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To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (34809)3/16/2004 4:19:07 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793896
 
The Pals hit a new low: they used a 12 year old as an unwitting mule, and tried to blow him up at a checkpoint:

I saw this. Now that the wall is going up, the Pals are getting desperate.



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (34809)3/16/2004 4:55:29 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793896
 
Pressthink Blog - The Legend of Trent Lott and the Weblogs
A new study from the Kennedy School pinpoints what happened between Big Media and the blogs in the case of Trent Lott. The report does not portray the blogs as lead actor, but as reactor to a story that almost disappeared.

I want to say this about my state. When Strom Thurmond ran for president, we voted for him. We're proud of it. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years either.
-- Senator Trent Lott, Dec. 5, 2002

One way to learn that pack journalism is real is to be caught outside the pack with a story it does not recognize. This happened to Ed O'Keefe, a young "off-air reporter" for ABC News in Washington, who happened to be in the room when Trent Lott, then the most powerful man in the United States Senate, gave some remarks that embraced the spirit of Strom Thurmond's 1948 campaign for president. O'Keefe knew enough about that campaign to find Lott's words shocking, and he said to himself, "This is news."

But Washington journalism said back to him: we don't think so.

O'Keefe's judgment later won out. Pack judgment was wrong-- in this case, extremely so. Lott became the first majority leader in Senate history to resign under pressure. How it all happened is the story told in the new case study from Harvard's Kennedy School, “Big Media” Meets the “Bloggers." (By Esther Scott, supervised by Alex Jones of the Shorenstein Center at the Kennedy School of Government. Available only in pdf form here.)

My favorite moment in the story is when O'Keefe's counterpart at another network asks a more senior producer in the Washington bureau to look at what Lott said that evening in praise of Thurmond's campaign. "No, I don't think it's anything" says the more experienced pro.

This gave O'Keefe some pause, causing him to second-guess his judgment. "I think there is something to the [notion] of pack journalism," he reflects, "of individuals believing that if something is noteworthy, ... everyone will get it... If they didn't all get it, then it couldn't possibly be a newsworthy item."
The conservative writer David Frum would later call Lott's words, "the most emphatic repudiation of desegregation to be heard from a national political figure since George Wallace's first presidential campaign." But when others in the newsroom said, "no news here," O'Keefe began to doubt himself.

The Harvard study has gotten notice in Blogistan, but its stingy formatting (the pdf is encrypted and won't allow you to cut and paste) has been discussed in greater depth than the story it tells, perhaps because we think the events are well known. According to legend--partially confirmed by the report--webloggers from Left and Right were responsible for pushing the Trent Lott story into the news, after the mainstream media missed it.

"The Internet's First Scalp" said John Podhoretz in the New York Post. That's hyperbole, but the report makes clear that webloggers had a crucial role. It also de-limits and describes that role. Now we know more precisely why--and when--the bloggers were needed.

There's another way to read this sequence of events, however. The Kennedy School report does not portray the blogs as lead actor, but as a reactor to an event of neglect (similar to an act of omission) within professional newsrooms, where the story of Lott's remarks languished and nearly died. The story in the case study is mostly about herd thinking in the press, and the illusion that "news" jumps out at everyone simultaneously.

Pack judgment did not find Lott's statements significant, when in fact they were potentially devastating. Other than a brief item that ABC ran at 4:30 am on December 6th, television news did nothing with the story, initially. This is due in part to the strange effects of the “24-hour news cycle” in television, a creature that has its own demands and even a kind of logic. What it does not have is the gift of human judgment, and humans in the system understand this deficit.

