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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Bill who wrote (538519)	2/11/2004 9:23:09 AM
From: D.Austin	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769670

I've been listening to Ayla Schbley each morning on a 5 part series explaining the position the West has gotten itself into concerning this Religious War and what led up to 9-11. Religious Terrorists: What They Aren’t Going to Tell Us AYLA H. SCHBLEY Department of Political Science Fort Hays State University Hays, KS 67601 The more people die for our cause, the stronger we shall become. Imam Ayatollah Khomeini (1979) Abstract This article is an effort to identify some facets of the operational code ofthe Lebanese Shi ‘i religious terrorist. Twenty-six Lebanese Shi ‘i who have been in- volved in the planning or execution of terrorist actions were interviewed. Although the model of Lebanese Shi ‘i terrorist ‘s cognitive processes in decisionmaking remains largely undefined, the following information provides some clues needed for the safety of potential victims of religious terrorism. Keywords: Operational codes, religious terrorists, Amal, Hizbollah, Kafan squad, K—17, Fatah, relative culture, operational profile. Religious terrorism is the most serious threat to secular societies and the world. The aim of this study is to identify some operational codes of the Lebanese Shi’a religious terror- ist. This contemporary form of religious terrorism “will be with us for a very long time—no matter what happens to Imam Ayatollah Khomeini.” Diplomatic, governmental, academic, and legal experts have failed to publicize and directly address the dire need to identify clearly terrorist’s operational codes. This study is based on 14 interviews that were conducted in Beirut (1988), Brussels (1989), Dakar (1988), London (1989), Paris (1989), and Dearborn, Michigan (1990). The information gathered attempts to provide some answers to protect future and potential victims of religious terrorism. The 14 interviews were conducted with 26 Lebanese Shi’ite Muslims. All of the interviewees were directly involved in the planning or executing, or both, of terrorist operations. Eight of the interviewees have taken hostages. Eleven of those interviewed are members of the Amal organization.2 The interview of one of Hizbollah’s current regional military commanders, who also was a former group leader of Amal, is in- cluded.3 The remaining 14 interviewed are members of Hizbollah’s Kafan squad, and Hizbollah’s guards. One of them, Asaad Hussein Berro, a member of my family, killed himself by driving a car bomb into a roadblock manned by Israeli soldiers in south Lebanon.4 All of the interviewees were, or have been, trained by elements of the now defunct K-l7 team, which was Fatah’s (a PLO faction) special operations group. Most of these interviews were conducted in my home in Lebanon or in hotel rooms, 237 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 2 238 A. H. Schbley and, for obvious reasons, were not taped. All interviewees are my childhood friends, neighbors, or family members, and were given a lifetime promise of anonymity. Most of them are married with more than one dependent. All of those interviewed outside Beirut have an established residence abroad. There appears to be a Lebanese Shi’a religious terrorist’s operational code, which can be identified and disseminated. This operational code is the by-product of relative culture, Lebanese Shi’a Religious Leadership prohibitions, and implied organizational policies and guidelines. The evidence needed to provide a conclusive Lebanese Shi’a terrorist operational code remains sketchy. Interviews solicited by this study provide needed clues, however, from which the following operational profile is deduced.