To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (127084 ) 3/23/2004 6:11:20 AM From: Elsewhere Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 The CIA and director Tenet would certainly love to see substantiated evidence of an Iraq-al Qaeda link. Then Tenet wouldn't be in the embarrassing situation of having to admit he will have to correct Cheney's claim of such a link. #reply-19937147nytimes.com ceip.org Tenet: On the Record by Alexis Orton Wednesday, March 10, 2004 The testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9 adds valuable insight into four key intelligence controversies: the role of DOD Undersecretary Douglas Feith's special intelligence unit, and allegations of an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection, mobile bio-weapon labs, and Iraqi efforts to procure uranium. In order to avoid future intelligence failures on the scale of September 11 and the war in Iraq, the independent commission to investigate Iraqi intelligence - or another of the several intelligence inquiries that currently exist - must make a deeper probe into these misrepresentations and mistakes. We present excerpts and analysis of Tenet's testimony below. Feith's Special Intelligence Unit Tenet revealed that the special intelligence unit run by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith had given briefings to Vice President Cheney's office and the National Security Council on the Iraq-Al Qaeda connection - without the DCI's knowledge. Senator Levin noted, but did not specify, a "very significant omission" in the briefing the unit gave to George Tenet in contrast to the briefing given to Cheney's office and the NSC. (According to the Wall Street Journal, the omission was a slide that criticized the CIA's analysis of the Iraq-Al Qaeda issue.) This is significant because many suspect that Feith's now-disbanded office provided intelligence directly to administration officials, "cherry picking" information that would help justify a rush to war. "SEN. LEVIN: Now in August of 2002, Mr. Feith briefed you in a classified briefing about Iraq's relationship with Al Qaeda. That briefing was subsequently given to the National Security Council and to the Office of the Vice President. When were you aware of the fact that the briefing that you were given in August of 2002 was then given to the Office of the Vice President? MR. TENET: I did not know it at the time, sir. And I think I first learned about this at our hearing last week. SEN. LEVIN: So last week was the first time that you ever knew that the Feith office was briefing the Office of the Vice President? MR. TENET: I was unaware of it, sir. … SEN. LEVIN: . . . is that a normal thing to happen, that there be a formal analysis relative to intelligence that would be presented to the NSC that way, without you even knowing about it? MR. TENET: I don't know. I've never been in the situation . . . … SEN. LEVIN: …It is a different briefing slightly, I might say, than the one that was presented to the CIA director. I'll just have to leave it at that. I'll leave out -- because I'm not allowed to say, since that's still a classified briefing -- a very significant little omission in that briefing as it was presented to Mr. Tenet compared to the briefing that was sent to us and was presumably presented to the vice president." The Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection Tenet said that the CIA did not approve a classified annex to a memo by Feith to Senators Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The annex provided a list of about 50 incidents related to potential Iraqi-Al Qaeda cooperation, and was partially published by the Weekly Standard in November 2003. Tenet said that he would now inform Vice President Cheney that the CIA does not agree with the Feith assessment - two months after Cheney had said in an interview that the Weekly Standard article was the "best source of information" on the subject. "SEN. LEVIN: . . . last November, the Weekly Standard published excerpts from an alleged classified document that was prepared by Undersecretary of Defense Feith - it was dated October 27th, 2003 - that was sent to the Intelligence Committee. Now, this article alleged an operational relationship between Iraq and the Al Qaeda organization. In the words of this article by Steven Hayes, "The picture emerges as one of a history of collaboration between two of America's most determined and dangerous enemies." Did the CIA, number one, agree with the contents of the Feith document that was sent to the Intelligence Committee - did it have disagreements with that document? MR. TENET: Senator, we did not clear on that document. We did not -- my understanding is, is we did not agree with the way the data was characterized in that document. … SEN. LEVIN: Now, the vice president of the United States, during an interview with the Rocky Mountain News on January 9th, when asked about the relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq, said the following: "One place you ought to look is an article that Steven Hayes did in the Weekly Standard here a few weeks ago." So now he's referring to the article in the Weekly Standard. "It goes through and lays out in some detail, based on an assessment that was done by the Department of Defense and was forwarded to the Senate Intelligence Committee some weeks ago. That's your best source of information." That's what the vice president says about that document that you had disagreements with . . . … MR. TENET: … I think what we did is, is went back to the Department of Defense, who subsequently retracted the document and submitted a correction to you, because of our concerns with what the document said. … SEN. LEVIN: … Have you gone to the vice president of the United States and said, "You know, you said a document was the best source of information, and it's quoted, allegedly, in the Weekly Standard, and, Mr. Vice President, that is not the best source of information according to us." Have you said that to him? MR. TENET: I haven't, sir. But I learned about his quote last night when I was preparing for this hearing. I was unaware that he had said that. And I will talk to him about it." ...