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To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 9:31:33 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
federalreserve.gov

Remarks by Governor Edward M. Gramlich
At the Euromoney Bond Investors Congress, London, England
February 25, 2004

Budget and Trade Deficits: Linked, Both Worrisome in the Long Run, but not Twins

Thank you for inviting me to speak today. While I know that most of you would welcome any insights I might have about current U.S. monetary policy--whether the Open Market Committee will be raising or lowering interest rates at our next meeting--I prefer to focus instead on some issues that could become serious over the longer run. These issues involve the persistent budget and trade deficits facing the American economy, issues that could eventually involve significant economic adjustments around the world.1

Large budget and trade deficits are not a new phenomenon. They also arose in the United States in the mid-1980s. At that time, the business press and many economists began referring to the situation as one of "twin deficits." With the current re-emergence of both deficits, the phrase has come back into common usage--too common, in my view.

To be sure, in theoretical models there is a scenario by which budget deficits can create trade deficits, and one by which trade deficits can create budget deficits. But there are also many scenarios by which either deficit can arise independently, or even by which budget and trade deficits can move in opposite directions, as they did in the 1990s. In general, while budget and trade deficits can be linked, there are important differences between the two, both in how they respond to economic forces and in their long-run consequences.

I start by examining the relationship between budget and trade deficits--why they are linked but not twins. I discuss the sustainability conditions for budget and trade deficits; the conditions that must be fulfilled for the debts on both accounts to be stabilized in relation to the size of the U.S. economy. Then I discuss what happens if either debt violates this condition and rises in relation to the size of the economy. This discussion, in turn, raises further interesting distinctions between the two deficits.

The Link
The link between budget and trade deficits can be seen most naturally through the national income accounting framework. Any saving the nation does finances either private domestic investment directly or the accumulation of claims on foreigners. This means that national saving--the sum of private and government saving--equals private domestic investment plus that period's accumulation of claims on foreigners, or the trade surplus. The trade surplus can also be thought of as net foreign lending. All of these relationships are accounting identities--true at every moment in time apart from data inconsistencies captured by a statistical discrepancy.

In equation form, we have

(1) NS = S - BD = I - TD
On the left side of the equation NS refers to national saving, S refers to overall private saving, and BD refers to the government budget deficit. This part of the equation says merely that total national saving equals the sum of all saving done in the economy by the private sector and the government sector. A budget surplus would be treated as governmental saving and added to private saving; a budget deficit would be treated as governmental dissaving and subtracted.

The right side of the equation repeats the familiar open economy identity that national saving equals private domestic investment, I, plus the accumulation of claims on foreigners or less that domestic investment financed by foreigners. As was noted earlier, borrowing from foreigners involves either a reduction of claims on them or an increase of claims on us by them. It is by definition equal to the trade deficit TD. In the equation, then, a trade surplus means that some national saving goes to building up claims on foreigners (national saving is greater than domestic investment) while a trade deficit means that some investment is financed by foreigners (national saving is less than domestic investment).

This identity first demonstrates the all-important role of national saving in shaping long-run economic welfare. National saving is the only way a country can have its capital and own it too. Models of the economic growth process identify national saving as one of the key policy variables in influencing a nation's living standards in the long run.

The identity also makes clear that the budget deficit and the trade deficit can move together on a dollar-per-dollar basis, but only if the difference between private domestic investment and private saving is constant. Typically that difference will not be constant. For example, if there were to be an investment boom, interest rates might rise to induce some new private saving and some new lending by foreigners. The implied trade deficit might rise and, because of the rise in income, the budget deficit might fall. In this case, the trade deficit would increase while the budget deficit fell.

Conversely, suppose that expansionary fiscal policy resulted in a rise in budget deficits. If this expansion were totally financed by borrowing from foreigners, domestic interest rates would not change much, and domestic investment and private saving might not either. In this scenario, there could be a simultaneous dollar-per-dollar change in budget and trade deficits--the classic twin-deficit scenario. Such a situation is most likely to occur in small economies fully open to international trade and capital flows, economies in which domestic interest rates are determined by world capital markets and are independent of domestic economic variables. But if domestic interest rates do change, as they likely would in either a closed economy or a large open economy, private investment and saving would also likely change, and any strict link between budget and trade deficits would be broken.

One could spin any number of scenarios, but these are enough to make the basic point. Because of the underlying relationship between saving and investment, budget and trade deficits could be strictly linked. But in a large open economy like the United States, it is easy to imagine plenty of scenarios in which they are imperfectly linked, and even some scenarios in which they move in opposite directions. Budget and trade deficits should be viewed as linked, but not as twins.

Stability Conditions
Although the economic implications and reactions of budget deficits and trade deficits differ, both are deficits. Another elementary accounting identity says that last period's debt level plus the current deficit equals the current period's debt level. This identity is true whether we are talking about budget deficits building up the stock of outstanding government debt (a liability of the government sector to the private sector), or trade deficits building up the stock of external debt (the net stock of accumulated foreign claims against the United States).2

Economists have worried for years about optimal stocks of government and external debt. For government debt, the optimal stock turns out to be related to the optimal level of national saving, which can be defined as the level that maximizes the nation's long-term path of consumption per worker. The optimal stock of net external debt can be determined in the same framework from an open economy perspective.

While these models can be instructive, today I am going to focus on a weaker standard. Whatever the long-term optimal level of government debt, and whatever the optimal level of external debt, one can separately ask whether either debt level is becoming a more, or less, important economic factor over time. For government debt, this weaker standard, or stability condition, determines merely whether the ratio of debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is stable. If it is, interest payments on the debt will, in equilibrium, also settle down to a stable proportion of GDP. For external debt, a stable debt-to-GDP ratio means that the net interest and dividend payments of the United States to foreign investors will also settle down to a constant ratio to GDP.

The appendix derives this stability condition generically. It is that

(2) d (g - i)/(1 + g) = p,
where d is the stable ratio of debt to GDP, g is the nominal growth rate of the economy, i is the nominal interest rate in the economy, and p is the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP. For budget accounts, the primary deficit is the national income accounts budget deficit, but excluding interest payments. For trade accounts, the primary trade deficit is the current account deficit, excluding net interest and dividend payments to foreigners.3

As a general rule, the economy's growth rate and interest rate will be fairly close. The equation says that if they are equal, the primary deficit must be zero to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. If the interest rate is slightly above the growth rate, as it would be in models without risk for economies that save less than the theoretical optimum, a nation with outstanding debt would have to run a slight primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio. If the effective interest rate on debt is slightly below the growth rate, as it has generally been found to be in the past for both deficits, a nation with outstanding debt could run slight primary deficits and not see the debt ratio grow.4

On the foreign side, this condition has until now been especially forgiving. Even with a large net debt position, our net investment income from foreigners has exceeded that paid out to foreigners. Since the net interest rate has been less than the GDP growth rate, the ratio of external debt to GDP could have been stabilized with a moderate primary trade deficit.5

Magnitudes
It is well known that the U.S. economy now suffers both budget and trade deficits. But how do these deficits compare with the stability conditions?