"Part of the problem, O'Keefe points out, was that "there had to be a reaction" that the network could air alongside Lott's remarks, and "we had no on-camera reaction" available the evening of the party, when the news was still fresh. By the following night, he adds, "you're dealing with the news cycle: 24 hours later-- that's old news."
Let’s review what the news cycle is saying. There is a logic to it, but of course it's circular:

X happens. We do not report X. Nor do we solicit and air reactions to X. The next day, we ask ourselves: is X still news? It’s true, no one in the nation knows about X, which entitles the nation to say, “X is still news to us,” but look at the facts. X surfaced yesterday, right? That’s old news by our definition. And today we find there are no reactions to what we did not report yesterday. Sorry, X. Your existence may be news to Americans out there. But not to us, the keepers of the cycle. You’re too old, X! Next time, don’t be surfacing in one or two places “yesterday” if you want to be news today.
“News stories,” says Josh Marshall in the report, “have a 24 hour audition on the news stage, and if they don’t catch fire in that 24 hours, there’s no second chance.” This is a system that cries out for a corrective, with the Lott case as Exhibit One. O’Keefe had one success. He got the story online and into The Note, the most blog-like medium at ABC News. This in turn gave it to the weblogs.

Thomas Edsall of the Washington Post was the exception in the establishment press. He heard about Lott's statements from a Style section reporter who covered the party as party. Then he read the quotes in The Note. Edsall is the author of Chain Reaction, a forceful book on race and Republican politics. He had earlier written a series of articles for the Post about Trent Lott and his connection to the Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC), a “racialist” group and a remnant of segregation in the South. Still, the Post editors didn’t think much of Lott’s remarks as news, and they tried to confine Edsall to a paragraph or two. He had to write his 660-word story and show it to them before they could see anything in it.

This is where prominent webloggers like Josh Marshall, Atrios, Glenn Reynolds, but also others entered in. They and their readers (200,000 people at most) were a back-up alert system, another sphere where the story could circulate, register with people, and provoke a political response. The bloggers had the required background knowledge, and they imported it immediately into the story. This meant that reactions and rumblings from Left to Right across the blogs were a proxy for a public reaction that had not been able to emerge because of press neglect.

But the blogs got only temporary custody of a story that originated in a small corner of the national press on December 6th, and became big news on December 10th, with just a few days (Dec. 6-9, 2002) for the blogs to operate as bridge narrator. "For the most part," Atrios says in the study, "the influence of blogs is limited to the degree to which they have influence on the rest of the media. Except for the very top hit-getting sites, blogs need to be amplified by media with bigger megaphones."

A key point. Weblogs may continue to exert some influence on the news, but it won't come by grabbing the attention of the broader public, gaining major traffic, or displacing the national press as a news source. Political blogs need the press; they are parasitic on the flow of news. They can achieve an effect, however, by debating the mainstream news mind, correcting for errors and blind spots, further sifting and refining the flow of news. By activating passions and commitments long ago driven from daily journalism, blogs submit news stories to the argument test, which in this case showed that Lott had few defenders Left or Right.

The Web legend about Trent Lott's demise says, “the blogs kept the story alive,” and this is basically accurate, but it misses why they were needed for that, and when. To understand how Lott’s words were a political deed, and to see why they might be news, specific background knowledge in American history was required. (The case study doesn't tell us how, but Ed O'Keefe knew that history.) Also required was a certain receptivity, an ear, that seemed to be missing in many Washington journalists.

Conditions of labor at the bottom of the news machine, and toast of the town privileges at the top help explain this deadness in the Washington ear, according to the report. For many journalists, Lott had become too familiar to be revealed by his own words. “Seems the blogosphere is way ahead on this one,” said Glen Reynolds at 11:10 on the morning after Thurmond’s birthday party (Dec. 6th). “Where’s every everybody else?” Whatever it is the blogs stand “outside” of worked to their advantage in recognizing a story that days later rocked official Washington.

What news you heard that night depended entirely on prior knowledge that a journalist either did or did not have about race, Southern politics, and the re-alignment of the political parties in the civil rights era. You also had to know something of Trent Lott’s career in Mississippi, going back to his college years at Ole Miss. If you didn’t, you wouldn’t hear anything special in his praise of Thurmond and the Dixiecrats of 1948. A party platform Edsall dug up summarizes it well: "We stand for the segregation of the races and the racial integrity of each race."

