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To: lurqer who wrote (35147)1/15/2004 4:44:28 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 89467
 
Seem's I'm not the only person to think this way......

Lies About the President's Policy in Iraq

By Eleana Gordon
FrontPage Magazine
January 14, 2003
The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

A rising chorus of new studies, articles, opinion pieces and interviews is accusing the Bush administration of lying about Iraq and misleading America into an unnecessary war. Ironically, the proponents of this narrative are validating their thesis by doing exactly what they accuse the Bush administration of doing: selectively highlighting some facts and ignoring others, unabashedly presenting quotes out of context, and ignoring the broader issues that substantiated the case for war, such as Iraq's violation of more than 17 UN Security Council resolutions. The result is a skewed picture of the administration's case for removing Saddam Hussein from power, and the emergence of two myths in particular that trivialize the very real dangers and challenges America faces in the international arena in the wake of 9/11:

Myth 1: The case for the war in Iraq was based on the belief that Iraq's advanced program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed an “imminent” threat. According to this view, the failure to find massive stockpiles of WMD proves the threat was not imminent, that the policy of “containment” was working and that war was therefore unnecessary. Bush simply made a bogeyman out of Saddam Hussein because his hard-line advisors were war-hungry.

Myth 2: Saddam and al-Qaeda are so ideologically opposed that they would never work together, even against their common enemy -- the United States. Therefore, there was no need to be concerned about Iraqi weapons ever falling into the hands of al-Qaeda.

The chorus singing these myths reached its crescendo last weekend when former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill's told "60 Minutes" that the Bush administration was eyeing an invasion of Iraq "from the very beginning,” and that he had never seen anything he would characterize as evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

O'Neill's remarks came in the wake of recently published books and articles on President Bush's alleged deceptiveness by prominent liberal writers such as David Corn at the Nation, Michael Kinsley of Slate and syndicated columnist Molly Ivins. The newly minted Center for American Progress has issued numerous reports purporting to expose the White House's rhetoric against the “facts” in Iraq. MoveOn.org, the Web-based grassroots organization that became famous for its unprecedented success in raising funds online for anti-war candidate Howard Dean -- and more recently by its connection to an ad comparing Bush's invasion of Iraq to Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia -- is now promoting a documentary that claims to tell “the story of how the truth became the first American casualty of the Iraq war.” And the liberal Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has issued “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” which claims to uncover the truth about how intelligence was manipulated for political purposes.

These self-described exposes of the Bush administration's
“mistruths” fall short when they are held up against a
thorough examination of the information and facts that
were available to the administration when it began to
shape its Iraq policy in 2001 and 2002.

Iraq's Weapons Programs

The fact that no huge stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction have been found to date in Iraq has led many to justifiably question whether, given the existing intelligence, the administration exaggerated the state of Iraq's weapons programs. There is no doubt that the administration projected confidence that it would find extensive weapons stockpiles in Iraq.

Many Democrats, eager to use this to their political
advantage, are now claiming that the administration
intentionally misled the nation about the “imminent
threat” posed by Iraq.

Of course, the Bush administration was not alone in worrying about the threat from Iraq. One of the most vocal and articulate proponents of regime change was Kenneth Pollack, who served as Director of Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council from 1990 to 2001 under both Clinton administrations. In his book the Threatening Storm, Pollack gave a detailed analysis of the history of containment -- and why it was failing. He explained in a March 2002 Foreign Affairs article that the only viable policy option left was regime change: “The last two years have witnessed a dramatic erosion of the constraints on the Iraqi regime. The Bush administration's initial solution to this problem, the smart sanctions plan, would be little more than a Band-Aid and even so could not find general acceptance. If no more serious action is taken, the United States and the world at large may soon confront a nuclear-armed Saddam.”

Furthermore, the fundamental case for war never rested on
what we knew about Saddam's weapons, but rather the
opposite: What we did not know, and what we feared we
would never know as long as Saddam persisted in defying
the United Nations, with increasing help from other
governments.

Of particular concern were the vast quantities of chemical
and biological agents (such as VX, Sarin and anthrax) that
Iraq had once admitted to having, and then claimed,
without any proof, to have destroyed. In his presentation
to the United Nations in February 2003, Hans Blix himself
stated: “This is perhaps the most important problem we are
facing."

Former President Clinton explicitly stated his support for
the war on precisely those terms in a Larry King interview
last July, saying there was "a substantial amount of
biological and chemical material unaccounted for " in
Iraq, “so I thought it was prudent for the president to go
to the U.N. and for the U.N. to say, 'You got to let these
inspectors in, and this time if you don't cooperate the
penalty could be regime change, not just continued
sanctions.'" Clinton understood the bigger picture that
the angry Left is ignoring: We didn't have the luxury of
waiting for certainty about Iraq's weapons programs before
we acted.