Historically, there have not been significant instabilities in U.S. federal budget deficits.6 Overall deficits have averaged about 2 percent of GDP over the past four decades, but figure 1 shows that when interest is deducted, primary budget deficits have averaged close to zero, the approximate level that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio. Hence, the outstanding debt, while fluctuating in the range of 25 percent to 50 percent of GDP, has actually declined slightly as a share of GDP. It was 38 percent of GDP in the mid-1960s and is now only 37 percent of GDP. The ratio did rise as high as 50 percent in the high-deficit years of the early 1990s, but it dropped sharply thereafter with the primary budget surpluses of the late 1990s.

Looking ahead, things might not be so favorable. As a result of recent fiscal changes, the budget has lately fallen into primary deficit again; this primary deficit is now more than 2 percent of GDP (1.5 percent after cyclical adjustment). The deterioration reflects the much-discussed recent rapid growth in expenditures, along with significant tax cuts. Perhaps more significant, in a few years the United States will face huge looming costs for retirement and health programs. It will take extraordinary fiscal discipline just to keep the present primary deficit near its current level of 1 to 2 percent of GDP over the short, medium, and long run. And even at that level, the stability condition is violated by at least 1 percent of GDP, suggesting that the debt-to-GDP ratio is likely to climb steadily upward.7

On the trade side, figure 2 shows that the trend is definitely more worrisome. While the budget debt has fluctuated between 25 percent and 50 percent of GDP over the past several decades, the net external debt has grown steadily. Until 1985, this external debt was not even positive; that is, until that time the United States had net claims on foreigners. But because the United States has run persistent and sizable primary trade deficits since 1990, the net external debt is now 25 percent of GDP and rising sharply. The primary trade deficit is now 5 percent of GDP, violating the stability condition by nearly this same amount. At this rate, the external debt ratio will climb very quickly.

While the trade deficit does have equilibrating tendencies, as will be discussed later, there are also forces that tend to increase it. Econometric studies of the basic demand for imports and exports find that the U.S. income elasticity of demand for imports is higher than the foreign income elasticity of demand for U.S. exports. This means that even if the world economy grows at the same rate as the U.S. economy, our trade deficit is likely to widen, (apart from any changes in relative prices).8 Indeed, the U.S. primary trade deficit has widened steadily since 1990.

Adjustments
I have just argued that the U.S. is now in violation of the stability condition for both budget and trade deficits--recently and moderately on the budget side, persistently and significantly on the trade side. What are the implications?

With each deficit there is probably a credibility range. By that, I mean a limited range within which a country may be able to violate its stability condition and have its debt-to-GDP ratio trend upward without further economic consequences. For budgets, there may be a range within which the debt-to-GDP ratio can grow without significant changes in interest rates.9 As equation 1 indicates, economic performance in this range is by no means optimal, because the persistent deficits are subtracting funds that would otherwise be devoted to capital investment and future growth in living standards. But there may not be significant relative price effects. The same is true on the trade side; there could be a range in which foreign claims on the United States just build up without major impact on relative prices.

Once the economy gets outside of the credibility range, more significant relative price adjustments become likely. On the trade side, for example, the continued accumulation of foreign claims on the U.S. economy will raise the issue of whether foreign investors will want to hold an ever-increasing share of their wealth in the form of U.S. assets. Or, as is the focus of the stability condition above, whether the U.S. economy can indefinitely pay out ever-higher shares of GDP in the form of interest and dividend payments. The conventional view is that at some point there should be a relative price adjustment--some combination of rising U.S. interest rates (to make U.S. assets more attractive), rising foreign prices (to make imports more expensive), moderating U.S. prices (to make U.S. exports more competitive), or a change in exchange rates. Each of these reactions is likely to occur naturally, and each moves in the direction of lowering the external imbalance. That is why foreign trade deficits are typically thought of as self-correcting. The main risk here is that the natural adjustments may not occur gradually, but so rapidly as to threaten various types of dislocations.

There are complicating factors. One involves the currency denomination of the net debt. Countries with large trade deficits often have their external liabilities denominated in a foreign currency. Hence, when their own currency depreciates, the value and burden of foreign debt automatically increases. The United States does not have this problem because most of its debt is denominated in dollars--say, foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury bills. If the dollar were to fall, the value of our debt in terms of foreign currencies would then automatically decline, inducing foreign wealth-holders to make further portfolio shifts, perhaps even including increasing their stock of dollar-denominated debt. This denomination effect would not permanently prevent any relative price adjustment, but it could lengthen the process.

Beyond that, for pragmatic reasons this conventional adjustment process could be extended or distorted even further. By way of illustration, Asian central banks have now accumulated more than a trillion dollars of international currency reserves--largely in dollar-denominated assets--equal to roughly half of the outstanding net debt of the United States. These central banks are not traditional wealth-holders motivated by expected risks and returns. Instead, they seem motivated more by the prospect of preserving low domestic currency values for their exporters.10 To pursue this objective, they can print money to buy U.S. securities. This monetary expansion could generate domestic inflation unless it is sterilized with other open market sales of securities--and the mere scale of present and expected future debt stocks may make continued sterilization impossible. But if these central banks continue behaving this way, the so-called credibility range could be extended significantly.

While trade deficits should ultimately correct themselves, perhaps after a long trek through the credibility range, there are really no natural self-corrective mechanisms for budget deficits. Once the U.S. economy gets through the credibility range, interest rates on the increasing government debt will have to rise to induce people to hold the debt. This rise increases the interest burden and causes total deficits to rise further, all the time subtracting more and more funds from capital accumulation. Once this process begins, market psychology may hasten the adjustment.11 Hence, while natural forces lessen the basic external imbalance, they increase the basic budget imbalance. In the long run, the only way to correct budget deficits is for policymakers to correct them.

Outside Forces
There are several outside forces--both natural and as a result of policy--that could influence budget and trade deficits.

One generally helpful influence is productivity growth. Say the U.S. economy benefits from an exogenous positive shock to productivity growth, as it seemed to have in the late 1990s. This shock would raise the trend path of income, meaning that slightly higher primary budget and trade deficits could still be consistent with debt-to-GDP stability; in effect, a higher level of g can be plugged into equation 2 (at least as long as it is not offset by a higher i). Higher productivity could also help lengthen the credibility range, the range in which moderate changes in the debt ratio might not lead to adverse changes in relative prices. Among other things, higher productivity could raise the marginal product of capital and make investment in U.S. assets relatively attractive. But even with these favorable developments, the stability conditions discussed above still hold. If they are violated, the natural adjustment mechanisms will eventually take over for the trade deficit, and the primary budget deficit will eventually have to be reduced to stop a growing government debt ratio.

