STRATEGY PAGE: IRAQ: The Importance of Being Solid With The Sheikhs
January 3, 2004: For the fifth time since May, an American helicopter was brought down by enemy fire. A U.S. Army OH-58 two seat scout helicopter was brought down over a Sunni area by a shoulder fired missile. One of the two men on board were killed. While soldiers were guarding the site, to cars full of men dressed as journalists (wearing jackets with "PRESS" printed on them) drove up and fired on the troops. One car was later found and the occupants arrested. But Reuters says some of it's Iraqi employees were arrested in error.
Iraqi journalists have a long tradition of working for the highest bidder and doing what they are told. Worked for Saddam, and before him as well. The Baath party may well be paying Iraqi journalists working for Western media in order to perform additional services. This sort of thing is no longer a secret because the American informer network is now revealing all sorts of interesting stuff. For example, months of rumors indicated that many mosques were used as bases for attacks on American troops. But now precise information is available and raids on mosques are being made. Weapons, explosives and documents are being found and mosque employees arrested. Local Iraqis then stage demonstrations to protest American defilement of the mosque.
But operations like this have played a major role in reducing the American casualty rate. In November, 83 U.S. troops were killed, while only 38 died in December. Even before Saddam was captured, the American casualty rate was coming down. A major factor in that was the establishment in, in early December, of a council of tribal leaders (sheikhs). American Special Forces officers had worked on this for months, compiling a list of the 150 tribes and over 2,000 clans in Iraq and who was related to who. Some of the sheikhs were more legitimate, and influential, than others. This is because some had been installed by Saddam, while others had been bought off by Saddam.
But most sheikhs played along with the government and still managed to look after their kinsmen. Saddam's police and courts were seen as hopelessly corrupt and the sheikhs were perceived as a more just and legitimate source of justice. By working closely with the sheikhs, and handing out money and jobs to those who are most cooperative, more information about criminal gangs and anti-coalition activities has been provided.
January 2, 2004: With over a hundred thousand Iraqis armed and performing security duties, the crime rate had rapidly come down, and most American troops are now concentrating on operations against terrorist and pro-Saddam Iraqis who are still fighting. A data collection system for crimes has also been installed, and it showed that Baghdad's murder rate in October was lower than New York City's (which has the lowest rate of any major city in the United States). Baghdad had six murders per 100,000 population, while New York had seven. This, however, does not count the deaths from American military operations, or terrorist acts, which would increase the Baghdad "murder rate" by at least fifty percent.
That would still put it below many large American cities. The murders per 100,000 are 17 in Los Angeles, 19 in Philadelphia, 22 in Chicago and 46 in Washington, D.C. American journalists have no problem getting English speaking Baghdad residents to complain bitterly about "high crime rates." This is because many of the victims are Sunni Arabs who grew rich working for Saddam. These people still occupy nice homes in fancy neighborhoods. The criminals go where the money is, obtaining an additional satisfaction in sticking it to someone who worked for Saddam.
Some 65 kilometers north of Baghdad, a thousand U.S. troops and about 400 Iraqi police conducted a series of raids to round up rebels. American troops captured nine of the eleven rebel leaders being sought while Iraqi police picked up at least 16 men who had participated in attacks on Americans and Iraqis. Several weapons caches were also seized. These operations leave the Iraqis somewhat in awe of American military prowess. That's because U.S. troops prefer to operate at night, where convoys of armored vehicles and trucks can move rapidly down roads with no lights on. The troops use their night vision goggles to see the road, but to any Iraqis, it's just these dark shapes hurtling through the night. Even scarier is the precision with which the troops appear to operate. The vehicles surround a village or large compound and dozens of American troops dismount, each one quickly going about a specific task. No shouting (many troops use personal radios or hand signals), and no milling around. And no lights. If the people the troops are looking for try to escape out a back door, American troops swiftly cut them off and arrest them, or shoot them if there is resistance. It seems like magic to Iraqis who witness this. But it's technology and training more than magic. The troops practice their raiding drills beforehand, and are briefed on the "game plan" before each operation. The commanders back at the base have access to live video from a UAV overhead (which is displayed on large, flat screen TV monitors), and Blue Force Tracker shows all commanders the position of all vehicles and helicopters at all times. Sometimes the Special Forces has the target under observation before the troops show up, as does a UAV overhead. There are also electronic intelligence troops listening in on any cell phone (or other radio) signals coming from the target location. Detective work tries to find out exactly who is in the buildings to be raided, and who is in charge. Interpreters or Arabic speaking G.I.s will then call for the senior Iraqi to let them know why the troops are there and to avoid any resistance. This is shock and awe.
Story telling is an old tradition in Iraq, and the stories of these raids get embellished. While Iraqis like to emphasize how these American barbarians searched women for weapons (leaving out that usually only a metal detector is used), the "magical" manner in which the troops come out of the darkness and grab exactly who, or what, they want, never fails to impress. It sounds like a fairy tale, but it's real.
On a more practical level, U.S. troops are getting lots of training with the new electronic gear that has just been introduced during the last few years. The 4th Infantry division is actually the "test division" for a lot of this stuff and what this unit is doing in Iraq is something of a large scale field test, with real ammo. The troops have rapidly come up with new ways to use the equipment to protect themselves (by spotting ambushes and roadside bombs) and, of course, carrying out raids quickly and with few, if any, injuries to either side. This kind of "shock and awe" works. Iraqis tend to freeze during these rapid raids, and just let the Americans get it over with and leave.
January 1, 2004: Intelligence efforts have begun to unearth the connections between the pro-Saddam resistance and al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has hired some of Saddam's people to handle smuggling terrorists into Iraq and provide safe houses. There's a lot of money involved; millions of dollars are being spent each week by pro-Saddam and al Qaeda to pay fighters and people who provide support (safe houses, information, weapons). Raids are increasingly picking up more of the al Qaeda members, and the Iraqis who are paid to support them.
While there is an Iraq, there are all that many Iraqis. Everyone thinks first of family, tribe and ethnic group. This can be seen in northern Iraq, where Kurds are asking for the city of Kirkuk (and it's nearby oil fields) to be included in the "Kurdish region" that will have some autonomy in a democratic Iraq. For centuries, Kirkuk was the major Kurdish city in the region. But as long as Saddam ran Iraq, he moved Arabs to Kirkuk and forced Kurds to move elsewhere (under threat of death.) When the Kurds returned to Kirkuk earlier this year, they drove thousands of Arabs out, but many remain and they, along with the Turkmen (ethnic Turks, a minority that has been in the region for centuries) have been violently protesting turning Kirkuk into a "Kurdish city." The non-Kurds fear persecution and attempts to drive them from the city (and the oil jobs). These fears are not unique to Kurdish areas. Throughout Iraq, ethnic groups and tribes warily view each other, wondering who will be the exploiter, and who will be the victim. Getting Iraqis to accept the idea that they are all citizens of one Iraq is a major challenge. There are two forces that are pushing Iraqis towards these novel, and alien, ideas. First, there are the many (over ten percent of the population) Iraqis who had fled the country since Saddam came to power. Many of these are coming back and telling other Iraqis that democracy and honest government works, even for, and with, Arabs. Second, Arab journalists and pundits are now talking up the same idea. It's become fashionable to admit that Arabs have been losers for the past few centuries and that maybe it's something Arabs are doing wrong that holds back Arab progress. Iraq is seen as the great opportunity to demonstrate Arabs building a democracy with the rule of law and economic prosperity. While a worthy goal, no one in Iraq gives it more than a 50:50 chance of succeeding.
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