If anything, our history with Iraq had taught us that Western intelligence had consistently underestimated Iraq's weapons programs. Not only did we discover in 1991 after the Gulf War that Saddam's nuclear program was far more advanced than we thought but, throughout the 1990s, UN inspectors were regularly hoodwinked by Saddam's regime, and most of their major weapons discoveries were thanks to defectors, not inspections. Once inspectors left in 1998, we were in the dark about Saddam's activities.

And in 1998, the Clinton administration successfully
passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which made regime change
in Iraq the official policy of the US government.

After 9/11, it was only responsible to weigh the risks of continuing business as usual against the distinct possibility that Saddam was secretly reconstituting his weapons programs and to consider what tools were available in order to prevent such an outcome.

The same lack of perspective has led Bush's critics (and
much of the mainstream media as well), to misrepresent the
recent findings of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), presented
by David Kay to the US Congress in November 2003, as
suggesting that the ISG has found no evidence that Saddam
had any significant weapon programs at all.

Not so. With respect to nuclear weapons, the ISG found
hidden documents and equipment in scientists' homes that
could be used to resume uranium enrichment. Scientists
told the ISG team that Saddam had made it clear to them
that he expected them to be able to quickly reactivate the
nuclear program. Kay concluded that "the testimony we have
obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government
officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam
still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons.”

The ISG's findings thus validate pre-war concerns that Iraq had kept its nuclear teams in place and in a position to reactivate secret nuclear research activities. It was on this basis that the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an independent, London-based research institute, determined in a July 2002 report that while Iraq would take several years and foreign assistance to build fissile material production facilities, “it could, however, assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained.”

The possibility that Iraq was seeking, or had already
obtained fissile material from Africa was therefore not to
be taken lightly. Although US intelligence was never able
to substantiate that Iraqis were attempting to purchase
uranium from Niger (the infamous “yellowcake” affair), the
British Secret Intelligence Service to which the claim was
credited continues to stand by its evidence. In September,
the UK parliamentary commission that was created to
investigate pre-war British intelligence claims concluded
that the basis for the uranium intelligence was "reasonable."

According to a Washington Post article in December 2003, it now appears that the CIA and the State Department “knew Hussein already had a stockpile of the same type of uranium that he was supposed to be seeking." It seems remarkable that this has not received more attention.

In connection to Iraq's biological and chemical weapons,
the ISG found a clandestine network of laboratories
maintained by Iraqi Intelligence with equipment for
ongoing chemical and biological research; new research on
BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean
Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF); continuing work on ricin and
aflatoxin; and leads into chemical research activities
that have yet to be investigated. Kay also pointed out the
magnitude of the task in trying to locate chemical
weapons: “ISG has had to contend with the almost
unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional weapons armory,
which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the physical size of
any conceivable stock of chemical weapons.”

Finally, in connection to missiles and delivery systems, the ISG concluded that Iraq was engaged in undeclared activities to produce missiles with ranges of at least 1000km, well in excess of its permitted range of 150km. “These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement program about which we have much still to learn," Kay added.

What all of this suggests about Iraq's weapons programs is
that Saddam was moving from the vast, centrally controlled
WMD manufacturing capability of the 1980s to a smaller and
more clandestine system that left fewer traces, and would
have allowed it to maintain the façade of obeying the UN
while retaining the ability to quickly activate the
production of WMD on a just-in-time basis. In other words,
it was a program specifically designed to elude inspectors
as he continued to pursue his goal of acquiring weapons of
mass destruction – a goal there is no reason to believe he
ever gave up. This constituted the “grave and growing”
danger the administration spoke of (which, conceptually
and strategically, is different from an “imminent” threat –
a description the administration did not employ). In
other words, it was not necessarily the presence of actual
weapons -- or the imminence of attack -- but the ongoing
intention and the ease with which Saddam could covertly
create a capability to act on those intentions that
constituted a challenge that we could not ignore and had
to address decisively.

Connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda.

Critics of the President claim that he created the idea of a link between Saddam's regime and al-Qaeda out of thin air. The Center for American Progress stated: “No evidence exists to substantiate the claim that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda had any connections. In fact, most evidence points to the contrary.” This is echoed by Fairness and Accuracy, the leftwing media watch group, which similarly claimed in a July 18 press release that the administration "has produced no evidence to demonstrate that this link exists." These groups have either failed to do their homework, or are deliberately misleading their audiences.

