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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (123439)1/18/2004 10:26:22 PM
From: Win Smith  Respond to of 281500
 
Meanwhile, I noticed this nifty little bit by Pollack's Atlantic piece on the PNAC version of the proper use of the CIA:

On many occasions Administration officials' requests for additional information struck the analysts as being made merely to distract them from their primary mission. Some officials asked for extensive historical analyses—a hugely time-consuming undertaking, for which most intelligence analysts are not trained. Requests were constantly made for detailed analyses of newspaper articles that conformed to the views of Administration officials—pieces by conservative newspaper columnists such as Jim Hoagland, William Safire, and George F. Will. These columnists may be highly intelligent men, but they have no claim to superior insight into the workings of Iraq, or to any independent intelligence-collection capabilities.

So, the PNAC people leak what they want to hear to the bloviating pundits, and then expect the CIA to confirm their own leakage for them. We used to talk about "intelligence reform" here, but it looks like the idea is a real joke until there's a local regime change. Too bad.



To: tekboy who wrote (123439)1/18/2004 11:33:38 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Is Bush Doomed by the Neocons?

newsmax.com



To: tekboy who wrote (123439)1/21/2004 9:48:12 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
COMMENTARY by a 2 time Pulitzer Prize winner...

__________________________________

State of the 'Vision Thing'
By Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.
The Los Angeles Times
January 21, 2004

The presidency, FDR said, 'is predominantly a place of moral leadership. All our great presidents were leaders of thought at times when certain historic ideas in the life of the nation had to be clari



The president of the United States, wrote Henry Adams, the most brilliant of American historians, "resembles the commander of a ship at sea. He must have a helm to grasp, a course to steer, a port to seek."

The Constitution awards presidents the helm, but creative presidents must possess and communicate the direction in which they propose to take the country. The port they seek is what the first President Bush dismissively called "the vision thing."

Let us interview another president on this point. Franklin D. Roosevelt was by common consent one of the great presidents of the United States. The presidency, FDR said, "is not merely an administrative office. That's the least of it. It is more than an engineering job, efficient or inefficient. It is predominantly a place of moral leadership. All our great presidents were leaders of thought at times when certain historic ideas in the life of the nation had to be clarified." In other words, they were possessed by their visions.

So, FDR continued, Washington personified the idea of federal union. Jefferson typified the theory of democracy, which Jackson reaffirmed. Lincoln, by condemning slavery and secession, put two great principles of government forever beyond question. Cleveland embodied rugged honesty in a corrupt age. Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson were both moral leaders using the presidency as a pulpit. "Without leadership alert and sensitive to change," FDR wrote, "we are bogged up or lose our way,"

But a vision per se is not necessarily a good thing. Adolf Hitler had a vision. Josef Stalin had a vision. Especially when visions harden into dogmatic ideologies, they become inhuman, cruel and dangerous. Bush the elder was generally held to have a vision deficit, but that's not the same as having a defective vision. Bush the elder was a moderate as president, and he did not harm the republic.

Bush the younger is another matter. In his State of the Union address, he presented a medley of visions. Is it reasonable to suppose that the son feels that his father committed two fatal errors, which he is determined not to repeat? One might be the folly of alienating the ideological right. The other — the absence of a vision.

Born again, Bush the younger has a messianic tinge about him. He thinks big and wants to make his mark on history. Four hours of interviews left Bob Woodward with the impression, as he wrote in "Bush at War," that "the president was casting his mission and that of the country in the grand vision of God's master plan."

His grand vision told Bush that American troops invading Iraq would be hailed as liberators, not hated as occupiers, and that the transformation of Iraq under American sponsorship into a Jeffersonian democracy would have a domino effect in democratizing the entire Islamic world.

That dream has waned, and so has the vision that lies behind it. It turns out that the president's vision-free father had a much more accurate forecast of what an American war against Iraq would bring. Bush the elder wrote, defending (with Gen. Brent Scowcroft) his decision not to advance to Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf War, "Trying to eliminate Saddam would have incurred incalculable human and political costs…. Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land."

The United States is today an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. In a couple of years, Bush the younger has succeeded in turning the international wave of sympathy that engulfed the U.S. after 9/11 into worldwide dislike, distrust and even hatred. With his Iraq vision collapsing around him, Bush is trying to dump his self-created mess on the United Nations, heretofore an object of contempt in his administration. And he is trying out a new vision — the moon and Mars.

In this respect he is following the example of President Kennedy, who sought to repair American self-confidence after the Bay of Pigs by proposing to send men to the moon and return them safely to Earth "before this decade is out." A difference is that the preventive war against Iraq was an essential part of the Bush vision, but the Bay of Pigs was not part of the JFK vision. It was a CIA vision inherited from the Eisenhower administration.

I was appalled by Bush's preventive war against Iraq, as I was appalled in the Kennedy White House by the Bay of Pigs. And as I applauded JFK's vision of landing men on the moon, so I applaud Bush's vision of landing men on Mars.

It has been almost a third of a century since human beings took a step on the moon — rather as if no intrepid mariner had bothered after 1492 to follow up on Christopher Columbus. Yet 500 years from now (if humans have not blown up the planet), the 20th century will be remembered, if at all, as the century in which man began the exploration of space.

Some visions are intelligent and benign. Other visions are stupid and malevolent. "Where there is no vision … the people perish," the Good Book says. Where there is a defective vision, people perish too. In a democracy, it is up to the people themselves to make the fateful choice.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., a special assistant to the president in the Kennedy White House, has twice won the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award. His most recent book is "A Life in the Twentieth Century: Innocent Beginnings" (Houghton Mifflin, 2000).

latimes.com



To: tekboy who wrote (123439)2/2/2004 9:11:00 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Restoring Trust in America

____________________________

By Zbigniew Brzezinski
Editorial
The Washington Post
Monday, February 2, 2004
washingtonpost.com

Whether or how our national leadership should be held accountable for having inaccurately asserted, at war's outset, that Iraq was armed with weapons of mass destruction is ultimately a matter for the politicians to debate and the electorate to resolve. But two consequences with ominous implications for our national security call for a more urgent response: U.S. credibility worldwide has been badly hurt by the WMD affair, and U.S. intelligence capabilities have been exposed as woefully inadequate.