One unhelpful measure is trade protectionism. While it might appear that trade protectionism would correct trade deficits, it probably will not. Over the medium and long run, the economy should be producing near its natural growth path, perhaps because of timely monetary and/or fiscal policy, perhaps because of natural equilibrating forces in the economy. In this event, trade protectionism would not stimulate added national production. Even if protectionist measures reduce imports, the added spending demands for import-competing industries will crowd out other types of production. Put another way, equation 1 shows that the trade deficit is ultimately determined by national saving and investment. Without a change in these, protectionism merely shifts the types of goods that are produced. It does not increase overall production and, short of cutting off trade altogether, does not even change the trade balance. Moreover, as is well known, over the long run, trade protection lowers a nation's standard of living.

Finally, suppose politicians actually do correct budget deficits, again assuming an economy near its medium-term growth path. As mentioned above, such a fiscal austerity policy is the only known way to correct persistent budget deficits. The reduction in deficits should lower domestic interest rates and trigger changes in exchange rates that lower imports and raise exports. Hence, well-designed fiscal austerity measures could solve all the problems simultaneously. They correct budget deficits directly, they reduce trade deficits indirectly, and the implied higher level of national saving also permits more funds to flow into capital formation and long-term productivity enhancements. Fiscal austerity is the one tried and true approach to dealing with budget and trade deficits simultaneously.

Conclusions
There are obviously strong links between budget and trade deficits, and the deficit-debt dynamic relationships are very similar. At the same time, it is misleading simply to equate the two deficits, as is often done in the twin-deficit literature. Budget deficits typically involve a reduction in national saving and, if large, a steadily growing government debt-to-GDP ratio. They typically will not be corrected without explicit action. Trade deficits, on the other hand, typically involve an increase in foreign claims on the U.S. economy. As these claims grow in relation to national income, at least some natural forces are set in motion to correct the imbalance.

From a policy standpoint, neither deficit may be terribly harmful in the short run, and at least the recent fiscal deficits have been useful in stabilizing movements in output. Moreover, there is likely to be a credibility range in which debt levels could rise relative to GDP without much change in relative prices. In the long run, however, both deficits could become much more worrisome. There are forces tending to increase both deficits: political and demographic for budget deficits, income elasticities for trade deficits. At some point, continued large-scale trade deficits could trigger equilibrating, and possibly dislocating, changes in prices, interest rates, and exchange rates. Continued budget deficits will steadily detract from the growth of the U.S. capital stock and may also trigger dislocating changes.



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 9:42:48 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
federalreserve.gov

Remarks by Governor Susan Schmidt Bies
At the Global Association of Risk Professionals Fifth Annual Convention, New York, New York
February 25, 2004

Qualitative Aspects of Effective Risk Management

Good morning. I am delighted to be here for GARP's 5th Annual Risk Management Convention and to support, to the extent that I can, the work of your organization. It's gratifying to see the progress GARP has made in its short life toward promoting the visibility and quality of the risk management profession. I congratulate you on the progress you have made and wish you further success in the years ahead.

I have spent much of my own career in the field of risk management, and certainly the Federal Reserve has a keen interest in the matter. For those of us who have spent more than a few years in the business, it is easy to see the recent progress in the quantitative or scientific aspects of risk management as a result of data base and other technological advances. These increased capabilities have helped push financial theory and have opened doors and minds to new ways of measuring and managing risk.

These advances have also made possible the development of important new markets and products that have become widespread and essential to the risk management practices of both financial and nonfinancial firms. They have also made the practice of risk management far more sophisticated and complex. The application of mathematics and statistics, the collection and compilation of large amounts of data, and the analysis and characterization of the risks embedded in business activities today are much different--and in many ways more challenging--than they were not long ago.

While the enhanced quantitative dimensions of risk measurement may be quite visible (at least to practitioners of the art), their implications for the qualitative aspects of risk management may be less apparent. In practice, though, these qualitative aspects are no less important to the successful operation of a business--as events continue to demonstrate. As risk measurement practices advance, the full range of risk management practices needs to keep pace.

In my remarks today, I would like to highlight some of the advances in risk management that we have seen in recent years, particularly those related to the management and transfer of credit risk. These gains and the development of new and important markets have come about because of better risk-measurement techniques and have the potential, I believe, to substantially improve the efficiency of U.S. and world financial markets. However, as an economist, I also know there is no free lunch; some of the implications of these developments on the more fundamental elements of risk management must be considered and adequately addressed if the quantitative aspects are to work well. For obvious reasons, I will focus on the practices of large commercial banks.

Competitive and Innovative Markets
I would like to draw on some observations gathered from the Federal Reserve's role in banking supervision as we have worked to better understand recent practices by financial institutions to manage and transfer credit risk. I find the preliminary assessment to be informative, interesting, and at least somewhat reassuring; however, I also feel that it appropriately highlights vulnerabilities in market practices that must be carefully monitored and managed. Because much of the innovation in credit risk transfer involves credit derivatives, attention has been focused on transactions using these instruments and on credit default swaps (CDS), in particular. By way of note, the Federal Reserve also is participating in work commissioned last year by the Financial Stability Forum to gain a broader understanding of these issues. I look forward to the conclusions and assessment in this regard.

As most of you know, credit default swaps involve the sale, or transfer, of credit risk associated with a specific reference entity for a fixed term in exchange for a fee from the other counterparty (the "protection buyer"). Related instruments--synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)--entail similar arrangements, but are based on portfolios of exposures and are "tranched" in a manner typically seen in securitizations. Consequently, through CDOs, parties gain even greater flexibility in tailoring and marketing financial transactions to match the risk appetites of ultimate investors, or risk takers.

This market has grown rapidly in recent years, attracting increased attention among risk managers and leading to larger operations and higher staffing levels--particularly at dealer firms. The British Bankers Association, for example, reports that the notional value of credit derivatives has grown from less than $200 billion in 1997 to nearly $2 trillion in 2002. Our own bank Call Reports indicate that late last year U.S. commercial banks held credit derivatives with notional values of more than $800 billion, which may represent one-third of the global market. Trading of these instruments occurs mostly among some 1,200 large investment-grade "reference entities," with more liquidity, of course, among the most active fifty names than among the next several hundred. Most liquidity for CDS contracts is with five-year maturities, although participants are trying to expand market depth at longer terms. There are also efforts to push demand beyond investment-grade corporate names, for example to high-yield and middle-market sectors.

