February 27, 2004
The Haiti Hot Potato
France surprised many U.S. observers on Feb. 24th by offering to lead international efforts to establish a UN civil peacekeeping force for Haiti. The Caribbean, after all, is a traditionally American zone of influence, and Haiti, 700 miles from the Florida coast, is a lot closer to the United States than Europe. However, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has so far been reluctant to take a leading role in stopping the deteriorating humanitarian situation on the island . French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin filled in the void by submitting a plan that envisions a United Nations presence to create new government institutions integrating legitimate opposition, and to guarantee a long-term commitment by the international community to raise Haiti out of its current plight. Ultimately however, the mission’s success may depend on U.S. participation. Questions also persist about the international community’s staying power – particularly in the light of Haiti’s recent history.
The debate over an international intervention in Haiti is quickly moving from whether to who. Images of violence and the prospect of a full-scale civil war on the island are raising the pressure on foreign governments to step in. The Bush administration is caught in a bind. It seems to view an intervention in Haiti as a distraction from its central focus on terrorism, and it is also probably concerned about over-extending its military forces, already heavily deployed abroad. Nor is there much enthusiasm in Washington for a regime change. Despite the emergence of a drastically new political landscape, the White House openly prefers a status quo ante with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in power – not unparadoxically, because the United States has made democracy and fight against corruption the linchpins of its Haiti policy, and Aristide has consistently disappointed on both counts. The White House has also ignored a potential ally in the “Groupe des 184,” a pacifist civic opposition grouping composed of bankers, doctors, teachers etc., that may hold the promise of creating a viable economic and democratic system in the country. (The U.S. stance on Aristide seems to have shifted on Feb. 26, when Secretary of State Collin Powell hinted that the Haitian president’s departure may be desirable.)
But other powerful factors are pulling Washington toward a Haiti intervention. For one, about 8 percent of drugs coming to the United States from Colombia are channelled through Haiti. Drugs are increasingly viewed not only as a problem in itself but also as a security threat – the U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly warns of dangers stemming from emergence of weak states beholden to drug cartels. And then there is the refugee problem: the United States is the traditional destination of Haitian refugees, and hundreds have already been spotted making their way to the Florida coast. Bush has vowed to meet any refugee influx with a “robust presence with an effective strategy” but without offering specifics.
And last but not least, U.S. credibility may be at stake. For almost two centuries, under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has mapped out the Americas – the Caribbean included – as its sphere of influence. A failed state in Haiti and a communist one in nearby Cuba could put the U.S. ability to bolster prosperous and democratic governments further abroad into question. In 1994, Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., specifically (and successfully) used credibility as a tool to pressure the administration of President Bill Clinton for intervention in Haiti. He argued that a failure to act would put into question Washington’s democratic leadership role, and its commitment to curtail drugs trafficking and to promote human rights and democracy throughout the Caribbean and Latin America.
What interest does France have in Haiti? It has considerable influence there, largely by virtue of its leading role in the Francophone world, of which Haiti is a part. Through the years, France has also been the single largest European donor of financial aid, and as such, has an interest in seeing a return on its investment. More cynical voices speak of French desire to assert its influence on Washington’s doorstep but mostly, Paris seems to be filling in a perceived leadership void created by U.S. reluctance to intervene. (The potential deployment of a French force in Haiti would not be without irony – this year marks the bicentennial anniversary of Haiti’s independence from Napoleonic France.)
Paris has been much less reluctant than Washington to take sides – de Villepin’s plan essentially echoes that proposed by the pacifist opposition. (It calls for a combination of a civil peace-keeping force, internationally supervised free and fair elections, humanitarian aid, a human rights observer mission and, most importantly, a long-term commitment for social and economic reconstruction.) Paris has also already stated that Aristide’s responsibility in bringing Haiti to its current crisis state precludes his participation in a potential solution, thus opening up the possibility that he will join Haiti’s previous dictator, Duvalier, in exile in Paris.
If it were not for current tensions between Paris and Washington, stage might be set for a joint mission. In operational terms, despite the fractionalised nature of the rebellion, it is unlikely that a foreign force will encounter much resistance. However popular Aristide may have once been, most Haitians today are disillusioned with him and would likely welcome any change – assuming the outside party is viewed as acting out of benign interests. This is what would make an international mission, perhaps under UN auspices, a more suitable tool of bringing peace and stability to Haiti than a solo mission of either of the parties involved.
However, like all other attempts at foreign intervention in Haiti, the success of any outside mission will be temporary unless coupled with genuine long-term international commitments. There is every reason to be skeptical about the staying power of any foreign party in Haiti. The downward spiral that led to today’s violence began shortly after the temporary high of 1994, when an American-led intervention reinstated the freely elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide. In return, Aristide gradually reneged on his commitments to fight corruption and install true democracy. Faced with a falling support, he created a militia force – the Organisation Populaire (OP) or the so-called Chimères – to terrorize opposition through political assassinations and widespread violence. The rigged 2000 parliamentary elections produced a government illegitimate by any reasonable standard. Instead of stepping up pressure on Aristide, foreign powers responded by withdrawing. The UN presence was effectively removed in 2000. International aid had been reduced at an annual rate of 17 percent before 2000, and after the flawed elections of the same year, the United States, the European Union (most notably France as the leading European donor), and Canada froze their aid altogether. Haiti fell off the international radar until it reappeared with vengeance this year, with images of violence beamed to television screens around the world.
Author(s): Aurelie Basha
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