Stephen Den Beste has an excellent post up at USS Clueless. He is one blogger who is mainstream now.
Captain's log): Violent war is not senseless slaughter and destruction, at least not when it is used competently. Violent war is slaughter and destruction carefully tailored to advance a political goal.
Terrorism is one form of violent war. It emerged as a way to wage war on the cheap; it was a way that very small groups could contend militarily with opponents who were vastly more powerful.
"Terrorism" in a broad generic sense is as old as humanity. But in the 20th century, a coherent doctrine for terrorist war emerged, which I described here. The key point to remember is this: the strategic goal of terrorism is to provoke reprisals.
Most of the activity by insurgents in Iraq during the last year was technically guerrilla warfare. Like terrorism, guerrilla warfare developed as a way for weak forces to fight against strong ones. But guerilla war aims to harm the enemy by direct action; that's the main distinction between the two.
In all warfare, at all times, you have to keep your eyes firmly on the ultimate objectives of those involved in the war. Each side uses violence to advance its own goals and to try to prevent the other side from achieving its goals. (If, of course, the leaders are competent, which historically speaking has often not been the case.)
During the last year, Baathists were responsible for the majority of insurgent action in Iraq. They mostly stayed in the background and used huge piles of cash looted at the last moment during the invasion to pay others to carry out various attacks. Their primary target was American soldiers, because they hoped that an ongoing trickle of casualties would cause us to lose heart and leave, after which they felt they had a reasonable chance to move into the resulting power vacuum. It didn't turn out that way, though; American resolve never wavered. And as time went on our intelligence people began to learn more and more about their organization and how it operated. Eventually that reached a tipping point, leading to the capture of Saddam in December, and the priceless contents of his briefcase. The next few weeks saw a huge number of raids and arrests all over Iraq, and there's every reason to believe that the Baathist insurgency has now been shattered.
The primary source of violent resistance in Iraq now is foreigners, mainly al Qaeda and sympathetic radicals from the region. And for the first time we have begun to see attacks in Iraq which are consistent with classic terrorist doctrine: to provoke reprisals so as create conditions which prevent us from achieving our goals.
A couple of days ago, Wei sent me a link to a translation of a couple of articles originally published in Arabic in London, which commented on a book written in Arabic in Egypt by leaders of Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, which in turn analyzed and deeply criticized the strategy and tactics being used by al Qaeda. (Pause for a moment to inhale...)
It's surprisingly level headed and accurate. Taking into account the partisanship of the authors, it actually gets it mostly right. It summarizes the American strategy in the war thusly:
The features of the strategy of "liberating the Muslim world" to which Rice referred can be seen in the following points:
1. The crushing of the Taliban movement and depriving Al-Qa'ida of a safe haven.
2. The globalization of the persecution of Al-Qa'ida elements and any other Islamic organization that the United States considers as posing a threat to it, its interests, and its allies.
3. Pushing the countries of the Muslim world to propagate US and western values by liberating themselves from the values and traditions of the Muslim culture which, in their opinion, generate violence. This point requires a change on the current textbooks that encourage the culture of extremism. This point also reflects Fukuyama's theory in his article to which we referred above.
4. The Turkization, in the words of a senior member of the US Administration, of the Muslim world. In other words, the application of the Turkish model that allows the existence of an Islamic current in a political arena that is closer to secularism than to Islam. This approach provides a solution by giving the Turkish Islamists room to let off steam while pulling the rug from under the feet of the Islamic radicals.
5. Pressure on the governments in Muslim countries to adopt policies that allow the persecution of terrorism on one hand and that give a chance to Islamists to participate in political life on the other hand.
6. US contribution in solving some of the political problems in the Muslim world in a way that polishes the US image before Muslim public opinion but without jeopardizing US interests.
Thus, the final stage of this US strategy aims at making drastic changes on the Islamic currents or in the Muslim identity and values. This strategy demonstrates how the United States is poking its nose in the affairs of the Muslim world under the pretext of defending democracy and the human rights of men, women, and children, and combating terrorism. All this is part of the strategy to impose US hegemony on the whole world.
