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To: Dayuhan who wrote (23706)1/10/2004 4:33:26 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 793677
 
NY Times Magazine Cover Story.



January 11, 2004
Professor Nagl's War
By PETER MAASS

Maj. John Nagl approaches war pragmatically and philosophically, as a soldier and a scholar. He graduated close to the top of his West Point class in 1988 and was selected as a Rhodes scholar. He studied international relations at Oxford for two years, then returned to military duty just in time to take command of a tank platoon during the 1991 Persian Gulf war, earning a Bronze Star for his efforts. After the war, he went back to England and earned his Ph.D. from St. Antony's College, the leading school of foreign affairs at Oxford. While many military scholars were focusing on peacekeeping or the impact of high-tech weaponry, Nagl was drawn to a topic much less discussed in the 1990's: counterinsurgency.

At Oxford, he immersed himself in the classic texts of guerrilla warfare. There are different schools of thought, but almost every work in the canon imparts the message that counterinsurgency is one of the hardest types of warfare to wage. Nagl read ''Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice,'' by Col. C.E. Callwell, a British officer who in 1896 warned of ''protracted, thankless, invertebrate war'' in guerrilla terrain. Nagl also read ''Small Wars Manual,'' published in 1940 by the United States Marine Corps, which cautions: ''Every detachment representing a tempting target will be harassed or attacked. The population will be honeycombed with hostile sympathizers.''

The more Nagl read, the more he understood the historical challenge of insurgency. Julius Caesar complained that his legions had trouble subduing the roving Britons because his men ''were little suited to this kind of enemy.'' In the early 1800's, Carl von Clausewitz wrote of ''people's wars'' in which ''the element of resistance will exist everywhere and nowhere.'' The book that most forcefully captured Nagl's imagination was written by T.E. Lawrence, popularly known as Lawrence of Arabia, the British officer who, during World War I, led Arab fighters against the Turkish rulers in the Middle East and described the campaign (taking liberties with the facts) in his counterinsurgency classic, ''Seven Pillars of Wisdom.''

Lawrence's is one of the few books in the canon written from the point of view of the insurgent. (Another is Mao Zedong's ''On Guerrilla Warfare.'') In a near-hallucinatory state, suffering from dysentery and lying in a tent, Lawrence realized the key to defeating the Turkish Army. ''Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head,'' he wrote. Lawrence's guerrillas, by contrast, ''might be a vapour.'' For the Turks, he concluded, ''war upon rebellion was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.''

In his own research, Nagl focused on two modern insurgencies in Asia. In Malaya in the 1950's, the British successfully suppressed a Communist revolt (comprised mostly of ethnic Chinese) by generally steering clear of excessive force and instituting a ''hearts and minds'' campaign to strip the insurgents of public sympathy. In Vietnam in the 1960's and 1970's, the United States military took a different approach and failed. The Americans resorted to indiscriminate firepower and showed little concern for its effect on the civilian population. Comparing the two efforts, Nagl demonstrated that a key issue for a counterinsurgent army is to calibrate correctly the amount of lethal force necessary to do the job with the minimum amount of nasty, counterproductive side effects. Even if using force with restraint meant the mission would take more time or reduce the level of force protection, it was still an indispensable step: a successful counterinsurgency took care and patience. When Nagl's doctoral thesis, ''Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam,'' was published in 2002, it carried the subtitle ''Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife.''

Nagl's scholarship helped earn him a post as a professor at West Point. But when I met him last month, he was testing his theories far from the classroom. Nagl is now the third in command of a tank battalion in the heart of the so-called Sunni Triangle, which extends north and west of Baghdad. The counterinsurgency expert is, for the first time in his life, practicing counterinsurgency.

Over the course of two weeks I accompanied Nagl as he did everything from overseeing raids to detaining Iraqis, meeting local sheiks, doling out grants to schools, attending a memorial service for a fallen soldier, picking up bits of human flesh after a car-bomb attack, playing ultimate Frisbee with fellow soldiers and dodging rocks and bullets that Iraqis were firing at him and his soldiers. In the first of many discussions we had, I described him as an expert in counterinsurgency, and this made him laugh.

''The 'expert' thing just kills me,'' he said. ''I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency, until I started doing it.''

Nagl is the operations officer of Task Force 1/34 Armor, an 800-soldier battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Jeff Swisher, that is part of the First Infantry Division. The battalion is stationed a 90-minute drive west of Baghdad, at an Iraqi air base, not far from the city of Falluja, that is now known as Camp Manhattan. The main town in the battalion's area of operations is Khaldiya, a few miles from the base. Like Falluja and Ramadi and other former Baath Party citadels, Khaldiya is a staging ground for anti-American attacks, and five of the battalion's soldiers have been killed and more than 40 wounded. Local allies of the Americans, or people seen as collaborators, live dangerously, too; in September, assailants killed Khaldiya's police chief, firing 25 bullets into his body.

Despite that attack, Nagl knows that effective counterinsurgency can't work without the formation of local security forces. Foreign troops don't know the terrain and its people as well as locals, and besides, foreign forces cannot remain forever. And so, soon after arriving in Iraq in September, Nagl and his battalion set out to retrain Khaldiya's corrupt and hesitant police.

When the first detachment of American soldiers went to the Khaldiya police station in an effort to form a joint patrol, the policemen on duty at the station, seeing the Humvees rolling up, scrambled out the back windows, Nagl told me. They were frightened at the prospect of walking the streets with the occupiers. The next day, when Nagl went to the station, the same thing happened. He and a few of his men walked across the street to the police force's administrative office and collared two of the officers there, informing them that they would have the honor of patrolling with the Americans. He put AK-47's into their hands and said it was time to move out. The conversation, as Nagl remembers it, went like this:

''You're going to walk with us,'' Nagl said.