A key question--how much risk is being transferred?--has been difficult to answer due to the participation in the market of many types of regulated and unregulated investors and firms as well as the fact that participants simply reverse or close out one exposure by entering into an additional and offsetting one, as they do with other types of swaps. To be sure, notional amounts substantially overstate the level of risk transfer, but by most accounts, market participants seem to agree that the volume of risk transferred has been material. Anecdotally, some of the largest banks indicate they hedge about 15 percent of their investment-grade corporate credit. Standard and Poor's estimates the banking system globally has used credit derivatives to transfer the risk associated with some $300 billion of exposures. But S&P acknowledges that this estimate likely overstates the true level of risk transferred because CDS are almost exclusively written on low-risk, investment-grade credits, and because banks issuing CDOs typically retain the riskier tranches.

Even so, it seems to me that such risk management practices are important in governing credit risk in large banking organizations and, in many respects, reducing systemic risk, as well. Despite the common practice by banks that issue CDOs to retain much or all of the first-loss or "expected-loss" tranche, such banks have at least reduced their previous, full credit exposure. Moreover, the sale and purchase of CDS also allow banks to manage concentrations and to further diversify their portfolios. In the event of highly unexpected defaults among investment-grade firms, a hedged bank's losses will be reduced. The experience with credit derivatives in the Enron, World Com, and Parmalat events, indicate that these new risk products can work effectively.

One aspect that we, as bank supervisors, find encouraging about the growth of credit risk transfer activity is the diversification benefit it provides--and its potential for greater economic efficiency. Certainly, not all of the risk transferred by banks has left the banking sector. S&P estimates that roughly one-half of this risk remains in the banking sector. The insurance sector, including reinsurance firms, has been a major participant among nonbank firms. Among banks, the belief is that those in Europe and Asia have been net sellers of credit protection, particularly with respect to North American borrowers. Such credit flows, whether within or outside the banking system, should help enhance the geographic diversification of the protection-seller and add liquidity to the debt offerings of the reference firms.

By distributing risks more broadly among the major players--banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and private asset managers--these transactions would seem almost by definition to add to the diversity and strength of financial markets and reduce risk concentrations. By their design, derivative instruments segment risk for distribution to parties most willing to accept them. A key point, however, is that these parties are also able to do so by successfully absorbing and diffusing any subsequent loss. In any event, reducing or more evenly redistributing the risk within the banking system--where such credit risk has been traditionally concentrated--would seem to be a clear benefit.

A second question that is certainly of interest to you as risk management professionals is whether participants recognize and understand the underlying risks. It is important to recognize that the market for credit default swaps is dominated by large institutions and private investors that have specialized expertise in credit analysis and significant historical performance records. Participants will always adjust their positions and move in and out of markets as they gain experience, and there will certainly be lessons to learn along the way. We will learn them, and hopefully we will deal with them well--as we have so far. But we have little evidence, to date, that suggests there are material weaknesses in the knowledge and understanding of the major market-making dealers.

That said, I would offer one critical caveat regarding the potential for a large group of market participants to place an over-reliance on external ratings and key modeling assumptions. In particular, the pricing and risk management of the increasingly complex credit risk transfer instruments and trading strategies rely on credit risk models and supporting assumptions, including assumptions about the degree of default correlations between different reference entities. Although these future correlations cannot be measured, correlations during periods of normal conditions can change greatly during periods of stress. Time will tell how robust these models are and whether they will perform well.

Market participants must consider whether there is a concentration of reliance on a small set of risk management frameworks or approaches in the Credit Risk Transfer (CRT) market. This issue arises in regard to the reported similarity of credit risk models and assumptions used by major market participants. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with convergence in risk management approaches. But in this case, given the widespread view that models are still in their relative infancy, the similarities are perhaps worth noting. This issue also arises in relation to the reliance on rating agency ratings and methodologies regarding CDO tranches and related structures. Ideally, all market participants that are investing substantial amounts in CDOs would have the capacity to undertake their own analysis of the risks, so that the rating agency ratings would function more as a supplement to these analyses. In practice, however, it is likely that substantial reliance will be placed on the rating agency's rating. Consequently, the risk judgments of many market participants are concentrated in the hands of a small number of public rating agencies.

In the context of commercial banking where past credit-related failures have had substantial and widespread effects, we also have close government supervision, that has focused primarily on risk management practices and controls relating to evolving market practices. I would not for a minute suggest that such oversight ensures that all will go well in the future. But it should help to reinforce effective risk management, and we are learning from the growing list of case studies.

Qualitative Aspects
This discussion of the role of derivatives in transferring credit risk serves to illustrate many important--and not always highly technical--aspects of risk management that cannot be overlooked. Some of these issues relate to the nascent features of that particular market, but they apply to other markets as well, and to the sheer complexity of measuring risk. Thoughts of legal risk, operational risk, reputational risk, counterparty credit risk, and model risk all come to mind. For their part, central bankers and bank supervisors must also consider the implications of new products, activities, and management innovations on financial markets, systemic risk, and their own prudential regulations. The combined implications of market innovations on all of these and other issues can be profound and challenging, but, I would submit, overall beneficial to market efficiency. We simply must manage the process well.

In the legal arena, the financial industry has made, and continues to make, substantial progress, for example, standardizing netting agreements related to derivative instruments and reducing related misunderstandings and differences among institutions and legal jurisdictions. Understanding market practices, such as those related to settling transactions using "cheapest to deliver," and knowing for certain the specific legal entities that are the reference parties on credit risk swaps are also crucial, low tech elements of a successful risk management process. Uncertainties will exist in any complicated operation. They are typically greater when associated with innovation and they grow as product structures become more complex. We all need to recognize this.

Regarding models, aside from the technical parts, it's important to consider the less quantitative. For instance, are the inputs sound? Are the model parameters based on sufficiently robust and accurate data? Are the assumptions reasonable? One needs to understand the business and risk management principles, but that does not require a "quant." In modeling, "GIGO"--garbage in, garbage out--always rules.

Data integrity is growing in importance in effective risk management. In today's world of credit risk models, especially for centralized underwriting in areas such as consumer, mortgage, and small business credit, the responsibilities of data input may reside with the lending officer. To ensure effective underwriting, the culture and incentives for loan officers should support accountability for valid information going into a model.

In the "old days" when individual loan officers made credit decisions, any weaknesses in underwriting were confined to that lender's portfolio. It was the responsibility of loan reviewers to identify those weaknesses before losses became extensive. Today, the responsibility for effectively predicting defaults and loss given default resides with the senior credit officer responsible for the credit scoring model. When the underwriting results are then tested for reliability, it is critical to identify the root cause of errors due to model specifications and changes in customer behavior. The risk of centralized, model-based underwriting is that errors are no longer limited to the portfolio of a single loan officer. Rather, model errors can create significant systemic risks across that loan product portfolio. We are still trying to learn how to estimate these types of risks.

