Although correctly pointing out the high risks of a Taiwan-China confrontation, this guy misses the point. Increasingly, the people of Taiwan don't consider themselves Chinese. As I've pointed out in several posts, this is an evolving process that has been going on for decades, and has now passed a critical mass. It is not something that is likely to be changed by any Washington or Beijing pronouncements.
Dire Strait: The Risks On Taiwan
U.S. policy has for many years sought to dissuade China from using force against Taiwan while at the same time dissuading Taiwan from unilaterally declaring independence. The objective has been to provide breathing space for the two sides to find their way to a peaceful resolution to the issue of their political relationship.
That policy is now encountering the most serious challenge it has ever faced. The immediate problem stems from Taiwan's presidential race, in which President Chen Shui-bian is blatantly challenging the existing framework in his bid to win reelection. He has declared that there is an "immediate threat of force" from China and announced that he will hold a referendum March 20 (the date of the elections) on whether China should remove its missiles targeted at Taiwan and renounce its right to use force in the event of a bid for independence by Taiwan. His opponents, recognizing the huge popularity of a separate Taiwan identity and fearful of losing ground in a close race, have also, at least for the time being, dropped all rhetoric about the possibility of seeking eventual unification with even a future, democratic China.
Chen is both reflecting and creating facts on the ground that have profound implications for the United States, China and Taiwan itself -- and that therefore demand new thinking in both Washington and Beijing. For both countries, the stakes could not be higher. At a time when they have established significant cooperation in the global war on terrorism, the Korea problem and many other issues, developments in Taiwan could drag the United States and China into armed conflict. That outcome is so horrendous as to be almost unthinkable, but it is also increasingly likely unless serious steps are taken soon. One tail is, it seems, vigorously wagging two dogs.
When the Bush administration entered office, it mistakenly believed that it had to restrain Beijing while providing a virtual blank check to Taiwan; the president proclaimed the United States would do "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan. He now realizes his mistake.
In a Dec. 9 Oval Office meeting, in the presence of U.S. and Chinese reporters and with the Chinese premier at his side, the president warned Chen Shui-bian not to take steps unilaterally to change the status quo. The president was referring generally to Taiwan's disregard of more discreet American messages and specifically to Chen's recent referendum stratagem.
But the president's blunt warning has had no discernible effect on Chen's thinking or actions. Almost immediately after the statement, Chen declared that, in essence, Bush did not mean what he said. Taipei has long seen mixed messages from various parts of the administration that have emboldened it to believe Washington will actually continue to do "whatever it takes" to protect Taiwan. Chen has kept the referendum at the top of his political agenda.
Unfortunately, the White House has had no visible follow-up strategy since its warning to Chen. The administration thus now stands in serious danger of losing whatever credibility it had in both Taipei and Beijing. The warning thus may increase the danger rather than rein it in.
It is increasingly likely that if Chen Shui-bian is reelected March 20, he will follow through on his proclaimed desire to use a referendum to adopt a new constitution before his second term ends in May 2008. Such a constitution would, even without declaring "independence," formalize Taiwan's claim to separate sovereign status. While almost all nations, including the United States, would reject that claim, few doubt that such an effort would be seen in Beijing as clearly crossing a red line and precipitating armed conflict. Since Chen has already forecast his plans and China will hold the Olympics in Beijing in 2008, strategists in Beijing will argue for military action sooner rather than later.
The Bush administration must, therefore, decide what to do next. It cannot continue to tell Beijing that it opposes what is happening in Taiwan without taking concrete measures that affect developments there. It must, essentially, make three decisions.
First, it has to decide how to chasten Chen Shui-bian so as to reduce the chances that a Chen victory will be seen in Beijing as inevitably producing unacceptable consequences. White House credibility is on the line.
Second, it must decide whether the United States would actually shed blood and go to war with China solely for the Taiwan government to add "independent" to its current attributes of being democratic, wealthy and -- as long as it does not declare independence -- secure. If it would not, it needs to find a way to communicate credibly to Taiwan where the limits of the U.S. commitment lie and to establish that case in this country, too. And it must do this in a way that does not encourage a Chinese attack.
And finally, it must decide whether it wants to seek to persuade Beijing to modify its own stance toward Taiwan, given the evolution of public opinion there. One approach would be to propose a decades-long, formal agreement to maintain the "status quo" if, for the specified period of the agreement, Taiwan agrees to take independence off the table and Beijing agrees to retract its threat to use force. If it chooses this approach, the White House must decide soon whether to seek to actively broker such an agreement, given the speed of deterioration in cross-strait relations.
The irony is that it is only Chen's reelection strategy that is leading him to push the envelope right now. Although Beijing has been consistently hostile to Chen personally, it has encouraged cross-strait trade and investment and made clear it is in no hurry concerning dialogue and potential unification. Taiwan's democracy is thriving and, paradoxically, its defense budget has been shrinking.
Chen is calculating that President Bush's commitment to Taiwan will deter China regardless of what Taiwan does (which helps explain the combination of challenging Beijing while allowing defense spending to decline). That argument presumes an unqualified U.S. commitment and a China unwilling to pay the price of conflict simply to keep Taiwan from achieving full independence. Both presumptions are extremely questionable. But unless the United States and China can convince the leaders and people of Taiwan that these assumptions are wrong, Chen's electoral strategy could lead directly to unimaginable tragedy for Americans, Chinese and the people of Taiwan.
washingtonpost.com
JMO
lurqer |
