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Strategies & Market Trends : Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: zonder who wrote (3426)4/2/2004 11:48:34 AM
From: Robert Douglas  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Trust only "buy side" analysts, which I assume means SI posters such as the one who wrote this in January 2003:

Yes, but not ALL SI posters have such poor records. I seem to recall YOU making a good deal of money shorting the U.S. dollar. <g>



To: zonder who wrote (3426)4/2/2004 12:19:37 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Euroland: No Clear Easing Signal from the ECB

Joachim Fels & Elga Bartsch (London)

“The fact that we do not say “appropriate” should not be overinterpreted”
Jean-Claude Trichet during the Q & A session

Bottom line
Taking the Introductory Statement and the following lengthy Q & A session together, ECB President Trichet sent a slightly garbled message on the Council’s monetary policy stance. While the statement adopted a somewhat more dovish tone by omitting for the first time since last July the phrase that the policy stance was “appropriate”, the ECB President went out of his way in the Q & A to play down the impression that there had been any fundamental change in the ECB’s assessment. On balance, our interpretation of today’s press conference is that the Council wanted to signal (1) that it stands ready to ease provided that the economic data fall short of the ECB’s main scenario of a modest economic recovery, and (2) that these downside risks to growth may have increased marginally. However, given that we do not expect the downside risks to this central scenario to materialise, we continue to think that the current rate of 2% will be the bottom for ECB interest rates in the current cycle. We thus reiterate our view that markets had run ahead of themselves in pricing in a greater than 50% chance of a rate cut over the next few months.

The Introductory Statement appeared slightly more dovish than the following Q & A. The two notable changes in the statement compared to March are as follows: First, while the March statement, like all previous statements since July 2003, had stated that the “current stance of monetary policy remains appropriate”, today’s statement says that the stance “remains in line with the maintenance of price stability”. In the past, the omission of “appropriate” or its replacement with “consistent” (similar to today’s “in line”) has usually foreshadowed a change in rates in one of the next two meetings. Second, today’s statement omitted last month’s sentence that the risks to the main economic scenario of a moderate recovery were “broadly balanced”. By simply repeating the two downside risks to growth -- economic imbalances elsewhere and the weakness of consumer spending -- the statement creates the impression that the Council now sees the balance of risks as tilted slightly on the downside.

However, the modifications in the Introductory Statement (which is a very carefully drafted document) were then downplayed by President Trichet in the Q & A when he was questioned about these two changes. While he avoided saying that the stance was “appropriate”, he went out of his way to suggest that the omission of this phrase and its replacement with “in line” did not represent a fundamental change in the Council’s assessment (see the quote at the top of this note). He said the Council had been in “exactly the same mood” as at the last meeting and that the situation today “doesn’t call for a rate cut”, but that the Council “will see whether or not there will be information that would call for any change in either direction.” Asked whether the Council still sees the risks to the economic outlook as balanced, he said “overall, we consider we have a balanced situation” and “we have no bias but we can change on the basis of objective information”.

All in all, we are left a slightly puzzled in the face of the diverging signals emanating from the statement and the Q & A. On balance, the Council and its President probably wanted to make clear that the ECB stands ready to cut rates if the economic data fail to live up to its modest expectations, and that the balance of risks may have shifted slightly on the downside. However, our own read of the recent “mixed” data flow is that the downside risks are very limited, and we continue to see a continuation of the modest recovery in the quarters ahead. Against this backdrop, we continue to see the ECB on hold and we reiterate our view that the next rate move is more likely to be up than down. But with today’s press conference the ECB clearly intended to keep all its options open.

morganstanley.com



To: zonder who wrote (3426)4/2/2004 12:23:31 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
China: The First Energy Crisis

Andy Xie (Hong Kong)

China is facing its first energy crisis, in my opinion. Electricity rationing has become widespread. The trade deficit in energy products is rising at 70% annually and may reach 2.3% of GDP in 2004.