Well, bloggers did know this background, and they went quickly to it. Atrios, for example, printed the official Democratic Party ballot in Mississippi from 1948. "Get in the fight for State's rights-- fight for Thurmond and Wright." Esther Scott writes: “Bloggers weighed in quickly on Lott, offering readers a short course on Dixiecrat politics and their own acid commentary on the matter.”

That the blogs could provide, almost overnight, that “short course on Dixiecrat politics” was one reason they played corrective to the news machine. It happens to be one of the properties of the weblog system at this stage, especially the political blogs that touch the membranes of professional journalism most often (Marshall, Atrios, Reynolds, the Daily Kos, Andrew Sullivan, Mickey Kaus are the best examples.) The blogs don’t originate much, but they are quick to import the missing knowledge that can make an event feel important; and when one part of the blog network knows, all who are interested can easily find out.

Free from the craziness of the 24-hour news cycle and from some of the reflexes in press think, the blogs, their users and the links among them work as a complex filter that gets added to the news flow. The blog sphere sifts through information, rescuing facts and arguments from the news cycle’s strange habits, while loosening up the lines of debate. The case study says:

What journalists found when they visited these weblogs would not be new stories, but a closer look at those that were of interest to the blogger. "There is very little--though some--original reporting on weblogs," Atrios observes, "...It's more about focusing on stories which would otherwise be buried or simply focusing on key details from stories which may be overlooked…." For a blogger like Marshall, providing what he calls "a kind of counter-conversation to what's going on in the mainstream media, particularly the national daily newspapers, was [a] driving force in his weblog writing.
I think counter conversation gets it right.
journalism.nyu.edu



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (34809)3/16/2004 10:49:00 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793896
 
Here is Steyn's London column.

The Spanish dishonoured their dead
By Mark Steyn
(Filed: 16/03/2004)

"When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, naturally they will like the strong horse." So said Osama bin Laden in his final video appearance two-and-a-half years ago. But even the late Osama might have been surprised to see the Spanish people, invited to choose between a strong horse and a weak horse, opt to make their general election an exercise in mass self-gelding.

To be sure, there are all kinds of John Kerry-esque footnoted nuances to Sunday's stark numbers. One sympathises with those electors reported to be angry at the government's pathetic insistence, in the face of the emerging evidence, that Thursday's attack was the work of Eta, when it was obviously the jihad boys. One's sympathy, however, disappears with their decision to vote for a party committed to disengaging from the war against the jihadi. As Margaret Thatcher would have said: "This is no time to go wobbly, Manuel." But they did. And no one will remember the footnotes, the qualifications, the background - just the final score: terrorists toppled a European government.

What was it all those party leaders used to drone robotically after IRA atrocities? We must never let the bullet and the bomb win out over the ballot and the bollocks. Something like that. In Spain, the bombers hijacked the ballot, and very decisively. The Socialist Workers' Party wouldn't have won, except for the terrorism.

At the end of last week, American friends kept saying to me: "3/11 is Europe's 9/11. They get it now." I expressed scepticism. And I very much doubt whether March 11 will be a day that will live in infamy. Rather, March 14 seems likely to be the date bequeathed to posterity, in the way we remember those grim markers on the road to conflagration through the 1930s, the tactical surrenders that made disaster inevitable. All those umbrellas in the rain at Friday's marches proved to be pretty pictures for the cameras, nothing more. The rain in Spain falls mainly on the slain. In the three days between the slaughter and the vote, it was widely reported that the atrocity had been designed to influence the election. In allowing it to do so, the Spanish knowingly made Sunday a victory for appeasement and dishonoured their own dead.

