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To: epicure who wrote (6545)2/2/2004 8:01:28 AM
From: epicure  Respond to of 20773
 
White House Says Congress Underestimated New Medicare Costs
By ROBERT PEAR and EDMUND L. ANDREWS

Published: February 2, 2004

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 — Bush administration officials said Sunday that Congress had grossly underestimated the cost not only for prescription drug benefits, but also for private health insurance plans that would be offered to elderly people under the new Medicare law.

When President Bush signed the legislation on Dec. 8, the Congressional Budget Office said it would cost $395 billion in the decade from 2004 to 2013. On Thursday, the White House put the cost at $534 billion.

Mr. Bush will try to explain the difference when he submits his budget to Congress on Monday.

The budget is expected to show a record deficit of more than a half-trillion dollars in 2004, up from $375 billion last year. But the president says his policies will reduce the deficit to $364 billion in 2005 and to $237 billion by 2009, fulfilling his vow to cut the deficit in half in five years.

Administration officials said that Mr. Bush's budget would not include the costs of the Iraq war. Nor, they said, would it include the costs of restructuring the alternative minimum tax, estimated at more than $162 billion over five years.

The minimum tax is intended to prevent wealthy people from making excessive use of sophisticated tax breaks, but it will snare millions of people with moderate incomes in the next few years.

Budget analysts say the administration's five-year goal glosses over the much bigger fiscal gap that looms over the next 10 years. The huge upward recalculation of costs for the new Medicare law has little effect in the first five years, because the new drug benefits do not become available until 2006.

The same is true of Mr. Bush's proposal to make his tax cuts permanent. The cost would be more than $1.2 trillion over 10 years, but most of that would come at the end of this decade.

Mr. Bush is expected on Monday to outline a list of programs that would be cut back or halted. The administration plans to limit the rise in discretionary spending outside of defense and domestic security to less than 1 percent, which is less than the amount needed to keep pace with inflation.

Administration officials and Congressional budget analysts said that nearly three-fourths of the discrepancy in the Medicare cost estimates — $100 billion of the $139 billion difference — was attributable to the fact that the White House believed the new drug benefit would be more expensive than Congress had assumed.

About a fourth of the discrepancy, or $32 billion, results from the fact that the administration expects Medicare to spend much more on private health plans than Congress assumed.

The new cost estimate has touched off a political furor.

Senator Bob Graham, Democrat of Florida, said he was "shocked and appalled" at the new figure. "We should reopen the bill and examine what is driving this cost estimate," Mr. Graham said.

Democrats said Congress should investigate the discrepancy to find out when the administration first realized that the bill might cost far more than the $400 billion sum proposed by Mr. Bush early last year.

The Senate Democratic leader, Tom Daschle of South Dakota, said it would be inexcusable if the administration had "concealed or withheld" such information from Congress.

The House and the Senate passed separate versions of the Medicare bill in June. Lawmakers haggled with one another and with administration officials last fall. Medicare actuaries continually developed and revised cost estimates.

Tommy G. Thompson, the secretary of health and human services, said Friday: "Congressional staff knew our actuarial numbers. Our actuaries communicated with the Congressional Budget Office throughout the negotiations. There was no attempt to keep our number camouflaged."

Representative Pete Stark of California, the senior Democrat on the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health, said, "We repeatedly asked the actuaries for cost estimates and other analysis of the Medicare bill, but the administration refused to release the information."

The administration now says the actuaries' cost estimates have been over $500 billion since last summer.

A Medicare official said, "If the administration had owned up to its cost estimates a long time ago, there would be a lot less drama now."

Christin Tinsworth, a spokeswoman for Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee, said Democrats were hypocritical to complain about the cost of the new law, written mainly by Republicans. Prescription drug bills proposed by House Democrats would have cost $1 trillion over 10 years, she said.

Representative Trent Franks, Republican of Arizona, said: "If we had failed to pass the Republican version of the Medicare legislation, some Democratic alternative would have passed. It would have been an unmitigated disaster, with an even higher cost estimate."

Administration officials and Congressional budget experts gave several reasons for the discrepancy. Republicans in Congress wanted to promote the growth of private health plans, especially preferred provider organizations. The new law authorizes extra payments and subsidies for such plans, which Congress assumed would cost $14 billion over 10 years.

But the Bush administration says the cost will be $46 billion, or more than three times as much — partly because the administration assumes that many more people will enroll.