''No, we're not,'' one of the officers responded.

''Yes, you are.''

''No.''

''Yes.''

''No.''

''Yes.''

''No.''

''You're going, buddy.''

Nagl laughed as he told me the story. He and I were sitting on cots in the room where I was staying with the battalion's translators. One of them had Scotch-taped a few centerfolds from a soft-porn magazine above his cot. A few feet away, another translator was on his knees, praying. Nagl, like every other soldier in his battalion, was far from home.

Nagl is 37, the eldest of six children. He grew up in a Roman Catholic household in Omaha, Neb., and said he decided to attend West Point out of a desire to serve his nation and spare his family the expense of putting him through college. (His father was an electrical engineer who served in the Navy.) Nagl found, in the gulf war, that combat was his metier, or one of them. During the invasion of Iraq last spring, he watched impatiently from the sidelines at Fort Riley, Kan., with his wife and infant son; he wanted to be in the action and thought he had missed his chance. Now, in and around Khaldiya, he is getting his chance. I asked whether it was different from what he expected. He laughed again.

''I understood intellectually that counterinsurgency is an intel-driven event,'' he began. ''You have to have the local nationals tell you who the bad guys are, and then you act on that information. But the steps between there were not clear to me.''

What did he mean?

He offered an example: ''The local comes in and says, 'There's a bad guy in my neighborhood who is planting I.E.D.'s''' -- improvised explosive devices -- '''and is an arms dealer and fires mortars at you.' Wow, that's great intel. 'So tell me where he lives.'''

He paused for effect.

''There aren't any addresses in this country. The streets don't have names, there are no street signs, there aren't numbers on houses; all the houses look the same.''

Nagl said he would next offer a map or satellite image to the local and ask him to point out the house. The Iraqi, in most cases, would scratch his head.

''These clowns don't know how to read maps,'' he continued. ''So how exactly do I find out which house the bad guy lives in? I've got to get the Iraqi in a Humvee and drive past the house and get him to point out the house -- but he doesn't want his friends to see him in a Humvee. I can put him in a Mercedes and put myself in local garb, but if I do that the Geneva Conventions say I lose my rights and protections. Conventional soldiers don't usually do that sort of stuff.'' (It is the sort of thing the Special Forces are doing. I was told -- though not by Nagl -- that S.F. operators occasionally visit his base, wearing local clothes or outdoor gear that regular soldiers are not permitted to wear.)

Much of Nagl's time in Iraq is taken up with conundrums like this. His days start before dawn, and by the time he goes to sleep, he can hardly remember everything that happened since he opened his eyes. For a student of guerrilla warfare, he knows, this is the opportunity of a lifetime. He is like a paleontologist given the chance to go back in time and walk with the dinosaurs. But Nagl can't simply stand around and take notes. He is responsible, with the rest of his battalion, for taming an insurgency, which is as difficult as teaching dinosaurs to dance.

The American counterinsurgency war in the Philippines, which began in 1899, cost more than 4,000 American lives and left hundreds of thousands of civilians dead. The British forced the relocation of nearly half a million peasants in Malaya in the 1950's. The French in Algeria. The British in Northern Ireland. The Turks and the Kurds. The Israelis in Palestinian lands. The Americans in Vietnam. The dour lessons of the past are very much on the minds of Nagl and other American officers trying to implement a workable strategy in Iraq, but they are playing catch-up. In the 1990's, and in fact until 9/11, counterinsurgency was a musty corner of the American military. The Pentagon referred to it as ''military operations other than war'' or ''low-intensity conflict.'' As the Iraq situation shows all too grimly, however, counterinsurgency is war, and there is nothing low-intensity about it.

Nagl understands this intellectually and intuitively. The portions of his book that focus on Vietnam stress the erroneous and muddled thinking of American military and political elites, especially Gen. William Westmoreland, who (as the historian Max Boot recounts), when asked his solution to the Vietcong, replied with one word: ''firepower.'' As a counterpoint in his study, Nagl quotes Marine Gen. Victor (Brute) Krulak, who concluded: ''You cannot win militarily. You have to win totally, or you are not winning at all.''

For Nagl, Vietnam stands as an encyclopedia of what shouldn't be done. Foremost in the do-not-repeat category are the indiscriminate use of firepower, the resort to conventional tactics to fight an unconventional threat and the failure to implement an effective ''hearts and minds'' campaign. The preferred strategy has been referred to as ''total war,'' though the phrase is often misunderstood as referring to a scorched-earth strategy. John Waghelstein, a retired Special Forces colonel who led the team of American advisers in El Salvador in the 1980's, is regarded as an astute though controversial practitioner of counterinsurgency; he promotes the ''total war'' strategy but does not define it as the vicious practices used by some of his pupils in the Salvadoran Army. Instead, Waghelstein, now a professor at the Naval War College, offers a subtler definition.

''Total war means you use all the elements of national power,'' he told me recently. ''It's at the grass-roots level that you're trying to win. You can kill enemy soldiers -- that's not the only issue. You also need to dry up their support. You can't just use the military. It's got to be a constant din of propaganda; it's got to be economic support; it's got to be elections. As long as you only go after the guy with the weapon, you're missing the most important part.''

Ignoring the civic side of counterinsurgency has been likened to playing chess while your enemy is playing poker. Though this truism is now well known in the military, Nagl acknowledges that it is not being applied in Iraq as well as it could be.