And, if it works in Spain, why not in Australia, Britain, Italy, Poland? In his 1996 "Declaration of War Against the Americans", Bin Laden cited Washington's feebleness in the face of the 1992 Aden hotel bombings and the Black Hawk Down business in Somalia in 1993: "You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew," he wrote. "The extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear." To the jihadis' way of thinking, on Thursday, the Spaniards were disgraced by Allah; on Sunday, they withdrew. The extent of their impotence and weaknesses is very clear.

Or, as Simon Jenkins put it in a hilariously mistimed cover story for last Thursday's Spectator arguing that this terrorism business is a lot of twaddle got up by Blair and Bush: "Bombs kill and panic the panicky. But they do not undermine civilised society unless that society wants to be undermined." And there's no chance of that happening, right?

Jenkins's argument, such as it is, is that a bomb here, a bomb there, nothing to get your knickers in a twist about: that's one thing we Europeans understand. But what he refuses to address is the shifting facts on the ground.

Europe's home-grown terrorism problems take place among notably static populations, such as Ulster and the Basque country. One could make generally safe extrapolations about the likelihood of holding Northern Ireland to what HMG used to call an "acceptable level of violence".

But in the same three decades as Ulster's "Troubles", the hitherto moderate Muslim populations of south Asia were radicalised by a politicised form of Islam; previously broadly unIslamic societies such as Nigeria became Islamified; and large Muslim populations settled in parts of Europe that had little or no experience of mass immigration.

You can argue about what these trends mean, but surely not that they mean absolutely nothing, as Sir Simon and the Complaceniks assure us: nothing to see here, chaps; switch back to the Test and bring me another buttered crumpet; when Osama vows to avenge the "tragedy of Andalucia", it's just a bit of overheated campaign rhetoric, like Kerry calling Bush a "liar", that's all.

For the non-complacent, the question is fast becoming whether "civilised society" in much of Europe is already too "undermined". Last Friday, for a brief moment, it looked as if a few brave editorialists on the Continent finally grasped that global terrorism is a real threat to Europe, and not just a Bush racket. But even then they weren't proposing that the Continent should rise up and prosecute the war, only that they be less snippy in their carping from the sidelines as America gets on with it. Spain was Washington's principal Continental ally, and what does that boil down to in practice? 1,300 troops. That's fewer than what the New Hampshire National Guard is contributing.

The other day, the editor of Le Monde, writing in the Wall Street Journal, dismissed as utterly false the widespread belief among all Americans except John Kerry's campaign staff that France is a worthless ally: "Let us remember here," he wrote, "the involvement of French and German soldiers, among other European nationalities, in the operations launched in Afghanistan to pursue the Taliban, track down bin Laden and attempt to free the Afghans."

Oh, put a baguette in it, will you? The Continentals didn't "launch" anything in Afghanistan. They showed up when the war was over - after the Taliban had been toppled and the Afghans liberated. And a few hundred Nato troops in post-combat mopping-up operations barely registers in the scale against the gazillions of Americans defending the Continent so that EU governments can blow their defence budgets on welfare programmes that make the citizens ever more enervated and dependent.

The only fighting that there is going to be in Europe in the foreseeable future is civil war, and when that happens American infantrymen will want to be somewhere safer. Like Iraq. There are strong horses and weak horses, but right now western Europe is looking like a dead horse.

Information appearing on telegraph.co.uk is the copyright of Telegraph Group Limited and must not be reproduced in any medium without licence. For the full copyright statement see Copyright



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (34809)3/16/2004 10:59:39 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793896
 
David Warren made some Blog lists with this column.

"Maybe the Socialists will get our troops out of Iraq, and Al Qaeda will forget about Spain, so we will be less frightened."