In our current regulatory efforts to develop internal rating-based capital standards for credit risk, we find that simply identifying and describing "minimum" data requirements can be a challenge. What is adequate and robust for a given purpose and what is not? Each company's practices are unique--as they should be. We do not wish to create the moral hazard and greater systemic risk associated with a highly specific, government-dictated procedure to measure risk. Rather, we want the discipline that can be gained from requiring that the input data and the parameters used for regulatory purposes are--as much as possible--the same as those used for business purposes, so that they can be market-tested. Differences among model results will occur, but both management and regulators must decide what is good enough for their respective purposes. Some answers are more judgmental than empirical. Experience, judgment, and a sound degree of prudence are all important.

In the old days, banking was often a smaller and certainly less complex business. In this smaller scale, management could gain a more direct "feel" about their customers, their exposures, and the related risk. And the potential consequences of making mistakes were typically small as well. If the bank had a bad loan underwriter, it could dismiss the person and proceed to clean up the mess. As many banking organizations have grown into much larger and far more complex institutions, that personal feel often gets lost. Their managements need the more sophisticated and systematic processes that risk modeling can provide, but they also need to ensure that an incorrect or weak model does not bring down the house. I would offer that success in this area often requires grey hair and keen intuition as well as highly developed analytical skills.

Beyond these points, accounting and disclosure practices must be considered as they relate to such matters as earnings volatility, customer suitability, and the incentives or disincentives they provide to risk managers. Fundamental elements of corporate governance must also be adequately addressed--and they naturally become more challenging as activities become more complex. Nevertheless, they cannot be ignored, given the corporate scandals of recent years and the legislated remedies that followed.

Recent failures of corporate governance--whether at Enron, Parmalat, or the New York Stock Exchange--have changed the landscape underlying many transactions conducted by financial institutions. The implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation are now being felt throughout corporate America and are proving to be expensive to many firms. How much better, for all, had these few corporations behaved more responsibly all along! Responsible self-governance and sound corporate governance are much better and far less costly than rigid governmental-imposed rules. A greater awareness of business ethics and a reshaping of accounting practices and incentive packages should help. But risk managers must also play an active role in focusing on sound practices, and not just on expedience.

Accounting, Disclosure, and Market Discipline
Revelations of significant corporate governance and accounting failures, with Parmalat being the latest example, demonstrate that strong accounting, effective internal and external auditing, and transparent disclosure practices are critical concerns worldwide, not just in one part of the world, such as the United States. Events at the international level have renewed attention to the need for companies worldwide to implement high-quality corporate governance practices and accounting and disclosure standards, and for their external auditors to employ rigorous and sound international auditing techniques. Long before coming to the Federal Reserve, I had a strong interest and became involved in accounting, auditing, and internal control matters. This led to my serving on the Financial Accounting Standard Board's Emerging Issues Task Force and the Committee on Corporate Reporting of the Financial Executives Institute. I have continued to pursue this interest in my role as a Federal Reserve Board member and as chair of the Board's Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Affairs. I would like, now, to turn to some of the recent accounting issues surrounding complex instruments and the role of financial disclosure in promoting risk management.

For starters, I am pleased to see movement in recognizing employee stock options grants as a business expense. At year-end 2003, thirty-five of the fifty largest U.S. bank holding companies that we closely monitor each quarter were taking this approach, a notable increase from the year before. Many nonbank firms are doing so as well, and we should expect to see many more companies do so in periods ahead. In my view, that is a useful step toward more accurately disclosing a company's true results, and one that should help rebuild investor confidence in financial statements.

The techniques for valuing financial derivatives--whether they be employee stock options, mortgage interest rate lock commitments, credit default swaps, or another type--are continuing to evolve. As these markets grow, fair-value estimates will only improve. In the process, firms of all types will face growing competitive pressures to manage risk more effectively and to make greater use of these and other products. Accounting rules and disclosure practices must keep pace. A frequently cited issue is the effect of current hedge accounting rules, which sometimes cause banks to recognize losses on credit hedges while ignoring, in earnings, the offsetting gains in the economic value of the asset hedged. This leads to greater earnings volatility and has understandably caused some banks to reassess, and in some cases scale back, their credit hedging activities.

If market discipline is to function, accounting boards themselves must find better, more-innovative solutions that more accurately capture the underlying economics of transactions. Moreover, with regard to securitizations, derivatives, and other innovative instruments that can transfer risk, it is not at all clear that accounting measures of a company's balance sheet at a given point in time are sufficient to reflect the company's financial risk profile.

As bank regulators, we recognize the need to strike the right balance in deciding what disclosure standards to promote. It is said that for every complex issue there is an answer that is simple, concise, and wrong. We would prefer to get it right. We need to identify the information that sufficiently informs investors of risk levels without being unduly burdensome and without revealing proprietary information. Much of the answer may involve disclosures about how risks are being managed and valued, drawing less on accounting information and more on information available in risk management reports. Disclosures need not be fully standardized; rather each firm should tell its own story.

One area in which improved disclosures by banking organizations are needed involves credit risk and the allowance for loan losses. As you know, there is a high degree of management judgment in estimating the loan-loss allowance, and that estimate can have a significant impact on an institution's balance sheet and earnings. Expanded disclosures in this area would improve market participants' understanding of an institution's risk profile and whether the firm has adequately provided for its estimated credit losses in a consistent, well-disciplined manner. Accordingly, I strongly encourage institutions to provide additional disclosures in this area. Examples include a breakdown of credit exposures by internal credit grade, the allowance estimates broken down by key components, more-thorough discussions of why allowance components have changed from period to period, and enhanced discussions of the rationale behind changes in the more-subjective allowance estimates, including unallocated amounts.

It is also important to note that the soon-to-be-released enterprise risk management (ERM) framework of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, or COSO, should provide much needed guidance in the areas of risk management and internal controls and, thus, is of particular interest to bank regulators. The ERM framework, as proposed, requires an entity to identify the potential events that may affect its operations and requires the entity to systematically manage those risks with a particular emphasis on its risk appetite and strategic direction. The framework is predicated on the existence of sound controls and effective management. Successful application of the framework requires managers to consider both current and planned or anticipated operational and market changes and to identify the risks arising from those changes. Once these risks have been identified comprehensively, assessed, and evaluated as to their potential impact on the organization, management must determine the effectiveness of existing controls and develop and implement additional mitigating controls where needed. This is a critical step and if it is not performed properly, it may doom the entire process.

One of the weaknesses that we have seen is the delegation by management of both the development and the assessment of the internal control structure to the same risk management, internal control, or compliance group. It is important to emphasize that line management has the responsibility for identifying risks and ensuring that the mitigating controls are effective--and to leave the assessments to a group that is independent of that line organization. Managers should be expected to evaluate the risks and controls within their scope of authority at least annually and to report the results of this process to the chief risk officer and the audit committee of the board of directors. An independent group, such as internal audit, should perform a separate assessment to confirm management's assessment.

