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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: lurqer who wrote (37153)	2/6/2004 9:50:39 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 89467

Top four reasons Bush and media can't claim they were 'misled' workingforchange.com

To: lurqer who wrote (37153)	2/7/2004 6:24:35 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

estimates are not written in a vacuum - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD intelligence I have now given you my provisional bottom lines, but it is important to remember that estimates are not written in a vacuum. Let me tell you some of what was going on in the fall of 2002. Several sensitive reports crossed my desk from two sources characterized by our foreign partners as established and reliable. <font size=4> The first from a source who had direct access to Saddam and his inner circle said Iraq was not in the possession of a nuclear weapon. However, Iraq was aggressively and covertly developing such a weapon. Saddam had recently called together his nuclear weapons committee, irate that Iraq did not yet have a weapon because money was no object and they possessed the scientific know-how. The committee members assured Saddam that once fissile material was in hand, a bomb could be ready in 18 to 24 months. The return of U.N. inspectors would cause minimal disruption because, according to the source, Iraq was expert at denial and deception. The same source said that Iraq was stockpiling chemical weapons and that equipment to produce insecticides under the oil-for-food program had been diverted to covert chemical weapons production. The source said that Iraq's weapons of last resort were mobile launchers armed with chemical weapons which would be fired at enemy forces in Israel; that Iraqi scientists were dabbling with biological weapons with limited success, but the quantities were not sufficient to constitute a real weapons program. A stream of reporting from a different sensitive source with access to senior Iraqi officials said he believed production of chemical and biological weapons was taking place, that biological agents were easy to produce and hide, and that prohibited chemicals were also being produced at dual-use facilities. The source stated that a senior Iraqi official in Saddam's inner circle believed, as a result of the U.N. inspections, Iraq knew the inspectors' weak points and had to take advantage of them. The source said that there was an elaborate plan to deceive inspectors and ensure prohibited items would never be found. Now, did this information make any difference in my thinking? You bet it did. As this information and other sensitive information came across my desk, it solidified and reinforced the judgments that we had reached in my own view of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein and I conveyed this view to our nation's leaders. Could I have ignored or dismissed such reports? Absolutely not. <font size=3> edition.cnn.com

To: lurqer who wrote (37153)	2/7/2004 6:26:57 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

"Why haven't we found the weapons?" - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD intelligence Now, I'm sure you're all asking, "Why haven't we found the weapons?" I've told you the search must continue and it will be difficult. <font size=4> As David Kay reminded us, the Iraqis systematically destroyed and looted forensic evidence before, during and after the war. We have been faced with organized destruction of documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories and companies suspected of weapons of mass destruction work. The pattern of these efforts is one of deliberate, rather than random, acts. Iraqis who have volunteered information to us are still being intimidated and attacked. Remember, finding things in Iraq is always very tough. After the first Gulf War, the U.S. Army blew up chemical weapons without knowing it. They were mixed in with conventional weapons in Iraqi ammo dumps. My new special adviser, Charlie Duelfer, will soon be in Iraq to join Major Keith Dayton, commander of the Iraqi Survey Group, to continue our effort to learn the truth. And when the truth emerges, we will report it to the American people no matter what..... ....So what do I think about all this today? Based on an assessment of the data we collected over the past 10 years, it would have been difficult for analysts to come to any different conclusions than the ones reached in October of 2002. <font size=3> edition.cnn.com

To: lurqer who wrote (37153)	2/7/2004 6:30:25 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

Transcript of Tenet address on WMD intelligence <full text at link>..... QUESTION: I think you've done a good job outlining why the issues today do not constitute an intelligence failure. However, how do you think realistically this issue will be perceived in the future by the international community? <font size=4> TENET: Well, I think that the interesting piece, of course, is the international community itself, through the United Nations and its inspection process over the years, clearly understood the nature of this regime. They clearly understood the deception and the denial that this regime had engaged in. And they clearly were frustrated by what Saddam Hussein would not comply with. They clearly recognized that even the data declaration he provided us in 2002 was phony. And at the end of the day, they have now learned from the Iraqi Survey Group that Saddam Hussein was in material breach of Resolution 1441. Now, here's the problem we have when we talk about issues as difficult as this. How long do you let -- and this is a policy decision; our policy-makers made a different choice -- how long do you let material breach, deception and denial go on before you risk with the kind of surprise that I could never fully and 100 percent predict? This is the question we were faced with. The international community may have different views, but they can't walk away from the record the international community developed about Saddam Hussein himself. <font size=3> cont'd @ edition.cnn.com

To: lurqer who wrote (37153)	2/7/2004 6:31:15 AM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 89467

none of the countries and allied services that we were working with in the time saw this any differently - Transcript of Tenet address on WMD intelligence <full text at link>..... QUESTION: Given the kind of vigorous defense you've just made of the American intelligence community, how can you argue that if the American intelligence community was so -- had to make such a judgment call that other allies of the United States were not able to reflect the same judgment call and make similar decisions? TENET: Well, actually, I would say you're incorrect about that, because none of the countries and allied services that we were working with in the time saw this any differently. We were all working together. We all believed he had chemical and biological weapons, so the notion that we -- you know, what people don't understand is, just as we build military coalitions and diplomatic coalitions, there is a coalition of intelligence services with like-minded interest around the world who are trying to get to the truth. And I would say that, if I went to my principal foreign partners -- and not just the British; Middle Eastern services, other European services -- none of us called us any differently. I would also say the front part is, what I was trying to do today is defend our community to the American people, but be absolutely honest in telling you what we said and didn't say in this estimate. edition.cnn.com