THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
06 February 2004
The Geopolitics of Alliance
Summary
The United States has been less than generous in rewarding its
allies for their political and military assistance in the 2003
Iraq war and its aftermath. The U.S. allies might have had high
hopes -- and made very real sacrifices -- but the question for
the United States remains: Who needs whom more?
Analysis
Australian Prime Minister John Howard warned Feb. 1 that the free
trade agreement in negotiation with the United States still is
"very much in the balance."
Extending a visit originally scheduled to last a couple days,
Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile remained in Washington for
what has become a 10-day marathon negotiation, running headlong
into powerful U.S. agricultural lobbies. While U.S. lobbying
groups have applied a full-court press to keep out Australian
competition, Australia has made it clear that agricultural access
is a deal-breaker. At week's end, a deal that was supposed to be
wrapped up in 2003 still is far from certain, with just one day
of talks remaining.
The difficulty over the Australian FTA is just one example of
problems that Washington is facing in rewarding its most loyal
allies and in demonstrating the concrete benefits of that
loyalty, particularly in terms of the Iraq war. Although being
friendly with the only global superpower is clearly more
beneficial than being at odds with it -- just ask Syria, North
Korea or France -- there is the built-in expectation of a quid
pro quo. If that expectation is not fulfilled, it creates public
perception problems on the domestic political level that can
limit the leeway that political leaders must enthusiastically
support U.S. foreign policy. The failure of countries such as
Australia, Poland, Spain and even the United Kingdom to turn
support of the United States into concrete benefits -- both for
the public and for political leaders -- could end up constraining
key U.S. allies from offering support in the future.
Stratfor previously wrote that the United States would give way
to Canberra on the free trade deal despite opposition from the
agriculture lobby, primarily because it makes sense
geopolitically for Washington. Though Stratfor stands by that
analysis, the domestic politics have become dicier, making it
more difficult for the Bush administration to give in.
On Feb. 4, Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota
and two other senators sent a letter to U.S. President George W.
Bush, requesting that beef be excluded from the Australian FTA.
This is a particularly sensitive issue, considering the U.S.
bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- "mad cow" -- scare, and the
fact that the Australians have been the primary beneficiary of
it, with their beef replacing U.S. exports in key markets like
Japan. Since Vaile's arrival in January, 32 U.S. senators and at
least 40 House members have sent letters to Bush opposing the
deal because of its potential cattle-industry impact. Any FTA
deal must be approved by Congress. Then there is the big-spending
sugar lobby, which is particularly influential in Florida, a
state rich in both highly subsidized sugar producers and
electoral votes.
There is much more than domestic politics, or even economics, at
stake for the United States in the FTA negotiations. Trade pacts
under the Bush administration are a key part of a larger foreign
policy toolbox, a highly prized reward for valued and cooperative
allies such as Morocco, Singapore and -- arguably one of
Washington's most loyal global buddies -- Australia. Failure to
seal a deal would send a signal to Australians that their U.S.
alliance is a one-way street.
Another country that expects a reward for staunch support of the
United States, and has yet to see much of anything, is Poland.
Prior to a late-January visit to Washington, Polish President
Alexander Kwasniewski pledged to get Washington to drop a visa
requirement for Polish travel to the United States -- something
that is not required for most European countries. This seemingly
minor issue has struck a chord in Poland, especially considering
Poland's staunch support for the U.S.-led Iraq war, and the
2,400-strong Polish contingent leading 10,000 international
peacekeepers in Iraq. The best Kwasniewski could get was a vague
promise from Bush to "address" the Cold War era regulations,
which also require fingerprinting at U.S. airports. Bush then
promptly passed the blame, saying Congress would have to make the
visa change. Kwasniewski went home empty-handed, and Poland's ego
remains bruised.
Polish opposition leaders and the Polish media criticized
Kwasniewski for not coming home with a concession from the Bush
administration, and not a little of that ire was aimed at
Washington. Warsaw Mayor Lech Kaczynski said the visit brought
"poor results because Poland offers too much and demands too
little." He pledged he "will never go to the United States. I
don't want to be treated like a second-class citizen."