Internal audit's review should determine whether the firm is accomplishing its stated control objectives, in light of growth and changes in the firm's business mix as well as in regard to new customers, strategic initiatives, reorganizations, and process changes. Internal audit should also evaluate the entity's adherence to its control processes and assess the adequacy of those processes and its related disclosure practices in light of the complexity and legal and reputational risk profile of the organization. It is essential for internal audit to be staffed with personnel who have the necessary skills and experience to report on the degree of compliance with an entity's policies and procedures. Internal audit should test transactions to validate that business lines are complying with the firm's standards and should report the results of that testing to the board or the audit committee, as appropriate.

Although I have referred to internal audit, the key point is that strong internal controls, sound corporate governance, and effective disclosure practices require that periodic assessments of overall effectiveness be performed by an independent group. Then, as corporate disclosure practices evolve, market analysts must do their part to understand the information, while recognizing both its value and its limitations. Analysts need to make sure they are correctly using all available information. This includes understanding that some accounting practices may not result in the best presentation of economic reality and that other sources of information may provide more-accurate insight into a company's condition.

For example, current accounting rules for defined-benefit pension plans permit firms to use expectations of the long-term return on assets to calculate current-period pension costs. A spot rate is used to discount future liabilities. The discrepancies between the assumed and the actual returns are reconciled by gradual amortization. This smoothing feature can create large distortions between economic reality and the pension-financing cost accrual embedded in the income statement.

A recent study by Federal Reserve staff members indicates that "full disclosure" of the underlying details would not necessarily assist the analyst in reaching a "correct" judgment.1 The study adopts the premise that most of what investors need to know about true pension-financing costs can be reflected in two numbers disclosed in the pension footnote. These two numbers are the fair-market value of the pension assets and the present value of outstanding pension liabilities. The study finds that these two numbers tend to be ignored by investors in favor of the potentially misleading accounting measures. Investors and analysts need to ensure that the information they are using most accurately reflects the organization under consideration. Also, bank employees who use financial statements of potential borrowers to make credit-related decisions need to understand the documents they are using and be able to identify potential shortfalls.

Too often, analysts have relied too heavily on projections and interpretations given to them by management. Recent events have injected more independence into the analysis process and should help wean many analysts from CFOs and investor relations departments. More-insightful and more-independent analysis by them can help greatly in promoting market discipline and identifying a company's true worth. That progress, in turn, strengthens the input data and the risk-measurement systems we all rely on.

Throughout its supervisory and regulatory efforts, the Federal Reserve is, indeed, looking more to market signals. For example, information contained in subordinated debt spreads, credit default swap spreads, KMV EDFs, and equity prices provide useful indications of the market's collective assessment of a company's underlying risk. In banks, this information supports credit judgments and overall measures of the institution's capital adequacy and credit risk. As regulators worldwide move to finalize new capital standards, the role of market information in risk management should grow further, particularly among the largest banks, as it will in our own oversight activities.

Before closing, I would like to take off my central banker hat and speak to you only as an industry observer and a former bank CFO. I want to simply note the historically low level of interest rates which are not within the work experience of many investment and risk managers. The typical response is to try to increase nominal yields and widen spreads. Thus, some banks have acted to extend portfolio durations and accept risk, given the steep yield curve, because statistics will likely tell you that the odds of a rate increase are greater than a further decline. We are also seeing some investors attempt to increase nominal yields by investing in lower-rated bonds. But the skills that this association's members practice, remind us that the goal should be appropriate "risk management," that is, given an organization's risk appetite, the attractiveness of higher yields must always be balanced against the increased level of risk in the transaction. And in times of turns in business and interest rate cycles, estimating these tradeoffs can be more difficult. That is not a prediction of near or future rate movements--just advice from an experienced manager of interest rate risk.

Conclusion
In my remarks this morning, I have sought to encourage you to continue your efforts to support the evolution of risk-management practices and heighten the degree of professionalism that every effective risk manager should demonstrate. I would like to leave by reminding all of you not to become so caught up in the latest technical development that you lose sight of the qualitative aspects of your responsibilities. Models alone do not guarantee an effective risk-management process. You should encourage continuous improvement in all aspects, including some I mentioned today--data integrity, legal clarity, transparent disclosures, and internal controls.



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 10:44:24 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Overall petro inventories down another 2.7 million barrels.
Summary of Weekly Petroleum Data for the Week Ending February 20, 2004

U.S. crude oil refinery inputs averaged nearly 14.5 million barrels per day during the week ending February 20, down 498,000 barrels per day from the previous week's average, and more than the cumulative increase seen over the previous two weeks. Most of the decrease last week was in the Gulf Coast (PADD III), where refinery inputs averaged 6.5 million barrels per day, the lowest weekly average since October 11, 2002.

U.S. crude oil imports averaged 9.0 million barrels per day last week, down nearly 1.2 million barrels per day from the previous week. This continued the up-and-down pattern seen over the last several weeks. Most of the decrease was on the West Coast (PADD V) and the East Coast (PADD I). Over the last four weeks, crude oil imports have averaged over 9.5 million barrels per day. Distillate fuel imports averaged 696,000 barrels per day last week, the most since the week ending February 9, 2001. Total motor gasoline imports (including both finished gasoline and gasoline blending components) averaged 854,000 barrels per day last week.

With both crude oil imports and refinery inputs down significantly, U.S. commercial crude oil inventories (excluding those in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve) were unchanged last week. At 273.8 million barrels, U.S. crude oil inventories are 26.4 million barrels less than the 5-year average for this time of year. Distillate fuel inventories fell by 1.1 million barrels, and have now dropped by 26.9 million barrels over the last 6 weeks (since January 9). At 111.4 million barrels, distillate fuel inventories are 8.3 million barrels below the 5-year average for this time of year. Motor gasoline inventories decreased by 1.6 million barrels last week, and are 9.5 million barrels below the 5-year average. Total commercial petroleum inventories are 63.4 million barrels less than the 5-year average.

Total product supplied over the last four-week period has averaged nearly 20.8 million barrels per day, or 2.4 percent more than the same period last year. Motor gasoline demand over the last four weeks has averaged nearly 8.7 million barrels per day, or 1.6 percent above the same period last year. Distillate fuel demand is up 4.4 percent, while kerosene-type jet fuel demand is unchanged over the last four weeks compared to the same four-week period last year.



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 10:56:54 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
MASS LAYOFFS IN JANUARY 2004
bls.gov

Small snip
I suggest a brief look at the PDF itself

In January 2004, there were 2,428 mass layoff actions by employers, as measured by new filings for unemployment insurance benefits during the month, according to data from the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. Each action involved at least 50 persons from a single establishment, and the number of workers involved totaled 239,454. (See table 1.) This marked the most events for a January and the third highest January level of mass-layoff initial claims since the series began. Both the number of layoff events and initial claims were higher than a year ago. January 2004 marked only the third time in the last two years that initial claims had increased over the year.



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:10:41 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
BERLIN (AFX) - Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has urged the European Central Bank to cut interest rates in order to weaken the euro.

