IDENT/IAFIS: The Batres Case and the Status of the Integration Project (Cont)
The second IDENT database, called the lookout database, contains information on deported and criminal aliens. Alien ten-print fingerprint records are entered into the lookout database at a central location in Washington, D.C., from ten-print cards sent by INS offices from around the country. Ten-print cards are generally prepared whenever immigration personnel process aliens for deportation or prosecution. Index fingerprints, photographs, and basic text information are scanned and retyped from the fingerprint cards to create individual lookout records in the IDENT database.
The INS's IDENT system was designed to automatically alert personnel at the Western Identification Network Automated Fingerprint Identification Center (WIN/AFIS) whenever IDENT returned a lookout hit indicating an outstanding warrant for an apprehended alien.6 INS procedures required WIN/AFIS personnel to contact promptly by telephone the apprehending Border Patrol personnel to confirm the lookout match and to inform the Border Patrol agents of the nature of the warrant and the contact numbers for the appropriate law enforcement officials regarding the warrant. This contact generally occurs within one hour. A Border Patrol supervisor then should make the appropriate contact with the law enforcement officials who issued the warrant to determine whether they want to transport the alien to their jurisdiction for prosecution. The burden and expense for such transportation falls on the requesting agency.
Typically, if the issuing authorities do not want the alien transported, and there is not any other reason to detain the alien, the Border Patrol voluntarily returns the alien across the border. However, some circumstances warrant further detention and investigation. For example, if a processing agent learns - usually from the alien himself, or through prior IDENT entries from previous apprehensions - that the alien has a prior criminal history, the Border Patrol may seek the prosecution of the alien for the offense of Entry Without Inspection.7 Also, if the agent learns that the alien has a prior deportation, the law requires reinstatement of the prior order of deportation, and the alien is not eligible for voluntary return to Mexico. See 8 USC § 1231(a)(5). Upon learning of the prior deportation, the processing agent should confirm the alien's prior criminal history. Moreover, an alien likely will be prosecuted for the felony charge of Reentry After Deportation if the alien has a record of a prior felony or aggravated felony. A conviction for Reentry After Deportation carries a potential sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment for an alien with a prior criminal record of a felony or three misdemeanors, or a sentence of up to 20 years' imprisonment for an alien with a prior "aggravated felony" conviction pursuant to § 1326(b).
However, Border Patrol agents in the El Paso Sector's Deming and Santa Teresa Stations did not have direct access to the FBI's records or databases to determine the alien's criminal history, and the FBI's criminal records are not linked to IDENT.8 Rather, in order to conduct criminal record checks on apprehended aliens, Border Patrol agents in these stations had to telephone the Border Patrol sector's communications office, commonly known as the "radio room," which has direct links to various criminal and immigration databases. These databases include the FBI's NCIC, which contains criminal history information and outstanding warrants submitted by participating federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on millions of individuals;9 immigration databases containing records of prior immigration contacts with the alien, such as deportations; and a United States Customs Service (Customs) database, the Treasury Enforcement Communications System/Interagency Border Inspection System (TECS/IBIS), that is typically used by inspectors at ports of entry to check incoming travelers.
The Border Patrol lacks the manpower to conduct separate criminal and immigration history checks for every apprehended alien. Accordingly, these additional database checks are requested for only the small fraction of the apprehended aliens whose behavior, appearances, outstanding warrants, or other information in IDENT raises concerns with the Border Patrol agents processing the aliens.
Thus, while the IDENT database is a useful tool for identifying recidivist aliens who continue to enter the United States illegally, its lack of integration with the FBI's IAFIS database results in significant problems. First, IDENT contains only a fraction of the Criminal Master File fingerprint records in the FBI IAFIS database - limited to the "wants and warrants" that the FBI and United States Marshals Service (USMS) have entered into IDENT since August 2001 and the criminal history fingerprint records of aliens from certain countries believed to pose a security risk to the United States. Second, because IDENT is not integrated with IAFIS criminal history files, it does not apprise Border Patrol agents of aliens with serious criminal records which, in combination with prior deportations, would warrant prosecution of the alien for Reentry After Deportation or on other grounds. Further, Border Patrol agents may fail to take the extra steps needed to query the alien's criminal history information, particularly when the alien has a limited number of apprehensions. Fourth, even when criminal history checks are initiated by Border Patrol agents, the results may not be communicated to the processing agent (either by WIN/AFIS, the radio room, or assisting agents) in an accurate or timely manner. Finally, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have a limited ability to access IDENT fingerprint records through their systems in order to make use of the information in their investigations.
The selected input of FBI criminal records into the IDENT database over the past few years has illustrated the large number of criminal aliens who are regularly apprehended by the Border Patrol. The USMS "wants and warrants" were added to IDENT in August 2001. From December 2001 to April 2003, 152,000 FBI "wants and warrants" fingerprint records were entered into IDENT. From January 2002 to April 2003, immigration authorities apprehended 4,820 aliens who were wanted for criminal offenses based on these records. Fifty of these aliens were wanted in connection with murder. During the same period, an additional 179,500 IAFIS criminal history fingerprint records of aliens from countries believed to be a threat to the United States were entered into IDENT and immigration personnel have matched these criminal records to 3,440 apprehended aliens.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, several significant events illustrated the problems resulting from separate INS and FBI databases. First, controversy arose regarding the way fingerprint checks were conducted for aliens applying for citizenship under the INS's "Citizenship U.S.A." (CUSA) program. This program was designed to reduce substantially the backlog of citizenship applications by expediting the processing of citizenship applications, including the processing of fingerprints. Under CUSA, the INS sent ten-fingerprint cards of citizenship applicants to the FBI to be checked for evidence of criminal histories in the FBI's files. If the INS did not receive a response from the FBI after 60 days, the INS assumed that the alien had no criminal record. This practice led to many instances in which the INS did not receive timely notice from the FBI that aliens had a disqualifying criminal record and nevertheless granted the alien citizenship.
As a result, the Attorney General established a Fingerprint Coordination Working Group, which included representatives from the INS and the FBI, to address problems in fingerprint procedures. As part of this effort, the DOJ Justice Management Division (JMD) reviewed issues of integration of the INS and FBI automated fingerprint identification systems and attempted to coordinate the integration of their separate systems.
Subsequently, in March 1998 the OIG issued a report evaluating the INS's implementation of IDENT.10 The OIG found that the INS was enrolling less than two-thirds of the aliens apprehended along the U.S.-Mexico border into the IDENT system. In addition, the INS was entering into the IDENT lookout database the fingerprints of only 41 percent of the aliens deported and excluded in Fiscal Year (FY) 1996. Of these aliens, only 24 percent had accompanying photographs entered into IDENT, even though the INS relied on photographs as an important method of confirming identification. The OIG found virtually no controls in place to ensure the quality of data entered into the IDENT lookout database, which resulted in duplicate records and invalid data. The OIG report also raised concerns that the INS had not provided sufficient training to its employees on the use of IDENT, and that these failures hampered the INS's ability to make consistent and effective use of IDENT.
Two months later, in May 1998, in response to a letter from Congressman Alan Mollohan urging that consideration be given to integrating the IDENT and IAFIS systems, JMD issued a report recommending that the INS retain IDENT to meet INS internal requirements, but that the INS adopt ten-printing as a long-term policy goal. The JMD report concluded that properly funded, this option would permit the Border Patrol to maintain processing times while providing other law enforcement agencies with a fingerprint database that could be searched. The report also recommended a 12-month pilot study, to begin in the fall of 1999, of a ten-fingerprint system in selected Border Patrol stations.
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