Afghanistan's Islamic Democracy: A Contradiction in Terms?
by Luke Thomas
Digital Freedom Network
(01.08.04)
dfn.org
The New York Times reports that on January 4, "Delegates at a national meeting approved a new Constitution for Afghanistan on Sunday, concluding three weeks of often tense debate. Their decision heralded a new era of democracy after a quarter-century of war."
According to reports, Afghanistan will be renamed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in its effort to "combine democracy and religion." Elections will be held in six months within the newly-created democratic presidential system, including directly elected president and a two-chamber national assembly (one chamber will be the Wolsei Jirga or "house of people" and the other chamber will be Meshrano Jirga or "house of elders"). An independent judiciary has also been created.
Civil rights of religious minorities are afforded legal protection and women are given special consideration: women are recognized as equal citizens before the law and 25 percent of the seats in the national legislature are allocated for them.
Interestingly, the document is thoroughly Islamic: Islam has been declared the state's official and "sacred religion", no law can be contrary to the beliefs and practices of Islam, and in addition to the notable name change to the "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan", the new flag contains a prayer niche and pulpit with two inscribed Islamic core ideological tenets, "There is no God but Allah and Muhammed is his Prophet" and "Allah Akbar" ("God is Great").
Thus, the conflation of robust Islam with democracy seems to have created an "Islamic democracy." But is such a moniker a contradiction within its own definitional parameters? Traditional arguments have viewed Islam as diametrically opposed to democracy (arguments have even been extended to suggest that Islam and oppressive systems of government have a wide swathe of overlapping characteristics. To be certain, there are elements of both entities that resemble each other, i.e. are both "oppressive" in some form. However, a major Abrahamic religion and various theoretical systems of governments are so radically incomparable that any resemblance must be inept, largely contrived, coincidental if at all true, and likely of no substantive value). The Christian Science Monitor summarizes the argument against combining Islam and democracy:
Islam, the argument goes, breeds a submissive attitude - not only to Allah but also to political and religious leaders as well - that makes Muslims inherently incapable of participating in the rough-and-tumble world of electoral politics and of respecting the rights of minorities who follow a different religious or cultural path.
The dilemma is that if such assessments accurately capture "authentic" Islam, then democracy can never take root in such societies. If true, the US has embarked on monumental wastes of time. Even without in-depth analysis, in at least the 20th century Islamic societies have neither adopted effective capitalist policies nor have they been remotely respective of human rights. Presently, there is widespread abuse in the name of Islam towards women, religious and ethnic minorities and foreign territories and governments. Abhorrence and violence by Muslims "for Islam" is a fact. Although enormously regrettable, it is nevertheless a reality that cannot be ignored.
However, such inapplicable and clumsy generalizations that Muslims are wide-eyed fatalistically driven creatures who are beyond reason and beneficial mutations are fortunately incorrect. The US is acting very appropriately in fostering democracy throughout the Middle East.
There exists the tendency to extrapolate out of Islam's history inherent deficiencies, penchants for violence, bigotry and unmitigated loathing by Muslims for all things "not Muslim". These abstractions are entirely unjustified as they do not take into account differing histories, governmental policies, literature, trends, common beliefs, philosophical disputes, locations of acceptance and alternate cultural instantiations that are all required to gain an adequate perspective of "Islam." How is one to make sense of a survey of Egyptians, Iranians, Moroccans, Bosnians and Indonesians? In such a sample, the coherence of the group falls apart on fundamental levels, most notably on cultural grounds. One cannot reduce Muslims to nothing more than their religion since myriad other factors also shape their views and lives.
It is also unclear that the aforementioned problems Islam faces are somehow unique to Islam and not issues all religions must or have resolved. Therefore, to define "Islam" as merely "Islam" without incorporating substantial discontinuities and important nuances that are historical, philosophical, and cultural in nature, one cannot possibly expect to garner an accurate portrayal of what Islam truly is: an unbelievably intricate, widespread and powerful religion affecting billions of followers in incalculably different ways (there are important core ideological and historical similarities, some more important than others, such as Muhammed as the prophet of God, but the point is that an entity as daedal as "Islam" is fantastically involved and requires erudition to accurately grasp).
The acknowledgement of these discontinuities is imperative. The gaps in knowledge about Islam are misunderstandings concerning genuine beliefs. Islam, contrary to what is often presented, has significant values and teachings that are absolutely crucial to and necessary for democracy.