The CIA has intelligence pointing to contacts between al-
Qaeda and Iraq starting in the early 1990s. George Tenet –
who has served as CIA director under both President
Clinton and President Bush -- referred to this
intelligence in a October 2002 letter to Senate
Intelligence Committee: “We have solid reporting of senior-
level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a
decade. ... We have credible reporting that al Qaeda
leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them
acquire WMD capabilities." Secretary of State Colin
Powell also mentioned this history of contacts in his
testimony to the UN: “We know members of both
organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight
times at very senior levels since the early 1990s.” Powell
went on to state that Guantanamo detainees from
Afghanistan have revealed that an al-Qaeda militant known
as Abdallah al-Iraqi was sent to Iraq between 1997 and
2000 to obtain help in acquiring poisons and gasses.

CIA officials also told the New Yorker's Jeffrey Goldberg
about al-Iraqi and that members of the Iraqi secret police
were sent to Afghanistan to train al-Qaeda on terrorist
tactics and weapons. Vanity Fair's David Rose learned that
there were over 100 CIA reports of Iraq/al-Qaeda contacts
which were all given the CIA's highest credibility rating,
and the Weekly Standard's Stephen Hayes recently published
a leaked classified Pentagon memo documenting 50
intelligence items on contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda
since 1990, including a meeting between bin Laden and the
chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

The Clinton administration was concerned about a possible
collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda as early as 1996,
when the CIA observed that Iraqi experts were working with
the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (where bin
Laden was based at the time, and the target for US
bombings in 1998). These suspicions were strengthened in
1998 when the CIA found traces of the acid known as EMPTA,
a key ingredient for the deadly nerve agent VX. Only Iraq
was known to produce VX agent using EMPTA.

In its 1998 indictment of bin Laden for the East African
embassy bombings, the Clinton administration claimed: “Al-
Qaeda reached an understanding with the Government of Iraq
that al Qaeda would not work against that government and
that on particular projects, specifically including
weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively
with the Government of Iraq.”

Even David Benjamin, a former National Security Council advisor on terrorism during the Clinton administration who rejects the idea that al-Qaeda and Iraq have any formal cooperation, acknowledged in a USA Today article that “there are bound to be some (al-Qaeda) contacts with Iraqi agents, even some who are known as such.”

There is no question that Saddam's Iraq was supporting other radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas whose members also are known to have contacts with al-Qaeda. Captured members of the Kurdish Islamic terrorism group, Ansar al-Islam, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda, have also disclosed that they received assistance from Iraqi intelligence.

It is not difficult to imagine how weapons expertise and stocks might be funneled from one group to another, with or without Saddam's expressed approval.

Meanwhile, new evidence continues to trickle out of Iraq. In December 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council uncovered a document from July 2001 in which the former head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, describes arranging for 9/11 plotter Mohamad Atta to obtain three days of training in Baghdad by the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal, under the “direct supervision” of the IIS.

Whether all this evidence is authentic and compelling, and how much is conclusively revealed about the working relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq are fair questions. But to deny this evidence altogether is dishonest – unless one is alleging that the Clinton administration, George Tenet and Colin Powell, among others, were lying.

At issue here is not whether the Bush administration should come under scrutiny for how it presented the case for war. It should, and our democracy is only strengthened by such critical inquiry. But as Bush's critics shine the light narrowly on the administration's pre-war statements, seeking to expose contradictions, exaggerations and falsehoods, they should not obscure the issues that were at stake.

As Aesop warned, “Beware lest you lose the substance by
grasping at the shadow.”

The premise that the case for war relied on convincing
evidence of an imminent and urgent threat posed by Iraqi
WMD is simply wrong. It also is naïve to promote the myth
the secular Ba'ath regime and al-Qaeda would never have
worked together due to their ideological differences –
despite ample evidence that the Ba'ath regime worked with
other Islamist terrorist groups.

In the post-9/11 world, as we face the growing and
converging threats of radical Islamist terrorism and
weapons proliferation in the hands of dictators with
records of aggression, genocide and other human rights
abuses, the burden should be on those who opposed taking
decisive action to disprove that claim that Saddam
represented a grave and growing threat, and to disprove
that the liberation of Iraq did not represent a net
benefit for Americans, Iraqis, the Middle East and the
world.

Eleana Gordon is Vice-President of Communications and Democracy Programs at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

frontpagemagazine.com

defenddemocracy.org.



To: lurqer who wrote (35147)1/15/2004 4:44:51 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 89467
 
Cheney v. Powell
The vice president and the secretary of State appear to have conflicting opinions of the Iraq-al Qaeda connection.

by Stephen F. Hayes
01/13/2004

"I HAVE NOT SEEN smoking-gun, concrete evidence about the connection. But I think the possibility of such connections did exist, and it was prudent to consider them at the time that we did."

That was Secretary of State Colin Powell last Thursday. It was a curious comment, given that the administration had made an Iraq-al Qaeda connection an important, if ancillary, part of its case for war in Iraq. In fact, Powell himself had laid out some of the "concrete evidence" of the Iraq-al Qaeda connection himself in a presentation at the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003.