"I say this with all respect for the independence of the ECB, but there is good reason (for the bank) to consider possible interest rate cuts," Schroeder said on German television.

"I believe that the people with sole responsibility for interest rate decisions -- this isn't a matter for politicians -- should think more about this aspect. The weak dollar and the corresponding euro strength are causing problems for our exports and the ECB should consider this intensively," Schroeder said.

iii.co.uk
======================================================
Yee Ha!
Euribors are flying!



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:16:14 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
France: Inflation moderated in January

 Consumer prices were unchanged in January, triggering a decline in inflation from 2.2% to 2.0%. The fall in manufactured goods’ prices during the winter sales season was offset by increases in other components, mainly for
seasonal (food) and fiscal (tobacco) reasons.

 The resilience of headline inflation in recent months, in a low growth environment, resulted in particular from the higher than usual contribution of tobacco prices (0.6 percentage point in January, i.e. nearly one third of
headline inflation). Excluding tobacco, inflationary pressures are much more moderate, as shown by the subdued increase in core prices (+1.6% y/y).

lots more info here:
economic-research.bnpparibas.com



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:24:24 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
UK: The broad based economic dynamism needs to be reined in.

The Office for National Statistics unrevised the GDP growth estimate for Q4 at 0.9% q/q. Output in the manufacturing sector increased by 0.2% q/q, with the most significant rises in chemicals and paper, printing and publishing
and transport equipment. Activity in the construction and services sectors turned out to be buoyant, growing by 1.6% q/q and 1.0% respectively. In the construction sector nonetheless, this good performance, which is largely a
model based estimate, is likely to be revised, as survey results become available.

On the expenditure side, household consumption continued to increased by 1.1% in Q4, thus remaining the main engine of growth. Government expenditure rose by 1.9% q/q. Fixed investment rose by 1.6%, as investment in dwellings and other buildings more than offset declines in equipment and
plants and machinery. By contrast, net exports deducted 0.2 percentage point from growth.

For 2003 as a whole, GDP grew by 2.3% y/y, its fastest pace in three years, versus 2.1% previously estimated. This correction reflects upward revisions to the export in communication and insurance services and household
expenditure in the first three quarters of last year. Furthermore, numerous signs (retail sales, PMI...) tend to prove that growth even accelerated in the first months of this year.

Today’s results confirm that the UK economy is buoyant and that the recovery is more broadly based than previously estimated, even if household consumption remained the main growth engine last year, rising by 2.8% in 2003.

Despite a first rate hike in November, UK policy mix has remained very accommodative up until recently and we expect the BoE to deliver a further 25-bp interest rate hike in May, at the occasion of its next Inflation Report, in
order to progressively take back the insurance cuts.


Lots more info here:
economic-research.bnpparibas.com



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:32:33 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
UK 2003 growth revised up to 2.3%
Britain's economy grew by 2.3% last year, a faster pace than first estimated, official figures have shown.
The growth figure was revised upwards from the initial estimate of 2.1% after evidence of stronger exports of services and household spending.

Analysts said the new figure meant that another rise in UK interest rates could be on the cards.

Earlier this month the Bank of England raised interest rates to 4% to keep the economy from overheating.

Bounding ahead

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) figures showed that while the fourth quarter figure remained unchanged at 0.9% on the previous three months, year-on-year it grew by 2.8%.

That was up from the 2.5% estimated last month, making it the strongest fourth quarter since 2000.

Jonathan Loynes, of consultants Capital Economics, said the revised figures would "underpin expectations of more rate rises to come".

"This obviously lifts the starting point for GDP growth this year and certainly lends some support to the strong growth forecasts of the Treasury and Bank of England," he added.

On target

Richard Batley, economist at Halifax, said the stronger figures had come as something of a surprise.

"We had expected a small downward revision because of weaker than expected industrial production numbers," he said.

"The latest GDP figures are consistent with our view that the economy is growing above trend. We still expect the base rate to go up to 5% by the end of this year."

The 2.3% expansion during 2003 means the growth rate came in the middle of the chancellor's 2.0 to 2.5% forecast made in last year's Budget.

news.bbc.co.uk



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:37:18 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
How far will the Bank raise interest rates?
The Bank of England has raised interest rates again. But why have they acted now, with inflation so low, and will they continue to raise rates?

A quarter point up.

No surprise there, and not much in the way of controversy either.

Perhaps the right way of looking at the Bank of England's latest rate increase is not to ask "why did rates go up?" - but "why should rates stay down?" at such abnormally low levels.

After all, even at 4% they're far lower than we in the UK were used to until 2001.

And all the news of the past few months has demonstrated the economy is - to use a Bank of England word - resilient.

It's growing above the sustainable rate and the global economy is picking up, making it easier to export to overseas markets.

And there's little evidence of any crash in house prices or consumer borrowing.

Rebalancing the economy

The bank's objective, backed up by a strategy of gradually increasing rates, is to rebalance the economy away from consumer spending, towards exports and investment.
This goal appears attainable without an undue risk of slump.

The consensus forecast for the British economy in 2004 is for growth of 2.8%, with consumer spending growing by less than the economy for the first time since the mid-1990s.

Of course in raising rates, the Bank is taking a broad view of its mandate.

That mandate is to control inflation, yet inflation - as measured by the new Consumer Prices Index - is well below target.

Only by looking ahead could you justify the rise.

Who will suffer?

And what about the effect of this rise?

It will mostly be felt by people who've borrowed money in the past couple of years, and who haven't paid higher rates on their loans.

Most of the trillion pounds of household debt that is sitting around out there, was incurred when base rates were higher than they are now.

Thursday's rise is the second, but undoubtedly not the last of a series of rate increases.

Market expectations are that rates will hit 4.5% later this year.

If you are a borrower who thinks that is too difficult to cope with, it may be best to start preparing now.

news.bbc.co.uk



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:42:55 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Soft Labor Market Translates into Declining Consumer Confidence

ntrs.com



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:49:32 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Currency notes: The big Euro question

belfasttelegraph.co.uk



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:52:33 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Deflation Deepens in Japan
BOJ May Keep Interest Rates Near Zero as Deflation Deepens
Feb. 25 (Bloomberg) -- The Bank of Japan will probably keep interest rates almost at zero as the fastest economic growth in more than 13 years fails to stop prices falling, economists said.

Governor Toshihiko Fukui and his eight policy board colleagues will also keep monthly purchases of government bonds from banks at 1.2 trillion yen ($11 billion) and leave the upper limit of the bank's target for reserves available to them at 35 trillion yen during a one-day meeting on Thursday, said all 15 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News.

The world's second-largest economy expanded at a 7 percent annual pace last quarter, the fastest since 1990, as exporters such as Sharp Corp. and Canon Inc. increased investment, a government report showed last week. The same report showed prices fell at the second-fastest pace in 23 quarters.