Rotten Europe

Three days after the worst terror attack in continental Europe since World War II, Spain voted to capitulate. In compliance with the demands made in an Al Qaeda videotape, the Socialist prime minister elect, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, announced yesterday that Spain would withdraw its 1,300 troops from Iraq -- unless, of course, the U.S. turns over the whole operation to the incompetent United Nations. We have seen the spectacle of nine million Spaniards, demonstrating their grief in the streets, their hands raised and painted white in a poignant gesture of mass surrender.

This quotation, to a New York Times correspondent in Madrid by "David", a 26-year-old window frame maker who would not give his surname, tells the whole story. He explained why, at the last minute, he had changed his vote from Popular to Socialist: "Maybe the Socialists will get our troops out of Iraq, and Al Qaeda will forget about Spain, so we will be less frightened."

It should be juxtaposed with this quotation from Mark Steyn, in Britain's Daily Telegraph: "So the choice for pluralist democracies is simple: You can join Bush in taking the war to the terrorists, to their redoubts and sponsoring regimes. ... Or you can stick your head in the sand and paint a burqa on your butt. But they'll blow it up anyway."

For Al Qaeda, it is a huge victory after 30 months of continuous setbacks. They have tried a new tactic, and it works. They have shown that by massacring large numbers of innocents on the eve of a Western election, they may persuade the survivors to vote as they wish. Count on it: they will not now abandon this tactic. And they are likely to try it in the United States as well, to defeat President Bush in November, thanks to that Spanish capitulation.

How often small symbols confirm the depth of a betrayal. In Spain's case, one of the Moroccan terrorists of 3/11 has been revealed to be a member of the same cell that participated in the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.

The Spanish Socialists exploited the shock and grief of last Thursday's murderous attacks on Madrid's transit rail system, with demonstrations on the eve of the election. The outgoing government of Prime Minister José María Aznar was accused of "lying to the Spanish people" by suggesting that the attack might have been mounted by the Basque ETA, and thus have nothing to do with Iraq. In defiance of Spanish electoral law, and disregarding the period of mourning that had been agreed by all parties, the Socialist partisans shouted that the blood of Spain was on Aznar's hands.

Let what it did stand to the eternal credit of Mr. Aznar's government. In the early morning of Sunday before the polls had yet opened, and in the full knowledge of what the consequences might be to its electoral prospects, it released information about the capture of Moroccan and Indian Jihadists, and the receipt of the videotape, that left no doubt about the authorship of the carnage.

Analysis and homily must converge in what I have to say today. There is no ambiguity in what has happened in Spain. The rotten heart of Europe has been exposed. The best comparison one can make is to Europe in 1940, when the entire continent had capitulated to Nazism and fascism, leaving Britain alone to fight. It thus came to be known as "Churchill's war", rather than "Hitler's war", only to revert when the Allies had won it, and a generation of Europeans, who had not lifted a finger, decided retrospectively that they had been in the Resistance.

The position of Tony Blair's government in Britain today is further undermined by the Spanish vote, so that it is quite possible that the British, too, may soon abandon what the Europeans now choose to call "Bush's war", rather than "Osama's war".

A good question might be asked of the Bush administration, in light of the Spanish election. It was articulated by an American friend yesterday: "Before we waste another drop of blood trying to create democracies in the Middle East, shouldn't we reflect a bit on how easily democracy in Spain was subverted by terrorists?"

One must not, under the present circumstances, sound an uncertain trumpet. All men of goodwill, regardless of nation, are fighting the Jihadists in Afghanistan and Iraq, as we fought the Nazis in Italy and France; and if the Americans must fight them alone, so be it. Then as now we made a lot of blather about "democracy". But screw democracy, we are fighting an enemy of civilization, an embodiment of real evil. There is no compromise with such an enemy, no capitulation to him, no way to avoid casualties, no easy way out. We defeat him, or he defeats us.

We do not retreat because our allies are cowards. We continue to fight, for ourselves, for our children, and for their children.