One week after this presentation, on February 12, 2003, Powell testified before the House International Relations Committee. He was asked by Rep. Howard Berman of California why containment of Saddam was no longer a viable option. Powell explained that potential threat of terrorists with WMD was not acceptable in a "post-9/11 environment."

What's more, Powell declared, the links are not speculative. "This is not hypothetical. The ricin that is bouncing around Europe now originated in Iraq. Now, not part of Iraq directly under Saddam Hussein's control, but his intelligence people know all about it. There's cooperation [between al Qaeda and Iraq] taking place in the manner I described last week. And I have no reason to step back from anything I said last week--this nexus between weapons of mass destruction, states that are developing them, and cooperation with non-state actors such as Osama bin Laden or some other nut case who might come along in due course. It's a risk that we strongly believe, the president strongly believes, and I think most members of the international community strongly believe we should not take any longer."

Moments later, Rep. Donald Payne, a Democrat from New Jersey, challenged Powell on the link between Iraq and al Qaeda. "I think Saddam Hussein is a bad person. I think that he should disarm. I think it would be good if he is out of power. But I think the more we co-link those two and make them one-in-the-same we do a disservice to the American people by giving them a false feeling of comfort as we go into Iraq."

Again, Powell was emphatic. "It's not that we are trying to find a connection between al Qaeda and Iraq. It's there. It's not something we're making up--it's there and we can't fail to take note of it or to talk about it or report it."

Vice President Dick Cheney was asked about Powell's recent comments in an interview last Friday with the Rocky Mountain News. He sidestepped a direct contradiction of Powell's words. "I'm not familiar with what he said yesterday," Cheney said. But the vice president was unequivocal about the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.

Well, there are two issues here . . . two issues in terms of relationship. One is, was there a relationship between al Qaida and Iraq, between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, or the al Qaida and the Iraqi intelligence service? That's one category of issues. A separate question is, whether or not there was any relationship relative to 9/11. Those are two separate questions and people oftentimes confuse them.

On the separate issue, on the 9/11 question, we've never had confirmation one way or another. We did have reporting that was public, that came out shortly after the 9/11 attack, provided by the Czech government, suggesting there had been a meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, and a man named al-Ani (Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani), who was an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague, at the embassy there, in April of '01, prior to the 9/11 attacks. It has never been--we've never been able to collect any more information on that. That was the one that possibly tied the two together to 9/11.

On the general question, Cheney was clear.

I can give you a few quick for instances--one, the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. The main perpetrator was a man named Ramzi Yousef. He's now in prison in Colorado. His sidekick in the exercise was a man named Abdul Rahman Yasin . . . Ahman Rahman . . . Yasin is his last name anyway. I can't remember his earlier first names. He fled the United States after the attack, the 1993 attack, went to Iraq, and we know now based on documents that we've captured since we took Baghdad, that they put him on the payroll, gave him a monthly stipend and provided him with a house, sanctuary, in effect, in Iraq, in the aftermath of nine-ele . . . (sic) . . . the 93' attack on the World Trade Center.

The reporter followed up. "So you stand by the statements?"

Absolutely. Absolutely. And you can look at Zarkawi, (Abu Mussab) al-Zarkawi, who is still out there operating today, who was an al-Qaida associate, who was wounded in Afghanistan, took refuge in Baghdad, working out of Baghdad, worked with the Ansar al Islam group up in northeastern Iraq, that produced a so-called poison factory, a group that we hit when we went into Iraq. They were involved in trying to smuggle things, manufacture and smuggle things like ricin into Europe to attack various targets in Europe with. He also, Zarkawi, was responsible for the assassination of a man named Foley, who worked for A.I.D. in Amman, Jordan, an American assigned over there.

The links go back. We know for example from interrogating detainees in Guantanamo that al Qaida sent individuals to Baghdad to be trained in C.W. and B.W. technology, chemical and biological weapons technology. These are all matters that are there for anybody who wants to look at it. A lot of it has been declassified. More, I'm sure, will be declassified in the future, and my expectation would be as we get the time. We haven't really had the time yet to pore through all those records in Baghdad. We'll find ample evidence confirming the link--that is the connection, if you will, between al Qaida and the Iraqi intelligence services. They have worked together on a number of occasions.

Cheney's comments are consistent with Powell's compelling presentation about the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda at the United Nations Security Council and with Powell's congressional testimony a week later. They're not really consistent with what appears to be Powell's current view. What's the administration's view?

Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.

weeklystandard.com.



To: lurqer who wrote (35147)1/15/2004 4:45:35 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 89467
 
Clinton believed Iraq had WMD
Fri 9 Jan 2004
Message 19674178

STATEMENT BY DAVID KAY ON THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP (ISG)
fas.org

Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
Message 19669853

Powell Defends Bush-Style Diplomacy
Message 19670571
Message 19670589

Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths
odci.gov.