The civic chores are supposed to be shouldered by the American-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority, led by L. Paul Bremer III, but the C.P.A. remains isolated and rather inept at implementation. Its presence is minimal outside Baghdad, and even in the capital the C.P.A.'s thousands-strong staff spends much of its time in the so-called Green Zone, in and around Saddam Hussein's Republican Palace, behind elaborate rings of security and far removed from Iraqi civilian life. Some of the staff are on 90-day tours: they arrive; they learn a little; they leave. On the few occasions when C.P.A. officials venture outside the compound, they are usually escorted by G.I.'s or private guards.

One morning, during breakfast at the battalion canteen, I asked Nagl about the Coalition Provisional Authority. He has yet to see a C.P.A. official at the base, he said. He pointed to an empty plastic chair at the table and asked: ''Where's the guy from C.P.A.? He should be sitting right there.''

Given the weakness of the C.P.A., Nagl and other soldiers are effectively in charge not only of the military aspects of the counterinsurgency but also of reconstruction work and political development. Trained to kill tanks, the officers at Camp Manhattan spend much of their time meeting local sheiks and apportioning the thin funds at their disposal for rebuilding; the battalion maintains a list of school-improvement projects known as ''the Romper Room list.'' It is not unusual for Nagl and Colonel Swisher to go out in the morning on a ''cordon and search'' raid and return in the afternoon to their tactical operations center for a meeting with the second in command, Maj. David Indermuehle, about dispersing small grants to local health clinics.

The entrance to Camp Manhattan discourages direct attacks. Approaching cars must park in a dirt lot about 100 yards from the front gate. The car and anyone in it must undergo a search before proceeding further. Any vehicle trying to reach the gate without stopping for a search must first run a slalom of concrete barriers that slow it down, and along the way it will be fired upon and destroyed. This makes the base a hard target.

On a bright Sunday morning in December, insurgents in Khaldiya struck a soft target -- the police station. Not long before, the officers there had been jumping out windows to avoid working with the Americans, but in the intervening months, Nagl had begun to build trust, and relations had improved. That changed on Dec. 14. At 8:32 a.m., a car packed with plastic explosives and ball bearings detonated outside the station, killing 24 policemen as well as two women and a child. Colonel Swisher and his troops arrived at the blast site within minutes, and Nagl followed soon after. When Nagl arrived, the smell of cordite was still in the air, with blood and charred flesh on the ground. An eight-foot crater had gouged the spot where the car exploded.

That evening, as we sat in the cramped room in the battalion's tactical operations center where Nagl worked and slept, he told me about the attack and its aftermath. A portrait of Saddam Hussein was hung, with coy humor, over his bed. Above his desk, he had taped up a Dilbert spoof that a few of his soldiers had created about him. The Dilbert character, intended as Nagl, says: ''At Oxford I learned to use my huge brain. But I try not to frighten ordinary people with any gratuitous displays of mental superiority.''

The crowd that gathered after the blast, Nagl told me, didn't seem angry at the insurgents responsible for the carnage. Instead many of them blamed the G.I.'s. The mother of a dead policeman, who was allowed inside the hastily formed perimeter, shouted insults at the Americans until an Iraqi police officer escorted her out. A rumor swept through the crowd that it wasn't a car bomb that had caused the blast but a missile fired by the Americans, who were angry, so the rumor went, because the police were not supporting the occupation.

Though a car bombing like this one might seem indiscriminate, there are in fact at least two strategic reasons for such attacks. First, they discourage cooperation with American forces, creating precisely the kind of fear that made the police reluctant to aid the Americans in the first place. They also create chaos. If an occupying power is unable to guarantee security -- and car bombs have a way of showing it can't -- the insurgents might, over time, win over the populace. It is a real-world employment of the Russian revolutionary slogan, ''The worse, the better.''

In the early afternoon, a funeral procession passed by Nagl and the police station, on its way from a mosque to the cemetery. A bit later, as Nagl and other soldiers recounted it to me, another procession neared the station, larger than the previous one, with about 1,000 people, many of them shouting anti-American slogans. Nagl, who was on the street, couldn't see much of the crowd, but one of his tank commanders, Capt. Ben Miller, had a better vantage point.

''Crowd coming,'' Miller warned over the radio. ''Recommend we mount up now and pull back.''

''Roger,'' Nagl replied. ''Execute.''

The crowd threw rocks at the retreating soldiers, who sprinted to an American outpost 400 yards away. The rocks hit some of Nagl's men, and as the mob surged forward, on the verge of overwhelming the G.I.'s, the Americans fired warning shots to disperse the protesters. Nagl's soldiers then retreated behind coils of concertina wire at the outpost. Most of the crowd continued to the cemetery, but several hundred stayed behind, staring at the Americans from the other side of the wire. Anything could happen, Nagl recalled thinking: perhaps they'll rush the wire; perhaps they'll throw grenades or fire AK-47's.

Sitting in Nagl's room, I mentioned that a few days earlier a commander in a nearby area had told me how he'd instructed his snipers, before a planned anti-occupation march on their base began, to identify the leaders of the march and, if the crowd became violent, to shoot the leaders dead.

Nagl said he wasn't surprised by the idea that Americans would fire on protest leaders. ''I'm only surprised he told you that,'' he said.

In his own standoff, Nagl went on to say, ''I was running through what to do if they rushed us, and there were not any particularly good answers to that question.''

What if the crowd attacked?

''You look for the leaders,'' he replied, quietly.

After a half-hour, the crowd filtered away, leaving Nagl with a metaphor for his hearts-and-minds effort: ''Across this divide they're looking at us, we're looking at them from behind barbed wire, and they're trying to understand why we're here, what we want from them. Almost inconceivable to a lot of them, I think, that what we want for them is the right to make their own decisions, to live free lives. It's probably hard to understand that if you have lived your entire life under Saddam Hussein's rule. And it's hard for us to convey that message, particularly given the fact that few of us speak Arabic.''