``There are few reasons that the Bank of Japan must change its policy for now,'' said Seiji Shiraishi, chief market economist in Tokyo at Daiwa Securities SMBC Co., among the top five buyers of Japanese government bonds at auction. ``Japanese financial markets are stable and the bank has no headwind.''

Nationwide core consumer prices, the price index the bank watches most closely, have risen once from the year-before level since April 1998. The GDP deflator, a measure of price changes used to calculate the difference between nominal and real gross domestic product, fell 2.6 percent from a year earlier in the fourth quarter.

Deflation

``Price declines for electronics products are continuing,'' Tetsuya Kawakami, a managing director at Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the world's largest consumer-electronics maker, said at a press conference this month. ``We must make up for those declines by efforts to cut costs.''

Japanese bond futures rose for the fourth day in five yesterday on expectations the economy will slow and as a decline in share prices fueled demand for fixed-income securities.

Ten-year bond futures for March delivery rose 0.10 to 140.09. The Nikkei 225 Stock Average fell 2.1 percent, the biggest drop this year, to 10,644.13 on concern that gains in technology stocks had outstripped their profit potential.

The central bank lowered interest rates to almost zero in March 2001 and has pledged to keep them there until core consumer prices, excluding fresh food, stop falling for at least a few months and the bank is sure they won't fall again.

Kazumasa Iwata, one of the central bank's two deputy governors, last week said ``somewhat strong'' economic growth won't affect the zero-rate policy. Japan's economy must grow about 2.5 percent a year for two years to overcome deflation, he said. The economy grew 2.7 percent in 2003 in real terms.

Pressure Easing

A decline in the yen last week is easing pressure on the central bank to pump more cash into the economy. The yen's 11 percent advance against the dollar last year hurt exporters by making Japanese products more expensive overseas and deepened deflation by making imported goods cheaper.

The yen last week fell 3.3 percent against the dollar, its biggest weekly drop in five years, after the central bank sold yen on at least one day, adding to the record 7.15 trillion yen sold last month to protect exporters.

The Japanese currency traded at 108.42 yen per dollar at 5:22 p.m. yesterday in Tokyo.

The central bank last month unexpectedly decided to pump more cash into the economy, which it said was recovering gradually. The policy board voted to raise the upper limit of the bank's target for reserves available to lenders by 3 trillion yen.

``Financial markets tend to get volatile at the end of March, when Japanese companies close their books,'' said Masaaki Kanno, a former central bank official and now head of research at J.P. Morgan Securities Asia Ltd. ``It's highly possible the bank will lift the reserve target again if the yen rises further.''

Reserve Target

Twelve of the 15 economists surveyed said the bank will probably lift the reserve target and pump more cash into the economy within three months if the yen rises more.

Fukui told parliament this month that the Bank of Japan will implement ``additional'' policy action if needed. Since Fukui became governor on March 20 last year, the bank has raised the limit of the reserve target five times from 20 trillion yen.

The central bank has used the target -- the amount of money it makes available to lenders in the money market -- as its main tool for adjusting monetary policy because overnight rates are almost zero.

The bank will announce any policy decisions probably by early afternoon Thursday. Fukui will speak at a press conference at 3:30 p.m. Minutes of this week's meeting will be published on April 14.

quote.bloomberg.com



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 11:58:59 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Greenspan urges Social Security cuts
msnbc.msn.com

WASHINGTON - Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan urged Congress on Wednesday to deal with the country’s escalating budget deficit by cutting benefits for future Social Security retirees. Without action, he warned, long-term interest rates would rise, seriously harming the economy.
In testimony before the House Budget Committee, Greenspan said the current deficit situation, with a projected record red ink of $521 billion this year, will worsen dramatically once the baby boom generation starts becoming eligible for Social Security benefits in just four years.

He said the prospect of the retirement of 77 million baby boomers will radically change the mix of people working and paying into the Social Security retirement fund and those drawing benefits from the fund.

“This dramatic demographic change is certain to place enormous demands on our nation’s resources — demands we will almost surely be unable to meet unless action is taken,” Greenspan said. “For a variety of reasons, that action is better taken as soon as possible.”

But while Greenspan urged urgency, Congress is unlikely to take up the controversial issue of cutting Social Security benefits in an election year.

Greenspan, who turns 78 next week, said that the benefits now received by current retirees should not be touched but he suggested trimming benefits for future retirees and doing it soon enough so that they could begin making adjustments to their own finances to better prepare for retirement.

Greenspan did not rule out using tax increases to deal with the looming crisis in Social Security, but he said that tax hikes should only be considered after every effort had been made to trim benefits.

“I am just basically saying that we are overcommitted at this stage,” Greenspan said in response to committee questions. “It is important that we tell people who are about to retire what it is they will have.” He warned that the government should not “promise more than we are able to deliver.”

While the country is currently enjoying the lowest interest rates in more than four-decades, Greenspan warned that this situation will not last forever. He said financial markets will begin pushing long-term interest rates higher if investors do not see progress being made in dealing with the projected huge deficits that will occur once the baby boomers begin retiring.

“We are going to be confronted ... in a few years with an upward ratcheting of long-term interest rates which will be very debilitating for long-term growth,” Greenspan told the committee if the deficit problem is not addressed.


Greenspan suggested two ways that benefits could be trimmed. He said that the annual cost-of-living adjustments for those receiving benefits could be made using a new version of the Consumer Price Index called the chain-weighted index, which gives lower readings on inflation.

He also said that the age for retirement should be indexed in some way to take into account longer lifespans. He noted that presently the age for being able to get full Social Security benefits is rising from 65 to 67 as one of the changes Congress adopted in the mid-1980s, based on recommendations of a commission Greenspan chaired. In his testimony, Greenspan said Congress should go further and index the retirement age so that it will keep rising.

As he has in the past, Greenspan called on Congress to reinstitute rules that require any future tax cuts to be paid for either by spending cuts or increases in other taxes.

While that would erect a high hurdle to President Bush’s call for making his 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent, estimated to cost at least $1 trillion over a decade, Greenspan again repeated his belief that spending cuts rather than tax increases were the best way to deal with the exploding deficit.

While not ruling out totally the use of tax increases to deal with at least part of the looming surge in spending on Social Security, Medicare and other entitlement programs, Greenspan urged caution in increasing taxes.

“Tax rate increases of sufficient dimension to deal with our looming fiscal problems arguably pose significant risks to economic growth and the revenue base,” Greenspan said. “The exact magnitude of such risks is very difficult to estimate, but they are of enough concern, in my judgment, to warrant aiming to close the fiscal gap primarily, if not wholly, from the outlay side.”



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 12:03:36 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Fear factor
Commentary: Job losses could spur new protectionism

cbs.marketwatch.com



To: Wyätt Gwyön who wrote (597)2/25/2004 12:04:23 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Japan: Revival of the Cycle

morganstanley.com