The administration offers several reasons to explain why the drug benefit will cost $100 billion more than Congress expected. The White House says that per capita costs will be 4 percent higher than Congress assumed, accounting for $16 billion of the discrepancy. Another $16 billion of the difference results from the Bush administration's assumption that more people will sign up for the drug benefit: 94 percent of those eligible, compared with the 88 percent assumed by Congress.

The administration also predicts that Medicare will spend more than Congress assumed on subsidies for low-income people, to help them with drug costs not covered by Medicare.

The Congressional Budget Office said the subsidies would cost $192 billion over 10 years. The administration says the cost will be higher by $47 billion, or 24 percent.

Karen M. Ignagni, president of the American Association of Health Plans, a lobby for insurers, said the new estimates boded well for beneficiaries.

"If it's true that more people take advantage of low-income subsidies and more people enroll in private plans, they'll get more benefits," Ms. Ignagni said. "That's very good for beneficiaries. We can help them stretch the dollars they spend on prescription drugs."

One big uncertainty for White House budget planners is the outlook for tax revenues, which declined in each of the past three years as a result of the economic slowdown and the collapse of the stock market bubble.

As recently as November, administration officials had been counting on a big increase in tax collections as the economy rebounded. But tax receipts have climbed less than expected. The Congressional Budget Office noted last week that corporate tax collections in recent months had been "weaker than analysts had expected, given the strong surge in profits."

Over all, the budget office said, it has reduced its estimate of tax collections by $15 billion a year for 2004 and 2005.



To: epicure who wrote (6545)2/3/2004 3:03:13 PM
From: Win Smith  Respond to of 20773
 
The Chieftains and the Church theatlantic.com

There were a couple recent things in the Atlantic relevant to Friedman and the budget. This one deals primarily with the budget side. A clip:

No assessment of the modern Republican Party would be complete without a discussion of the elaborate mythology of supply-side economics, whose logic has been strained to the breaking point under Bush's watch. The basic supply-side argument is that tax cuts increase the incentive to work, save, and invest, which boosts economic growth. During the Reagan years such logic was used to argue that slashing tax rates would actually increase tax revenues, by producing additional growth—but this has long since been dismissed by mainstream economists and shown false by the record of history. The party also uses supply-side economics to justify tax cuts that are disproportionately skewed in favor of the well-to-do, on the grounds that they are the most likely to save and invest. This argument has always been suspect, and it is even less credible in the aftermath of the technology bubble; the economic woes of the past few years have been due not to lack of investment but, rather, to an excess of capacity.

By sticking with the old supply-side formula—cut taxes as often as possible, especially for the wealthy—Bush has delivered a particularly costly and inefficient stimulus package to help the nation out of its economic downturn. And the Administration seems to recognize as much, given that it has hedged its bets by marrying large supply-side tax cuts with equally large demand-side spending increases, yielding an odd hybrid that might be called "supply-side Keynesianism." This contradictory policy suggests that not even Republicans still believe in the magic of their standard fix. Yet they are not about to abandon the myth. It is far too sacrosanct and convenient an article of faith in the Republican canon.

A major risk in combining moralism and policy, evidently, is that dogma often trumps intellectual honesty. This is particularly clear in the case of official claims that the Administration's overall economic agenda is aimed at helping middle-class families. A more candid articulation of its domestic-policy vision appeared in a June 2003 Washington Post op-ed article by Grover Norquist, one of the most influential of conservative strategists. "The new Republican policy is an annual tax cut," Norquist wrote; he predicted that Bush would proceed step by step to abolish estate and capital-gains taxes altogether, to exempt all savings from taxation, and to move the nation to a flat tax on wages only. Implicit in this vision is not only a grand contradiction—cutting taxes while raising spending is unsustainable—but also a significant shift in the burden of taxation from the wealthy to the working class and the poor. Apparently the contemporary Republican Party does remain faithful to at least one old conservative belief, which Clinton Rossiter, in his book Conservatism in America, described nearly fifty years ago as "the inevitability and necessity of social classes."


This article isn't particularly kind to the Democrats either, which is ok. In general, I consider Republicans to be focused and operationally good at pushing their dogmatic and malevolent agenda, while Democrats are all over the place. It's not the best choice, but given the alternative I'll stick to the proverbial "no organized political party".



