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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Hawkmoon who wrote (123220)1/14/2004 7:02:02 PM
From: GST  Respond to of 281500
 
No, Bush did not merely "cite intelligence" -- because there is no way that the intelligence could support the statements made by him and others in his Administration. He lied about the intelligence -- the only way to soften this is to say that he simply never understood the intelligence. It is hard to say which would be worse, an incompetent President or a liar.



To: Hawkmoon who wrote (123220)1/14/2004 7:24:48 PM
From: Nadine Carroll  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
A must-read. Lawrence Wright's New Yorker piece about his experiences in Saudi Arabia.

lawrencewright.com

I am strongly reminded of the British consuls remarks from Charleston, SC in 1861, who said that he really did not know how to describe the atmosphere in Charleston, as the place was too small to be a country and too large to be a lunatic asylum.



To: Hawkmoon who wrote (123220)1/15/2004 10:40:29 AM
From: GST  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
From Foreign Affairs: <What actually happened, however, was the fourth scenario, one for which Washington was wholly unprepared: partial compliance. Iraq did not accept that it bore the burden of proof of showing that it had disarmed, and it gave the UN a preposterously implausible declaration of its weapons programs (comprised, in part, of previous reports to the UN). But it did allow inspectors unfettered access to suspected sites, and it generally cooperated with them. Iraq granted inspectors access to presidential palaces and other locations that they had been barred from or where they had been harassed in the past, and it destroyed dozens of al Samoud missiles after the UN declared that they exceeded their allowed ranges. Some key scientists were also allowed to be interviewed, and new methods were proposed to prove the past destruction of banned weapons. Washington, however, was caught flat-footed by these developments, and the result was disastrous.

The right way to deal with partial compliance would have been to develop a timetable for completing the verification of Iraq's disarmament and a way to judge whether Baghdad had actually met it. To achieve such an outcome would have required careful multilateral diplomacy. The Bush administration could have approached all the key players at the outset to discuss this method and all the other options. Putin, for example, would have viewed summit-level discussions about how to respond to different scenarios as a sign of respect for Russia and a demonstration of real partnership. According to key Russian officials, he would then have agreed in advance to setting a deadline for Iraq's compliance. French officials similarly claim that Chirac would have gone along with the use of force if a nine-month schedule had been set at the beginning. The swing voters on the council (Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, and Pakistan) would have been satisfied with as little as four months. But no such consultations took place between Bush or Secretary of State Colin Powell and their counterparts.

In fact, the partial compliance scenario was not even seriously examined before or immediately after the passage of Resolution 1441. When Iraq then took such an approach, the United States seemed unprepared. This result may have occurred because of divisions within the administration over what to do in such a case, with hard-liners determined not to respond to anything short of unequivocal compliance. Regardless of the reasons, however, Washington had no plan in place. Not having laid the diplomatic groundwork, the allies waited until February to start scrambling for support of a resolution endorsing war.>

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Stumbling Into War
James P. Rubin. Foreign Affairs. New York: September/October 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 5; pg. 46