Iraq's WMD's
Strategic Choices, Intelligence Challenges
Robert Hutchings
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Message 19669942

Powell Says Kay Report Confirms Iraq Defied U.N. Res. 1441
usinfo.state.gov

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
fas.org

The U.S. government's secret memo detailing cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.
Message 19506425



To: lurqer who wrote (35147)1/15/2004 4:46:06 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 89467
 
'Spinning Into Control'
By WILLIAM SAFIRE
January 12, 2004
OP-ED COLUMNIST

The strategic reason for crushing Saddam was to reverse the tide of global terror that incubated in the Middle East.

Is our pre-emptive policy working? Was the message sent by ousting the Baathists as well as the Taliban worth the cost?

Set aside the tens of thousands of lives saved each year by ending Saddam's sustained murder of Iraqi Shia and Kurds, which is of little concern to human rights inactivists. Consider only self-defense: the practical impact of American action on the spread of dangerous weaponry in antidemocratic hands.

1. In Libya, Colonel Qaddafi took one look at our army massing for the invasion of Iraq and decided to get out of the mass-destruction business. He has since stopped lying to gullible U.N. inspectors and — in return for U.S. investment instead of invasion — promises civilized behavior. The notion that this terror-supporting dictator's epiphany was not the direct result of our military action, but of decade-long diplomatic pleas for goodness and mercy, is laughable.

2. In Afghanistan, supposedly intractable warlords in a formerly radical Islamist, female-repressing culture of conflicting tribes and languages have come together. Under our NATO security umbrella and with some U.N. guidance, a grand conclave of leaders freed by U.S. power surprised the Arab world's doubting despots with the elements of a constitution that leads the way out of the past generation's abyss of barbarism.

3. In Syria, a hiding place for Saddam's finances, henchmen and weaponry — and exporter of Hezbollah and Hamas terrorism — Dictator Bashar al-Assad is nervously seeking to re-open negotiations with Israel to regain strategic heights his father lost in the last Syrian aggression. Secret talks have already begun (I suspect through Turkey, Israel's Muslim friend, rather than the unfriendly European Union); this would not have happened while Saddam was able to choke off illicit oil shipments to Syria.

4. On the West Bank, incipient Israeli negotiations with Syria — on top of the overthrow of the despot who rewarded Palestinian suicide bombers — further isolates the terror organizations behind Yasir Arafat. Under the pressure of Israel's security fence, and without the active support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia (each eager to retain protection of a strong-willed Bush administration), Palestinians now have incentives to find an antiterrorist leader who can deliver statehood.

5. In Iran, the presence of 130,000 U.S. troops near the border was not lost on the despot-clerics in power, who suddenly seemed reasonable to European diplomats seeking guarantees that Russian-built nuclear plants would be inspected. Colin Powell has been secretly dickering with the so-called reform ayatollah for a year in hopes of being on the right side of a future revolution. The old "Great Satan" crowd has just barred four-score reformist Parliament members from seeking re-election. That panicky crackdown in Teheran is a sign of the rulers' weakness; the example of freedom in neighboring Iraq will help cause another part of the axis to fall.

6. In Iraq, where casualties in Baghdad could be compared to civilian losses to everyday violence in New York and Los Angeles, a rudimentary federal republic is forming itself with all the customary growing pains. After the new Iraq walks by itself, we can expect free Iraqis to throw their crutches at the doctor. But we did not depose Saddam to impose a puppet; we are helping Iraqis defeat the diehards and resist fragmentation to set in place a powerful democratic example.

7. In North Korea, a half-world away from that example, an unofficial U.S. group was shown nuclear fuel facilities at Yongbyon to demonstrate that the world faced a real threat. But the U.S. has given China to understand that nuclear-armed Pyongyang would lead to missile defenses in Japan and Taiwan, a potential challenge to China's Asian hegemony. Our new credibility is leading China to broker an enforceable agreement like the kind Libya has offered, with economic sweeteners tightly tied to verification.

The columnist Jim Hoagland cautions that it is too early to proclaim that nonproliferation is "spinning into control." But taken together, this phased array of fallout to our decision to lead the world's war against terror makes the case that what we have been doing is strategically sound as well as morally right.

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company



To: lurqer who wrote (35147)1/15/2004 4:46:43 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 89467
 
The Soft-Line Ideologues

Hard-liners are the real pragmatists.

AT WAR

BY DAVID FRUM AND RICHARD PERLE
Sunday, January 11, 2004 Wall Street Journal

Under the leadership of President Bush, two approaches to American foreign and security policy have emerged. One approach is founded on vigorous, decisive action, including a readiness to use military power, against the terrorist enemy. Its exponents are the hard-liners. You know the names: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Abrams and so on.

