Why is the administration set on a June 30 handover?
1) The deadline is driven far more by US desperation - electoral and economic/corporate - than by any concern about "returning sovereignty" to Iraq. The administration of President George W Bush is lying about the deadline, claiming that it will lead to a "transfer of sovereignty" and the "end of US occupation" in Iraq. A real "end to occupation" requires the withdrawal of US troops. Transferring nominal authority from one US-selected Iraqi agency to another US-vetted Iraqi organization does not equal an end to occupation.
2) The Bush administration wants to be able to claim "the occupation is over" and "troops are being withdrawn" as summer campaigning for the November presidential election in the United States heats up.
Why the US is begging for UN backing in Iraq
By Phyllis Bennis
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
The United States is eager for the United Nations to return to Iraq to provide political cover for its occupation. The quagmire on the ground in Iraq, plus recognition that the rest of the world, and most Iraqis themselves, reject Washington's claim of legitimacy, is the basis for the Bush administration reversing its earlier anti-UN positions to beg the international organization for help.
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's decision to send a technical investigative team to Iraq is partly in response to mounting pressure from the US, but was also a response to shifting sentiments among Iraqis, particularly the call from Shi'ite leader Ayatollah al-Sistani for a UN assessment of political conditions. While Annan indicated he was responding to the request of the US occupation authorities and its hand-picked "governing council" to determine whether elections could be held by Washington's June 30 deadline, he left open the possibility of a broader definition of "what alternative arrangement would be acceptable" if not.
Why is the administration set on a June 30 handover?
1) The deadline is driven far more by US desperation - electoral and economic/corporate - than by any concern about "returning sovereignty" to Iraq. The administration of President George W Bush is lying about the deadline, claiming that it will lead to a "transfer of sovereignty" and the "end of US occupation" in Iraq. A real "end to occupation" requires the withdrawal of US troops. Transferring nominal authority from one US-selected Iraqi agency to another US-vetted Iraqi organization does not equal an end to occupation.
2) The Bush administration wants to be able to claim "the occupation is over" and "troops are being withdrawn" as summer campaigning for the November presidential election in the United States heats up. Under the current plan, the reality will be the continuation of military occupation, with a US-backed "sovereign" government "requesting" that US troops remain. The US will withdraw 20,000-25,000 troops with great fanfare, hoping the voters will forget about the 100,000 or so US troops that will remain, and the likely continuation of significant casualties among US troops.
3) US plans for massive privatization in Iraq have faltered because of a lack of potential buyers. Profiteers are concerned that without something resembling an official government in Iraq, US efforts to sell off Iraqi assets will be recognized as illegal under international law and could be overturned when something closer to a truly legitimate and representative government takes over. So the US has every interest in ensuring that a transitional phase includes something that can be called a "sovereign Iraqi government", but which in fact remains under US control, to make sure the privatization plan goes ahead before a real end to the occupation.
Why did the administration change its line on the UN?
1) The utter and all-too-public failure of the US occupation (especially the continuing deaths and mounting injuries of US soldiers) in Iraq seems to have led to an internal power shift within the Bush administration, with the Pentagon ideologues tactically (and almost certainly temporarily) giving way to electorally focused considerations. In the battle between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld/Vice President Dick Cheney and Karl Rove, Bush's chief adviser, the Rumsfeld/Cheney team seems to have blinked first.
2) There is no doubt that unilateralist, anti-UN sentiments continue to dominate the Bush White House. But hypocrisy aside, changes are afoot. One piece of evidence is Cheney's unexpected European foray. While arrogantly refusing even to hint at an apology for launching Washington's war in the face of UN and broad international opposition, the fact that he left his undisclosed location at all to travel to European capitals urging greater international support for the United States in Iraq, even calling on (though only once) the UN to respond to the request of the Iraqis, indicates a significant level of pressure on Cheney's long-standing antagonism to multilateralism and the UN.
What did Kofi Annan agree to?
1) The secretary general agreed to "send a technical mission to Iraq to establish whether elections for a transitional national assembly can be held before the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June and, if not, what alternative arrangement would be acceptable".
2) The language is significant, since "alternative arrangements" could refer to a wide range of possible alternatives, in essence broadening the US-defined mandate. Those alternatives could include not only the nature of the elections but also a challenge to the validity of the US-imposed deadline itself. That is, the UN mission could conclude that elections are possible at a time beyond June 30. An internal UN study in Iraq from last August determined that it would take six months to organize elections.
3) It is clear that Annan's decision was partly based on the call from Iraqis beyond the US-appointed Governing Council. Specifically, it is clear that al-Sistani's call for the UN to determine the feasibility of elections played a part in his decision.
Why did Ayatollah al-Sistani ask for UN help?
1) While al-Sistani represents a Shi'ite current that does not call for complete clerical control of government, he is eager to realize the likely political potential inherent in the 60 percent Shi'ite majority in Iraq .
2) The US-proposed selection system for choosing an Iraqi parliament would not only privilege the US-selected Iraqi Governing Council, which would choose most of the assembly members, it would give a functional veto to the US occupation officials themselves. (In each of the 18 regions, the Coalition Provisional Authority - Bremer and company - would appoint five of the 15 members. Since 11 votes would be needed to approve candidates, the CPA would hold an effective veto over anyone it didn't like.)
What is the danger to the United Nations?
1) If the UN completely rejects the US proposal that it return to Iraq under the auspices of the occupation, it faces the possibility of escalating marginalization by the Bush administration, further threats to its independence, and the likelihood of being deemed "irrelevant" by the world's sole superpower. Washington might make additional cuts in dues to the world organization and the humanitarian agencies, reduce its already insufficient political support, and increase its threats against and punishments of UN member states who stand defiant.
2) If the UN agrees to return to Iraq under terms set by the US occupation, the dangers are even higher. The global organization risks a serious loss of international credibility, and the danger of being deemed an agent for or facilitator of occupation. Aside from the credibility factor itself, UN staff in Iraq would again face the likely possibility of physical attack, based on the opposition's view that the UN was acting as an agent of an illegitimate occupation. Passed under extreme US pressure, Security Council Resolution 1483 arguably provides a kind of forced legality to the US occupation of Iraq; it does not provide any legitimacy.
So what should be done?
1) There should be an immediate end to US occupation, and withdrawal of US troops. Because the US invasion destroyed the governing capacity in Baghdad and undermined security for civilians throughout much of the country, the withdrawal of the US forces should be followed by a temporary combined mandate for the UN, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to provide direct support for Iraq's reclaiming of sovereignty. That would include election assistance, humanitarian and reconstruction aid (including control over all international funds, including those coming from the US Congress, designated for Iraqi rebuilding), and peacekeeping/security deployment.
2) The UN investigation team should reject the artificial US-imposed June 30 deadline, and broaden its mandate to examine what conditions would have to change before an election could be organized, assess what time frame would be required to accomplish those changes, and determine whether any election conducted under foreign military occupation could be free and fair.
Phyllis Bennis (pbennis@compuserve.com) is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus.
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