The key to achieving most of that is establishment of a relatively successful liberal democracy in Iraq, which was the primary reason for the invasion (rhetoric about WMDs notwithstanding). And it can't be done unless the Sunnis participate and are accepted by the Kurds and Shiites.
During the Saddam years, the Sunnis were the top dogs, and Kurds and Shiites suffered very badly. With Saddam gone and the Baathists shattered, if what replaces them in turn oppresses the Sunnis, then in the long run it will fail to achieve the larger political goals the US requires: to inspire reform and liberalization of the entire region. We need the Sunnis themselves to participate, and we need the Shiites and Kurds to accept them.
And if we succeed, and if it actually does inspire liberalization elsewhere, it will be a catastrophe for the Islamists, and they know it. The insurgency in Iraq now is attempting to make that fail, by trying to prevent any reconciliation with the Sunnis.
One of the first important attacks which was consistent with classic terrorist doctrine was the mass bombing of the Shiites. The goal of that attack was to inspire hatred among the Shiites and to provoke Shiite retaliation against the Sunnis. If the attack had successfully provoked that kind of reprisals, it would have had a good chance of convincing the Sunnis that they faced disaster if they cooperated in the process of establishing a new Iraqi government, which would have derailed our efforts to create it.
If the new government ends up totally dominated by the Shiite majority, and if they in turn use it to repress the Sunnis, then it would be seen elsewhere in the region as "the new boss, same as the old boss". Political backlash by Shiites against the Sunnis in response to that bombing would therefore have been a major victory for al Qaeda. Violent attacks against Sunnis by Shiites would have been frosting on the cake.
Fortunately, saner heads among the Shiites recognized the attack for what it was, and strongly discouraged such a response.
Now, in Falluja, we have seen another operation consistent with the doctrine of terrorism, only this time the US was the target. Four American civilians driving through that city were killed, and their bodies were desecrated by an exultant crowd. Foreign cameramen captured it all.
The Baathist insurgency thought that ongoing attacks would cause American demoralization and retreat. That didn't work, because they monumentally misjudged the American character. But the goal of this attack is to inspire American fury. What they hope is that the Americans will be blinded by hatred and will do something extremely stupid: to punish the Sunnis collectively for the actions of the terrorist group.
Remember, that's the basic theory behind terrorism; that's the core of the doctrine of terrorism as a form of violent warfare. It is not the terrorist act itself which helps advance the political goals of the terrorist group; it is rather the reprisal. Terrorism is a form of jiu-jitsu, a way of using an enemy's strength against himself. (In jiu-jitsu, you don't throw an opponent. You aid him in throwing himself.)
If there are broad reprisals against the uncommitted friendly population because of the acts of the terrorists, that population will become motivated and polarized in favor of the position held by the terrorists. If the American response is viewed by the Sunnis as being directed broadly at all Sunnis, rather than being targeted specifically at those responsible for this outrage, then there's every likelihood that the Sunnis will begin to wonder whether the US is actually genuine in its attempts to include the Sunnis as equal partners in the new government of Iraq. That would be a major victory for al Qaeda.
This terrorist attack was an application of violence intended to derail the American effort to set up a liberal democracy in Iraq, by attempting to provoke an American reprisal which would lead to Sunni suspicion and reduce Sunni participation in that democracy.
Paul Bremer understands that and seems to be responding to it appropriately. But he's being criticized by hotheads who don't seem to understand that swift, strong, broad reaction against Sunnis collectively would be a blunder of the first order.
Charles Johnson writes:
I’m just going to ask one simple question.
Why hasn’t the United States already launched an overwhelmingly armed operation to recover the remains of our citizens murdered today in Fallujah, and punish those responsible?
Their body parts are still hanging from that goddamned bridge.
What the hell is wrong with us?