Electricity supply is likely to become even more bottlenecked, with no improvement likely for another two years. As investment continues to rise rapidly, electricity rationing becomes more necessary, decreasing economic efficiency. The government may have to introduce more draconian measures to slow investment.

The trade deficit in energy products may significantly constrain China’s future growth. This is both a cyclical and secular challenge. The investment bubble has exaggerated China’s demand for electricity in the short term. Energy prices get pushed up, transferring China’s income to exporters of energy products. Energy price increases cost China about US$6 billion (or 0.4% of GDP) last year.

If current trends persist, China’s trade deficit in energy products could exceed US$100 billion in 2013, from US$18 billion in 2003. To sustain its growth, China will have to increase its export pricing power or reduce its energy dependency.

China needs to smooth its investment cycles to minimize periodical surges in demand for energy, which result in higher costs to achieve the same rate of growth. In my view, the key is to establish a market economy for the allocation of capital. China also needs to improve the energy efficiency of its development model.

Electricity Shortages Worsen

Electricity shortages in China are worsening. Anecdotally, even prominent export companies are being asked to stop using electricity for two days a week. The main problem is the demand resulting from surging investment by local governments; in the first two months of 2004, such investment surged by over 70% from the same period last year.

The government is committed to increasing electricity supply by 10% this year. But demand growth is trending above 15%. As the peak-demand summer season draws near, widespread economic dislocations loom that could be far worse than last year’s. Power stations take three years to build, ruling out extra capacity as an immediate solution to the power shortage. Further, demand for electricity is cyclical. The current investment bubble is lifting electricity demand way above a secular trend rate of 8% annually. China cannot afford to build out capacity to accommodate the unusually high demand during an investment bubble.

Diesel generators are a stopgap measure for many exporters. But diesel prices have gone up substantially, even though production volumes rose 22% in the first two months of 2004, and are too expensive for most downstream factories, which are suffering high prices of raw materials and declining margins. High domestic prices appear to have triggered a surge in smuggling, making it difficult to estimate the trade balance.

China’s economy risks grinding to a halt unless investment – especially that promoted by local governments – decelerates quickly over the next three months.

Energy Shortages Cast a Long Shadow over China’s Development

While China’s electricity shortage is mostly cyclical and associated with an investment bubble coinciding with personnel changes at local governments, the availability and cost of fossil fuels is a major long-term challenge. China’s trade deficit in fossil fuels averaged about US$2 billion in 1990s but reached US$18 billion last year. If China’s oil demand rises at 7% a year (less than the average of 8% in the past five years), the country’s trade deficit in energy products could reach US$100 billion by 2013.

Affordability of energy imports will increasingly become a bottleneck in China’s economic growth. China’s exports are mostly in the form of OEM and have little pricing power. Further, most of the profits from exports (US$40 billion, or 2.9% of GDP per annum, in my estimation) do not stay in China but usually are recycled back into the US by the Hong Kong and Taiwan businessmen who control most of China’s exports. Essentially, China relies on the income of workers in the export sector – who earn less than US$100 per month – to pay for the expensive energy imports. The current equilibrium is not sustainable, in my view.

The problem can be solved in two ways: an increase in export pricing power or a decrease in the energy intensity in the economy. Increasing pricing power requires reinvesting the export profits derived from labor arbitrage into developing technologies and brands. But, as such profits do not stay in China, sufficient funds are not available to develop brands and technologies to upgrade the export value-added.

China should rework its export strategy to keep at home the wealth it creates. First, local companies should be encouraged to take over the export industry. China’s incentive framework is biased towards foreign-owned enterprises. While that has been good for job creation, the economy has been deprived of the benefits from the wealth generated. Second, China should improve the protection of private wealth and institutionalize economic development to make Taiwan and Hong Kong businessmen more willing to keep their wealth inside China.