The other approach holds that diplomacy and international organizations like the U.N. are the key to defeating terrorism. Supporting this camp of soft-liners are the professionals at the State Department championed by Secretary Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage; some veterans of the first Bush administration, like former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; and some current and former intelligence and military officials.

There is nothing unusual about divisions of this sort among the president's advisers. And President Bush has made shrewd and discriminating use of the advice he has received. What is unusual is that while the hard-liners have won most policy battles since 9/11, the soft-liners have won nearly complete control of the way those battles are reported. Pick up almost any newspaper account of the war on terror--such as the worshipful profile of State Department adviser retired general Anthony Zinni in the Dec. 22 Washington Post--and you'll learn that the hard-liners are "ideologues," bent on democratizing the Middle East through war, heedless of the dangers in their way. The soft-liners are "moderates," "pragmatists," "realists," whose hesitations, fears, and resentments are represented as subtle, nuanced foreign-policy wisdom.

Yet the truth is the opposite. It is the soft-liners who are driven by ideology, who ignore or deny inconvenient facts and advocate unworkable solutions. It is the hard-liners who are the realists, the pragmatists.

The soft-liners place their trust in institutions and tactics that have consistently failed in the past; it is the hard-liners who have learned from experience. In their devotion to the U.N., their belief in the efficacy of international law, and their nostalgia for the alliances of the Cold War (and Gulf War I), the soft-liners cling to exploded illusions about the way the world should work. They protect themselves from facts with pretenses, insisting for example that negotiated successes--such as the apparent willingness of Libya to come to terms with the U.S.--are achieved by coaxing and cajoling, not toughness and credibility.

Three recent examples prove the point:

• Mr. Powell's New Year's call for "dialogue" with Iran. Suppose you were a landlord with a tenant who repeatedly broke his promises to pay his overdue rent. After being stiffed again and again, you show up at his door with an eviction notice. He swears he will pay in full next Tuesday. Would it be "realistic" to believe him?

Soft-liners tend to think that so long as we are talking with other countries, we are accomplishing something--even if everything they say to us is an obvious lie. In 2003, dissidents smuggled out proof that Iran had systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency about its nuclear program. The Iranians replied with more lies--until those too were exposed by later inspection missions.

Over the last year, the rulers of Iran have confirmed that they are indeed sheltering members of Osama bin Laden's family and the senior leadership of al Qaeda. They continue to sponsor Hezbollah terror. In the summer of 2003, the mullahs unleashed brutal repression against activists calling for democracy.

Since the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, Western diplomats have again and again hailed the imminence of "reform" in Iran--and called for negotiations and Western concessions to hasten those reforms along. Again and again, the Iranian regime has revealed its true character. Mr. Powell's Dec. 30 announcement of a "new attitude" in Iran that opens the way to a dialogue is only the latest episode of this embarrassing story.

Aren't the real "ideologues" the people who refuse to let
hard facts and adverse experience alter their thinking or
change their behavior?

• Tyranny and democracy. Hard-liners are constantly accused of seeking to impose democracy by force out of blind ideological zeal. Against this, the soft-liners congratulate themselves on their prudent emphasis on continuity and stability. But by now it should be clear that there is no form of government less stable than autocracy. On Christmas Day, two suicide car-bombers crashed into the motorcade of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The blast killed 16 people. Suppose Pakistan's president had been one of those killed? Where would we be then? The U.S.-Pakistani alliance depends on the actuarial chances of one brave man--how is it prudent to rely on those?

Hard-liners are not bent on imposing democracy on anybody. But it is realistic to notice the connection between Middle Eastern tyranny and Middle Eastern terrorism; and it is realistic too to understand that it is sometimes true that societies that yearn for freedom are denied it by force--as Iraq was by Saddam's force. The U.S. may not be able to lead countries through the door to democracy; but where that door is locked shut by a totalitarian deadbolt, American power may be the only way to open it up.

• The demise of the "road map." In March 2003, the Bush administration presented Israel and the Palestinian Authority with a "road map" to peace. The idea was that Israel and the Palestinian leadership would each take immediate steps to reduce tensions, with an eye to an agreement in principle on a Palestinian state by December 2003 and a final settlement in 2005.

Not one milestone on the road map has yet been traversed. The very first item listed on the text is this: "Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel." Well, that has not happened. Nor have the Arab states cut off funds to anti-Israel terror groups. Nor have there been free elections in areas of Palestinian jurisdiction. Nor have . . . well, you get the idea.