To: epicure who wrote (6545)2/3/2004 3:08:46 PM
From: Win Smith  Respond to of 20773
 
The Friedman Principle theatlantic.com

[ The other Friedman-related piece was this one, where our man Thomas is credited with originating the whole "democracy domino" theory. I wonder about that, although my understanding is that the Rumsfeld / Cheney inner circle was never particularly interestind in "democracy". They seemed to be more into old-style installations, of the Shah - Mobutu - Pinochet school. Who knows? Anyway, this is the note in full, it's relatively short. ]

by Jack Beatty


The influential New York Times columnist's vision of spreading democracy through the Arab world is this era's domino theory—and it is just as misguided

.....

Thomas Friedman, the Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign-affairs columnist for The New York Times, attributes wonder-working power to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. For him, it is not about finding WMD or opening a new front in the war on terror or even ending a cruel regime. More is at stake—the transformation of the Arab world from autocracy to democracy.

The Bush State Department identified the demiurge of this deliverance, in a paper scoffing at its chances of success, as the second coming of the domino theory. Friedman has argued that much as the propaganda of the good life from Western Europe undermined communism's grip on Eastern Europe, emanations from a democratic Iraq will precipitate democratic revolts against the Arab despots or force them to reform to head off revolution. Their long-suffering people will gain, but so will U.S. national security. Legitimate Arab polities with opposition parties, Friedman has taught us, are the only long-term solution to terrorism, which is rooted in domestic political frustration.

This maximalist vision—which, in the absence of weapons of mass destruction President Bush and others in his Administration have been playing up as a rationale for the war and its punishing sequel—is morally attractive and strategically astute, but programmatically inordinate. To transform Araby and dry up the roots of terror: that sounds like an objective worth paying any price or bearing any burden to achieve. But who will pay that price? Other people's kids who would not know Tom Friedman from a cord of wood. Yet his views, his vision, could get them killed.

There is a Vietnam shadow on Friedman's grand strategy. Not many Americans would have supported a war solely to secure the factitious independence of South Vietnam. It took the original domino theory to justify the deaths of so many U.S. soldiers and the expenditure of so much treasure: if we don't stop "them"—the forces of international communism—in Pleiku we'll have to fight them in Pasadena. (President Bush has said the same thing about the terrorists attacking our troops in Iraq.) In Syria, for one, the dominoes have been falling the wrong way. At the height of "major combat operations," Pentagon hawks made noises about an incursion into Syria. The House recently voted sanctions on Syria for its support for terrorists. The Syrian dictatorship has used the U.S. presence in Iraq and the increased U.S. pressure on terrorism to crack down. "The situation enables the regime to say there is a danger of war," Haitam Maleh, a human rights activist, told The Financial Times. "We estimate there have been over 700 new [political] prisoners over the past year."

Maximalist goals tend to sanction maximum sacrifices. Suppose our goal in Iraq was modest: call it tenable stability—broadly representative government—in one country. That would be consistent with our interests in the Gulf. The region's governments have never been democratic, but they have kept the oil flowing for more than fifty years. Stable government in Iraq: what strategy could realize that goal? A plan was recently proposed that might. It would:

# turn Iraqi reconstruction over to the UN, which would have complete political control. The UN could draw in troops from around the world, and deal their host countries in on reconstruction contracts.

# reverse Ambassador Bremer's tragic decision to demobilize the Iraqi army.

# stand up some kind of Iraqi government tout de suite, to put an Iraqi face on the reconstruction.

# pull U.S. troops out of the Iraqi cities, where the attacks on them are hampering nation-building and killing three to ten Americans a week. Replace them with combined Iraqi and UN troops. And deploy the U.S. troops, in reduced numbers, to bases near Iraq's borders, to guard against infiltrating jihadis eager to turn Iraq into America's Afghanistan.

Not a bad plan—but, alors!, the French foreign minister proposed it, and according to a jolting recent Friedman column France is our "enemy." Enemy? Not of the families whose sons might get killed if we try to use Iraq to redeem the Middle East. Not of U.S. taxpayers, who would bear a lighter burden if the UN were doing the nation-building in Iraq. It is the enemy of the transformational agenda, however.

Friedman is a principled man with influence not only over Administration thinking but among people often opposed to Bush policies. "Even Tom Friedman..." In my circle that was a conversation stopper during the lead-up to war. "Well, if Tom Friedman is for war..." voices trailed off, second thoughts were thought. As a rare sane man writing about foreign policy—a man not besotted with power worship—he has moral credibility. To maintain it he needs to write a column on the costs of his vision, on its risks (Islamist democracies opposed to the U.S., for one), and on its feasibility that would help his readers judge the U.S. stake in the war after the war, which Friedman would be the first to agree has taken too many American lives.