David Warren

© Ottawa Citizen



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (34809)3/16/2004 11:36:49 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 793896
 
The Urgent Need to Study Islamic Anti-Semitism

By NEIL J. KRESSEL The Chronicle of Higher Education
Neil J. Kressel, author of Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (Westview Press, 2002), directs the honors program in social sciences at William Paterson University of New Jersey.

For many decades, social scientists of every disciplinary stripe have placed themselves in the forefront of the battle against bigotry. On the basis of that record, one might expect to find psychologists, sociologists, and others hard at work studying the dynamics of Jew-hatred in the Muslim world. But that is far from the case.

These days, more than a few leading Muslim clerics routinely denounce Jews with dehumanizing rhetoric. For example, in April 2002, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi of Egypt, one of the most important Sunni clerics, described Jews in his weekly sermon as "the enemies of Allah, descendants of apes and pigs." Sheikh Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis, the imam of the most important mosque in Mecca, similarly sermonized that the Jews are "the scum of the human race, the rats of the world, the violators of pacts and agreements, the murderers of the prophets, and the offspring of apes and pigs." The imam further advised Arabs to abandon all peace initiatives with Jews and asked Allah to annihilate them. Many leaders of Muslim countries enthusiastically greeted former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's similarly racist ranting.

Yet social scientists have essentially remained mum concerning a problem that President Bush, in a speech in November, has placed high on the world agenda. "Europe's leaders, and all leaders," he said in London, "should strongly oppose anti-Semitism, which poisons public debates over the future of the Middle East."

The image of the president of the United States pressing ahead in the battle against bigotry while social scientists lag far behind is, to say the least, unusual -- especially when one considers the mountains of research that have addressed past anti-Semitism and racism in Europe and the United States.

An examination of PsycINFO, a leading online index of psychological studies, shows 458 entries on anti-Semitism since 1940, 99 of which have appeared during the past 10 years. But not a single one deals directly with hatred of Jews by Muslims or Arabs in the contemporary world. At most, a few psychologically oriented authors, like Mortimer Ostow, have touched tangentially on Muslim anti-Semitism in studies focusing on Jew-hatred in other contexts, and a few political historians, like Bernard Lewis and Robert Wistrich, have offered some social-scientific speculation on the topic.

An analysis of Sociological Abstracts tells much the same story. Since 1963, 130 entries in the database have dealt with anti-Semitism, but none center on the hatred of Jews among Arab Muslims or others in the broader Muslim world.

The failure of social scientists to confront this dangerous form of contemporary bigotry is particularly curious in light of the past prominence of sociologists and psychologists in the study of anti-Semitism. The list of important studies is long and includes, among many others, books by Nathan Ackerman and Marie Jahoda (1950), Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz (1964), Charles Glock and Rodney Stark (1966), George Kren and Leon Rappoport (1994), Robert Jay Lifton (1986), Gary Marx (1967), Harold Quinley and Charles Glock (1979), Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg (1969), and Charles Stember (1966). Indeed, several seminal studies in mainstream social psychology -- The Authoritarian Personality, by Theodor Adorno and his colleagues; The Nature of Prejudice, by Gordon W. Allport; and Obedience to Authority, by Stanley Milgram -- had their roots, in part, in the desire to understand manifestations of anti-Semitism.

So what's going on? Why have social scientists neglected the study of Muslim anti-Semitism?

Some say there is no need to study the phenomenon, and that the charge itself is merely a sneaky ploy to fend off criticism of Israel. For example, the columnist Norman Solomon purports to explain the "strategy" used by supporters of Israel: "To quash debate, just smear, smear, smear. Instead of trying to refute critiques of Israeli policies, it's much easier to equate criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism -- a timeworn way of preventing or short-circuiting real debate on the merits of the issues."

Sheikh Tantawi, of Egypt's Al-Azhar University, offers a more extreme form of the argument, holding that "the charge of anti-Semitism was invented by the Jews as a means of pressuring the Arabs and Muslims, and with the aim of implementing their conspiracies in the Arab and Muslim countries. It should be disregarded."

