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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (123037)1/11/2004 9:56:20 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Clark says he's vindicated by O'Neill book

sfgate.com

Clark says he's vindicated by O'Neill book
KATE McCANN, Associated Press Writer
Sunday, January 11, 2004
©2004 Associated Press

(01-11) 17:09 PST MANCHESTER, N.H. (AP) --

Democratic presidential hopeful Wesley Clark says a book by former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill vindicates what he has said all along about the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

While rallying campaign volunteers Sunday at his Manchester headquarters, Clark praised O'Neill for "The Price of Loyalty," which contends the United States began the war on Iraq just days after President Bush took office -- more than two years before the start of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

O'Neill was fired by Bush in December 2002.

Clark first met O'Neill when Clark worked at the White House during the Ford administration, and calls him a man with "100 percent, rock-solid commonsense judgment."

"When he writes that the Bush administration is planning and exchanging documents on how to go to war with Iraq as soon as they took office, that just confirms my worst suspicions about this administration," Clark said.

In Clark's book, "Winning Modern War", which came out in November, the retired Army general traced the plotting of the war in Iraq back to 1996, when he says a group left over from the first Bush administration recommended that Israel focus on removing Saddam from power.

Clark goes on to write that in 1998, the group of 20, which included Donald H. Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, now Defense Secretary and Deputy Defense Secretary, respectively, wrote a letter to President Clinton, asking him to "aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power."

"We went to a war in Iraq we didn't have to go to," Clark told a group of supporters. "I'm calling on the Congress of the United States to fully investigate exactly why this country went to a war it didn't have to fight."

Clark said he was in the Pentagon immediately after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, and heard officials joking that, "'if Saddam didn't do it, he should have, because if he didn't, we're going to get him anyway."'

©2004 Associated Press



To: tekboy who wrote (123037)1/11/2004 10:40:51 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Bush decided to remove Saddam 'on day one'

guardian.co.uk

Former aide says US president made up his mind to go to war with Iraq long before 9/11, then ordered his staff to find an excuse

Julian Borger in Washington
Monday January 12, 2004
The Guardian

In the Bush White House, Paul O'Neill was the bespectacled swot in a class of ideological bullies who eventually kicked him out for raising too many uncomfortable questions. Now, 13 months later at a critical moment for the president, the nerd is having his revenge.
Mr O'Neill's account of his two years as Treasury secretary, told in a book published tomorrow and in a series of interviews over the weekend, is a startling tale of an administration nominally led by a disengaged figurehead president but driven by a "praetorian guard" of hardline rightwingers led by vice president Dick Cheney, ready to bend circumstances and facts to fit their political agenda.

According to the former aluminium mogul and longstanding Republican moderate who was fired from the US Treasury in December 2002, the administration came to office determined to oust Saddam and used the September 11 attacks as a convenient justification.

As Mr O'Neill, who sat in countless national security council meetings, describes the mood: "It was all about finding a way to do it. The president saying 'Go find me a way to do this'."

"From the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go," Mr O'Neill told the CBS network programme, 60 Minutes. In the book, based largely on his recollections and written by an American journalist, Ron Suskind, Mr O'Neill said that even as far back as January 2001, when President Bush took office, no one in the NSC questioned the assumption that Iraq should be invaded.

In the book, The Price of Loyalty: George W Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill, the author, Mr Suskind, quotes from memoranda preparing for a war dating to the first days of the administration. "One of them marked 'secret' says 'Plan for Post-Saddam Iraq,'" he told CBS television.

Oil contracts
He quoted from a Pentagon document entitled "Foreign Suitors For Iraqi Oilfield Contracts," which, he said, talks about carving the country's fuel reserves up between the world's oil companies. It talks about contractors around the world from ... 30, 40 countries and which ones have what intentions on oil in Iraq," Mr Suskind said.

The administration, as described by Mr O'Neill, was equally fixated on granting unprecedented tax cuts to the nation's richest people who had bankrolled its election campaign. It was not prepared to listen to an anxious Treasury secretary warning of dangerously ballooning deficits. The president was "clearly signing on to strong ideological positions that had not been fully thought through", Mr O'Neill says. Moderates like himself, the secretary of state, Colin Powell, and Christine Todd Whitman, head of the Environmental Protection Agency, "may have been there, in large part, as cover" for a hardline agenda, he argues. Of that trio, only Mr Powell remains in the administration and he has privately made it clear he will not stay on for a second Bush term.