There's nothing wrong with us. The reason we didn't immediately launch the kind of operation he describes is that it would have failed miserably and would have had catastrophic long term consequences.
We have to respond, and we have to respond massively. But that response must be targeted only at those truly involved in this attack. Sunnis collectively must not feel themselves victimized by it. And that's why this is exactly the right response:
U.S. troops on Thursday vowed to use overwhelming force to enter the volatile Iraqi town of Falluja and hunt down those who killed and mutilated four American contractors.
Marines took up positions on the outskirts of the restive town west of Baghdad where insurgents ambushed the contractors on Wednesday, but the U.S. army's deputy director of operations Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt said they would return.
"Coalition forces will respond," Kimmitt told a news conference. "They are coming back and they are going to hunt down the people responsible for this bestial act.
"It will be at a time and a place of our choosing. It will be methodical, it will be precise and it will be overwhelming."
What is needed is a response which simultaneously punishes al Qaeda and reassures the Sunnis. But to do that, there has to be preparation. Our intelligence people now are busting their butts trying to learn everything they can about this attack and those responsible for it. Until they begin to make headway in that process, we must wait.
Update: By the way, the strong power targeted by well-calculated terrorism is in something of a political trap. If it responds broadly, then the terrorists win because that response mobilizes the uncommitted. But if there's no response at all, the terrorists also win because the strong power will be seen as weak-willed, which also mobilizes the uncommitted. That's why there must be a response but why it has to be very carefully crafted.
Update: American officials have announced that they think the attack in Falluja was planned. I think the likelihood is that it wasn't a specific plan to hit those four people at that place and time. Rather, it was a general plan on how to exploit an opportunity to attack and kill an isolated group of Americans so as to maximize the chance of American blind rage leading to a broad reprisal. The four Americans who were killed were simply unlucky.
Update: Ralph Peters writes about the attack, and uncharacteristically he misses the real purpose of it. Like many, he assumes that it is a continuation of the Baathist strategy of trying to make us become weary of casualties so that we'll give up and leave.
That was what the Baathists attempted because they hoped to resume power afterwards. However, al Qaeda doesn't care too much what kind of government gets formed in Iraq or who is in charge of it as long as it doesn't satisfy the American goal of seeding the ideas of liberal democracy in the region. And because their goals are different, their strategy also is different.
Ideally, al Qaeda would prefer a Wahhabist theocracy dominated by Sunnis. But an Iranian-style Shiite theocracy would be almost as good, and a secular fascist tyranny would also be acceptable. Their primary objective is to prevent establishment of liberal democracy resulting from cooperation between the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.
Update: Charles Johnson responds.
Update: I'm afraid that Donald Sensing also misses the point.
Update: I'd like to clarify something, as a response to some emails I've gotten. I believe that if Gore had been elected in 2000 rather than Bush, the American response to the 9/11 attack would have been much different – and, quite frankly, much worse (in the sense of being much less effective). I do not think a Gore administration would have chosen the large strategy of trying to reform the Arab world, as Bush did, and I think that anything less would ultimately have led to disaster in the long run.
However, once we invaded Iraq, then we were committed to the large strategy. If Kerry gets elected this year, he'll have to carry through with it. There might be other ways in which a Kerry foreign policy would differ from a Bush foreign policy, but on the question of continuing to work for democracy in Iraq and making sure it doesn't collapse in just a few years, there would be no important difference. And since I think that to be the one key ingredient to winning the war in the long run, that's what really matters to me.
And that's even without factoring in the likely continuing domination of one or both chambers of the Congress by the Republicans, even if Kerry wins.
Update: Donald Sensing doesn't think he disagrees with me. (Rather, I misunderstood what he wrote.)
Update: Wretchard offers a general outline of our response, which has now started. What he describes sounds perfectly appropriate to me: it will be massive, methodical, broad, comprehensive, and inexorable.
He also points out that there's reason to believe that the insurgents were trying to provoke a fast response by us because they were ready to ambush the responding force. |