China needs to cut its energy dependence for growth, in my view. Two reasons account for this dependency. First, China’s service sector is highly inefficient. The state occupies the commanding heights in this sector. Finance, telecommunications and transportation are the most important examples. State ownership is the reason for the low efficiency. Thus, the sector that is not energy-intensive does not contribute much to economic growth. Second, in global trade China occupies only the segment that requires a lot of energy. Other parts of the value chain, such as design, logistics, marketing and finance, are often found offshore.

The easiest way to decrease China’s energy dependence would be to make the service sector more efficient through privatization. Many arguments can be made against privatization. But when state ownership is too inefficient to be affordable, it has to go.

China Must Deal with Energy Security

Regardless of how efficient China becomes in using energy for economic development, the country will become more and more dependent on imported energy. This is highly important for national security. If China faced the threat of its energy supply being cut off, its ability to defend its interests could be seriously constrained. China must develop a comprehensive framework for energy security.

First, heavy investment is needed in nuclear power, despite the industry’s problematic safety record in many countries. China does not have the resources to defend its oil supply from distant shores. The balance of the risks is tilting towards a careful but necessary adoption of nuclear power.

Second, China must restrict the development of its automobile industry. While the current size of the automobile industry is still tolerable, it should not be allowed to grow without check. Urgent action is required, before the commuter towns emerge that would hook China forever on the convenience of automobiles. Gasoline taxes should be gradually introduced and increased, and incentives should be provided for alternative automotive technologies.

Third, China should better organize the natural gas sector, especially in distribution. This sector is poorly organized and filled with opportunistic players who rely on favors from local governments. China should organize big national companies that invest heavily and quickly in this sector. Such companies could be privatized.



To: zonder who wrote (3426)4/2/2004 12:27:02 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
At the heart of the matter is the extremely loose monetary policy wrought by the Federal Reserve in its attempt to boost asset prices and maintain consumption after the bursting of the stock market bubble in 2000. When combined with intervention by Asian central banks to prevent their currencies rising against the dollar, the lowest US interest rates in a generation have sparked a remarkable global experiment. US monetary policy has liquefied Asia and initiated bubbles. Such market manipulation has a nasty way of ending in tears.

Consider the distortion in the US market for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored financial intermediaries, enjoy low borrowing costs because they are regarded as "too big to fail". With ultra-low interest rates, securities issued by US government sponsored agencies, mainly Fannie and Freddie, had soared by 2003 to $5,600bn, or 161 per cent of the value of all US Treasuries.

Neither will be allowed to go bust. But both hedge continuously against changes in the duration of their assets, as borrowers re-mortgage or choose not to. Wall Street analysts have estimated that a half per cent rise in long-term interest rates requires hedging sales of a whopping $200bn of securities. This amplifies any rise as hedgers sell into falling markets. So Fanny and Freddie make the financial world a very dangerous place for everyone else.

Another consequence is what one pundit has dubbed "the flight to garbage". Investors have poured money into junk bonds, property, commodities, high-technology stocks and emerging market bonds. Everyone whose investment performance is rewarded without allowance for risk has been chasing high yields. These have tumbled - most of all in Latin America, which now borrows on the cheap. Investors differentiated little initially between Venezuela's dismal Hugo Chavez and the market-friendly Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil.

news.ft.com



To: zonder who wrote (3426)4/2/2004 12:29:08 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Global: India’s Awakening
morganstanley.com

Stephen Roach (New York)

First impressions are superficial almost by definition. But more often than not, they end up pointing you in the right direction. Quite simply, I was blown away by what I saw on my first trip to India. It’s a land of great contrasts, to be sure -- strength in human capital and technology coexisting with backward infrastructure and heart-wrenching poverty. But there is no doubt in my mind that the balance has shifted. After decades of stop and go, the critical mass of a new approach to Indian economic development now appears to have been attained. If I’m right, not only would that have enormous implications for the world’s second most populous nation, but it could have profound implications for the Asian and broader global economy.