Washington's most important European ally -- the United Kingdom -
- faces a somewhat different problem related to its support of
the United States, though the implications could be quite
similar. Tony Blair's support of the Iraq war has not yet been
fatal, but it has turned into a persistent, degenerative illness.
The majority of the British public is not buying Blair's recent
exoneration by Lord Hutton's Commission of Inquiry, which cleared
the government of charges that it "sexed up" prewar intelligence
from Iraq. If anything, the report has refocused Britons on the
issue of prewar intelligence, prompting the opposition Tories to
renew their calls for Blair's resignation, and forcing Blair
(like Bush) to establish a commission to investigate his
government's intelligence practices.
The whole mess has fractured Blair's support within his own Labor
Party and with the public, but Blair intends to fight on to
rebuild his political castle. Though Anglo-American relations
will remain strong, Blair's (and Labor's) rebuilding could well
prompt London to
step back from from its nearly unquestioning support of U.S.
foreign policy priorities. Blair can no longer afford to be seen
at home as Washington's lap dog -- or attack dog.
Then there is Spain, which is in a somewhat similar -- but also
different -- situation as the United Kingdom. Spanish Prime
Minister Jose Maria Aznar's government has come under almost
constant fire domestically for its support for the Iraq war, and
more recently for the intelligence used to justify it. Spain has
approximately 1,300 troops in Iraq supporting the U.S.-led
occupation.
However, Aznar has it easy compared to Howard, Kwasniewski and
Blair -- his job ends soon after the March 14 elections. That
made it easier for him to decide, as Spanish daily El Pais
reported Feb. 5, that the government should not launch an
investigation into prewar intelligence. It also allows Aznar to
pledge Spain's continued loyalty to the United States. He did so
in a Feb. 4 speech to the U.S. Congress, noting that he does not
wish for Europe to become a "counterpower to the United States."
Aznar, only the second
Spaniard to address a joint session of Congress, was greeted as
something of a hero by the U.S. lawmakers. The speech itself
could be considered something of a personal reward.
But that does not take things much beyond March, when Aznar
retires. The ruling Popular Party should win the elections
handily, allowing Aznar's hand-picked successor, Mariano Rajoy,
to follow. Though this will not result in any clear shifts in
policy toward the United States, it might still be harder for
Rajoy to stand squarely behind Washington in future areas of
foreign policy, considering the substantial remnants of public
opposition to the Iraq war evident in Spanish public opinion.
Unfortunately, from the viewpoint of dissatisfied allies, they
need the United States more than the United States needs them.
It is an unavoidable fact that the United Kingdom has been the
most stable European pillar of NATO for decades, and its
importance to U.S. foreign policy goes well beyond its military
value.
London has consistently maintained a policy of balance regarding
Brussels and the European Union, attempting to integrate
economically into mainland Europe without allowing itself to be
subsumed into some sort of European polity.
London sees its favored relationship with Washington as a lever
and fulcrum in this balancing act. Maintaining close ties --
economic, political and military -- with the United States allows
the United Kingdom to be part of Europe, while remaining just
outside Europe. This allows London to use its American lever to
sabotage European integration when London feels events are
progressing too quickly (something Washington, always concerned
that a single unity power could emerge in Eurasia, is happy to
assist with) or to test the European waters as domestic politics
allow. From the standpoint of the United States, the United
Kingdom is the European Union's poison pill.
Australia views its relationship with the United States as even
more fundamental to its national existence. Since the de facto
disintegration of the Commonwealth in the 1970s that accompanied
the United Kingdom's entry into the European Union, Australia has
found itself increasingly drawn into the U.S. orbit.
Australia's mindset -- and geography -- allow for no other
possibilities. Australia is cut off from Europe by EU tariffs and
the tyranny of distance, insulated from Asia by a populace that
fears drowning in a sea of Asians, and is able to consider tiny
New Zealand only a geographically proximate cultural sibling.
