Re: "And the U.S. impose trade sanctions that were extremely prejudiced against Aristide's efforts at normalizing Haiti's economy."
As in the case of the sanctions against Iraq, the sanctions imposed against the de facto regime in Haiti may be divided into two phases: Phase I began on October 4, 1991, with the issuance of Executive Order No.12775 declaring a national emergency resulting from the overthrow of President Aristide, the democratically elected President of Haiti, and imposing limited sanctions against Haiti’s de facto regime. Phase II began on June 23, 1993, when mandatory sanctions against Haiti promulgated by the United Nations became effective. The embargo ended on October 14, 1994, following reinstatement of President Aristide, with issuance of Executive Order No. 12932 terminating the national emergency and revoking U.S. sanctions against Haiti, in accord with a Council Resolution rescinding all U.N. mandatory sanctions.
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The effect of trade sanctions on health and nutrition
Summary of published paper
The most recent RRN network paper* reviews evidence of the impact of trade sanctions against Cuba, Haiti and Iraq. Although the review deals mostly with impact on health and health services, effects on food security and nutrition are also considered.
General Findings
The countries with the greatest import dependency experienced the greatest decline in child nutrition during sanctions. Sanctions were often associated with a dramatic increase in the price of staple goods. The most affected groups were children under five years of age, pregnant and lactating women, those with chronic diseases and the elderly. Although adequate calories were available in Haiti and Iraq during sanctions, child nutrition suffered. One reason for this appears to have been that women have had to spend more time in income seeking or income substitution activities and have therefore had less time available for child care and feeding. Child feeding problems have been made worse in Iraq where the government insisted on putting infant formula into the ration. This led to a decline in breastfeeding.
Cuba
About half of all proteins and calories were imported prior to sanctions. Importation of foodstuffs declined by about 50% from 1989-93 and milk production declined by 55% from 1989-92. Cuba's response has been to increase equity of resource allocation and prioritise vulnerable groups. Breastfeeding has been actively promoted and the percentage breastfeeding has risen from 63% in 1990 to 97% in 1994. Distribution of food, clothing and other goods to women, the elderly and children has also occurred. Weighing of pregnant women and young children has been promoted and is now routine practice at health centres.
Haiti
The price of staple food increased fivefold from 1991-3 and the value of the national currency plummeted as hyperinflation occurred. Estimated rates of low birth weight increased from 10 to 15%. In addition 7.8% of children under five suffered acute malnutrition compared to 3.4% in 1990. Chronic malnutrition increased from 5 to 23% between 1991-2. An important factor contributing to the nutritional decline has been the mothers' absence from home due to economic activity resulting in less attention to breast feeding, weaning foods for the young and care for sick children.
Iraq
Iraq was about 70% dependent on imported food prior to sanctions. From 1991-6 acute malnutrition among under fives rose from 3% to 11% while chronic malnutrition rose from 19% to 31%. The percentage of children born in hospitals under 2.5 kg rose from 5% to 22%. In 1996 the Oil for Food (OFF) programme was implemented. The programme had a number of beneficial effects; the price of non-rationed food declined, rationed foods provided more meals per month and people were spending less of their total incomes on food. This led to a reduction in chronic malnutrition in the north followed by some reduction in the centre and south by mid-1999.
Conclusions
Trade sanctions which have the greatest impact on the health of the general population occur in countries that are heavily dependent on imports. Paradoxically, however it has been shown that indices like infant mortality rates have declined in some embargoed countries even during periods of severe resource shortages. This occurs when scarce resources are distributed more efficiently and national leaders mobilise child health activities, e.g. breast feeding initiatives in Cuba and promotion of community nutrition programmes in Iraq.
The review concludes that the objectives of a trade sanctions regime should be better determined in the light of the extensive experience in the 1990s. Sanctions are seldom associated with a hoped for overthrow of repressive regimes, military action is needed for that. The review further argues that; i) sanctions may be a form of collective punishment which is illegal and abhorrent under both international and customary law and that, ii) when a few individuals are at fault, asset freezing, halting of cultural exchanges and travel bans may result in the desired policy changes.
There is currently an emerging hope that such targeted sanctions will avoid the major humanitarian impacts described above while affecting the offending policies of the sanctioned regime more effectively. However, the authors caution that humanitarian damage will occur when targeting is not precise, when elites respond by punishing other nationals or when capital shortages occur in an unstable political environment. Thus, improved monitoring, expanded humanitarian action, and the modification of national policies to protect the most vulnerable with simple low cost public health actions will still be needed to reduce humanitarian damage.
* Garfield.R (1999): The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being. Relief and Rehabilitation Network Paper No 31, ODI, London.
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The Security Council also reacted to the military takeover of power in Haiti after the 30 September 1991 coup d'état in Haiti, which forced the democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, out of power; however, the Council did not impose sanctions immediately. Instead, this was left to a regional organization, the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS made it clear that the sanctions were aimed only at persuading the military government to end its illegal regime and encouraged its members, including Canada, to provide food and medical supplies to the population, already in economic difficulty.
The recognition that the poor in Haiti would thereby face even more deprivations explains to some extent the U.N.'s hesitation to impose mandatory sanctions. Since most of Haiti's trade was with countries in the OAS, the regional body's sanctions had already had a significant impact, which world-wide sanctions would just reinforce. When the military regime remained defiant, however, the international community grew more impatient and on 17 June 1993 the Security Council passed a resolution threatening mandatory sanctions unless progress was made by 23 June in restoring the legitimate government of Haiti.
The threat produced the desired results; the military regime agreed to negotiations before the deadline and an agreement was reached on 3 July, paving the way for a new government of national reconciliation and President Aristide's return to Haiti on 30 October. The threat of U.N. sanctions was given credit for this development.(15) Any evaluation of the impact of these sanctions must, however, bear in mind the small size of Haiti and the weakness of its economy. The very fact that the regime of such a small country had been able to defy the international community for almost two years illustrates the limitations of sanctions and serves as a reminder that other factors also come into play in ending conflicts or periods of tension.
The turmoil in Haiti following the lifting of the OAS sanctions in August demonstrates how quickly the threat of sanctions can lose its impact when factions cannot reconcile their differences. In October 1993, when Canadian and U.S. peacekeepers were not allowed to come ashore to begin their mission, it became clear that the regime in Haiti was unwilling to comply with the agreement reached in July. On 13 October, the Security Council, in an attempt to persuade the regime to honour its commitments, adopted Resolution 873 re-imposing mandatory sanctions, effective on 18 October. The sanctions banned shipments of oil, weapons and other military equipment and froze Haiti's overseas assets: The U.S., Canada, and many other countries deployed ships off the coast of Haiti to enforce the sanctions.
Despite the impact of sanctions on the country’s economy, it was the threat of an invasion by U.S. and other forces, authorized by the U.N. Security Council, that finally persuaded the military government to end its illegal regime. On 18 September 1994, just before the invasion was slated to start, an agreement was reached between a delegation led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the military government allowing U.S. troops to land in Haiti without opposition from Haitian military and police forces.
As well as paving the way for President Aristide’s return to power and avoiding the likely bloodshed of a full-scale invasion, the Carter agreement also made the commitment to lift international sanctions as quickly as possible so as to limit damage to the Haitian economy. On 29 September, three days after President Clinton announced the termination of most U.S. unilateral sanctions against Haiti, the Security Council adopted Resolution 944 indicating that all U.N. sanctions would be lifted on the day President Aristide returned to Haiti.
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