Mr O'Neill's memoir is one of the most damning White House exposés of recent times, and is already being quoted with relish by Democratic presidential contenders. It has sparked a furious damage limitation and denigration response by the president's aides, one of whom told Time magazine in a revealing comment: "We didn't listen to him when he was there. Why should we now?"

White House aides have also pointed to Mr O'Neill's reputation as a gaffe-prone Treasury secretary, who at one point triggered a run on the dollar by suggesting that maintaining its strength was not a priority.

Mr O'Neill says the president often did not have much to say at key discussions and it was the bullies of the Republican right who took over. After perceptions spread early in the administration that Vice President Dick Cheney and the Republicans' political mastermind, Karl Rove, were really making policy, the White House publicity machine dedicated itself to building Mr Bush up as a decisive leader. Presidential aides have "leaked" anecdotes to the press showing Mr Bush making tough decisions. In Bob Woodward's book Bush at War, based principally on the celebrated Washington journalist's interviews with the president and top officials, there is no doubt who is in charge as the nation faces its greatest challenge since Pearl Harbor.

Mr O'Neill paints a very different picture. He describes Mr Bush as mostly silent and inscrutable during policy debates in cabinet, and says there was hardly any real interaction between president and his department heads.

He describes those cabinet sessions as being "like a blind man in a roomful of deaf people". At the end of them, he said, cabinet members were left to make policy like "blind man's bluff" guessing what the president's wishes were.

When the Treasury secretary went to the Oval Office for weekly discussions, he found he did all the talking. "I wondered from the first, if the president didn't know the questions to ask," he tells Mr Suskind, "or if he did know and just did not want to know the answers?"

The one time the president does become engaged in economic policy discussion in Mr Suskind's book, it is to question the orthodoxy of his own administration's policy during a White House discussion of a second round of tax cuts in November 2002, following triumphal midterm election results.

According to Mr Suskind, who says he has a transcript of the meeting, the president asks: "Haven't we already given money to rich people? This second tax cut's gonna do it again."

The president suggests instead: "Shouldn't we be giving money to the middle?" But Mr Rove, who has masterminded Mr Bush's election campaigns since his days in Texas, jumps in at this point in the transcript to urge the president: "Stick to principle. Stick to principle."

"He says it over and over again," Mr Suskind said. "Don't waver."

In his own account, Mr O'Neill discovers the hard line on tax cuts is coming from Mr Cheney. Not knowing he was in his last weeks as Treasury secretary, he went to see the vice president expecting to get a sympathetic hearing for his concerns over the deficit. Instead he is told: "You know, Paul, Reagan proved that deficits don't matter. We won the mid-term elections, this is our due."

Mr O'Neill's disillusion personifies a latent split in the Republican party between traditional moderates and followers of the president's father, and the hardliners around the second President Bush. Mr O'Neill served in the Nixon and Ford administrations before moving on to run the Alcoa aluminium corporation, where he dedicated himself to improving worker safety. He insists he continues to support the wider Republican cause but he is not going to be silenced. He declares: "I'm an old guy, and I'm rich. And there's nothing they can do to hurt me."



To: tekboy who wrote (123037)1/12/2004 10:51:34 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Liberal Hawks Reconsider the Iraq War

slate.msn.com

Here are some interesting new comments from Ken Pollack...

<<...From: Kenneth Pollack
To: Paul Berman, Christopher Hitchens, Thomas Friedman, Fred Kaplan, George Packer, Jacob Weisberg, and Fareed Zakaria
Subject: War Was Not a Necessity
Monday, Jan. 12, 2004, at 8:18 AM PT

I also don't find this to be an easy question to answer. And let me start with the necessary disclaimer that while I believed a war would be necessary to depose Saddam, I opposed both the timing and manner of the actual war as the Bush administration pursued it.

For me, there is no escaping the fact that the prewar intelligence estimates regarding Iraq's WMD programs—and particularly its nuclear program—were wrong. Iraq was not 4-5 years away from having a nuclear weapon, as I and the rest of the Clinton administration had been led to believe.

On the other hand, going back in time to 2002, but knowing that Iraq did not pose the same kind of strategic threat that we believed, I think there still would have been grounds to argue that a full-scale invasion to topple Saddam was a reasonable option.