America is preponderant in the world today, but it is not omnipotent. Thus America must have the capacity, when needed, to mobilize the genuine and sincere support of other countries, particularly of its closest allies. It can do so only if it is trusted.

That U.S. credibility has been hurt is indisputable. It is a serious matter when the world's No. 1 superpower undertakes a war claiming a casus belli that turns out to have been false. Numerous public opinion polls demonstrate there has been a worldwide drop in support for U.S. foreign policy. There is manifest resentment of recent American conduct and a pervasive distrust of America's leaders, even in countries that have participated in the coalition in Iraq. Trust is an essential ingredient of power, and its loss bears directly on our long-term national security. An America that is preponderant but distrusted is an America internationally weakened.

The first line of homeland defense as well as the point of departure for an effective global security policy is reliable and internationally credible U.S. intelligence. The sad fact is that in the Iraq crisis U.S. intelligence was not up to par. There are many reasons for that failure, but the most obvious one is the absence of an effective human clandestine intelligence service, compounded by excessive reliance on foreign intelligence services (the Niger uranium fabrications being a case in point).

Over the years the United States has been remarkably innovative in technological-scientific intelligence aimed at the Soviet Union, whose arsenal also depended heavily on science and technology. Consequently, the United States was well informed about the scale, deployments and even war plans of its most likely strategic opponent.

Regarding Iraq, the opposite has been the case. The United States, we now know, was uninformed not only about the level of Iraqi military capabilities but also about Iraqi military and political planning. That indicates the means used to define with reasonable accuracy the nature and scale of the Soviet arsenal were not helpful in deciphering Saddam Hussein's relatively backward military capabilities or in penetrating his primitive regime, even though it was hated by significant portions of the Iraqi population.

There is no excuse for the inadequacy of the intelligence that provided the background for the decision-making and the articulation of U.S. policy. Though an autocracy, Iraq was a much more porous state than the totalitarian Soviet Union had been. It was certainly much more porous than contemporary North Korea. The misjudgments made and the imprecision of the information provided, based (we now know) largely on extrapolations and hypothetical conclusions, are just not acceptable. The evident shortcomings of U.S. intelligence, if allowed to persist, pose too many risks for the future.

Today, in the more diffused post-Cold War circumstances, access to reliable political intelligence derived from high-level human penetration of potential adversaries is the essential requirement of responsible and globally credible strategic policymaking. It is therefore a matter of high national urgency that several steps be promptly taken to give our national decision makers a more reliable basis for shaping policies that command international support:

• The administration should candidly acknowledge that the United States was misinformed about the state and level of Iraqi armaments, a fact already quite evident to much of the world. Continued evasion on this subject is a disservice to America.

• A shake-up of leadership in the intelligence community is needed and appropriate; measures to that end should be promptly taken. Accountability is needed to restore credibility.

• A small committee of experienced individuals trusted by the administration (hence not including its critics, such as the undersigned) should be tasked on a short deadline to present the president a plan for changing the priorities and the modus operandi of the intelligence community, with high emphasis on the development of an effective clandestine service.

Our national security is too much at risk for the issue to be handled in a traditional fashion. The usual reliance on a comprehensive review by a high-level commission working at a leisurely pace would not be an adequate response. Sweeping the matter under a rug would be even worse. A globally preponderant power, if blind, can only lash out when it senses danger. America's leadership in the world calls for something better than that. For the world at large, America's word should again be America's bond.
_____________________________

The writer was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. His latest book, "The Choice: Domination or Leadership," is to be published this month.

© 2004 The Washington Post Company



To: tekboy who wrote (123439)2/4/2004 7:45:48 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Cheney key to Iraq probe, critics say

philly.com

<<...What went wrong with intelligence on Iraq may never be known unless the inquiry proposed by President Bush examines secret intelligence efforts led by Vice President Cheney and Pentagon hawks, current and former U.S. officials said yesterday.

The critics said Bush may limit the inquiry's scope to the CIA and other agencies, and ignore the key role the officials said the administration's own internal intelligence efforts played in making the case for war.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, did not dispute that the CIA failed to accurately assess the state of Iraq's weapons programs. But they said intelligence efforts led by Cheney magnified the errors through exaggeration, oversights and mistaken deductions.

Those efforts bypassed normal channels, used Iraqi exiles and defectors of questionable reliability, and produced findings on former dictator Saddam Hussein's links to al-Qaeda and his illicit arms programs that were disputed by analysts at the CIA, the State Department and other agencies, the officials said.

"There were more agencies than CIA providing intelligence... that are worth scrutiny, including the [Pentagon's now-disbanded] Office of Special Plans and the office of the vice president," said a former senior military official who was involved in planning the Iraq invasion.

Some of the disputed findings were presented as facts to Americans as Bush stated his case for war.

Those findings included allegations of cooperation between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, Cheney's assertion that Iraq had rebuilt its nuclear-weapons program and would soon have a nuclear bomb, and Bush's contention in his 2003 State of the Union address that Hussein was seeking nuclear bomb-making material from Africa.

Senior officials yesterday revealed new details of how Cheney's office pressed Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to use large amounts of disputed intelligence in a February 2003 presentation to the U.N. Security Council that laid out the U.S. case for an invasion...>>