Three successive U.S. administrations have sought to broker a peace. All three have made the same assumption: that the Palestinian leadership had abandoned its hope of destroying Israel and was ready to make peace. The job now was simply to negotiate the terms. It is now clear that this assumption was false. The Palestinian leadership's minimum demands, as articulated most recently in last month's Geneva Accord, include control of the Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem and an undefined but ominous "right of return" for the children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the refugees of 1948. No Israeli government could accept these terms.

When William James and Charles Pierce coined the
term "pragmatism" 150 years ago, they meant something more
than mere "practicality." James and Pierce were making a
point about the nature of "truth." Truth, they argued,
isn't some transcendent thing that exists beyond human
experience. Truth is found right here on earth. If belief
in an idea leads to positive results, then the idea is
true; if belief in an idea leads to negative results, then
it is false.

The belief that Yasser Arafat's Palestinian leadership will ever sign an agreement that permits Israel to live in peace and security has been tested over the years. The test has ended in the catastrophe of Arafat's terror war. Yet America's professional diplomats, especially those we hire to be knowledgeable about the Middle East, continue to cling to this belief despite its proven and total and repeated failure. If this is "pragmatism," what do the ideologues believe?

U.S. foreign policy will always be debated from different
points of view. That is as it should be. But is it too
much to ask for a little truth in labeling? We'd recommend
that the next time a journalist sits down to report a
foreign policy story from Washington, he try it this
way: "Washington remains divided between two major
factions: the pragmatic, neoconservatives and their
opposite numbers, the soft-line ideologues." Of course,
this story line too is an oversimplification. But at least
it is not an outright rejection of reality.

Messrs. Frum and Perle are resident fellows at the American Enterprise Institute and co-authors of "An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror," just published by Random House.

Copyright © 2004 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.



To: lurqer who wrote (35147)1/15/2004 4:47:09 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Subject: Iraq Revisionism

SLATE From: Christopher Hitchens

To: Paul Berman, Thomas Friedman, Fred Kaplan, George Packer, Kenneth Pollack, Jacob Weisberg, and Fareed Zakaria

Subject: Iraq Revisionism

Tuesday, Jan. 13, 2004, at 9:30 AM PT

Kenneth Pollack's revisiting of his own argument in The Threatening Storm, while admirable and scrupulous (even if it is written by someone who used to be a producer rather than a consumer of WMD information) affects the essential case no more than Paul O'Neill's supposed "disclosure" that the Bush administration was anti-Saddam from the start.

It was long ago announced, by President Clinton in a major speech in 1999, that a future confrontation with Saddam on WMD had become inescapable. And it was long ago voted nem con by the Senate that, for other reasons having to do with genocide and tyranny, the Iraq Liberation Act ought to become law. It would have been an occasion for very severe criticism if the incoming Bush administration had sought to dilute either of these historic commitments.

Pollack may have been led to overstate the immediate danger from WMD, but he did so on persuasive evidence that was supported by a long history of exorbitant behavior by the Baathists, and on a long history of culpable underreaction by Washington. (There was no comparable inquisition, as I recall, when the intelligence "community" failed to predict, and very nearly failed to report, the invasion of Kuwait. And the antiwar forces cling to their taunt on WMD because every other part of their propaganda and prediction has been utterly exploded.) That's if WMD ever were much of an argument in that quarter.

I myself had a different experience from Pollack, in the run-up to the war. I had to debate, every week and sometimes every day, with anti-interventionists who said that Saddam's possession of WMD was a reason NOT to attack or attempt to depose him. I said that the threat was latent not blatant, and that the main "immediate" danger was an off-the-shelf purchase by Iraq from North Korea, and by the way I think I was right.

But I was not an elected officeholder in a democratic government in a post-9/11 atmosphere. If I had been, I would certainly have decided to make the worst assumption about any report on Saddam's capacity for lethality, and I would have been operating at all times on the presumption of guilt. As a civilian, I would have wanted to criticize any Western government that did not err deliberately on this side.

Another way of phrasing this is to remember the line taken by the late Dr. David Kelly, sad subject of the Hutton inquiry in Britain. In an article written just before his death, this experienced inspector stated that you could have genuine inspections only by way of regime change. This essentially commonsensical view, which has been seconded by other veteran inspectors such as Rolf Ekeus and David Kay, takes account of the notorious Iraqi deception and concealment programs; the failure to comply at any point with U.N. resolutions; the sequestration of Iraqi scientists; and the preservation of secret funds, documents, and resources in Baghdad against the day when sanctions might be lifted and another bid for superpowerdom be made. Taken together with the secret bargaining (now exposed) with North Korea, this entitles us to speak of a Permanent Threat if not precisely an Imminent One. "Imminence" might have come when Saddam gave way to the Odai/Qusai regime: a prospect that need no longer concern us but that did not concern the antiwar forces even when it was a possibility.