In many ways, the standoff was also a metaphor for something larger: the American counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. The standoff could have gone either way, just as the war could go either way.

Nagl seemed to want to find a positive lesson in the day's events, and eventually he did. ''We had soldiers surrounded by an angry crowd, and if the soldiers had not acted under pressure with discipline, as they had been trained to do, it could have been a very ugly situation,'' he said. ''It is very easy to imagine one of the soldiers panicking and firing into the crowd, and that would have really set us back a very long way.''

A few hours after the car bomb detonated, the American military announced that Saddam Hussein had been captured. The news did not elicit shouts of joy at Nagl's base. The reaction among Nagl's men was summed up by a soldier who didn't hesitate when I asked whether he thought Hussein's capture would make his job easier. ''Nah, there are too many bad people here,'' he replied. ''They don't need Saddam Hussein to tell them to do bad things.''

Writing more than a hundred years ago, C.E. Callwell, the British military historian, predicted in his classic text ''Small Wars'' a dilemma that would face every counterinsurgent force of the 20th century. ''In a guerrilla situation,'' he warned, ''the guerrilla is the professional, the newcomer the amateur.'' Callwell offered this remedy: ''It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in a small war the only possible attitude to assume is, speaking strategically, the offensive. The regular army must force its way into the enemy's country and seek him out. . . . It must play to win and not for safety. . . . It is not a question of merely maintaining the initiative, but of compelling the enemy to see at every turn that he has lost it and to recognize that the forces of civilization are dominant and not to be denied.''

Callwell's solution tends to create a new problem, however. What is the right amount of offensive force to use? At the outset of the Vietnam War, Col. John Paul Vann, who would emerge as one of the most thoughtful and ultimately tragic officers in the war, recognized the paradox and realized his firepower-loving commanders had not. In 1962, he warned David Halberstam, then a young reporter for The New York Times, that the wrong strategy had been adopted. ''This is a political war, and it calls for the utmost discrimination in killing,'' he told Halberstam, as recounted in William Prochnau's ''Once Upon a Distant War.'' ''The best weapon for killing is a knife, but I'm afraid we can't do it that way. The next best is a rifle. The worst is an airplane, and after that the worst is artillery. You have to know who you are killing.''

Nagl, in his book, portrays Colonel Vann -- the protagonist of Neil Sheehan's Pulitzer-Prize-winning book ''A Bright Shining Lie'' -- as a clear-eyed officer who saw what was wrong and had the courage to say it out loud. Nagl understands the message Vann imparted to Halberstam and tried to impart to the generals he served under: counterinsurgency requires an excruciatingly fine calibration of lethal force. Not enough of it means you will cede the offensive to your enemy, yet too much means you will alienate the noncombatants whose support you need.

Nagl struggles to achieve the right calibration in Iraq. I went on several cordon-and-search raids with him and his men, and as we drove in his Humvee he would always make a point of waving at civilians. A small gesture, for sure, but it showed what was on Nagl's mind. The gesture was appreciated by some; from others it elicited hard stares.

The paradox might be impossible to resolve. The United States military has done a good job, in general, of limiting what it refers to as ''collateral damage'' in its occupation of Iraq. Yet for every raid that finds its target, there seem to be nine that don't, and in those nine, soldiers often point weapons at civilians, drive through fields and backyards, break down doors and detain people who are later released. This is the inherent messiness and slowness of counterinsurgency that T.E. Lawrence wrote of, and it is a key reason that the failure rate in counterinsurgency is so high.

''I didn't realize how right Lawrence of Arabia was,'' Nagl said to me once. ''My first experience of war was the gulf war, which was very clean. We shot the tanks that didn't look like ours, we shot the enemy wearing a uniform that didn't look like ours, we destroyed the enemy in 100 hours. That's kind of what I thought war was. Even when I was writing that insurgency was messy and slow, the full enormity of that did not sink in on me. I am seeing appreciable progress, but I am starting to understand in the pit of my stomach how hard, how long, how slow counterinsurgency really is. There is no prospect it's going to end anytime soon.''

The United States Army that marched into Iraq was a big-war army, with lots of armor and lots of plans for crushing a massed enemy, after which the people would offer flowers and sweets to their liberators. The Army has not completely adjusted itself to counterinsurgency, but it has undergone alterations. Nagl's soldiers, trained to guide tanks over open ground, are now negotiating Humvees through mud alleys. Artillery and bombs, which Vann identified as the least effective weapons in Vietnam, are being used in the Iraqi counterinsurgency campaign with the precision of the knives that Vann recommended -- or so the Americans believe.

Soon after arriving at Camp Manhattan, Nagl's battalion was the target of mortar attacks by an insurgent who was nicknamed ''the mad mortarman.'' The soldiers were unable to catch him in the act, but counterbattery radars pinpointed the field he was operating from, and Nagl's troops fired artillery and mortars at it one night. When American soldiers went to the scene the next morning, local civilians, who hadn't enjoyed the experience of having American shells landing by their homes, told the Americans who had been firing the mortars; four men were detained later that day.

According to the American troops, there were no complaints from local men and women about the American shelling; nobody was injured, and the locals apparently understood it was not an indiscriminate assault but a targeted response to targeted attacks. Nagl says he believes that makes a difference, and he points to declining attacks to support his case.

''Direct-fire attacks on us have dropped dramatically,'' he told me. ''We have a pretty clear message. If you shoot at us we will do our damnedest to kill you, and most of the time we will. And if you live in a neighborhood and you know there are bad people and you don't want Americans to return heavy fire into your neighborhood, endangering your families, you need to turn in the bad guys. That message is being received.''
End of Part one.



To: Dayuhan who wrote (23706)1/10/2004 5:59:17 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793677
 
This surprises and pleases me.

