries, and designed what he calls "the modern Arab tent." In 1998 he also exhibited a handmade sports car that he said he had designed to drive Ferraris and Porsches out of the market.

To describe Gaddafi as a "statesman" is as accurate as calling Mae West a nun.

Surely, British and American politicians cannot be so naive as to believe that a man like Gaddafi, and a system like the one he has created, can ever pursue a rational policy.

In his speech in London last month, President Bush went to the heart of the matter when he declared that the problem with the Middle East is the absence of democracy. A totalitarian state such as the one Gaddafi has built can never become a true friend and partner of the Western democracies. The potentate who has ordered a halt to a policy of terror and weapons of mass destruction could easily order a resumption anytime he likes.

The ultimate test of any regime is the way it treats its own people. A regime's foreign policy is the natural extension of its domestic policies. As long as the Libyan people have absolutely no say in decision-making, anything that Gaddafi might say should be taken with a pinch of salt.

The United States and Britain should not allow the prospect of juicy contracts in Libya to divert attention from what President Bush has identified as the vital imperative of democratization. Real change in Libya will come only if political prisoners are released, the censorship of the media is stopped, and the ban on political parties lifted. Libya needs a constitution -- it is the only country in the world without one -- providing for free elections. Until that happens, Gaddafi will always be able to revert to his shenanigans and laugh at Bush and Blair as he laughed at Mitterrand and Mubarak in the past.
? National Post 2003



To: frankw1900 who wrote (22248)12/31/2003 4:52:34 AM
From: D. Long  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793698
 
The jackals at the doorstep...

Derek