I just spent four days in India at the end of a two-week tour in Asia that also included China, Korea, and Japan. I visited with government officials in New Delhi, software companies in Bangalore, and investors, as well as technology, pharmaceutical, and industrial companies in Mumbai. I also met with several rapidly growing Indian subsidiaries of US multinationals. In addition, I took a long and arduous side-trip to Agra, where I was stunned by the sheer majesty of the Taj Mahal. I asked many questions, gave a few speeches, took copious notes, and recorded hundreds of digitized snapshots that have quickly become boring to my family and friends. There’s a fair amount of sensory overload in trying to sort through all the images, conversations, and insights that get filed away in a trip like this. But this visit to India was the missing piece in my Asian education. Up until now, it’s been a China-centric journey -- some 25 trips since 1997. But I have long suspected that there’s far more to Asia’s remarkable story. India convinced me that my instincts were right.

It’s tempting to make the China-India comparison -- trying to figure out which of these two Asian giants has the better approach to economic development. I see no reason to frame this in such black and white terms. In fact, I am inclined to argue that it’s not China or India but, in fact, China and India. Each of these two nations has a distinctly different recipe for economic development -- recipes that are complements rather than substitutes as they fit into the broad mosaic of globalization. To be sure, China has come first in the sequencing, but this breakthrough has served India well. As the rest of the world has finally come to accept the China miracle, that realization has opened the door for acceptance of the India miracle. As one Indian leader put it to me, “It’s the flying-geese pattern of Asian development.”

As China is to manufacturing, India is to services. That’s an over-simplification but it is the key conclusion that I take away from this journey. Manufacturing prowess is typically the yardstick that is used to measure the prosperity of emerging nations. As seen from that standpoint, there’s no comparison. China has plowed its huge reservoir of domestic saving -- about 40% of GDP -- into some of the best infrastructure you will see anywhere in the world. And it has been brilliant in attracting massive inflows of foreign direct investment as the means to acquire technology, managerial expertise, and factories on a scale and scope that is hard to believe. China has, in fact, leapt to the fore as the largest recipient of FDI in the world -- some US$53 billion per year in 2002-03.

India suffers in comparison basically from having none of the above. That’s an exaggeration but not all that wide of the mark. India has a 24% national saving rate, a little more than half that of China. As a result, it has far less in the way of internally-generated funds available to plow back into infrastructure. And it doesn’t take much traveling around in India to experience first-hand the serious deficiencies of its infrastructure. The India Infrastructure Report 2004, put out by the 3iNetwork of India’s best and brightest engaged in this field, says it all, “…even relative to our income, our failure in water, roads, sanitation, schooling, and electricity is woeful.” Nor can India hold a candle to China on FDI. China’s inflows in 2003 were more than ten times the US$4 billion that went into India.

But that’s not the lens through which India should be viewed, in my opinion. India’s strength is elsewhere -- namely, in an extraordinary stock of human capital. And it has deployed that strength into the creation of world class IT-enabled service companies such as Infosys and Wipro and the service subsidiaries of large conglomerates such as Reliance and Tata. I spent time with each of these companies and was staggered by what they had accomplished in the relatively short time span of the past 10-20 years. The push into IT-enabled services sidesteps what I believe are India’s greatest impediments on the road to development -- its infrastructure and FDI deficiencies. Self-sufficient in electrical power -- all big companies have back-up generating capacity -- the only infrastructure requirement in services is telecom. And, here, the Indian government has gotten out the way -- focusing on telecom deregulation and facilitating connectivity both in domestic markets and to overseas destinations.