U.S. issues call for electoral reform in Hong Kong
By Nicholas Kralev
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published January 10, 2004

The United States, ignoring China's warning not to meddle in its internal affairs, yesterday called for "electoral reform and universal suffrage" in Hong Kong that would allow the population of the Beijing-controlled territory to directly elect its chief executive.

Siding with hundreds of thousands of protesters who marched through the streets of Hong Kong last week, Washington said the demonstrations "reflect the desire of the people of Hong Kong to advance the democratization process, as provided for under the Basic Law," a miniconstitution.

"The United States strongly supports democracy through electoral reform and universal suffrage in Hong Kong," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said in a statement.

"These will advance economic and social development and are essential to Hong Kong's prosperity and stability within the 'one country, two systems' framework," he said in reference to China's communist government and Hong Kong's capitalist economy.

Asked specifically whether the United States supports direct elections for a chief executive, a senior State Department official said later that a direct vote is the only truly democratic electoral reform.

The current chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was in effect appointed by Beijing after the 1997 handover from Britain. His second -- and last -- five-year term expires in 2007.

The Basic Law does envision "universal suffrage" as an ultimate goal, but the document sees it as a gradual process and provides no timetable or other specifics about when and how it might be achieved.

Worried that the implementation of that intention might be delayed by the Chinese government, protesters gathered on Jan. 1 for the second time in six months to demand an immediate and concrete time frame for electoral reforms.

On Wednesday, Mr. Tung announced the creation of a task force to examine political reform, but democracy activists immediately rejected the initiative as inadequate.

They were also critical of China's request for consultations in the early phase of the task force's work.
Mr. Tung said the task force would examine possible changes leading up to the chief executive vote, as well as legislative elections in 2008.

However, he failed to address the issue of a firm timetable for constitutional reform, which is necessary to change the way the chief executive is elected.
Mr. Boucher, asked about Beijing's recent accusation that by commenting on developments in Hong Kong the United States is interfering in China's internal affairs, disagreed with such characterization of Washington's comments.

"I regard them as entirely appropriate, otherwise I wouldn't be making them," he told reporters.
Mr. Boucher is a former U.S. consul-general in Hong Kong.
Last month, the current consul-general, James Keith, praised in a speech the half-million demonstrators for democracy who marched on July 1.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman accused Mr. Keith of "irresponsible remarks." She told the Xinhua news agency that "the issue of Hong Kong's political development is China's internal affair and we firmly oppose any foreign interference on this issue."
According to the Basic Law, in addition to the chief executive, who also appoints the members of an Executive Council, Hong Kong has a 60-member Legislative Council.
But only 30 of those members will be elected in a direct vote this year. That number grew gradually after the handover -- for the first four years it was 20 and for the second 24.



To: Dayuhan who wrote (23706)1/10/2004 7:07:46 AM
From: unclewest  Read Replies (5) | Respond to of 793677
 
Clinton did leave us with a couple of good things: NAFTA for one, much improved relations with China for another.

Gee, I thought the China visits by Nixon, Reagan and GB were what opened up China and improved our relations.
Clinton did spend 10 days in China...and he certainly did a lot for China, but I have no idea what he accomplished for America.

James Baker's visit to China in 1991 did more to improve relations with China (after Tiananmen Square) than any presidential visits.

Here is part of the real story of the Clinton efforts on behalf of China.

November 1993: After a major China policy review within the U.S. administration in September, culminating in significant liberalization of controls on the export of supercomputers and other sensitive dual-use technology, President Clinton and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin meet at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and military exchanges, suspended after the 1989 crackdown, resume with a visit to China by Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman.

February 1994: Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck goes to Beijing and infuriates Chinese officials by meeting with Wei Jingsheng, who later is arrested. The Chinese governmetn breaks off an almost non-existent "human rights dialogue" as a result.

March 1994: Secretary of State Warren Christopher has disastrous trip to Beijing where he is publicly humiliated by the Chinese government on human rights issues.

May 26, 1994: President Clinton de-links human rights and MFN, saying while China had not made significant progress on many of the issues outlined in his 1993 Executive Order, a tough human rights policy was hampering the ability of the U.S. to pursue other interests. He bans $200 million worth of annual imports of Chinese munitions, and announces a "vigorous" new human rights policy, including an effort to get U.S. businesses in China to adhere to a voluntary set of principles for protecting human rights, increased support of broadcasting to China, undefined expanded mulitlateral efforts on human rights and support for nongovernmental organizations in China -- despite the fact that none existed at the time.

May 1995:White House announces voluntary code of conduct for businesses as promised in the 1994 decision to de-link MFN but the code proves to be generic, not aimed at companies operating in China.

June 1997: Vice-President Al Gore visits China, signing $685 million worth of contracts for the Boeing Corporation with Premier Li Peng while saying nothing about human rights and byapssing Hong Kong just months before the July 1 handover to China.

October 1997: President Jiang Zemin visits Washington in a triumphal summit that took place without human rights preconditions

March 1998: For the first year since 1990, the U.S. fails to sponsor a resolution critical of China's human rights practices at the annual meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.


As for NAFTA, many think the jury is still out. Yet Ross Perot's prediction that, with NAFTA, the giant sucking sound you will hear will be the export of American jobs has certainly materialized.

NAFTA is working well. Real well. The problem is it is working for everyone else. It is not working for Americans.

We have international corporations, like Toyota, Gap and K-Mart go to Mexico to set up plants that employ workers for pennies on the dollar. Then they come to America and set up corporate chain stores where workers don't make enough to pay apartment rent. Here with the help of government (NAFTA) preference, they cause our small businesess, our national backbone, to fail.