Canberra's choice is between becoming the junior U.S. ally in a
military, political and cultural context in exchange for the
ability to project power throughout its region while keeping its
national identity intact, or watch with trepidation as the
populous states to its north -- Indonesians alone outnumber
Australians 10:1 -- gradually overwhelm it with sheer numbers.
Poland also sees the United States as an indispensable ally. Even
more than Australia, the issue is survival. For Warsaw, the issue
is quite blunt: Its European allies cannot protect it from a
possible Russian resurgence. For Poland, the only guarantee of
national survival comes in the form of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Period.
Spain is perhaps the only country of the four that has room to
maneuver. Modern Spain began developing as a political entity
only with the death of Francisco Franco Bahamonde in 1975; in
terms of national identity the Spanish are "younger" in many ways
than even some of the former Soviet satellites. That grants Spain
a cultural mutability that allowed Aznar the political
flexibility to align with the United States in the first place.
The crux of this distinction is that the Spanish have the ability
to choose between political association with Europe or the United
States.
Each has its own pros and cons, but Madrid has no illusions about
the strength of its position. The United States could be a fickle
ally, and Madrid can never count upon Washington to look out for
Spanish interests; at the same time, the Spanish government knows
that with a nod from Washington, it can speak on the
international stage with a voice far louder than its 40 million-
strong population would normally allow.
Spain's other option is Europe, where it would be one of many
states -- and would be constantly drowned by the interests of the
more powerful Franco-German axis. The bottom line for Spain is
that its relative youth and geographic safety allow it the
freedom to select its political orientation. If Madrid chooses to
pursue international leverage, it can choose to align with the
United States. But unlike the United Kingdom, Australia or
Poland, such an alignment is not something Spain must make to
preserve its sense of identity -- or its survival. For Madrid,
its political alignments reflect its ambitions, not its needs.
Such hard facts give the United States a tremendous ability to
use -- and abuse -- its allies, since such geopolitical
considerations will survive the downfall of individual
governments. The United Kingdom always will see itself on the
edge of Europe, even if Blair falls. Australia will always see
the necessity of close alignment with Washington, even if Labor
returns to power. And Poland, so long as there is a Germany and a
Russia, will need to look beyond Europe in order to secure its
independence. Of the four states that backed the United States
most strongly in Iraq, only Spain -- by dint of its relative
youth and geographic position -- has the ability to tell the
United States "no."
The distinction that U.S. policy is flirting with is turning
these three states from "friendly allies" to mere "allies" --
changing them from states that are aligned with Washington
because they want to be, to states that are aligned with
Washington because they have to be.
Stratfor cannot emphasize enough that the United States is not in
any danger of losing the United Kingdom, Australia or Poland as
security allies; but should Washington continue balking at
rewarding them for their stalwart support, it risks losing their
support on a wide range of finer, more discrete policies. U.S.
foreign policy is more than hard security: It also is about
market access, investment rules, political maneuvering and
cultural expansion.
The United Kingdom has a veto on the United Nations Security
Council, wields influence globally via the Commonwealth and has
the option -- which it exercises on occasion -- of partnering
with major EU states in its foreign policy. Australia is perhaps
Washington's most creative ally and repeatedly has proven
instrumental in defusing the developing world's more outrageous
charges against the United States, as well as in facilitating
nonproliferation agreements and global trade talks from which the
United States is arguably the largest beneficiary. Poland has
become a powerbroker in its own right, and relishes its key role
as a bridge between Russia and an expanding European Union.
All three states use their various levers to support U.S. policy
in myriad and subtle ways, but their public support is by far the
most valuable. Even when the press refers to the United States as
"isolated" or "backed into a corner," these allies provide enough
support to provide a believable veneer of international support,
with Iraq being only the most recent obvious example. Should the
United States continue to -- as these states see it -- abuse
their trust, they will remain U.S. "allies," but there is little
reason to expect them to sustain such background support outside
of developments that affect their core interests. |