The results speak for themselves: By year-end 2003, growth in Indian services was nearing a 10% annual rate, well in excess of the 6% growth in industrial production. For the first time ever, services exceeded 50% of Indian GDP in FY03 -- at 50.5% this portion is up about ten percentage points from the share in 1991 but still well below the 65% average shares in more developed economies. While the combined sum of IT services and IT-enabled services (ITES) is growing very rapidly, it currently accounts for only 2.0% of Indian GDP as of March 2004; the export portion of ITES is estimated at US$3.6 billion in 2003-04 -- more than double the level of 2001-02, according to NASSCOM, India’s IT trade association. The US is a destination for about two-thirds of such exports. One of India’s leading IT companies has a row of flagpoles lining the entrance to its state-of-the art headquarters complex. Each day, national flags are raised for foreign visitors. They tell me the American flag is flying nearly every day.

India’s software and IT-enabled services industry currently employs about 785,000 workers -- this is up by nearly 60% from the headcount of 500,000 two years ago and projected to increase by around 50% by year-end 2005. Nor are there any serious worries about hiring constraints. Nearly 290,000 engineers alone graduated from India’s high-quality universities in 2002. As one IT executive put it to me, “Hiring from campus is a cinch. For new grads, our industry is a godsend.” Despite this rapid growth, the level of activity in this dynamic new industry is still low and hardly justifies the outcries of America’s anti-offshoring fanatics. But as I argued recently, the trend is emblematic of powerful change at the margin -- suggestive of new and lasting competitive pressures that are likely to bear down on America’s legions of long-sheltered knowledge workers for the foreseeable future (see my March 30 dispatch, “Offshoring -- Myth and Reality”). It’s called globalization, and that’s exactly the way it’s supposed to work.

It is important to stress that contrary to widespread impressions there is far more to India’s success in services than an attractive cost arbitrage in low-valued processing tasks. Yes, the cost saving is enormous -- like-quality Indian talent goes for about 15% to 20% of the Western norm. But the strength of India’s IT-enabled services model is not about the inroads it has made in attracting easily commoditized data processing and call-center operations. The successful IT-enabled service companies have been quick to move up the value chain into a wide range of BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) activities including purchasing and order functionality, procurement, accounting, insurance management, e-based corporate learning management, human resource and benefits management, and a vast array of internal corporate control functions. More recently, India’s BPO efforts have moved into medical, actuarial and legal functions. And then there’s India’s natural strength in a broad array of IT applications -- from software programming and multi-media platforms to systems support and network management.

The list goes on and on. But for Indian IT companies, the real breakthroughs come from the development of customized integrated systems solutions. The BPO business is basically the “Trojan Horse” -- driven initially by the cost arbitrage that makes outsourcing extremely attractive as a means to enhance corporate efficiency in high-cost countries. But India’s IT-enabled service companies have been quick to take this opportunity to the next level -- going beyond the functional “silo approach” that has long plagued corporate structures and exploiting the synergies that can be realized through collaborative solutions that span previously segmented functions. And they attack these integrated systems problems with seamless global networks that pass the management and control functions around the world every 24 hours. This revolutionizes the high-cost “cluster model” of the global services company made famous by Harvard’s Michael Porter (see The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Free Press, 1998). Porter argued that since services had to be delivered on site, in person, well-supported subsidiaries of global service firms had to be located in close proximity to major customer bases. India’s IT-enabled services model turns this concept inside out. These are real companies, with powerful new strategies and execution models that go well beyond the arbitrage play.

As logical as India’s service-based development model seems to me, I was surprised to find some pushback from the Indian leadership. The country is enormously proud of its accomplishments over the past 12 years in IT-enabled services -- and justifiably so. But it still believes that manufacturing ultimately holds the key to prosperity. Repeatedly, I heard the argument that manufacturing is critical to resolving India’s long-term unemployment problems. I find this response puzzling. Over the past 50 years, technological change has spurred capital-labor substitution and turned manufacturing into an increasingly labor-saving activity. Services, by contrast, are far more labor intensive, especially in the knowledge-based production activities of the Information Age. For a huge country like India, a services-driven development model seems tailor made both to its greatest strengths (human capital) and its greatest needs (employment and coping with poverty). And the new IT-enabled tradability of services is the icing on the cake. Many moons ago in grad school, I was very impressed by the elegance of India’s manufacturing-based development models. For lots of reasons they never really delivered. India’s new services-based approach is an exciting alternative, but it runs very much against the grain of these powerful legacy effects. Sometimes, old dreams just don’t fade.