I am for the principles of free trade that NAFTA proposes.
But it will only work equitably on a level playing field and we do not have that. Clinton thought that the world's living standard would increase and our's would get better too. In fact what is happening now is the standard of living is in decline for tens of millions of Americans and an increasing number of states are in serious financial trouble.

NAFTA provided some controls..i.e., worker safety checks. Clinton signed the bill and over the next 7 years never set up an org to provide control.

In early 1991, NAFTA experts meeting in Wash DC, openly acknowledged that the ultimate goal is the political integration of the Western Hemisphere similar to that of the European Union. Americans are already suffering badly from NAFTA, unfortunately there's lots more ahead.
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To: Dayuhan who wrote (23706)1/10/2004 1:08:08 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793677
 
Bottom-Up Culture Wars

By Alan Wolfe
DLC | Blueprint Magazine | January 8, 2004
Some cultural issues are top-down, like affirmative action and gay marriage. Others come up from the grassroots, like faith, family, and country. That's where Democrats could have an advantage.

Although Americans tend not to like culture wars, political activists invariably do. Issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and prayer in public places mobilize political bases, help raise money, and inspire political passion. And with some exceptions -- such as the effort to impeach and convict President Clinton -- cultural issues typically benefit the Republicans, helping them to energize their base and to paint liberals as out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people.

But before President Bush breaks out the champagne, we ought to recognize that there are two different kinds of cultural issues in American politics -- as well as two different sets of beneficiaries. Let me call them top-down and bottom-up cultural issues.

Top-down cultural issues rarely emerge from the lives and concerns of ordinary people but are of deep importance to political, ideological, legal, theological, and fund-raising elites. Affirmative action is the quintessential top-down cultural issue. Most Americans are not sympathetic to quotas. This even includes African-Americans, as the political scientists Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza have demonstrated. Their study showed that, "forced to make a choice between two applications for college, one black and one white, blacks overwhelmingly believe that the one who did better on the admission test should be the one that is admitted."

But university admissions officers, African-American politicians, and liberal foundations, while denying that affirmative action involves quotas, are in favor of admissions procedures that allow colleges to accept African-American applicants whose grades and SAT scores are lower than those of many white applicants who are rejected.

This gap between elite opinion and popular sentiment creates enormous political difficulties for the Democrats, for it puts them in the position of choosing between the activists in the party base and the concerns of large voting blocs. Whenever an issue like this takes front stage in a political campaign, Republicans can run as populists and accuse their opponents of being elitist.

Yet affirmative action will not be an issue in 2004, thanks to the U.S. Supreme Court generally and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor specifically. In Grutter vs. Bollinger and Gratz vs. Bollinger, the court rejected mathematical quotas but allowed race to be a factor in college admissions, thereby discovering the common ground on affirmative action that political elites have been unable to find.

The political importance of this fact can hardly be exaggerated. Race, after all, was the first wedge issue of contemporary politics, the one that could -- and did -- swing white Democrats over to the Republican Party. Now that Republicans appeal to diversity as much as Democrats, neither party in the 2004 presidential election is going to engage in racial demagoguery.

As the courts take away, however, the courts also give. While matters involving race are unlikely to be wedge issues in 2004, those involving gays inevitably will be. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts offered the Republican Party a gift by ruling that the state is barred by its constitution from prohibiting marriage between homosexuals. This is not a Republican Party in the habit of turning gifts down.

Whatever the legal and constitutional merits of the court's decision -- I find its reasoning compelling, even eloquent -- there are at least three ways this issue can benefit the Republican Party. The first is that it enables Republicans to mobilize conservative religious believers. Even while national leaders like Bush will avoid language that reeks of intolerance in reacting to the Massachusetts decision, the Republican influence industry of talk shows, magazines, and Christian commentators will claim that the decision threatens the future of Western civilization.

Second, the issue of gay rights enables Republicans to appeal to culturally conservative minority groups, especially African-Americans and Latinos. The former not only tends to register strong opposition to homosexuality, it also often resents comparisons between the struggles for civil rights and the arguments made on behalf of gay rights. And Latinos, overwhelmingly Catholic, may be inclined to follow the Church's teachings on homosexuality, which unambiguously condemn gay marriage.

Third, the fact that it was a Massachusetts court that issued this ruling will remind both parties of the red state/blue state divide in the 2000 presidential election. Massachusetts has an all-Democratic congressional delegation, is the home state of Sen. Ted Kennedy, and is the only state that voted for George McGovern for president in 1972. (McGovern also won the District of Columbia.) Republicans will be sure to tell the country that a state so liberal cannot be allowed to make policy for the rest of America, especially if other states find themselves forced to recognize homosexual marriages conducted in gay-friendly Provincetown.

The gay rights issue is not a completely free gift for the Republicans. If they use the issue, they will have to argue against marriage for those who want it, oppose the right of states to experiment in matters of public policy, defend governmental interference with private decisions, and allow Democrats to raise the specter of intolerance that showed itself during the Clinton impeachment. Still, the issue reminds us that top-down cultural concerns still matter. (Not only will gay rights be an issue in 2004, abortion may well be one as well, given the passage of a bill outlawing "partial-birth" abortions.)



At the same time, however, alongside the old issues in the culture war has arisen a set of concerns that do not easily fit into the political patterns with which we have become familiar. Bottom-up issues, as I call them, touch on matters individuals care about greatly: their faith, their families, their country. And while each of those issues sounds like it belongs on Republican terrain, Democrats, in fact, have major advantages because of Republican extremism.

Consider families first. Unease with Clinton's adulterous behavior certainly helped Republicans appeal to family values in the 2000 election. But in the past year or so, we have seen enough examples of Republicans engaging in less than perfect moral behavior to undermine any lingering sentiment that one party is more moral in its choice of leaders than the other. Charges of improper behavior toward women did not hurt Arnold Schwarzenegger's campaign for California governor, but having a Republican governor of the country's largest state whose views on hot-button moral issues are moderate and even liberal will make it difficult to charge Democrats with abandoning traditional values.