While the question of where legitimate criticism of Israel ends and anti-Semitism begins can be a tricky matter, whether one looks at bombings or rhetoric it is clear from a review of recent events that much Muslim hostility to Jews is old-fashioned bigotry, plain and simple.

Another attempt to end the discussion of Muslim anti-Semitism before it starts can be found in the contention that Arabs cannot be anti-Semites because they are Semites. Bernard Lewis put that specious semantic argument to rest when he explained in his 1986 book, Semites and Anti-Semites, that "the term Semite has no meaning as applied to groups as heterogeneous as the Arabs or the Jews, and indeed it could be argued that the use of such terms is in itself a sign of racism and certainly of either ignorance or bad faith. ... Anti-Semitism has never anywhere been concerned with anyone but Jews, and is therefore available to Arabs as to other people as an option should they choose it." In any event, nothing is gained from applying the "anti-Semitism" label to anti-Arab discrimination, abhorrent in its own right, except to confuse matters and take attention away from anti-Jewish hostility.

Part of the real explanation for the lack of research on Muslim Jew-hatred is that social scientists who wish to conduct empirical research on anti-Semitism in Arab countries and many other parts of the Muslim world face nearly insurmountable obstacles, starting with the critical problem of access.

Few countries in these regions welcome indigenous or Western interviewers -- whether social scientists or journalists -- who are apt to ask pesky questions. Recently, a Palestinian mob attacked the research center of a well-known Palestinian social scientist whose findings did not square with the local political agenda: Khalil Shikaki, of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, had conducted a survey that found that only a small percentage of Palestinians would exercise a "right of return" as part of a peace settlement.

In addition, nondemocratic regimes in much of the Muslim world tend to place strict limits on journalists and social scientists. They are especially likely to prohibit Jews and those suspected of sympathizing with Israel from conducting their professional activities. Such people are, of course, among the most likely to study anti-Semitism.

Consider, for example, the significant roadblocks encountered by the reporter Caroline Glick, a U.S. citizen, when she arrived in Kuwait in 2003, just before being embedded with an American military unit in Iraq. She also held Israeli citizenship and intended to send her dispatches to two papers owned by Hollinger International: the Chicago Sun-Times and the Jerusalem Post. Despite strong Kuwaiti support for the war, Kuwait's harsh treatment of its Palestinian population, and heavy American diplomatic pressure, the pro-Western and relatively open country refused to accredit her unless she signed a document promising not to report for any Israeli media outlet. Credentialing war correspondents is, of course, a somewhat different matter than permitting leeway for studies on anti-Semitism, but Glick's case illustrates problems likely to be encountered in the Middle East by Jewish researchers with a pro-Israel orientation.

Assuming access, financial support, and successful navigation of linguistic problems, there remains, simply, the danger involved in such research -- what might now be called "the Daniel Pearl effect." Probing questions directed to the wrong people can be fatal. It would require uncommon bravery for Western or indigenous social scientists, especially Jewish ones, to embark on serious empirical studies of anti-Semitism in the Middle East.

Beyond all of that, however, I suspect that there is some political motivation to avoid the topic -- even among those who are not, themselves, the least bit anti-Semitic.

Most social scientists approach current disputes in the Middle East with a perspective similar to that articulated by the influential Columbia University social psychologist Morton Deutsch just after the 9/11 attacks. Speaking to "those of us who have been working for a just, peaceful, humane, and sustainable world," he urged cooperation with Muslim religious authorities "in de-legitimizing violence against civilians whatever their religious background" and in encouraging "leading Islamic religious figures to broadcast statements that people who engage in terrorism are not acceptable in the Islamic community." He further maintained that Islam, like all of the other major religions, respects the sanctity of human life, and that only a small group of "deviant radical 'fundamentalist' groups" condone or encourage politically inspired violence against innocent victims. The highest goal, according to Deutsch, is to prevent the "conflict with terrorism" from escalating into a "conflict with Islam or Muslims." In all those regards, his goals were not so very far from those of the Bush administration.