Professor Noah Feldman of New York University contends that Islam is a fluid and mobile idea that carries different meanings in different cultures and universal truths alike. But he firmly holds that in Islam, all humans are equal before God and the law and that each person has responsibilities to society. Feldman argues Islam makes paramount the notion that human beings should be treated with respect and that they must treat others likewise. World-renowned Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis echoes this sentiment:
But beyond these there are older traditions, well represented in both the political literature and political experience of the Islamic Middle East: traditions of government under the law, by consent, even by contract...the rejection by the traditional jurists of despotic and arbitrary rule in favor of contract in the formation and consensus in the conduct of government; and their insistence that the mightiest of rulers, no less than the humblest of his servants, is bound by the law.
Lewis adds that a further complementary element of Islam is the requirement of tolerance by quoting the Koranic verse "there is no compulsion in religion" and "diversity in my community is God's mercy." Also, there is the Sufi ideal of dialogue among the faiths in an attempt to fulfill their mutual aspirations.
What Lewis and Feldman are suggesting is not that Islam is faultless and without significant problems; both unequivocally agree it has disconcerting issues. Both are seeking to demonstrate there are significant elements in Islam that facilitates its inclusion into and compatibility with life in a democracy.
Given that these notions of compatibility are true, how does an Islamic democracy work?
Feldman argues the process is not easy. He first underscores that Middle Eastern Muslims have a natural fear of secular governments since they have historically been the most repressive regimes in the Middle East. Concurrently, devout "Islamists", or politically minded hard-line Muslims, are untainted by scandal and are "steadfast in challenging autocracy." Thus, "[the Islamists] speak the language of the people."
For any democracy to function, a civil society must be both in place and active. In any contemporary Islamic democracy, Islamists will primarily fill that role. Secular governments have never made Islam illegal, but traditional political parties have been outlawed. The mosque will likely be the focal point for "organization, recruitment and advertising." Islamists will dominate the short and medium run of Islamic democracies.
This near monopolization of politics and political office by those whose interests are anathema to democratic ideals (or at least Western conceptions of them) is possible. After achieving their goals by attaining real power, these Islamists could then decide to abolish elections and impose their vision of theocracy. Feldman and Lewis believe this is unquestionably a valid concern.
Democracy could also collapse if the U.S. too closely attempts to transplant its secularized democracy. Feldman observes that, "nothing could delegitamize a constitution more quickly than America setting down secularist red lines in a well-meaning show of neo-imperialism." Both Lewis and Feldman agree that whatever forms these Middle Eastern democracies take, they must evolve slowly and create a future of their own accord.
Even if one is skeptical about the likelihood of success, what is the alternative? President Bush keenly noted that America has for too long allowed grievous regimes in the Middle East to exist out of concerns for stability. Permitting authoritarian regimes to abrogate their citizens' rights has not worked in our (and clearly not in their, meaning the people of those regimes) favor. Moreover, denying democracy to the Middle East will play right into the hands of the Islamic radicals who will desperately attempt to show their religion and freedom cannot feasibly unite. The solution, therefore, is to "persuade a majority of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims that Islam and democracy are perfectly compatible," says Feldman. That task is not as difficult as it may seem. Experts across the region universally acknowledge that there has been importuning from numerous Middle Eastern residents for some level of democratization.
The US must also foster economic prosperity and social stability to these new governments. While on the one hand the U.S. must release its grip on Afghanistan and Iraq, on the other it must take responsibility for helping to raise living standards and eliminating overbearing security threats from terrorists or warlords. There will be absolute futility in these democratization efforts if the U.S. commands these fledgling governments to sink or swim without having taught them to operate in these new and precarious environments.
Lewis captures all of these preceding ideas and arguments succinctly:
The study of Islamic history and of the vast and rich Islamic political literature encourages the belief that it may well be possible to develop democratic institutions - not necessarily in our Western definition of that much misused term, but in one deriving from their own history and culture, and ensuring, in their way, limited government under law, consultation and openness, in a civilized and humane society. There is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other to provide the basis for an advance towards freedom in the true sense of that word.
The path to democracy through Islam is new, uncharted and full of uncertainties. In truth, no one (including this writer) is certain whether or not they will succeed and achieve the desired democratic ends. Yet, the overarching point is that there is justified and ample reason to believe they can. With serious, disciplined and concerted efforts, worshippers of Islam will finally be able to share the experience of freedom as maintained by themselves, for their nations and through their faith. |