And the fact that William Bennett and Rush Limbaugh experienced problems with gambling and drugs led a number of conservatives to argue that we should be tolerant and understanding toward them. Perhaps we should, but once the language of forgiveness enters politics, the language of finger-pointing blame exits. Bush himself, no doubt, will continue to be perceived as a good family man in 2004. But assuming that the Democrats also nominate a man who loves his wife and cares for his children, it is hard to imagine anything like the 2000 Clinton subplot repeating itself in 2004.

There is further cause to believe that family issues need not work against Democrats in 2004. Americans worry that widespread divorce and a decline in the authority of parents make it difficult to bring up children. They are right to worry. But a lack of jobs, the pervasive appeal to sex and violence in the mass media, widespread gambling, and easy access to drugs, including abuse of the pharmaceutical variety, also increase the difficulty of parenting. Republican policies that give tax breaks to the wealthy at far greater rates than the middle class, allow the media free rein to dominate the airways as they choose, and weaken the ability of government to engage in responsible regulation are not family-friendly.

Why would Republicans, who claim to stand so strongly on behalf of the family, advocate policies that weaken the ability of parents to raise healthy and well-balanced children? The answer, interestingly enough, is that they have put themselves in a position strikingly similar to Democratic exposure on yesterday's cultural issues. Intent on rewarding contributors to their campaigns, Republicans have chosen to side with elites over the concerns of ordinary citizens. Whether Democrats can take advantage of the resulting policy distortions is a political question, but there is no doubt that the opportunity to do so exists.

Much the same is true of issues involving faith. Americans, compared with the citizens of any other wealthy liberal democracy, believe in God in overwhelming numbers. As writer Amy Sullivan has persuasively argued, the failure of Democrats to honor the faith commitments of Americans often puts them at a disadvantage. At the same time, however, the God in whom most Americans believe is not in exclusive possession of the truth, is tolerant toward people of other faiths, and is rarely severe in his condemnation of sinners. Not even evangelical Protestants, who form the core of Bush's electoral base, resemble these days the ignorant and dogmatic Christians portrayed in a film like "Inherit the Wind."

Alas, American society has in recent months witnessed public figures who act as if they had just stepped out of the script of that movie. None is more important than Lt. General William Boykin, deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence, who denounced Muslims for their belief in a false God. Although Boykin's intolerance is clearly harmful to U.S. efforts to win friends in the Muslim world, Bush, while criticizing his remarks, refused to remove him from his sensitive and important position.

Just as Democratic politicians in the past worried about negative reaction from pro-choice groups like NARAL, Bush has to be concerned that doing the right thing for our foreign policy would cost him support among those ideological extremist interest groups or newspaper columnists that claim (often without evidence) to represent the views of ordinary church-going evangelicals.

Boykin's extremism, and the failure of Republican politicians to distance themselves meaningfully from his bigotry, will undermine efforts by the Republicans to appeal to Muslim voters, whose support they generally won in 2000. Such extremism, however, can and should increase Republican vulnerability among all people of faith.

Although many liberal Democrats tend to forget it, evangelicals, even very conservative ones, believe in separation of church and state; among Baptists, for example, such separation is a founding doctrine of the faith. It is, moreover, a crucial feature of the ways evangelicals evangelize that one can never force another person to discover the joy of Jesus; conversion must, to be authentic, also be voluntary. Democrats should remember that we live in a nation under God, not a nation under Jesus, Allah, or any other specific deity. They should use the 2004 election as an opportunity to bring religion into politics and to kick intolerance out.

Finally there is, as there has to be, the question of country. After Sept. 11, Americans are unlikely to vote for a presidential candidate they perceive as insufficiently patriotic and unwilling to deploy American troops in defense of their security. But Americans are also mature enough in their patriotism to recognize that wars can be costly, both in terms of lives lost and in terms of money spent. There is no question that, whatever the costs, Americans do not want their leaders to cut and run from a place like Iraq. Yet Bush, in his approach to global security, rarely asks for sacrifice, fears acknowledging the difficulties he encounters, and tries to cover up his mistakes.

Now Democrats have an opportunity to make the case for national security by claiming that Republicans have not gone far enough. If security proves to be expensive, as it no doubt will, Democrats have to be prepared to argue that their approach to fiscal policy is more morally and culturally responsible, and more likely to find ways to pay for it.

The deep cultural divisions in our country can be troubling, especially when they are shrilly aired on cable television and in books with inflammatory titles. When our cultural issues were put on the table from the top down, there was all too little national debate. Knowing that their positions on affirmative action or abortion were unpopular among wide swatches of the electorate, liberals relied on the courts to achieve what they were unable to win in the court of public opinion. Gay marriage fits snugly into this pattern.

In retrospect, this approach was a mistaken strategy for which Democrats suffered greatly, for in relying on the courts to make policy, Democrats lost the fine art of convincing voters through the democratic process of the validity of their beliefs.

Now the shoe may be on the other foot. With cultural and moral concerns trickling up from ordinary people and not down from ideological elites, Republicans are the ones who find themselves reverting to their extremist base. Knowing full well that their views, if fully aired, would offend the centrist and moderate instincts of the American people, the administration nominates judges like Miguel Estrada, who never allowed his views to appear in print.

For the same reason, the administration has developed a fetish for secrecy in government and, when secrecy is impossible, it hides its true intentions by making claims that have little relationship to reality. Like the efforts of liberals of a previous era to rely on courts and administrative agencies to fashion policies that had little widespread support, the Bush administration understands that the American people, if given an honest choice, would reject its ideologically extremist policies. It has thereby conceded to Democrats the center. Democrats would be foolish not to grab it.