Gaining the cooperation of Muslim religious leaders, however, has proved far more difficult than expected, and hostility toward the United States appears more broad-based than initially believed in the days following 9/11. In that context, attempts to focus attention on mass hatred emanating from large segments of the Muslim and Arab world may be seen by some social scientists as fanning the flames of conflict by identifying negative characteristics of a population with whom they seek to get along.

Thus, well-intentioned observers may have sensed that it is best, at this historic moment, to leave this stone unturned. But by doing so, they may be shielding a significant danger from scrutiny and doing an injustice to their disciplines' proud history in the war against hate.

The historians Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer may well be correct when they suggest in the introduction to their recent book, Anti-Semitism: Myth and Hate From Antiquity to the Present, that large segments of the billion-strong Muslim world may now endorse a full-blown anti-Semitism, replete with home-grown Islamic themes, new and old, as well as hate imagery imported from the Christian world. Such hatred does not seem to be limited to fringe elements, and it is not constrained by the geographical confines of the Middle East.

Still, conclusive data about the extent and distribution of this hostile ideology are lacking. For example, how does hostility vary by country, level of education, social status, income, occupation, political ideology, and other characteristics? Where are we most apt to find moderate and tolerant people? What is the impact of variations in socialization and education? How do Middle Eastern Muslims differ from those outside the region in their feelings about Jews and Israel? In those same respects, how do Christian Arabs differ from Muslim Arabs? It would be especially helpful to explore the relationships among Muslims' anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Hinduism.

From a psychological perspective, it would be useful to construct a functional typology of anti-Semitism in the Muslim and Arab world. For some people, presumably, the ideology is centrally important, serving some key personality function. For others it is more peripheral, grounded in a social-adjustment function. Anti-Semitic ideology involves a wide range of irrational thought processes that might fruitfully be elaborated from a cognitive perspective. Psychoanalysts have offered many commentaries -- some insightful, some of limited value -- on European anti-Semitism; it may be possible to speak meaningfully about the psychodynamic underpinnings of Muslim anti-Semitism as well. Moreover, as I argued in Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, hateful behavior is generally best understood as an interaction between personal dispositions and situational pressures. We know very little about how those determinants interact to produce or inhibit anti-Semitic action in the Muslim world.

Some of those questions may be addressed from a distance. Others require access to local populations and, for the reasons noted here, are far more difficult to explore. Still, one should not presume to understand the foundations of Muslim anti-Semitism on the basis of studies conducted in other contexts. Extrapolations from research on European and American anti-Semitism are not likely to apply. For example, a substantial body of American research shows that anti-Semitism is least apt to be found among the highly educated. That, I suspect, would not be the case in the Muslim Middle East. Anti-Semitism has always been an idiosyncratic form of bigotry; consequently the very large body of research on American racism is even less likely to offer useful guidance.

There are those who argue that the dangers of Muslim anti-Semitism are not so severe. Hazem Saghiyah, one of the few Arab writers to address the topic (albeit from an anti-Israel viewpoint), believes that "Arab anti-Semites lack the functional modernism of Nazism, the Nazi order, and the racist ideological adherence of European anti-Semitism. ... Our anti-Semitism is uncivilized and totally idiotic, even in the mouths of flashy politicians and journalists." Thus he denies much important political potential for Jew-hatred in the Muslim world.

That position strikes me as unjustifiably sanguine. The warning signs surrounding Muslim Jew-hatred are too ominous to ignore. The dehumanizing rhetoric used to denounce Jews in the Muslim world is precisely the sort that alarms scholars who study genocide and mass atrocities. Surely the problem of Muslim anti-Semitism merits the attention of Western social scientists.

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Section: The Chronicle Review
Volume 50, Issue 27, Page B14

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