The three pillars of US occupation are shaking
Michael Jansen
THE ERUPTION over the past few days of resistance violence in half a dozen cities in central and southern Iraq demonstrates clearly that the country has not been pacified over the past year by its US and British conquerors. The main reason for the unrest is that Iraq remains a land seething with resentment.
As the anniversary of the fall of Baghdad approached, there was a revival of the feeling of humiliation many Iraqis felt when their country, once again, found itself under foreign domination. The US has not delivered on its promises of liberation, democracy and prosperity. Due to the failure of the US to provide security, Iraqis are afraid to leave their homes, with all the lawlessness in the streets of their cities.
There is no democracy. Iraq is ruled by decree by US Viceroy L. Paul Bremer III who rarely consults the appointed Iraqi Governing Council about major policy decisions. Bremer has not yet managed to come up with a plan for the handover to a credible Iraqi body by June 30, the date for the dissolution of the occupation regime. Instead, he has made arrangements for the continued occupation of Iraq by US and allied forces, making it clear that Iraq has lost its independence for the foreseeable future.
Iraq is not prosperous. More than 60 per cent of the workforce there is unemployed. Wages have risen for those with jobs, but rents are skyrocketing and food prices have quadrupled. Iraqi businessmen eager to take part in reconstruction are squeezed out by foreign firms connected to the major multinationals who have been given contracts by the Bush administration. The supply of electricity remains erratic, making it impossible for manufacturers to run their operations efficiently, and antagonising ordinary folk who continue to suffer daily difficulties and irritations without power. Iraqis have lost patience with Washington.
The Bush administration built the occupation on three pillars: the US armed forces, the support of the Kurds and the toleration of the Shiites. But all three pillars are unstable.
The US armed forces, now 135,000 strong in Iraq, are under great pressure. The soldiers are too few to impose law and order and are under constant threat from resistance elements. At least one third are reservists, resentful because they are being called upon to serve in Iraq for a year or more, disrupting their lives and careers. The suicide rate is high and a large number of soldiers suffering mental trauma are sent home along with the wounded. Soldiers who are recovering from injuries are being returned to duty in Iraq. Morale is low.
The Kurds have remained staunch supporters of the Bush administration's policies because it has promised them that the country will become a federation in which the Kurds will be granted considerable autonomy. But the 80-85 per cent majority Arab population opposes federation and is deeply suspicious of the motives of the Kurds who battled previous governments for independence. Indeed, young Kurds who gained maturity since the US imposed its “safe haven” on Kurdistan, effectively, cutting its ties with Baghdad, openly declare their support for secession.
The Shiites were prepared to wait for the US to bring democracy to Iraq in the expectation that they, as the majority, will dominate. But the US tilt towards the Shiites prompted Sunnis to join the armed resistance. Meanwhile, Shiite patience is wearing thin. Their demand for democracy is far from being met. The senior Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who opposes occupation but urges his people not to take up arms, has rejected three plans put forward by Bremer for the transfer of “sovereignty” from the occupation regime to an Iraqi body which will draw up a constitution and prepare for elections.
In the past three months, Bremer's credibility with the Shiites has been eroded because he has failed to come up with a proposal for the creation of a legitimate and credible Iraqi governing body to assume control at the end of June. Instead, Bremer has concentrated on deepening the occupation through decrees. He put the Iraqi army under US command, appointed a minister of defence and head of intelligence, reaffirmed legislation governing foreign investment in the country, and issued a law regulating the media.
Due to Sistani's opposition to Bremer's various plans for the handover, it is expected that he will simply transfer sovereignty to the Governing Council after appointing a three-man presidency (of a Shiite, Sunni and Kurd) and a prime minister (Shiite). This will please no one but Bremer. The Iraqis will have to wait until a constitution is drawn up and elections are held for a measure of democracy.
Sistani's carefully calculated political opposition to Bremer's plans for Iraq has been under challenge from more radical figures on the Shiite scene. Although he has urged restraint, a few have set up underground opposition groups and mounted violent operations against occupation forces. Hojatoleslam Moqtada Al Sadr challenged both Sistani and Washington by forming a populist Shiite movement calling for early US withdrawal. As soon as Baghdad fell to the US, Sadr moved into the vast Shiite suburb of Baghdad formerly called “Saddam City” and renamed it “Sadr City”, for his father, the revered Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Al Sadr, who was assassinated by the Baathist government five years ago today. Sadr's followers were also accused of murdering Sayed Abdel Majid Al Khoei, a moderate cleric tied to Sistani and the US who had returned to Iraq from London.
During the summer, Sadr established his “Mahdi Army”, which began as a force of several hundred unarmed men working on uplift projects in Shiite urban slums. But the army grew and took up arms, took over Kufa, neighbourhoods in Najaf and Basra, and challenged Sistani and Bremer. Last week, Bremer shut down Sadr's newspaper, Hawza, on the ground of inciting Iraqis against the occupation regime. His supporters staged a mass demonstration in central Baghdad. Shooting ensued, precipitating a widespread violent backlash against occupation forces. Bremer declared Sadr an outlaw and activated a warrant for his arrest for last year's murder of Khoei. The young cleric suddenly became an Iraqi hero.
Bremer's timing could not have been worse. This week, hundreds of thousands of Shiites make the pilgrimage to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, many of them on foot. Sadr has taken refuge in his office near the mosque in Najaf beside the Shrine of Ali, the adopted son and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad. Any attempt to arrest Sadr, surrounded by well armed militiamen near the mosque, would be seen as an act of war against the entire Shiite community. The US cannot expect the people of Najaf to give up Sadr or assist in his capture. The people of nearby Kufa have been cursed by Shiites for the last 1,400 years of betraying Hussein, Ali's son and the grandson of the Prophet, when he was killed by the forces of the caliph. Iraq's bloody past conspires to confound Bremer who has, belatedly, said that he is in no hurry to detain Sadr.
If Sadr's rebellion continues and gathers momentum, it will divide the Shiites and weaken Sistani's restraining hold on them, gradually eroding the main pillar of the occupation administration and its successor.
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