Alan Wolfe is professor of political science and director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College.

ndol.org



To: Dayuhan who wrote (23706)1/11/2004 3:21:23 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793677
 
"Thunder out of China." I am going to start reading the "Asian Times" again.

China Makes Itself Clear in Hong Kong
Beijing Now Openly Delaying Reform

By Philip P. Pan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, January 11, 2004; Page A17

BEIJING -- Minutes after Hong Kong's chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, finished his annual policy address Wednesday, mentioning in passing that he had postponed setting a timetable for democratic reform, the Chinese government made certain everyone understood what had just happened.

In a statement issued by the official New China News Agency, a government spokesman said China had told Tung it wanted him to "conduct thorough consultations with relevant departments of the central government" and "only afterwards finalize relevant work arrangements on this issue."

In other words, for the first time since more than 500,000 people participated in a huge anti-government rally in Hong Kong on July 1, China's Communist leaders stepped out of the background and made clear that they intended to control the pace of political change in Hong Kong.

By going public, China's leaders confirmed what many already suspected: Beijing is making key decisions in Hong Kong now, despite its promise of maximum autonomy for the former British colony. They have opened a new chapter in the mainland's relationship with the territory, one that makes them direct participants, and potential targets, in the decades-old fight over whether the people of Hong Kong should be able to elect their own leaders.

China's move has already forced Hong Kong's pro-democracy opposition to consider a change in tactics in their campaign for direct elections to select the chief executive in 2007 and the entire legislature in 2008.

Until now, pro-democracy activists have directed their anger at Tung, the unpopular shipping tycoon appointed by Beijing to run the city after its handover to Chinese rule 1997. But now that China's leaders have made it clear Tung is following their orders, the opposition must decide whether to attack Beijing.

Leaders of the pro-democracy movement have been reluctant to do so in the past, seeking to assure the Chinese leadership they are demanding elections only for Hong Kong, not the rest of the country. During the July 1 demonstration, the largest in China since the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square, and in subsequent rallies, the crowds chanted for Tung and his ministers to resign, but there was hardly any mention of Chinese President Hu Jintao or his Politburo colleagues.

The emphasis on Tung reflects public opinion in Hong Kong, where Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao are viewed kindly as potential reformers. But it also represents a pragmatic calculation by the democracy movement: China's leaders have the final say on political reform in Hong Kong, so it is best not to antagonize them.

Under Hong Kong's constitution, agreed on by China and Britain, direct elections can be introduced after 2007 only if two-thirds of the legislature, the chief executive and the central government agree. Pro-democracy activists had hoped that by mobilizing the public, they could win over the legislature, pressure Tung into going along and then present Beijing with the difficult choice of rejecting a proposal that enjoys broad support in Hong Kong.

By seeking a direct role in the process now, the Chinese government was saying it had lost confidence in Tung's ability to prevent that from happening, said Allen Lee, a member of China's national congress who is sometimes consulted by Beijing about the territory's affairs.

Lee said China's leaders blamed Tung for the huge protests in July, which took them by surprise and forced Tung to withdraw a stringent internal security bill that they wanted passed. "They don't want that to happen again. They really doubt C.H. Tung can manage these political reforms for them," he said. "They're worried about another groundswell of public opinion demanding elections in 2007."

Christine Loh, a former legislator who supports democratic reform, said Tung failed both the Hong Kong people and the Chinese government. "It's no secret that Beijing is concerned about the pace of political reform, so what we needed was someone who could explain and allay Beijing's fears," she said. "Now Tung's incompetence may have created a no-win situation for everybody. People will feel more frustrated and continue to demonstrate, and Beijing's fears will remain and perhaps get worse."

The pro-democracy movement appears divided about what to do next. Some members are calling for protests to put pressure on Beijing, but most are continuing to focus their criticism on Tung. Another large demonstration is expected on July 1, the anniversary of Hong Kong's handover to China and of the mass rally last year, followed by a showdown during legislative elections in September.

For the first time, 30 of the 60 seats in the Legislative Council will be filled by direct elections, up from 24 four years ago. Small business and professional groups that tend to favor the Chinese government will choose the other 30 lawmakers. Pro-democracy candidates now control 22 seats, and if they can win eight more, they will be able to block legislation and perhaps force Beijing into negotiations about political reform.

Martin Lee, one of the leaders of the Democracy Party, said the Chinese government's latest move appeared aimed at helping its candidates before the election. By delaying the reform process, Beijing makes it easier for them to avoid taking a position on whether universal suffrage should be used to choose Tung's successor in 2007.

China's leaders have carefully avoided saying they oppose universal suffrage for Hong Kong, in part because they are worried such a statement would affect voters in Taiwan, analysts said. The island's pro-independence president, Chen Shui-bian, is up for reelection in March and has argued that Hong Kong's experience under Chinese rule demonstrates the danger of unification with the mainland.

In addition, some in the Communist leadership have looked at Chen's strident, anti-China rhetoric and are worried that candidates in a democratic Hong Kong might behave similarly, according to one person who has been consulted by Beijing. Others are worried that democratic ideals might undermine the party's grip on power in the mainland, he said.

But China's leaders have not reached a consensus on how to answer Hong Kong's demands for elections in 2007, said Allen Lee, the deputy in the national congress. If the democrats win control of the legislature, he said, Beijing might consider a compromise that allows elections but gives them some control over how candidates for chief executive are nominated.

Asked Wednesday whether the Chinese president has told Tung he opposed direct elections in 2007, Hong Kong's chief secretary, Donald Tsang, replied: "Not specifically."

© 2004 The Washington Post Company