What impressed me the most about India is a new sense of focus and determination. Plagued by decades of false starts and government missteps, this Asian giant has now, in the words of one of India’s leading corporate executives, finally absorbed the “fixed costs of democracy.” Reforms began in earnest in the early 1990s and momentum has built steadily in the years since. India still suffers by comparison with China. But unlike China, India has a well developed banking system, vibrant capital markets, and a new generation of indigenous world-class companies. China has an outward-looking development model with the hope that the benefits will spread inward into home markets. India has much more of a home-grown development model that is now gaining global reach. Both approaches have their virtues and shortcomings. And yet the most fascinating thing is that they both may work. I have long been a big fan of China’s remarkable accomplishments. India’s awakening is equally impressive.



To: zonder who wrote (3426)4/2/2004 12:42:59 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
Putting oil's price in perspective -
Friday, April 2, 2004 4:50:56 PM

ANNANDALE, Va. (AFX) - With unleaded gasoline now going for more than $1.75 a gallon, up from just 95 cents five years ago, politicians are doing the obvious: They're blaming the other guy

Which means that many Americans will develop a sense of outrage about gas prices, and those who would exploit the issue for political gain will whip this outrage to a fever pitch

Yet in many ways the story about the current high price of gasoline is that there is no story

Consider gas in real, or inflation-adjusted, terms. If all gas prices since 1976 were expressed in terms of today's depreciated dollar, we'd discover that the average is $1.77 a gallon

This means that today's price is almost precisely equal to the long-term average

So outrage over today's apparently high price of gasoline is guilty of what economists sometimes call "money illusion," in which consumers are fooled into believing that a dollar is a dollar is a dollar

It isn't, of course. But most politicians don't want us to be aware of what inflation is doing to the value of the currency

Take a look at the accompanying graph, which plots the price of a gallon of unleaded gasoline in two different ways. The first, represented by the red line, is based on what the actual price of unleaded gas was at each point along the way over the past three decades

The second, represented by the blue line, shows what those actual prices would have been had they been expressed in terms of today's dollar. This leads to a big adjustment, since one dollar today is equal in value to around 30 cents in terms of a 1976 dollar (as judged by the Consumer Price Index)

Therefore, as you can see in the graph, even though you could buy a gallon of unleaded gasoline in January 1976 for 60 cents, in today's dollar that price would have been around $2

One newsletter editor who has drawn attention to gas prices in real terms is John Dessauer, editor of John Dessauer's Investors World. In his midweek update to subscribers, he pointed out that "gas prices in real terms, adjusted for inflation, are back at 1985 levels" and therefore nowhere near to record highs

The real story here, according to Dessauer, is that the supply of oil "far exceeds demand." He reports that, because of weak demand, worldwide supply of oil is growing 3.5 million barrels per day

As a result, OPEC "is terrified of an oil price collapse like 1998." And that's why it has cut production and announced that it most likely will cut production even more this summer

Dessauer believes that oil's price is in the latter stages of a classic market bubble, helped along by "massive speculation in the oil market" by "hedge fund managers and other speculators." That speculation has, up until now, kept oil's price from reflecting the underlying fundamentals

But Dessauer is confident that fundamentals will eventually win out: "Crude oil prices will come down." That, in turn, will be good news for the economy and the stock market


Dessauer, therefore, is advising clients to remain fully invested in equities

fxstreet.com



To: zonder who wrote (3426)4/2/2004 12:52:23 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Financial Sense Wrapup
financialsense.com