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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: redfish who wrote (30280)	2/18/2004 9:23:56 AM
From: LindyBill	Respond to of 793681

A U.N. Surprise By Jim Hoagland washingtonpost.com The United Nations has tiptoed back into Iraq and the good graces of the Bush White House. These surprising developments are worth two cheers and one big, ominous question mark. It is hard not to be impressed by the skill and audacity that led to a secretive six-day mission to Iraq last week by Lakhdar Brahimi, the Algerian diplomat who is Secretary General Kofi Annan's top troubleshooter. Getting the 70-year-old Arab nationalist to go to occupied Iraq required intense White House wooing, including two sessions with President Bush. The imperatives that drove Bush's interest were more immediate than repairing relations with the United Nations, though that was seen as a bonus. Brahimi, it was hoped, had the credibility and standing to get through to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. The reclusive Shiite religious leader disrupted the administration's original transition plans by demanding direct elections before the promised June 30 transfer of sovereignty. Bush is pressing aides to make sure that the sovereignty deadline is met even if other details of the transition plan have to be altered. Sistani's still-vague indications that he would accept a U.N. recommendation to hold elections later than June 30 triggered the administration's new outreach to Annan and his U.N. staff in January. Brahimi quickly understood that the job he was being offered was far more important than leading an election survey team. He was in fact being offered a fairly open-ended role in helping the administration manage an increasingly unwieldy transition. It was a challenge that appealed to this accomplished negotiator, who impressed U.S. officials with his fairness in negotiations that established President Hamid Karzai's government in Afghanistan. "He was very useful in Afghanistan" and other crisis situations, said one senior administration official. Added another official: "He did not always agree with us, but he never opposed us for the sake of opposing us." Even so, Brahimi repeatedly and emphatically told friends, U.N. staff members and journalists that he would never take on the mission. American and U.N. officials now say that Brahimi's blanket denials were in part a security measure to protect him from being targeted as was Sergio Vieira de Mello, the U.N. special representative killed in a Baghdad truck bombing in August. Members of the election team did not know Brahimi was coming on the trip with them until he joined them in the airport departure lounge in Paris, according to one official. His arrival in Baghdad became known only after he was in the "Green Zone," the heavily guarded area that houses the Coalition Provisional Authority. Brahimi is due to report this week to Annan, who will then make public the United Nations' recommendations on elections. But one result of the Algerian's trip is already apparent. U.S. and Iraqi officials acknowledge that their complicated plan to use local and regional caucuses to choose an interim legislature to take power on July 1 is dead. Brahimi is said to have conceded the point to Sistani in their meeting; this allowed the diplomat to argue that a new political consensus had to emerge in Iraq before free and fair elections could be held, probably at the end of this year at the earliest. The visible meaning of the transfer of sovereignty is now clear. The occupation authority will disband and its head, Paul Bremer, will be filmed climbing on a plane to leave Baghdad. The largest U.S. embassy in the world will then take charge of dealing with . . . whom? One option under discussion is expanding, perhaps even doubling, the 25-member Governing Council named by Bremer last spring. This expanded council would then help Brahimi and a U.N. staff organize national elections for a constituent assembly and government. The Brahimi mission was a diplomatic astonishment. Annan has been under enormous pressure from his staff to avoid further U.N. involvement in Iraq while occupation continues. His willingness to take the risks inherent in sending Brahimi and his team to Baghdad shows the secretary general's concern for Iraq and for the world body's relations with Washington. But both Annan and Bush must be careful not to leave the impression that they are maneuvering to decide Iraq's fate over the heads of its people. That is the large question mark that hangs over a process that must not rely too heavily on diplomacy and too little on the hard work of encouraging and allowing local politics to flourish and Iraqis to choose. That process, which began with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, is moving ahead with a speed and force diplomacy cannot contain. It is time to trust the Iraqis rather than to control them. jimhoagland@washpost.com © 2004 The Washington Post Company

To: redfish who wrote (30280)	2/18/2004 9:24:02 AM
From: epicure	Respond to of 793681

"but what I didn't believe is that Saddam was a threat to us." Hey I said that. :-)

To: redfish who wrote (30280)	2/18/2004 9:39:58 AM
From: michael97123	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793681

The fear was not that he would use them against us directly--it was that, given his hate for the US, if he obtained wmds, particularly bio weapons, he could pass them on to al quaeda. And of course if they were ever used against us, he could deny, deny, deny and we wouldnt be able to prove our case conclusively. And there would be millions dead. That is what we were trying to prevent. And although whether he had to be confronted in 2003 is now debatable (if there are no wmds in fact), it is clear to me that he would eventually have to have been dealt with. In a way, it was better that we were able to take him down without wmds because if he had them in usable form, he would have used them. Chemical weapons are clumsy but bio weapons come in little vials and who knows what he would have done. We are both happy though that he is gone so at least we have that in common. mike