Thus, we now can account more or less for Iraq's lunatic mixture of missing and undeclared weapons, and that in itself is an achievement. Moreover, the Iraqi economy and military are no longer at the disposal of a crime family with well-attested links to piracy and gangsterism, and that too is a gain. Dr. Howard Dean now tells that al-Qaida is in Iraq after all, but only because of President Bush. He is entitled as a private citizen to his touching belief that the connection began only a few months ago: One would not want a president to have been so insouciant if he had had to take the actual decision at the time, and once again I applaud the presumption of guilt, which was equally well-merited.

I cannot see the point of the case about a "distraction" from the hunt for Bin Laden, and this is not only because I strongly suspect that dear Osama has already passed away. Nor is it because so many of those who stress the Iraq "distraction" were telling me, just a couple of years ago, that it was futile to intervene in Afghanistan lest such a move cause thousands of new Bin Ladens to spring up. … (How soon they forget, but I don't, and I am keeping score.)

The tactics and resources that are required to fight a covert war against nihilistic theologues, and the tactics and resources that are required to remove a totalitarian dictatorship, are somewhat distinct. They may well overlap and they have in fact done so, but who can argue that we should not be ready and able to perform both such undertakings, possibly simultaneously? The two in fact reinforce one another, and coalition forces in Iraq are now rapidly acquiring deadly skills that will certainly be required in other places and at other times before the war against jihad and its patrons is over.

This point also applies to the question of cost. One cannot know the price of anything in advance, but one can be determined to pay it no matter what, as in a struggle for one's own life or for the life of loved ones. If it was foolish of the administration to argue that things like Iraq or Afghanistan could be done cheaply, it is flat-out irresponsible for the antiwar populists to argue that the money would be "better spent at home." Do they somehow still imagine that war is another word for "overseas"? For all I know they do. If we are really looking for cost cuts, then we could draw down the wastage and folly of the "war on drugs," or the fantasy of nuclearism. (The failure of the left to seize those chances, by the way, is yet another proof that it cares only for morbid dislike of anything undertaken by the president.)

As for casualties, there is only one apparent way of avoiding them for sure, and that way — abstention or pacifism — runs a risk of greater casualties later on, or as well. I detest utilitarianism, but I prefer it to idealism or neutralism, and I believe a decent case can be made that many, many Iraqis have been saved by the intervention, and that many inhabitants of other countries including our own are better-protected by the abolition of aggressive and unstable dictatorships. The case cannot be literally proved, of course, but we have a shrewd idea of what can happen when such regimes are left to choose the initiative. And this in turn makes one weep to think of what we and the Iraqis might have been spared if Saddam Hussein had been removed by Bush Senior. (Now that the in-between sanctions have been lifted, surely those who claimed that they were genocidal and child-murdering ought to have a good word to say. Or do they want one to suspect that they only wanted sanctions lifted when Saddam Hussein was still in power?)

Staying with the lachrymose for a moment, one weeps also at the missed chances and the blunders. Need I specify the appalling misjudgment of Washington's Turcophiles, the stupefying lack of economic and technological follow-through—the voracious Halliburton lobby seems really to have dropped the ball there — and the ditherings over the Governing Council? However, these seem to me to be second-order objections, since we had well before the turn of 2000 become in effect co-responsible for the future and the care of Iraq. Its future was unavoidably in our future. The chief blemish of that de facto policy, in which every main faction in American politics was already complicit, was that it involved a shame-faced and unstated power-sharing with Saddam Hussein. That was intolerable and could not long endure.

So, I think that the president and his advisers deserve credit for acknowledging and shouldering what was in fact an "actually existing" responsibility. While those who tried to disown or disclaim the responsibility are in a very poor position to snipe at the way it is being discharged. Much of the criticism I read expresses one or another form of denial of this basic consideration. Those who say, for example, that they would approve the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq if only there were more French or Russian soldiers there are conceding more than perhaps they intend. (I personally can't say that I yearn to see there the veterans of Rwanda and Cote d'Ivoire and New Caledonia, or the heroes of Grozny.)

Friedman is right to say that the macro-policy, so often and so stupidly attributed to "neocon" conspiracy, has provided an important vindication. Since the regime changes in Kabul and Baghdad, other regimes from Riyadh to Islamabad to Tehran have quietly but decidedly changed their tune, while some others have gone so far as to drop their weapons. There is no serious state-sponsored hiding place for al-Qaida, whereas a quiverful of measures and tactics now exists, well field-tested, to tackle any new challenger in this field.

Myself, I still have a fondness for the micro-policies, too. The Marsh Arabs are returning to their habitat, my profession can be practiced again in one of the places where writing was invented, the Shiites can follow their own religion, the Kurds are nearer to self-determination, there is politics again in a serious country, and we have seen the tree of liberty being watered in the traditional manner, which is an event that not every member of every generation can take pride in.

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