Saddam Hussein's regime was still a source of considerable instability in one of the most important and fragile regions of the world. Setting aside the invasions of Kuwait and Iran, and the wars he threatened with Syria and Israel, his behavior throughout the 1990s (when he did not have nuclear weapons and after suffering the horrible defeat of the Gulf War) was still astonishingly aggressive, risk-tolerant, and determined to overturn the status quo. His 1993 attempt to assassinate George Bush, his 1994 threat to Kuwait, the 1996 attack on Irbil, provoking Desert Fox in 1998, and trying to move Iraqi ground forces to the Golan to provoke an Israeli military action in 2000 all speak to the problems his regime created as a matter of routine.

There was still a residual WMD threat. What we have learned since the fall of Baghdad is that Saddam remained determined to acquire these weapons at some point in the future and had preserved rudimentary elements of the programs, which he intended to use to rebuild them after the sanctions were lifted. With the exception of the missile area, these were not very active programs, and the threat from Iraqi WMD (and particularly nuclear weapons) was much, much further away than was believed, but it was not gone completely. I think this the weakest argument, but not entirely irrelevant.

There was also the human rights argument. For me, this was very compelling, although I recognized that it wasn't necessarily as important for every American. Even before the revelations of postwar Iraq, only the most obtuse failed to recognize that Saddam's regime was among the most odious of the last 50 years. As someone who supported previous U.S. humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and elsewhere—and who wished we had taken action in Rwanda—the argument was an important aspect of my own conviction. I felt guilty all throughout the 1990s that we were not doing more for the Iraqi people (especially after we betrayed them in 1991). Unfortunately, until Sept. 11, I saw no likelihood that the American people were going to support an invasion—which was the only policy that could actually relieve Iraq's misery. However, I had supported both revising the sanctions (years before the Bush administration would adopt them under the banner of "smart sanctions"), and I argued for a more aggressive covert action program in the vain hope that it might produce regime change.

Which brings me to my last point: the range of available options. In asking whether the United States should have gone to war with Iraq I think we also need to address what our alternatives would have been. We need to remember that our Iraq policy was in bad shape starting in the late 1990s. I still find the alternatives all pretty bad—although some are not necessarily as bad as I thought them before the war.

I think the war put to rest the fantasies of the neocons that we could simply arm Ahmad Chalabi and a few thousand followers (followers he still has not actually produced), give them air cover, and send them in to spark a rolling revolution. Richard Perle and others argued for that initially, but in the end they had to support a full-scale invasion as the only realistic course. The covert-action-based regime-change policies that I and others in the U.S. government had pushed for as an alternative never had a high likelihood of success, either—they were just slightly more likely to produce a coup and much less likely to create a catastrophic "Bay of Goats," as Gen. Anthony Zinni once put it. Ironically, I think the events of the last 12 months have also indicated that containment was doing both better than we believed, and worse. On the one hand, the combination of inspections and the pain inflicted by the sanctions had forced Saddam to effectively shelve his WMD ambitions, probably since around 1995-96. On the other hand, the behavior of the French, Russians, Germans, and many other members of the United Nations Security Council in the run-up to the war was final proof that they were never going to do what would have been necessary to revise and support containment so that it might have lasted for more than another year or two.

The one alternative policy that looks better in retrospect is deterrence—which was the idea that we could allow containment to collapse because we could still deter Saddam from making mischief through our own military power. While I think Saddam's astonishingly reckless behavior before the war only confirms the prevailing view among Iraq experts that this was not someone we would have wanted to trust with nuclear weapons, the postwar revelations suggest that he was so much further away from having those nuclear weapons that we might have safely opted for deterrence in the expectation that we could have found an alternative way to deal with him in the years before he did get his hands on a nuke.

If I had to write The Threatening Storm over again I certainly would not have been so unequivocal that war was going to be a necessity. However, I still would have pointed out that there was a strong case for removing Saddam's regime (for the reasons mentioned above) and that realistically the only way to remove him from power was to mount a full-scale invasion. I might have decided that when you weighed all the pros and cons, deterrence and invasion might have been roughly equal, but I would have pointed out that a key difference between them was that if you opted for invasion you were removing a great evil from the world and creating the possibility that we could turn Iraq into a real positive, as Tom and Fareed argued when they made the case on the basis of democratization. It would not have been as compelling, but my guess is that many readers would still have come to the conclusion that war was the least-bad choice among a menu of imperfect options.

Ken Pollack...>>